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THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


PUBLISHED  BY 


JAMES  MACLEHOSE  AND  SONS,  GLASGOW, 
•publishers  to  the  Stnibersity. 

MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  LONDON  AND  NEW  YORK. 
London , . . . Simpkin , Marshall , Hamilton , 
Kent , and  Co.,  Limited. 
Cambridge , . . M acmillan  and  Bowes. 

Edinburgh,  . . Douglas  and  Foulis. 


MDCCCXCIV. 


THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT, 

AS  CONTAINED  IN  EXTRACTS  FROM 
HIS  OWN  WRITINGS. 


SELECTED  AND  TRANSLATED  BY 

JOHN  WATSON,  L L.D., 

PROFESSOR  OF  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  QUEEN’S  COLLEGE, 
KINGSTON,  CANADA,  AUTHOR  OF  “ KANT  AND  HIS  ENGLISH  CRITICS.” 


NEW  EDITION. 


NEW  YORK: 

MACMILLAN  AND  CO. 

1894. 


l:  II y 

)9 3.  2. 

K|(*W 

P 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 

My  reason  for  presenting  to  the  public  these  transla- 
tions from  the  philosophical  writings  of  Kant  will  be  best 
understood  if  I state  how  they  came  to  be  made.  The 
teacher  of  philosophy  soon  finds  that  a very  powerful 
irritant  is  needed  to  awaken  his  pupils  from  their  “ dog- 
matic slumber.”  I do  not  doubt  that  it  is  possible  to 
secure  the  desired  end  by  a systematic  criticism  of  the 
preconceptions  that  stand  in  the  way  of  genuine  philo- 
sophical comprehension.  But  my  experience  is  that  it 
is  almost  impossible,  by  this  method,  to  prevent  the 
average  student  from  accepting  what  he  is  told  without 
mastering  it  and  making  it  his  own.  Thus  he  passes 
from  one  form  of  dogmatism  to  another,  and  with  the 
new  dogmatism  comes  the  great  enemy  of  all  education, 
a conceit  of  knowledge  without  its  reality.  The  study  of 
philosophy  is  of  little  value  if  it  does  not  teach  a man  to 
think  for  himself.  The  process  of  self-education  is 
necessarily  a severe  one,  and,  therefore,  distasteful  to 
the  natural  man.  Yet  any  attempt  to  evade  it  by  some 
“ short  and  easy  method  ” defeats  the  end.  What  is 
required  is  a process  by  which  the  student  who  is  really 
in  earnest  may  pass,  gradually  and  surely,  from  a lower 
to  a higher  plane  of  thought.  The  philosophical  writings 


VI 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


of  Kant,  which  exhibit  in  brief  the  transition  from  the 
old  to  the  new,  I believe  to  be  a potent  instrument  for 
this  end.  But  the  struggle  upwards  must  be  made  by 
the  student  himself.  A man  may  hear,  and  seem  to 
appreciate,  a course  of  lectures  on  the  Critical  philo- 
sophy, containing  a clear,  and  even  a full  statement  of 
it,  and  may  yet  fail  to  enter  into  its  spirit.  To  obviate 
this  danger  as  far  as  possible,  I tried  some  years  ago 
what  could  be  done  by  throwing  the  student  more  upon 
himself.  My  plan  was  to  set  a class  of  more  advanced 
pupils  at  work  upon  extracts  from  the  philosophy  of 
Kant,  to  watch  them  as  they  forced  their  way  through  its 
perplexities,  and  to  put  forth  a helping  hand  only  when 
it  seemed  to  be  needful.  The  experiment  justified 
itself.  No  method  that  I have  tried — and  I have  tried 
several — has  been  so  fruitful  in  results. 

The  limited  edition  of  Extracts,  originally  printed 
for  the  use  of  my  own  students,  but  also  used  in  other 
American  Universities,  is  now  out  of  print.  I have, 
therefore,  gone  carefully  over  the  writings  of  Kant  again, 
selecting  and  re-translating  all  the  passages  that  seem 
to  be  essential  to  the  understanding  of  his  philosophy. 
The  Extracts  have  been  taken  from  four  treatises— the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason , the  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason , and  the  Critique  of  Judgment. 

In  the  translations  I have  sought  to  express  Kant’s 
meaning  as  clearly  and  simply  as  I could,  and  in  no 
case,  so  far  as  I am  aware,  have  I been  biassed  by  a 
pre-conceived  theory  of  what  he  ought  to  say.  To 
render  Kant  into  intelligible  English  I have  not  found 
an  easy  task,  but  it  has  been  made  much  lighter  for  me 
by  the  labours  of  my  predecessors,  Mr.  Meiklejohn,  Mr. 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


vn 


Max  Muller,  Dr.  Hutchison  Stirling,  Mr.  Mahaffy,  and 
Mr.  Abbott,  to  whom  I beg  to  express  my  obligations. 
My  very  special  thanks  are  also  due  to  Professor  Edward 
Caird,  of  Glasgow  University,  for  his  great  kindness  in 
reading  the  whole  of  the  manuscript,  and  making  a 
number  of  valuable  suggestions. 

The  pages  of  the  first  and  second  editions  of  the 
Kritik  der  remen  Vernunft  are  given  on  the  margin — the 
former  to  the  right,  the  latter  to  the  left.  The  references 
in  other  cases  are  to  the  complete  edition  of  Kant’s 
works  published  by  Hartenstein  in  1867.  The  Index  at 
the  end  of  the  volume,  which  I have  tried  to  make  as 
complete  as  possible,  will,  I hope,  be  found  useful. 

What  I call  the  Preface  to  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
really  consists  of  two  prefaces  thrown  into  one  ; but  the 
extracts  have  been  taken  mainly  from  the  preface  to  the 
second  edition,  though  a few  passages  from  that  to  the 
first  edition  have  been  inserted.  Here,  and  in  one  or 
two  other  places,  I have  made  a slight  change  from  the 
order  of  the  original ; but  the  transpositions  are  few,  and 
are  sufficiently  indicated  by  the  references  on  the  margin. 
As  a rule,  my  editorial  privilege  has  been  exercised  only 
in  the  way  of  omission. 

I am  well  aware  that  objection  may  be  taken  to  the 
whole  principle  of  these  Extracts.  The  work  of  a 
great  author,  it  may  be  said,  should  be  represented  “ all 
in  all,  or  not  at  all.”  The  objection  is  not  without 
force,  but  it  seems  to  me  to  apply  mainly  to  the  selec- 
tion of  disconnected  passages,  and  to  the  mutilation  of  a 
faultless  work  of  art  like  the  Republic  of  Plato.  The 
writings  of  Kant,  which  are  full  of  confusing  repetitions 
that  really  mar  their  perfection  of  form,  hardly  deserve 


via 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


the  same  tenderness  of  treatment.  This  is  a case  in 
which  it  may  be  doubted  if  the  less  does  not  contain  the 
greater  and  even  more.  At  least  it  is  safe  to  say  that 
most  students  are  more  likely  to  turn  to  the  full  text  of 
Kant  after  a study  of  the  more  important  passages  in  his 
works,  than  if  they  had  to  make  their  way  against  greater 
obstacles.  No  doubt  there  are  suggestive  points  which 
the  plan  of  this  work  has  compelled  me  to  omit,  but  I 
have  tried  to  reduce  these  to  a minimum.  I believe  that 
what  is  here  given  contains  all  the  main  ideas  of  Kant  in 
their  systematic  connection.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  how- 
ever, that  the  student  who  has  mastered  these  Extracts 
will  not  be  satisfied  until  he  has  read  all  that  Kant  has  to 
say. 


University  of  Queen’s  College, 
Kingston,  Canada, 

May,  1888. 


CONTENTS. 


Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

PAGE 

Preface,  ..........  i 

Introduction,  ^ 

Transcendental  .Esthetic,  22 

Section  I. — Space,  .......  23 

Section  II. — Time,  .......  29 

General  Remarks,  .......  36 

Transcendental  Logic,  .......  40 

Transcendental  Analytic,  ......  46 

Book  I. — Conceptions,  .....  46 

Chapter  I. — Guiding-thread  for  Discovery  of 

Categories,  ....  46 

Chapter  II. — Deduction  of  Categories,  . . 53 

Book  II. — Judgments,.  .....  83 

Chapter  I. — Schematism  of  Categories,  . . 84 

Chapter  II. — Principles  of  Pure  Understanding,  92 

1.  Axioms  of  Perception,  ...  92 

2.  Anticipations  of  Observation,  . . 96 

3.  Analogies  of  Experience,  . . . 101 

A.  Substance,  . . . . 106 

B.  Causality,  . . . . . no 

C.  Community,  . . . . 118 

4.  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought,  . 122 

General  Remark,  . . . . . 126 

Chapter  III. — Phenomena  and  Noumena,  . 129 

Transcendental  Dialectic, 135 

Book  I. — Ideas, 140 

Book  II. — Dialectical  Conclusions,  . . . 143 

Chapter  I.- — Paralogisms,  ....  145 

Chapter  II. — Antinomies,  . . . . 155 


X 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Chapter  III.— The  Ideal,  . . . . 195 

Ontological  Proof,  .....  204 

Cosmological  Proof,  . . . . 210 

Physico-theological  Proof,  . . . 218 

Metaphysic  of  Morality. 

Section  I. — Transition  from  Ordinary  Moral  Conceptions  to 

the  Philosophical  Conception  of  Morality,  . . . 225 

Section  II. — -Transition  from  Popular  Moral  Philosophy  to 

the  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  .....  232 

Section  III. — Transition  from  the  Metaphysic  of  Morality 

to  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  ....  250 

Critique  of  Practical  Reason. 

Book  I. — Analytic,  ......  261 

Chapter  I. — Principles,  ....  261 

Chapter  II. — Object,  .....  2S0 

Chapter  III. — Motives,  ....  284 

Book  II. — Dialectic,  ......  289 

Chapter  I.  — General  Consideration,  . . 289 

Chapter  II. — The  Summum  Bonum,  . . 291 

1.  Antinomy,  .....  292 

2.  Critical  Solution  of  Antinomy,  . . 293 

4.  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  . . . 294 

5.  Existence  of  God,  ....  296 

6.  Postulates,  .....  298 

7.  Extension  of  Practical  Reason,  . . 300 

8.  Faith,  ......  302 

Critique  of  Judgment. 

Introduction,  .........  307 

Critique  of  Teleological  Judgment,  .....  323 

Section  I. — Analytic,  .......  323 

Section  II. — Dialectic,  . . . . , . 331 

Appendix  on  Method,  ......  343 

Index 351 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 

PREFACE. 

This  may  well  be  called  the  age  of  criticism,  a criti-  vj[  n 
cism  from  which  nothing  need  hope  to  escape.  When 
religion  seeks  to  shelter  itself  behind  its  sanctity,  and  law 
behind  its  majesty,  they  justly  awaken  suspicion  against 
themselves,  and  lose  all  claim  to  the  sincere  respect  which 
reason  yields  only  to  that  which  has  been  able  to  bear 
the  test  of  its  free  and  open  scrutiny. 

Metaphysic  has  been  the  battlefield  of  endless  ii 
conflicts.  Dogmatism  at  first  held  despotic  sway ; but  Hi 
. . . from  time  to  time  scepticism  destroyed  all  settled 
forms  of  government ; . . . and  now  a widespread  iv 

iv  indifferentism  prevails.  Never  has  metaphysic  been  so 
fortunate  as  to  strike  into  the  sure  path  of  science,  but 
has  kept  groping  about,  and  groping,  too,  among  mere 
cv  ideas.  What  can  be  the  reason  of  this  failure  ? Is  a 
science  of  metaphysic  impossible  ? Then,  why  should 
nature  disquiet  us  with  a restless  longing  after  it,  as  if  it 
were  one  of  our  most  important  concerns  ? Nay  more, 
how  can  we  put  any  faith  in  human  reason,  if  in  one  of 
the  very  things  that  we  most  desire  to  know,  it  not  merely 

A 


2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


forsakes  us,  but  lures  us  on  by  false  hopes  only  to  cheat 
us  in  the  end  ? Or  are  there  any  indications  that  the 
true  path  has  hitherto  been  missed,  and  that  by  starting 
afresh  we  may  yet  succeed  where  others  have  failed? 
xvi  It  seems  to  me  that  the  intellectual  revolution,  by 
which  at  a bound  mathematics  and  physics  became  what 
they  now  are,  is  so  remarkable,  that  we  are  called  upon 
to  ask  what  was  the  essential  feature  of  the  change  that 
proved  so  advantageous  to  them,  and  to  try  at  least  to 
apply  to  metaphysic  as  far  as  possible  a method  that  has 

xi  been  successful  in  other  sciences  of  reason.  In  mathe- 
matics I believe  that,  after  a long  period  of  groping,  the 
true  path  was  disclosed  in  the  happy  inspiration  of  a single 
man.  If  that  man  was  Thales,  things  must  suddenly 

xii  have  appeared  to  him  in  a new  light,  the  moment 
he  saw  how  the  properties  of  the  isosceles  triangle  could 
be  demonstrated.  The  true  method,  as  he  found,  was 
not  to  inspect  the  visible  figure  of  the  triangle,  or  to 
analyze  the  bare  conception  of  it,  and  from  this,  as  it 
were,  to  read  off  its  properties,  but  to  bring  out  what  was 
necessarily  implied  in  the  conception  that  he  had  himself 
formed  a priori,  and  put  into  the  figure,  in  the  construc- 
tion by  which  he  presented  it  to  himself. 

Physics  took  a much  longer  time  than  mathematics  to 
enter  on  the  highway  of  science,  but  here,  too,  a sudden 
revolution  in  the  way  of  looking  at  things  took  place. 
When  Galileo  caused  balls  which  he  had  carefully  weighed 
to  roll  down  an  inclined  plane,  or  Torricelli  made  the  air 
bear  up  a weight  which  he  knew  beforehand  to  be  equal 
xiii  to  a standard  column  of  water,  a new  light  broke  on 
the  mind  of  the  scientific  discoverer.  It  was  seen  that 
reason  has  insight  only  into  that  which  it  produces  after  a 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  3 

plan  of  its  own,  and  that  it  must  itself  lead  the  way 
with  principles  of  judgment  based  upon  fixed  laws,  and 
force  nature  to  answer  its  questions.  Even  experimental 
physics,  therefore,  owes  the  beneficial  revolution  in 
qV  its  point  of  view  entirely  to  the  idea,  that,  while  reason 
can  know  nothing  purely  of  itself,  yet  that  which  it  has 
itself  put  into  nature  must  be  its  guide  to  the  discovery 
of  all  that  it  can  learn  from  nature. 

;vi  In  metaphysical  speculations  it  has  always  been 
assumed  that  all  our  knowledge  must  conform  to  objects  ; 
but  every  attempt  from  this  point  of  view  to  extend  our 
knowledge  of  objects  a priori  by  means  of  conceptions 
has  ended  in  failure.  The  time  has  now  come  to  ask, 
whether  better  progress  may  not  be  made  by  supposing 
that  objects  must  conform  to  our  knowledge.  Plainly 
this  would  better  agree  with  the  avowed  aim  of  meta- 
physic, to  determine  the  nature  of  objects  a priori,  or 
before  they  are  actually  presented.  Our  suggestion  is 
similar  to  that  of  Copernicus  in  astronomy,  who,  finding 
it  impossible  to  explain  the  movements  of  the  heavenly 
bodies  on  the  supposition  that  they  turned  round  the 
spectator,  tried  whether  he  might  not  succeed  better  by 
supposing  the  spectator  to  revolve  and  the  stars  to  re- 
vii  main  at  rest.  Let  us  make  a similar  experiment  in 
metaphysic  with  perception.  If  it  were  really  necessary  for 
our  perception  to  conform  to  the  nature  of  objects,  I do 
not  see  how  we  could  know  anything  of  it  a priori ; but 
if  the  sensible  object  must  conform  to  the  constitution  of 
our  faculty  of  perception,  I see  no  difficulty  in  the  matter. 
Perception,  however,  can  become  knowledge  only  if  it 
■ is  related  in  some  way  to  the  object  which  it  determines. 
Now  here  again  I may  suppose,  either  that  the  conceptions 


4 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


through  which  I effect  that  determination  conform  to 
objects,  or  that  objects,  in  other  words  the  experience  in 
which  alone  objects  are  known,  conform  to  conceptions. 
In  the  former  case,  I fall  into  the  same  perplexity  as 
before,  and  fail  to  explain  how  such  conceptions  can  be 
known  a p7-iori.  In  the  latter  case,  the  outlook  is  more 
hopeful.  For,  experience  is  itself  a mode  of  knowledge 
which  implies  intelligence,  and  intelligence  has  a rule  of 
its  own,  which  must  be  an  a priori  condition  of  all 
knowledge  oi  objects  presented  to  it.  To  this  rule,  as 
xviii  expressed  in  a priori  conceptions,  all  objects  of 
experience  must  necessarily  conform,  and  with  it  they 
must  agree. 

Our  experiment  succeeds  as  well  as  we  could  wish,  and 

xix  gives  promise  that  metaphysic  may  enter  upon  the  sure 
course  of  a science,  at  least  in  its  first  part,  where  it  is 
occupied  with  those  a priori  conceptions  to  which  the 
corresponding  objects  can  be  given.  The  new  point  of 
view  enables  us  to  explain  how  there  can  be  a priori 
knowledge,  and  what  is  more,  to  furnish  satisfactory 
proofs  of  the  laws  that  lie  at  the  basis  of  nature  as  a 
totality  of  objects  of  experience.  But  the  consequences 
that  flow  from  this  deduction  of  our  faculty  of  a priori 
knowledge,  which  constitutes  the  first  part  of  our  inquiry, 
are  unexpected,  and  on  a superficial  view  seem  to  be 
fatal  to  the  aims  of  metaphysic,  with  which  we  have  to 
deal  in  the  second  part  of  it.  For  we  are  brought  to  the 
conclusion  that  we  never  can  transcend  the  limits  of 
possible  experience,  and  therefore  never  can  realize  the 
object  with  which  metaphysic  is  primarily  concerned. 

xx  In  truth,  however,  no  better  indirect  proof  could  be  given 
that  we  were  correct  in  holding,  as  the  result  of  our 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  5 

first  estimate  of  the  a prioid  knowledge  of  reason,  that 
such  knowledge  relates  not  at  all  to  the  thing  as  it  exists 
in  itself,  but  only  to  phenomena.  For  that  which 
necessarily  forces  us  to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  experience 
and  of  all  phenomena  is  the  unconditioned , which  reason 
demands  of  things  in  themselves,  and  by  right  and 
necessity  seeks  in  the  complete  series  of  conditions  for 
everything  conditioned.  If,  then,  we  find  that  we  cannot 
think  the  unconditioned  without  contradiction,  on  the 
supposition  of  our  experience  conforming  to  objects  as 
things  in  themselves  ; while,  on  the  contrary,  the  contra- 
diction disappears,  on  the  supposition  that  our  knowledge 
does  not  conform  to  things  in  themselves,  but  that  objects 
as  they  are  given  to  us  as  phenomena  conform  to  our 
knowledge ; we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  what  we  at 
txi  first  assumed  as  an  hypothesis  is  now  established  as  a 
truth. 

It  may  seem  from  this  that  the  result  of  our  critical 
investigation  is  purely  negative,  and  merely  warns  us  not 
to  venture  with  speculative  reason  beyond  the  limits  of 
experience.  And  no  doubt  this  is  its  first  use;  but  a 
positive  result  is  obtained  when  it  is  seen  that  the  prin- 
ciples with  which  speculative  reason  ventures  beyond  its 
proper  limits,  in  reality  do  not  extend  the  province  of 
reason,  but  inevitably  narrow  it.  For  in  seeking  to  go 
-,xv  altogether  beyond  its  true  limits,  the  limits  of  sensibility, 

- those  principles  threaten  to  supplant  pure  reason  in  its 
vii  practical  aspect.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  necessary 
distinction  which  our  criticism  shows  to  exist  between 
things  as  objects  of  experience  and  the  same  things  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  had  not  been  made.  Then 
the  principle  of  causality,  and  with  it  the  mechanical 


6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


conception  of  nature  as  determined  by  it,  would  apply  to 
all  things  in  general  as  efficient  causes.  Hence  I could 
not,  without  palpable  contradiction,  say  of  the  same  being, 
for  instance  the  human  soul,  that  its  will  is  free,  and  yet 
is  subject  to  the  necessity  of  nature,  that  is,  is  not  free. 
But,  if  our  criticism  is  sound  and  the  object  may  be 
taken  in  two  distinct  senses,  on  the  one  hand  as  a 
phenomenon,  and  on  the  other  hand  as  a thing  in  itself ; 
xxviii  there  is  no  contradiction  in  supposing  that  the  very  same 
will,  in  its  visible  acts  as  a phenomenon,  is  not  free , but 
necessarily  subject  to  the  law  of  nature,  while  yet,  as 
belonging  to  a thing  in  itself,  it  is  not  subjectto  that  law,  but 
xxix  is  free.  Now,  morality  requires  us  only  to  be  able  to  think 
freedom  without  self-contradiction,  not  to  understand  it ; 
it  is  enough  that  our  conception  of  the  act  as  free  puts  no 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  conception  of  it  as  mechanically 
necessary,  for  the  act  stands  in  quite  a different  relation 
to  freedom  from  that  in  which  it  stands  to  the  mechanism 
of  nature.  From  the  critical  point  of  view,  therefore, 
the  doctrine  of  morality  and  the  doctrine  of  nature  may 
each  be  true  in  its  own  sphere  ; which  could  never  have 
been  shown  had  not  criticism  previously  established  our 
unavoidable  ignorance  of  things  in  themselves,  and 

xxx  limited  all  that  we  can  know  to  mere  phenomena.  I 
have,  therefore,  found  it  necessary  to  deny  knowledge  of 
God, , freedom , and  immortality , in  order  to  find  a place 
for  faith. 

It  is  dogmatism,  or  the  preconception  that  progress  in 
metaphysic  may  be  made  without  a previous  criticism  of 
pure  reason,  that  is  responsible  for  that  dogmatic  unbelief 

xxxi  which  is  so  hostile  to  morality.  The  first  and  most 
important  task  of  philosophy  is  to  deprive  metaphysic 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 


7 


once  for  all  of  its  pernicious  influence  by  closing  up  the 
xv  sources  of  its  errors.  Our  critique  is  not  opposed  to  the 
dogmatic  procedure  of  reason  as  a science  of  pure  know- 
ledge, but  only  to  dogmatism,  that  is,  to  the  presumption 
that  we  may  follow  the  time-honoured  method  of  con- 
structing a system  of  pure  metaphysic  out  of  principles 
that  rest  upon  mere  conceptions,  without  first  asking  in 
what  way  reason  has  come  into  possession  of  them,  and 
by  what  right  it  employs  them.  Dogmatism,  in  a word, 
is  the  dogmatic  procedure  of  reason  without  any  previous 
criticism  of  its  own  powers. 

The  critique  of  pure  reason  is  not  a criticism  of  books  vi 
and  systems,  but  of  the  faculty  of  reason  in  general,  in  so 
far  as  reason  seeks  for  knowledge  that  is  independent 
of  all  experience.  I have  evaded  none  of  its  questions, 
on  the  plea  of  the  imbecility  of  human  reason.  In  fact,  vii 
reason  is  so  perfect  a unity  that,  if  it  were  in  principle 
inadequate  to  the  solution  of  even  a single  one  of  the 
questions  which  by  its  very  nature  it  raises,  we  might  at 
once  with  perfect  certainty  set  it  aside  as  incapable  of 
idi  answering  any  of  the  others.  For  as  it  is  a true  organic 
unity,  in  which  the  whole  exists  for  the  sake  of  each  of 
the  parts,  and  each  part  for  the  sake  of  the  whole, 
iii  the  slightest  imperfection,  whether  it  is  due  to  a flaw 
or  to  a defect,  will  inevitably  betray  itself  in  use. 


INTRODUCTION. 

i.  Distinction  of  Pure  and  Empirical  Knowledge. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  all  our  knowledge 
begins  with  experience.  By  what  means  should  the 


8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


faculty  of  knowledge  be  aroused  to  activity  but  by 
objects,  which,  acting  upon  our  senses,  partly  of  them- 
selves produce  ideas  in  us,  and  partly  set  our  understand- 
ing at  work  to  compare  these  ideas  with  one  another, 
and,  by  combining  or  separating  them,  to  convert  the 
raw  material  of  our  sensible  impressions  into  that  know- 
ledge of  objects  which  is  called  experience?  In  the 
order  of  time,  therefore,  we  have  no  knowledge  prior  to 
experience,  and  with  experience  all  our  knowledge 
begins. 

But,  although  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience, 
it  by  no  means  follows  that  it  all  originates  from  experi- 
ence. For  it  may  well  be  that  experience  is  itself  made 
up  of  two  elements,  one  received  through  impressions  ot 
sense,  and  the  other  supplied  from  itself  by  our  faculty 
of  knowledge  on  occasion  of  those  impressions.  If  that 
2 be  so,  it  may  take  long  practice  before  our  attention  is 
drawn  to  the  element  added  by  the  mind,  and  we  learn 
to  distinguish  and  separate  it  from  the  material  to  which 
it  is  applied. 

It  is,  therefore,  a question  which  cannot  be  lightly  put 
aside,  but  can  be  answered  only  after  careful  investiga- 
tion, whether  there  is  any  knowledge  that  is  independent 
of  experience,  and  even  of  all  impressions  of  sense. 
Such  knowledge  is  said  to  be  a priori , to  distinguish  it 
from  empirical  knowledge,  which  has  its  sources  a 
posteriori,  or  in  experience. 

The  term  a priori  must,  however,  be  defined  more 
precisely,  in  order  that  the  full  meaning  of  our  question 
may  be  understood.  We  say  of  a man  who  undermines 
the  foundations  of  his  house,  that  he  might  have  known 
a priori  that  it  would  fall ; by  which  we  mean,  that  he 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  9 

might  have  known  it  would  fall,  without  waiting  for  the 
event  to  take  place  in  his  experience.  But  he  could 
not  know  it  completely  a priori ; for  it  is  only  from  ex- 
perience that  he  could  learn  that  bodies  are  heavy,  and 
must  fall  by  their  own  weight  when  there  is  nothing  to 
support  them. 

3 By  a priori  knowledge  we  shall,  therefore,  in  what 
follows  understand,  not  such  knowledge  as  is  inde- 
pendent of  this  or  that  experience,  but  such  as  is 
absolutely  independent  of  all  experience.  Opposed  to 
it  is  empirical  knowledge,  or  that  which  is  possible 
only  a posteriori , that  is,  by  experience.  A p7'iori 
knowledge  is  pure , when  it  is  unmixed  with  anything 
empirical.  The  proposition,  for  instance,  that  every 
change  has  its  cause  is  a priori,  but  it  is  not  pure, 
because  change  is  an  idea  that  can  be  derived  only 
from  experience. 

2.  Science  and  Common  Sense  contain  a priori 
Knowledge. 

Evidently  what  we  need  is  a criterion  by  which  to 
distinguish  with  certainty  between  pure  and  empirical 
knowledge.  Now,  experience  can  tell  us  that  a thing 
is  so  and  so,  but  not  that  it  cannot  be  otherwise. 
Firstly,  then,  if  we  find  a proposition  that,  in  being 
thought,  is  thought  as  necessary,  it  is  an  a priori 
judgment ; and  if,  further,  it  is  derived  only  from  one 
which  is  itself  necessary,  it  is  absolutely  a priori. 
Secondly,  experience  never  bestows  on  its  judgments 
true  or  strict  universality,  but  only  the  assumed  or 
comparative  universality  of  induction  ; so  that,  properly 

4 speaking,  it  merely  says,  that  so  far  as  our  observation 


io 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


has  gone,  there  is  no  exception  to  this  or  that  rule. 
If,  therefore,  a judgment  is  thought  with  strict  univer- 
sality, so  that  there  can  be  no  possible  exception  to 
it,  it  is  not  derived  from  experience,  but  is  absolutely 
a priori.  Necessity  and  strict  universality  are,  there- 
fore, sure  criteria  of  a priori  knowledge,  and  are 
also  inseparably  connected  with  each  other. 

Now,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  in  human  knowledge  there 
actually  are  judgments,  that  in  the  strictest  sense  are 
universal,  and  therefore  pure  a priori.  If  an  example 
from  the  sciences  is  desired,  we  have  but  to  think  of  any 
5 proposition  in  mathematics ; if  an  instance  from  common 
sense  is  preferred,  it  is  enough  to  cite  the  proposition, 
that  every  change  must  have  a cause.  To  take  the 
latter  case,  the  very  idea  of  cause  so  manifestly  implies 
the  idea  of  necessary  connection  with  an  effect,  that  it 
would  be  completely  lost,  were  we  to  derive  it,  with 
Hume,  from  the  repeated  association  of  one  event  with 
another  that  precedes  it,  and  were  we  to  reduce  it  to  the 
subjective  necessity  arising  from  the  habit  of  passing 
from  one  idea  to  another.  Even  without  appealing  to 
such  examples  to  show  that  as  a matter  of  fact  there  are 
in  our  knowledge  pure  a priori  principles,  we  might  prove 
a priori  that  without  such  principles  there  could  be  no 
experience  whatever.  For,  whence  could  experience 
derive  the  certainty  it  has,  if  all  the  rules  that  it  follows 
were  merely  empirical  and  therefore  contingent  ? Surely 
such  rules  couid  not  be  dignified  with  the  name  of  first 
principles. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  1 1 

3.  A Science  is  needed  to  determine  a priori  the  possi- 
bility, the  principles , and  the  extent  of  all  Knowledge. 

A far  more  important  consideration  remains  than  any- 
thing that  has  yet  been  stated.  There  is  a sort  of  3 
knowledge  that  even  quits  the  field  of  all  possible  experi- 
ence, and  claims  to  extend  the  range  of  our  judgments 
beyond  its  limits,  by  means  of  conceptions  to  which  no 
corresponding  object  can  be  presented  in  experience. 
Now,  it  is  just  in  the  province  of  this  sort  of  knowledge, 
where  experience  can  neither  show  us  the  true  path  nor 
put  us  right  when  we  go  astray,  that  reason  carries  on 
7 those  high  investigations,  the  results  of  which  we  regard 
as  more  important  than  all  that  understanding  can  dis- 
cover within  the  domain  of  phenomena.  Nay,  we  are 
even  willing  to  stake  our  all,  and  to  run  the  risk  of  being 
completely  deluded,  rather  than  consent  to  forego  in- 
quiries of  such  moment,  either  from  uncertainty  or  from 
carelessness  and  indifference.  These  unavoidable  pro- 
blems, set  by  pure  reason  itself,  are  God , freedom , and 
immortality , and  the  science  which  brings  all  its  resources 
to  bear  on  the  one  single  task  of  solving  them  is 
metaphysic. 

Now,  one  might  think  that  men  would  hesitate  to  leave 
the  solid  ground  of  experience,  and  to  build  an  edifice  of 
truth  upon  knowledge  that  has  come  to  them  they  know 
not  how,  and  in  blind  dependence  upon  principles  of 
which  they  cannot  tell  the  origin,  without  taking  the 
greatest  pains  to  see  that  the  foundation  was  secure.  One 
might  think  it  only  natural,  that  they  would  long  ago 
have  raised  the  question,  how  we  have  come  into 
possession  of  all  this  a priori  knowledge,  and  what  may 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


I 2 

S be  its  extent,  its  import  and  its  value.  But  the  fact  is,  4 
that  a part  of  this  knowledge — mathematical  knowledge, 
for  instance — has  so  long  been  established  as  certain, 
that  we  are  less  ready  to  suspect  the  evidence  for  other 
parts,  although  these  may  be  of  a totally  different  nature. 
Besides,  when  we  are  once  outside  the  circle  of  experi- 
ence, we  are  sure  not  to  be  contradicted  by  experience  ; 
and  so  strong  is  the  impulse  to  enlarge  our  knowledge, 
that  nothing  short  of  a clear  contradiction  will  avail  to 
arrest  our  footsteps.  Now,  such  contradiction  may  easily 
be  avoided,  even  where  we  are  dealing  with  objects  that 
are  merely  imaginary,  if  we  are  only  careful  in  putting 
our  fictions  together.  Mathematics  shows  us  by  a 
splendid  instance,  how  far  a science  may  advance  a priori 
without  the  aid  of  experience.  It  is  true  that  by  it 
objects  and  conceptions  are  considered  only  in  so  far  as 
they  can  be  presented  in  perception ; but  it  is  easy  to 
overlook  the  limitation,  because  the  perception  in  this 
case  can  itself  be  given  a priori , and  is  therefore  hard  to 
distinguish  from  a mere  idea.  Deceived  by  this  proof  of  5 
the  power  of  reason,  we  can  see  no  limits  to  the  extension 

9 of  knowledge.  So  Plato  forsook  the  world  of  sense, 
chafing  at  the  narrow  limits  it  set  to  our  knowledge,  and, 
on  the  wings  of  pure  ideas,  launched  out  into  the  empty 
space  of  the  pure  understanding.  He  did  not  see  that 
with  all  his  efforts  he  was  making  no  real  progress.  But 
it  is  no  unusual  thing  for  human  reason  to  complete  its 
speculative  edifice  in  such  haste,  that  it  forgets  to  look 
to  the  stability  of  the  foundation.  The  reason  why  we 
have  no  fear  or  anxiety  while  the  work  of  construction  is 
going  on,  but  take  it  for  granted  that  the  foundation 
stands  firm,  is,  that  much  of  the  work  of  reason,  perhaps 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  1 3 

the  greater  part,  consists  in  the  analysis  of  conceptions 
I0  which  we  already  possess.  This  analysis  really  gives  us  6 
a kind  of  a priori  knowledge  that  is  safe  and  useful. 
But,  misled  by  this  success,  reason  interpolates  proposi- 
tions of  quite  a different  character,  which  but  superficially 
resemble  the  others.  I shall  therefore  at  the  very  outset 
point  out  the  distinction  between  these  two  kinds  of 
knowledge. 

4.  The  distinction  between  Analytic  and  Synthetic 
Judgments. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  the  predicate  of  an  affirm- 
ative judgment  may  be  related  to  the  subject.  Either 
the  predicate  B is  already  tacitly  contained  in  the  subject 
A,  or  B lies  entirely  outside  of  A,  although  it  is  in  some 
way  connected  with  it.  In  the  one  case  I call  the  judg- 
j j rnent  analytic , in  the  other  case  synthetic.  Analytic  j 
judgments  are  those  in  which  the  predicate  is  related  to 
the  subject  in  the  way  of  identity,  while  in  synthetic 
judgments  the  predicate  is  not  thought  as  identical  with 
the  subject.  The  former  class  might  also  be  called 
explicative , because  the  predicate  adds  nothing  to  the 
subject,  but  merely  breaks  it  up  into  its  logical  elements, 
and  brings  to  clear  consciousness  what  was  already 
obscurely  thought  in  it.  The  latter  class  we  may  call 
ampliative , as  adding  in  the  predicate  something  that  was 
in  no  sense  thought  in  the  subject,  and  that  no  amount 
of  analysis  could  possibly  extract  from  it.  “ Body  is 
extended,”  for  instance,  is  an  analytic  judgment.  For, 
to  be  conscious  that  extension  is  involved  in  the  con- 
ception signified  by  the  term  body,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
go  outside  that  conception,  but  merely  to  analyze  it  into- 


14 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


the  various  logical  elements  that  are  always  thought  in 
it.  But  in  the  proposition  “ Body  has  weight,”  the  predi- 
cate is  not  implied  in  the  very  conception  of  body,  but 
is  a perfectly  new  idea.  The  addition  of  such  a predicate, 
therefore,  yields  a synthetic  judgment. 

Judgments  of  experience  are  all  by  their  very  nature 
synthetic.  To  say  that  I must  have  recourse  to  exper- 
ience for  an  analytic  judgment  is  absurd,  because  I can 
frame  the  judgment  without  going  beyond  the  conception 

2 I already  possess.  I have,  for  instance,  the  conception 
of  body,  and  by  mere  analysis  I become  aware  of  the 
attributes  extension,  impenetrability,  figure,  etc.,  which 
the  thought  of  it  involves.  To  enlarge  my  conception, 
I turn  again  to  experience,  from  wfirich  the  conception 
was  originally  derived,  and,  finding  weight  to  be  invari- 
ably connected  with  those  attributes,  I attach  it  to  them 
by  synthesis  as  a new  attribute.  The  possibility  of  this 
synthesis  of  the  attribute  weight  with  the  conception  body 
therefore  rests  upon  experience.  The  two  ideas  are 
quite  distinct,  but  they  yet  are  parts  of  the  same  experi- 
ence, and  experience  is  itself  a whole  in  which 
a number  of  perceptions  are  synthetically  though  only 
contingently  combined. 

In  a priori  synthetic  judgments,  on  the  other  hand,  I 

3 can  get  no  aid  whatever  from  experience.  But,  if  it  is 
here  vain  to  look  to  experience  for  aid,  on  what  other 
support  am  I to  rely,  when  I seek  to  go  beyond  a certain 
conception  A,  and  to  connect  B synthetically  with  it? 
Take  the  proposition,  that  every  event  must  have  its 
cause.  No  doubt  I cannot  have  the  conception  of  an 
event  without  thinking  of  something  as  having  a moment 
of  time  before  it,  and  from  this  certain  analytic  judg- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  1 5 

men  ts  may  be  derived.  But  the  conception  of  a cause 
lies  entirely  outside  the  conception  of  an  event,  and 
introduces  an  idea  not  contained  in  it.  By  what  right, 
then,  do  I pass  from  the  conception  of  an  event  to  the 
totally  different  conception  of  a cause  ? How  do  I 
know  that  there  is  a necessary  connection  between  the 
two  conceptions,  when  I can  perfectly  well  think  the  one 
without  the  other  ? AVhat  is  here  the  unknown  x,  which 
gives  support  to  the  understanding,  when  it  seems  to  have 
discovered  an  entirely  new  predicate  B to  belong  neces- 
sarily to  the  subject  A?  Experience  it  cannot  be, 
because  the  principle  has  a degree  of  universality  that 
experience  can  never  supply,  as  it  is  supposed  to  connect 
the  new  conception  with  the  old  in  the  way  of  necessity, 
and  must  do  so  entirely  a priori , and  on  the  basis  of 
mere  conceptions.  And  yet  our  speculative  a priori 
knowledge  must  rest  upon  such  synthetic  or  ampliative  io 
propositions. 

14  5.  The  principles  of  all  Theoretical  Sciences  of  reason 
are  a priori  Synthetic  Judgments. 

(1)  All  mathematical  judgments,  without  exception, 
are  synthetic.  No  doubt  the  mathematician,  in  his 
demonstrations,  proceeds  on  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, but  it  is  a mistake  to  suppose  that  the  propositions 
on  which  his  demonstrations  rest  can  be  known  to  be 
true  by  that  principle.  The  mistake  arises  from  not 
observing  that,  while  a synthetic  proposition  may  certainly 
be  seen  to  be  true  by  the  principle  of  contradiction,  its 
truth  is  in  that  case  evident,  not  from  itself,  but  only 
because  it  is  seen  to  follow  from  another  proposition  that 
has  been  previously  obtained  by  synthesis. 


i6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


The  first  thing  to  notice  is,  that  no  truly  mathematical 
judgments  are  empirical,  but  always  are  a priori.  They 
carry  necessity  on  their  very  face,  and  therefore  cannot 
15  be  derived  from  experience.  Should  any  one  demur  to 
this,  I am  willing  to  limit  my  assertion  to  the  proposi- 
tions of  pure  mathematics,  which,  as  everybody  will 
admit,  are  not  empirical  judgments,  but  perfectly  pure  a 
priori  knowledge. 

At  first  sight  it  may  seem  that  the  proposition 
7 + 5 = 12  is  purely  analytic,  and  follows,  by  the  principle 
of  contradiction,  from  the  conception  of  a sum  of  7 and 
5.  But,  when  we  look  more  closely  we  see  that  the  con- 
ception of  the  sum  of  7 and  5 is  merely  the  idea  of  the 
union  of  the  two  numbers,  and  in  no  way  enables  us  to 
tell  what  may  be  the  single  number  that  forms  their  sum. 
To  think  that  7 and  5 are  to  be  united  is  not  to  have  the 
conception  1 2,  and  I may  analyze  the  idea  of  the  possible 
sum  as  long  as  I please,  without  finding  the  12  in  it.  To 
get  beyond  the  separate  ideas  of  7 and  5,  I must  call  in 
the  aid  of  perception,  referring  to  my  five  fingers,  or  to 
five  points,  and,  starting  with  the  conception  7,  go  on  to 
add  to  it,  unit  by  unit,  the  5 so  presented  to  me  in 
perception.  The  propositions  of  arithmetic  are  therefore 
all  symhetic.  This  is  even  more  manifest  if  I take  larger 
numbers,  when  it  becomes  at  once  obvious  that  without 
t'he  aid  of  perception  no  mere  analysis  of  my  concep- 
tions, turn  and  twist  them  as  I may,  could  ever  yield  the 
sum. 

Nor  is  any  proposition  of  pure  geometry  analytic. 
That  the  straight  line  between  any  two  points  is  the 
shortest,  is  a synthetic  proposition.  My  idea  of  straight 
is  purely  an  idea  of  quality,  not  of  quantity.  From  no 


THU  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  I 7 

analysis  of  the  conception  of  a straight  line  can  the 
knowledge  that  it  is  the  shortest  be  derived.  Per- 
ception has  to  be  called  in  to  enable  me  to  make  the 
synthesis. 

T7  (2)  The  principles  on  which  physics  rests  are  a priori 
synthetic  judgments.  I shall  content  myself  with  citing 
two  such  judgments  : first,  that  in  all  changes  of  the 
material  world  the  quantity  of  matter  remains  the  same  ; 
and,  secondly,  that  in  the  communication  of  motion, 
18  action  and  reaction  are  always  equal.  Both  propositions, 
it  is  plain,  are  not  only  necessary,  and  therefore  in  their 
origin  a priori,  but  they  are  also  synthetic.  The  con- 
ception of  matter  does  not  include  the  idea  of  perman- 
ence, but  merely  signifies  its  presence  in  the  space 
which  it  occupies.  When,  therefore,  I say  that  matter  is 
permanent  in  quantity,  I add  to  the  conception  of  matter 
an  attribute  which  was  not  at  first  thought  in  it.  Accord- 
ingly, the  proposition  is  not  analytic,  but  at  once  a priori 
and  synthetic ; and  so  with  the  other  propositions  of 
pure  physics. 

(3)  Unsuccessful  as  metaphysic  may  hitherto  have  been 
in  solving  the  unavoidable  problems  set  to  it  by  human 
reason,  its  aim  undoubtedly  is  to  acquire  a priori  syn- 
thetic knowledge.  That  aim  it  certainly  will  never  attain 
by  merely  dissecting  the  conceptions  of  things  which  we 
have  in  our  mind  a priori , and  expressing  them  in 
I analytic  propositions.  For  it  seeks  to  enlarge  our  a 
priori  knowledge,  and  therefore  it  must  try  to  show  that 
there  are  judgments  that  add  to  a conception  something 
not  already  contained  in  it,  even  if  it  should  be  led  to 
venture  into  a region  where  experience  cannot  follow,  as 
for  instance  in  the  proposition  that  the  world  must  have 

B 

i 


i8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


had  an  absolute  beginning.  In  its  aim  at  least  meta- 
physic therefore  consists  entirely  of  'a  priori  synthetic 
propositions. 

9 6.  The  Problem  of  Pure  Reason. 

It  is  of  very  great  advantage,  to  others  as  well  as  to  one- 
self, to  be  able  to  bring  together  various  topics  of 
investigation  in  a single  problem.  Now,  the  true  problem 
of  pure  reason  may  be  put  in  this  way — How  are  a 
priori  synthetic  judgments  possible  ? 
o Should  this  question  be  answered  in  a satisfactory  way, 
we  shall  at  the  same  time  learn  what  part  reason  plays 
in  the  foundation  and  completion  of  those  sciences  which 
contain  a theoretical  a priori  knowledge  of  objects. 
Thus  we  shall  be  able  to  answer  the  questions — How  is 
pure  mathematics  possible  ? How  is  pure  physics  possible  ? 
As  these  sciences  actually  exist,  we  may  fairly  ask  hozc 
they  are  possible ; for  that  they  must  be  possible  is 
r proved  by  the  fact  that  they  exist.  But  as  no  real 
progress  has  as  yet  been  made  in  the  construction  of  a 
system  that  realizes  the  essential  aim  of  metaphysic , it 
cannot  be  said  that  metaphysic  exists,  and  there  is, 
therefore,  reason  to  doubt  whether  it  is  possible 
at  all. 

Yet  in  one  sense  metaphysic  may  certainly  be  said  to 
exist,  namely,  in  the  sense  that  there  is  in  man  a natural 
2 disposition  to  seek  for  this  kind  of  knowledge.  But  as 
all  attempts  to  answer  the  questions  which  human  reason 
is  naturally  impelled  to  ask,  as,  for  instance,  whether  the 
world  had  a beginning,  or  has  existed  from  all  eternity, 
have  always  and  unavoidably  ended  in  self-contradiction  ; 
we  cannot  be  satisfied  with  asserting  the  mere  natural 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON.  1 9 

disposition  to  metaphysical  speculation,  or,  in  other 
words,  with  the  bare  ability  of  pure  reason  to  construct 
some  sort  of  metaphysic.  It  must  be  possible  for  reason 
to  attain  to  certainty  one  way  or  the  other  : we  must  be 
able  to  ascertain  whether  reason  can  know  the  objects  it 
seeks,  or  whether  it  cannot  know  them  ; we  must  find  a 
conclusive  answer  to  the  question  whether  pure  reason  is 
capable  or  incapable  of  determining  the  nature  of  those 
objects,  and  whether,  therefore,  its  domain  may  with 
confidence  be  enlarged  beyond  the  limits  of  experience, 
or  must  be  restricted  within  them.  Accordingly,  the 
third  and  last  question,  which  flows  from  the  general 
problem  of  pure  reason,  may  be  correctly  put  in  this  way  : 
How  is  a science  of  metaphysic  possible  l Thus  a criticism 
of  reason  in  the  end  necessarily  leads  to  science,  whereas 
the  dogmatic  employment  of  reason  without  previous 

23  criticism  can  lead  only  to  groundless  assertions,  to  which 
other  assertions  equally  specious  may  always  be  opposed, 
the  inevitable  result  being  scepticism. 

24  7.  Idea  and  Division  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  we  get  the  idea  of  a unique 
science,  which  may  be  called  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

; 25  It  is  not  a doctrine,  but  a criticism  of  pure  reason,  and  its 
speculative  value  is  entirely  negative,  because  it  does  not 
enlarge  our  knowledge,  but  only  casts  light  upon  the 
nature  of  our  reason  and  enables  us  to  keep  it  free  from 
error.  By  transcendental  knowledge  I mean  all  know- 
ledge that  is  occupied,  not  with  objects,  but  with  the  way 
in  which  a knowledge  of  objects  may  be  gained,  so  far  as 

26  that  is  possible  a priori.  What  we  propose  is  not  a 12 


20 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


doctrine  of  pure  reason,  but  a transcendental  criticism, 
the  purpose  of  which  is  not  to  extend  knowledge,  but  to 
rectify  it,  and  to  supply  a touchstone  of  the  value  of  all 
a priori  knowledge. 

2 7 This  transcendental  criticism  will  afford  a complete  archi-  r3 
tectonic  plan  of  transcendental  philosophy,  as  exhibited 
in  its  principles,  and  will  therefore  give  a perfect  guar- 
antee of  the  completeness  and  stability  of  the  edifice  in 
all  its  parts. 

28  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  therefore  contains  all  14 
that  is  essential  to  the  idea  of  transcendental  philosophy, 
and  if  we  distinguish  it  from  that  philosophy,  the  reason  is 
that  it  does  not  carry  its  analysis  beyond  what  is  required 

in  a complete  estimate  of  a priori  synthetic  knowledge. 

The  main  thing  to  be  kept  in  view  in  the  division  of 
such  a science  is  that  no  ideas  be  allowed  to  enter  that 
are  in  any  way  of  empirical  origin,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  it  consist  only  of  perfectly  pure  a priori  knowledge. 
Hence,  although  the  principles  and  fundamental  concep- 
tions of  morality  are  a priori , they  form  no  part  of  a 15 

29  transcendental  philosophy,  because  they  are  necessarily 
relative  to  the  conceptions  of  pleasure  and  pain,  desire, 
and  inclination,  etc.,  which  in  their  origin  are  empirical. 

In  a systematic  division  of  this  science  we  must  have, 
firstly,  a doctrine  of  the  elements , secondly,  a doctrine  of 
the  method  of  pure  reason.  As  to  the  subdivisions,  it 
seems  enough  to  say  at  present  that  there  are  two  stems 
of  human  knowledge — Sensibility  and  Understanding, 
which  may  perhaps  spring  from  a common  root,  unknown 
to  us,  and  that  by  the  one  objects  are  given,  by  the  other 

30  they  are  thought.  Now,  if  Sensibility  is  found  to  contain 
an  a priori  element,  without  which  objects  could  not  be 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON. 


21 


given  to  us,  an  investigation  into  the  nature  of  that 
element  will  be  one  of  the  tasks  of  transcendental 
philosophy.  The  doctrine  of  this  transcendental  element  16 
of  sensible  perception  will  form  the  first  part  of  the 
science  of  elements,  because  we  must  consider  the 
conditions  under  which  objects  of  human  knowledge  are 
given,  before  we  go  on  to  inquire  into  the  conditions 
under  which  they  are  thought. 


22 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC. 


i. 

34  Sensation  is  the  actual  affection  of  our  sensibility,  or  2o 
capacity  of  receiving  impressions,  by  an  object.  The 
perception  which  refers  itself  to  an  object  through 
sensation,  is  empirical  perception.  The  undetermined 
object  of  such  a perception  is  a phenomenon  (Erscheinung). 

That  element  in  the  phenomenon  which  corresponds 
to  sensation  I call  the  matter , while  that  element  which 
makes  it  possible  that  the  various  determinations  of  the 
phenomenon  should  be  arranged  in  certain  ways  relatively 
to  one  another,  is  its  form.  Now,  sensations  cannot 
possibly  give  order  or  form  to  themselves.  The  matter 
of  a phenomenon  is  given  to  us  entirely  a posteriori , but 
its  form  must  lie  a priori  in  the  mind,  ready  to  be  applied 
to  all  sensations  as  they  arise,  and  hence  it  must  be 
capable  of  being  considered  by  itself  apart  from  sensation. 

This  pure  form  of  sensibility  is  also  called  pure per- 

35  ception.  Thus,  if  from  the  consciousness  of  a body,  I 
separate  all  that  the  understanding  has  thought  into  it,  as 
substance,  force,  divisibility,  etc.,  and  all  that  is  due  to 
sensation,  as  impenetrability,  hardness,  colour,  etc.  ; 2 1 
what  is  left  over  are  extension  and  figure.  These,  therefore, 
belong  to  pure  perception,  which  exists  in  the  mind 

a priori , as  a mere  form  of  sensibility,  even  when  no 
sensation  or  object  of  sense  is  actually  present. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC. 


23 


The  science  of  all  the  a priori  principles  of  sensibility- 
36  I call  Transcendental  A Esthetic , in  contradistinction  from 
the  science  of  the  principles  of  pure  thought,  which  I 
call  Transce7idental  Logic. 

In  Transcendental  ^Esthetic  we  shall  first  of  all  isolate  2 
sensibility,  abstracting  from  all  that  the  understanding 
contributes  through  its  conceptions,  so  that  we  may 
have  nothing  before  us  but  empirical  perception.  In  the 
next  place,  we  shall  separate  from  empirical  perception 
all  that  belongs  to  sensation  ; when  there  will  remain 
only  pure  perception,  or  the  mere  form  of  phenomena, 
the  sole  element  that  sensibility  can  yield  a priori.  If 
this  is  done,  it  will  be  found  that  there  are  two  pure  forms 
of  sensible  perception,  which  constitute  principles  of 
a p7-iori  knowledge,  namely,  Space  and  Time.  With 
these  it  will  now  be  our  business  to  deal. 


37  Section  I. — Space. 

2.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space. 

In  external  sense  we  are  conscious  of  objects  as  out- 
side of  ourselves,  and  as  all  without  exception  in  space. 
In  space  their  shape,  size,  and  relative  position  are 
marked  out,  or  are  capable  of  being  marked  out. 
Inner  sense,  in  w'hich  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves, 
or  rather  of  our  own  state,  gives  us,  it  is  true, 
no  direct  perception  of  the  soul  itself  as  an  object ; but 
it  nevertheless  is  the  one  single  form  in  which  our  own  2 
state  comes  before  us  as  a definite  object  of  perception  ; 
and  hence  all  inner  determinations  appear  to  us  as 
related  to  one  another  in  time.  We  cannot  be  conscious 


24 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


of  time  as  external,  any  more  than  we  can  be  conscious 
of  space  as  something  within  us.  What,  then,  are  space 
and  time?  Are  they  in  themselves  real  things?  Are 
they  only  determinations,  or  perhaps  merely  relations  of 
things,  which  yet  would  belong  to  things  in  themselves 
even  if  those  things  were  not  perceived  by  us  ? Or, 

38  finally,  have  space  and  time  no  meaning  except  as  forms 
of  perception,  belonging  to  the  subjective  constitution  of 
our  own  mind,  apart  from  which  they  cannot  be 
predicated  of  anything  whatever  ? To  answer  these 
questions  I shall  begin  with  a metaphysical  exposition  of 
space.  An  exposition  I call  it,  because  it  gives  a distinct 
although  not  a detailed,  statement  of  what  is  implied  in 
the  idea  of  space ; and  the  exposition  is  metaphysical. , 
because  it  brings  forward  the  reasons  we  have  for 
regarding  space  as  given  a priori. 

(1)  Space  is  not  an  empirical  conception,  which  has 
been  derived  from  external  experiences.  For  I could 
not  be  conscious  that  certain  of  my  sensations  are 
relative  to  something  outside  of  me,  that  is,  to  something 
in  a different  part  of  space  from  that  in  which  I myself 
am  ; nor  could  I be  conscious  of  them  as  outside  of  and 
beside  one  another,  were  I not  at  the  same  time  con- 
scious that  they  not  only  are  different  in  content,  but  are 
in  different  places.  The  consciousness  of  space  is, 
therefore,  necessarily  presupposed  in  external  perception. 

No  experience  of  the  external  relations  of  sensible  things 
could  yield  the  idea  of  space,  because  without  the 
consciousness  of  space  there  would  be  no  external 
experience  whatever. 

(2)  Space  is  a necessary  a priori  idea,  which  is  pre- 
supposed in  all  external  perceptions.  By  no  effort  can  24 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC. 


25 


39  we  think  space  to  be  away,  although  we  can  quite 
readily  think  of  space  as  empty  of  objects.  Space  we 
therefore  regard  as  a condition  of  the  possibility  of 
phenomena,  and  not  as  a determination  dependent  on 
phenomena.  It  is  thus  a priori , and  is  necessarily  pre- 
supposed in  external  phenomena. 

(3)  Space  is  not  a discursive  or  general  conception  of  2 
the  relations  of  things,  but  a pure  perception.  For  we 
can  be  conscious  only  of  a single  space.  It  is  true  that 
we  speak  as  if  there  were  many  spaces,  but  we  really 
mean  only  parts  of  one  and  the  same  identical  space. 
Nor  can  we  say  that  these  parts  exist  before  the  one 
all-embracing  space,  and  are  put  together  to  form  a whole; 
but  we  can  think  of  them  only  as  in  it.  Space  is  essen- 
tially single  ; by  the  plurality  of  spaces,  we  merely  mean 
that  because  space  can  be  limited  in  many  ways,  the 
general  conception  of  spaces  presupposes  such  limitations 
as  its  foundation.  From  this  it  follows,  that  an  a priori 
perception,  and  not  an  empirical  perception,  underlies  all 
conceptions  of  pure  space.  Accordingly,  no  geometrical 
proposition,  as,  for  instance,  that  any  two  sides  of  a 
triangle  are  greater  than  the  third  side,  can  ever  be 
derived  from  the  general  conceptions  of  line  and  triangle> 
but  only  from  perception.  From  the  perception,  however, 

it  can  be  derived  a priori , and  with  demonstrative 
certainty. 

(4)  Space  is  presented  before  our  consciousness  as 

40  an  infinite  magnitude.  Now,  in  every  conception  we 
certainly  think  of  a certain  attribute  as  common  to  an 
infinite  number  of  possible  objects,  which  are  subsumed 
under  the  conception ; but,  from  its  very  nature,  no 
conception  can  possibly  be  supposed  to  contain  an 


z6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


infinite  number  of  determinations  within  it.  But  it  is 
just  in  this  way  that  space  is  thought  of,  all  its  parts  being 
conceived  to  co-exist  ad  infinitum.  Hence  the  original 
consciousness  of  space  is  an  a priori  perception,  not  a 
conception. 

3.  Transcendental  Exposition  ofi  Space. 

A transcendental  exposition  seeks  to  show  how,  from 
a certain  principle,  the  possibility  of  other  a priori 
synthetic  knowledge  may  be  explained.  To  be  suc- 
cessful, it  must  prove  (x)  that  there  really  are 
synthetic  propositions  which  can  be  derived  from  the 
principle  in  question,  (2)  that  they  can  be  so 
derived  only  if  a certain  explanation  of  that  principle 
is  adopted. 

Now,  geometry  is  a science  that  determines  the 
properties  of  space  synthetically,  and  yet  a priori.  What, 
then,  must  be  the  nature  of  space,  in  order  that  such 
knowledge  of  it  may  be  possible?  Our  original  con- 
sciousness of  it  must  be  perception,  for  no  new  truth, 
such  as  we  have  in  the  propositions  of  geometry,  can  be 
obtained  from  the  mere  analysis  of  a given  conception 
(Introduction,  5).  And  this  perception  must  be  a priori, 
or,  in  other  words,  must  be  found  in  us  before  we  actually 
observe  an  object,  and  hence  it  must  be  pure,  not 
empirical  perception.  For  all  geometrical  propositions, 
as,  for  instance,  that  space  has  but  three  dimensions,  are 
of  demonstrative  certainty,  or  present  themselves  in 
consciousness  as  necessary ; and  such  propositions 
cannot  be  empirical,  nor  can  they  be  derived  from 
judgments  of  experience  (Introduction,  2). 

How,  then,  can  there  be  in  the  mind  an  external 


TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC. 


27 


perception,  which  is  antecedent  to  objects  themselves, 
and  in  which  the  conception  of  those  objects  may  be 
determined  a priori ? Manifestly,  only  if  that  perception 
has  its  seat  in  the  subject,  that  is,  if  it  belongs  to  the 
formal  constitution  of  the  subject,  in  virtue  of  which  it  is 
so  affected  by  objects  as  to  have  a direct  consciousness 
or  perception  of  them  ; therefore,  only  if  perception  is  the 
universal  form  of  outer  sense. 

Our  explanation  is,  therefore,  the  only  one  that  makes 
the  possibility  of  geometry  intelligible,  as  a mode  of 
a priori  synthetic  knowledge.  All  other  explanations  fail 
to  do  so,  and,  although  they  may  have  an  external 
resemblance  to  ours,  may  readily  be  distinguished  from  it 
by  this  criterion. 

Inferences. 

(a)  Space  is  in  no  sense  a property  of  things  in  them- 
selves, nor  is  it  a relation  of  things  in  themselves  to  one 
another.  It  is  not  a determination  that  still  belongs  to 
objects  even  when  abstraction  has  been  made  from  all 
the  subjective  conditions  of  perception.  For  we  never 
could  perceive  a priori  any  determination  of  things, 
whether  belonging  to  them  individually  or  in  relation  to 
one  another,  antecedently  to  our  perception  of  those 
things  themselves. 

( b ) Space  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  all  the  phenomena 
of  outer  sense.  It  is  the  subjective  condition  without 
which  no  external  perception  is  possible  for  us.  The 
receptivity  of  the  subject,  or  its  capability  of  being 
affected  by  objects,  necessarily  exists  before  there  is  any 
perception  of  objects.  Hence  it  is  easy  to  understand, 
how  the  form  of  all  phenomena  may  exist  in  the  mind 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


a priori , antecedently  to  actual  observation,  and  how,  as 
a pure  perception  in  which  all  objects  must  be  determined, 
it  may  contain  the  principles  that  determine  beforehand 
the  relations  of  objects  when  they  are  met  with  in 
experience. 

It  is,  therefore,  purely  from  our  human  point  of  view 
that  we  can  speak  of  space,  of  extended  things,  etc. 
Suppose  the  subjective  conditions  to  be  taken  away, 
without  which  we  cannot  have  any  external  perception, 

43  or  be  affected  by  objects,  and  the  idea  of  space  ceases 
to  have  any  meaning.  We  cannot  predicate  spatial 
dimensions  of  things,  except  in  so  far  as  they  appear  27 
in  our  consciousness.  The  unalterable  form  of  this 
receptivity,  which  we  call  sensibility,  is  a necessary 
condition  of  all  the  relations  in  which  objects  are  per- 
ceived as  outside  of  us,  and  this  form,  when  it  is  viewed 
in  abstraction  from  objects,  is  the  pure  perception  that 
is  known  by  the  name  of  space.  We  are  not  entitled 
to  regard  the  conditions  that  are  proper  to  our  sensibility 
as  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things,  but  only  of  things 
as  they  appear  to  us.  Hence,  while  it  is  correct  to  say, 
that  space  embraces  all  things  that  are  capable  of 
appearing  to  us  as  external,  we  cannot  say,  that  it 
embraces  all  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  no  matter 
what  subject  may  perceive  them,  and,  indeed,  whether 
they  are  perceived  or  not.  For  we  have  no  means  of 
judging  whether  other  thinking  beings  are  in  their 
perceptions  bound  down  by  the  same  conditions  as 
ourselves,  and  which  for  us  hold  universally.  If  we  state 
the  limitations  under  which  a judgment  holds  of  a given 
subject,  the  judgment  is  then  unconditionally  true.  The 
proposition,  that  all  things  are  side  by  side  in  space,  is 


TRANSCENDENTAL  /ESTHETIC. 


29 


true  only  under  the  limitation  that  we  are  speaking  of  our 
own  sensible  perception.  But,  if  we  more  exactly  define 
the  subject  of  the  proposition  by  saying,  that  all  things 
as  external  phenomena  are  side  by  side  in  space,  it  will 
be  true  universally  and  without  any  exception.  Our 
44  exposition,  therefore,  establishes  the  reality,  or  objective 
truth  of  space,  as  a determination  of  every  object  that  can  28 
possibly  come  before  us  as  external ; but,  at  the  same 
time,  it  proves  the  ideality  of  space,  when  space  is  con- 
sidered by  reason  relatively  to  things  in  themselves,  that 
is,  without  regard  to  the  constitution  of  our  sensibility. 
We,  therefore,  affirm  the  empirical  reality  of  space,  as 
regards  all  possible  external  experience ; but  we  also 
maintain  its  transcendental  ideality , or,  in  other  words,  we 
hold  that  space  is  nothing  at  all,  if  its  limitation  to 
possible  experience  is  ignored,  and  it  is  treated  as  a 
necessary  condition  of  things  in  themselves. 


46  Section  II. — Time.  3° 

4.  Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Time. 

(1)  Time  is  not  an  empirical  conception,  which  has 
been  derived  from  any  experience.  For  we  should  not 
observe  things  to  co-exist  or  to  follow  one  another,  did 
we  not  possess  the  idea  of  time  a priori.  It  is,  therefore, 
only  under  the  presupposition  of  time,  that  we  can  be 
conscious  of  certain  things  as  existing  at  the  same  time 
(simultaneously),  or  at  different  times  (successively).  3 1 

(2)  Time  is  a necessary  idea,  which  is  presupposed  in 
all  perceptions.  We  cannot  be  conscious  of  phenomena 
if  time  is  taken  away,  although  we  can  quite  readily 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


suppose  phenomena  to  be  absent  from  time.  Time  is, 
therefore,  given  a priori.  No  phenomenon  can  exist  at  all 
that  is  not  in  time.  While,  therefore,  phenomena  may 
be  supposed  to  vanish  completely  out  of  time,  time  itself, 
as  the  universal  condition  of  their  possibility,  cannot  be 
supposed  away. 

(3)  Time  is  not  a discursive,  or  general  conception, 
but  a pure  form  of  sensible  perception.  Different  times 
are  but  parts  of  the  very  same  time.  Now,  the  conscious- 
ness of  that  which  is  presented  as  one  single  object,  is  32 
perception.  Moreover,  the  proposition,  that  no  two 
moments  of  time  can  co-exist,  cannot  be  derived  from  a 
general  conception.  The  proposition  is  synthetic,  and 
cannot  originate  in  mere  conceptions.  It  therefore  rests 
upon  the  direct  perception  and  idea  of  time. 

(4)  The  infinity  of  time  simply  means,  that  every 
48  definite  quantity  of  time  is  possible  only  as  a limitation  of 

one  single  time.  There  must,  therefore,  be  originally 
a consciousness  of  time  as  unlimited.  Now,  if  an  object 
presents  itself  as  a whole,  so  that  its  parts  and  every 
quantity  of  it  can  be  represented  only  by  limiting  that 
whole,  such  an  object  cannot  be  given  in  conception,  for 
conceptions  contain  only  partial  determinations  of  a 
thing.  A direct  perception  must  therefore  be  the  founda- 
tion of  the  idea  of  time. 

5.  Transcendental  Exposition  of  Time. 

47  Apodictic  principles  which  determine  relations  in  time,  31 
or  axioms  of  time  in  general,  are  possible  only  because 
time  is  the  necessary  a priori  condition  of  all  phenomena. 
Time  has  but  one  dimension ; different  times  do  not 
co-exist  but  follow  one  another,  just  as  different  spaces  do 


TRANSCENDENTAL  AESTHETIC. 


31 


not  follow  one  another  but  co-exist.  Such  propositions 
cannot  be  derived  from  experience,  which  never  yields 
strict  universality  or  demonstrative  certainty.  If  they 
were  based  upon  experience,  we  could  say  only,  that  it 
has  ordinarily  been  observed  to  be  so,  not  that  it  must  be 
so.  Principles  like  these  have  the  force  of  rules,  that 
lay  down  the  conditions  without  which  no  experience 
whatever  is  possible  : they  are  not  learned  from  experi- 
ence, but  anticipate  what  experience  must  be. 

Let  me  add  here  that  change,  including  motion  or 
change  of  place,  is  conceivable  only  in  and  through  the 
idea  of  time.  Were  time  not  an  inner  a priori  percep- 
tion, we  could  not  form  the  least  idea  how  there  should 
be  any  such  thing  as  change.  Take  away  time,  and 
change  combines  in  itself  absolutely  contradictory  predi- 
cates. Motion,  or  change  of  place,  for  instance,  must 
then  be  thought  of  as  at  once  the  existence  and  the 
non-existence  of  one  and  the  same  thing  in  the  same 
' 49  place.  The  contradiction  disappears,  only  when  it  is 
seen  that  the  thing  has  those  opposite  determinations  one 
after  the  other.  Our  conception  of  time  as  an  a priori 
form  of  perception,  therefore  explains  the  possibility  of 
the  whole  body  of  a priori  synthetic  propositions  in 
regard  to  motion  that  are  contained  in  the  pure  part  of 
physics,  and  hence  it  is  not  a little  fruitful  in  results. 

6.  Inferences.  32 

(a)  Time  is  not  an  independent  substance  nor  an 
objective  determination  of  things,  and  hence  it  does  not 
survive  when  abstraction  has  been  made  from  all  the 
subjective  conditions  of  perception.  Were  it  an  indepen- 
dent thing,  it  would  be  real  without  being  a real  object  of 


3 2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


consciousness.  Were  it  a determination  or  order  of  33 
things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  it  could  not  precede  our 
perception  of  those  things  as  its  necessary  condition,  nor 
could  it  be  known  by  means  of  synthetic  judgments. 
But  the  possibility  of  such  judgments  becomes  at 
once  intelligible  if  time  is  nothing  but  the  subjective 
condition,  without  which  we  can  have  no  perception 
whatever.  For  in  that  case  we  may  be  conscious  of  this 
form  of  inner  perception  before  we  are  conscious  of 
objects,  and  therefore  a priori. 

( b ) Time  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  inner  sense,  that  is, 
of  the  perception  of  ourselves  and  our  own  inner  state. 

As  it  has  no  influence  on  the  shape  or  position  of  an 

o object,  time  cannot  be  a determination  of  outer  pheno- 
mena as  such  ; what  it  does  determine  is  the  relation 
of  ideas  in  our  own  inner  state.  And  just  because  this 
inner  perception  has  no  shape  of  its  own.  we  seek  to 
make  up  for  this  want  by  analogies  drawn  from  space. 
Thus,  we  figure  the  series  of  time  as  a line  that  proceeds 
to  infinity,  the  parts  of  which  form  a series ; and  we 
reason  from  the  properties  of  this  line  to  all  the  properties 
of  time,  taking  care  to  allow  for  the  one  point  of  differ- 
ence, that  the  parts  of  the  spatial  line  all  exist  at  once, 
while  the  parts  of  the  temporal  line  all  follow  one  after 
the  other.  Even  from  this  fact  alone,  that  all  the 
relations  of  time  may  thus  be  presented  in  an  external 
perception,  it  would  be  evident  that  time  is  itself  a 
perception. 

(c)  Time  is  the  formal  a priori  condition  of  all  pheno- 
mena without  exception.  Space,  as  the  pure  form  of  all  34 
external  phenomena,  is  the  a priori  condition  only  of 
external  phenomena.  But  all  objects  of  perception, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC. 


33 


external  as  well  as  internal,  are  determinations  of  the 
mind,  and,  from  that  point  of  view,  belong  to  our  inner 
state.  And  as  this  inner  state  comes  under  time,  which 
is  the  formal  condition  of  inner  perception,  time  is  an  a 
pi-iori  condition  of  all  phenomena : it  is  the  immediate 
condition  of  inner  phenomena,  and  so  the  mediate  con- 
dition of  outer  phenomena.  Just  as  I can  say,  a priori , 
that  all  external  phenomena  are  in  space,  and  are  de- 
termined a priori  in  conformity  with  the  relations  of 
space,  so,  from  the  principle  of  the  inner  sense,  I can  say 
quite  generally  that  all  phenomena  are  in  time,  and  stand 
necessarily  in  relations  of  time. 

If  we  abstract  from  the  manner  in  which  we  immedi- 
ately perceive  our  own  inner  state,  and  mediately  all 
external  phenomena,  and  think  of  objects  in  themselves, 
we  find  that  in  relation  to  them  time  is  nothing  at  all. 

It  is  objectively  true  in  relation  to  phenomena,  because 
we  are  conscious  of  phenomena  as  objects  of  our  senses  ; 
but  it  is  no  longer  objective,  if  we  abstract  from  our  35 
sensibility,  and  therefore  from  the  form  proper  to  our 
perceptive  consciousness,  and  speak  of  things  as  such. 
Time  is  therefore  a purely  subjective  condition  of  human 
perception,  and  in  itself,  or  apart  from  the  subject,  it  is 
nothing  at  all.  Nevertheless,  it  is  necessarily  objective 
in  relation  to  all  phenomena,  and  therefore  also  to  every- 
thing that  can  possibly  enter  into  our  experience.  We 
cannot  say  that  all  things  are  in  time,  because  when  we 
speak  of  things  in  this  unqualified  way,  we  are  thinking  of 
things  in  abstraction  from  the  manner  in  which  we  per- 
ceive them,  and  therefore  in  abstraction  from  the  con- 
dition under  which  alone  we  can  say  that  they  are  in 
time.  But,  if  we  qualify  our  assertion  by  adding  that 

c 


34 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


condition,  and  say  that  all  things  as  phenomena,  or 
objects  of  sensible  perception,  are  in  time,  the  proposi- 
tion is,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  objective,  and  is 
universally  true  a priori. 

We  see,  then,  that  time  is  empirically  real,  or  is 
objectively  true  in  relation  to  all  objects  that  are  capable 
of  being  presented  to  our  senses.  And  as  our  perception 
always  is  sensuous,  no  object  can  ever  be  presented  to 
us  in  experience,  which  does  not  conform  to  time  as  its 
condition.  On  the  other  hand,  we  deny  to  time  all  claim 
to  absolute  reality,  because  such  a claim,  in  paying  no  31 
heed  to  the  form  of  sensible  perception,  assumes  time  to 
be  an  absolute  condition  or  property  of  things.  Such 
properties,  as  supposed  to  belong  to  things  in  themselves, 
can  never  be  presented  to  us  in  sense.  From  this  we 
infer  the  transcendental  ideality  of  time  ; by  which  we 
mean  that,  in  abstraction  from  the  subjective  conditions 
of  sensible  perception,  time  is  simply  nothing,  and  cannot 
be  said  either  to  subsist  by  itself,  or  to  inhere  in  things 
that  do  so  subsist. 

7.  Explanatory  Remarks. 

To  this  doctrine,  which  admits  the  empirical  reality  of 
time,  but  denies  its  absolute  or  transcendental  reality, 
there  is  one  objection  so  commonly  made,  that  I must 
suppose  it  to  occur  spontaneously  to  everybody  who  is 
new  to  the  present  line  of  thought.  It  runs  thus  : No 
one  can  doubt  that  there  are  real  changes,  for,  even  if  it  3 
is  denied  that  we  perceive  the  external  world,  together 
with  the  changes  in  it,  we  are  at  least  conscious  of  a 
change  in  our  own  ideas.  Now,  changes  can  take  place 
onlv  in  time.  Therefore  time  is  real. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC. 


35 


There  is  no  difficulty  in  meeting  this  objection.  I 
admit  all  that  is  said.  Certainly  time  is  real  : it  is  the 
real  form  of  inner  perception.  It  has  reality  for  me 
relatively  to  my  inner  experience ; in  other  words,  I 
actually  am  conscious  of  time,  and  of  my  own  determina- 

54  tions  as  in  it.  Time  is  therefore  real,  not  as  an  object 
beyond  consciousness,  but  as  the  manner  in  which  I 
exist  for  myself  as  an  object  of  consciousness.  But,  if  I 
could  be  perceived  by  myself  or  by  any  other  being  without 
the  condition  of  sensibility,  the  very  same  determinations, 
which  now  appear  as  changes,  would  not  be  known  as  in 
time,  and  therefore  would  not  be  known  as  changes. 
The  empirical  reality  of  time  thus  remains,  on  our  theory, 
the  condition  of  all  our  experience.  It  is  only  its 
absolute  reality  that  we  refuse  to  admit.  Time  is  there- 
fore nothing  but  the  form  of  our  inner  perception.  If 
we  take  away  from  it  the  peculiar  condition  of  our 
sensibility,  the  idea  of  time  also  vanishes  ; for  time  does 
not  belong  to  objects  as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  only  38 
to  the  subject  that  perceives  them. 

55  Time  and  space  are  two  sources  of  knowledge  from 
which  a variety  of  a priori  synthetic  judgments  may  be  39 
derived.  Mathematics,  especially,  supplies  a splendid 
instance  of  such  judgments,  in  the  science  of  space  and 

56  the  relations  of  space.  Time  and  space  are  the  two  pure 
forms  of  all  sensible  perception,  and  as  such  they  make 
a priori  synthetic  propositions  possible.  And  just  because 
they  are  mere  conditions  of  sensibility,  they  mark  out 
their  own  limits  as  sources  of  a priori  knowledge. 
Applying  only  to  objects  regarded  as  phenomena,  they 
do  not  present  things  as  they  are  in  themselves.  Beyond 
the  phenomenal  world,  which  is  their  legitimate  domain, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


36 

they  cannot  be  employed  in  determination  of  objects. 
But  this  limitation  in  no  way  lessens  the  stability  of  our 
empirical  knowledge  ; for,  such  knowledge,  as  depending 
upon  necessary  forms  of  the  perception  of  things,  is  just 
as  certain  as  if  it  rested  upon  necessary  forms  of  things  in 
themselves. 

58  Transcendental  ./Esthetic  cannot  contain  more  than  41 
these  two  elements.  This  is  plain,  if  we  reflect  that  all 
other  conceptions  belonging  to  sensibility  presuppose 
something  empirical.  Even  the  idea  of  motion,  in  which 
both  elements  are  united,  presupposes  the  observation  of 
something  that  moves.  Now,  there  is  nothing  movable 

in  space  considered  purely  by  itself ; hence  that  which  is 
movable  can  be  found  in  space  only  by  experience,  and 
is  therefore  an  empirical  datum.  Similarly  the  idea  of 
change  cannot  be  put  among  the  a priori  data  of 
transcendental  msthetic.  Time  itself  does  not  change, 
but  only  something  that  is  in  time ; hence  the  idea  of 
change  must  be  derived  from  the  observation  of  some 
actual  object  with  its  successive  determinations — that  is, 
from  experience. 

59  8.  General  remarks  on  the  Transcendental  Aisthetic. 

(1)  A distinction  is  commonly  drawn  between  what 
belongs  essentially  to  an  object,  and  is  perceived  by  every 
one  to  belong  to  it,  and  what  is  accidental,  being  per- 
ceived only  from  a certain  position,  or  when  a special  organ 
is  affected  in  a particular  way.  In  the  one  case,  we  are 
said  to  know  the  object  as  it  is  in  itself ; in  the  other 
case,  to  know  it  only  as  it  appears  to  us.  This,  however, 
is  merely  an  empirical  distinction.  For,  it  must  be  re- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  /ESTHETIC. 


37 


membered,  that  the  empirical  object  which  is  here  called 
the  thing,  is  itself  but  an  appearance.  If  this  were  all, 
our  transcendental  distinction  would  be  altogether  lost 
sight  of,  and  we  might  imagine  ourselves  to  know  things 
in  themselves  when  we  knew  only  phenomena.  For  the 
truth  is,  that,  however  far  we  may  carry  our  investigations 
into  the  world  of  sense,  we  never  can  come  into  contact 
53  with  aught  but  appearances.  For  instance,  we  call  the 
rainbow  in  a sun-shower  a mere  appearance,  and  the  rain 
the  thing  itself.  Nor  is  there  any  objection  to  this,  if  we 
mean  to  state  merely  the  physical  truth,  that  from  what- 
ever position  it  is  viewed  the  rain  will  appear  to  our 
senses  as  a real  object  of  experience.  But,  if  we  go 
beyond  the  fact,  that  the  sensible  object  is  here  the  same  46 
for  every  one,  and  ask  whether  the  object  is  known  as  it 
is  in  itself,  we  pass  to  the  transcendental  point  of  view,  and 
the  question  now  is  in  regard  to  the  relation  of  our 
consciousness  of  the  object  to  the  object  as  it  exists 
apart  from  our  consciousness.  In  this  point  of  view,  not 
merely  the  rain-drops,  but  their  round  shape,  and  even 
the  space  in  which  they  fall,  must  be  regarded  as  mere 
appearances,  not  as  things  in  themselves.  Every  aspect 
of  the  phenomenon,  in  short,  is  but  a modification  or  a 
permanent  form  of  our  sensible  perception,  while  the 
transcendental  object  remains  to  us  unknown. 

71  (2)  It  is  recognized  in  natural  theology,  not  only  that 

God  cannot  be  an  object  of  perception  to  us,  but  that 
He  can  never  be  an  object  of  sensuous  perception  to 
Himself.  At  the  same  time,  His  knowledge  must  be 
perception , and  not  thought,  for  thought  always  involves 
limitations.  Now,  the  natural  theologian  is  very  careful 
to  say,  that  God,  in  His  perception,  is  free  from  the 


33 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


limits  of  space  and  time.  But,  how  can  this  possibly  be 
maintained,  if  it  has  previously  been  assumed,  that  space 
and  time  are  forms  of  things  in  themselves?  It  must 
then  be  held  that,  even  if  those  things  were  annihilated, 
space  and  time  would  continue  to  be  a priori  conditions 
of  their  existence.  And  if  they  are  conditions  of  all 
existence,  they  must  be  conditions  of  the  existence  even 
2 of  God.  We  can  avoid  this  conclusion  only  by  saying 
that  space  and  time  are  not  objective  forms  of  all  things, 
but  subjective  forms  of  our  outer  as  well  as  of  our  inner 
perceptions.  In  fact  our  perception  is  sensuous,  just 
because  it  is  not  original.  Were  it  original,  the  very 
existence  of  the  object  would  be  given  in  the  perception, 
and  such  a perception,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  can  belong 
only  to  the  Original  Being.  Our  perception  is  dependent 
upon  the  existence  of  the  object,  and  therefore  it  is 
possible  only  if  our  perceptive  consciousness  is  affected 
by  the  presence  of  the  object. 

Nor  is  it  necessary  to  say,  that  man  is  the  only  being 
who  perceives  objects  under  the  forms  of  space  and 
time;  it  may  be  that  all  finite  thinking  beings  agree  with 
man  in  that  respect,  although  of  this  we  cannot  be 
certain.  But,  however  universal  this  mode  of  perception 
may  be,  it  cannot  be  other  than  sensuous,  simply  because 
it  is  derivative  (intuit us  derivations)  and  not  original 
(intuitus  originarius),  and  therefore  is  not  an  intellectual 
perception.  An  intellectual  perception,  as  we  have 
already  seen  reason  to  believe,  is  the  prerogative  of  the 
Original  Being,  and  never  can  belong  to  a being  which  is 
dependent  in  its  existence  as  well  as  in  its  perception, 
and  in  fact  is  conscious  of  its  own  existence  only  in  re- 
lation to  given  objects. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  /ESTHETIC. 


39 


73  Conclusion  of  the  Transcendental  /Esthetic. 

We  have,  then,  in  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic,  one 
of  the  elements  required  in  the  solution  of  the  general 
problem  of  transcendental  philosophy  : How  area  priori 
synthetic  propositio?is  possible  ? Such  propositions  rest 
upon  space  and  time,  which  are  pure  a priori  perceptions. 
To  enable  us  to  go  beyond  a given  conception,  in  an  a 
priori  judgment,  we  have  found  that  something  is  needed, 
which  is  not  contained  in  the  conception,  but  in  the 
perception  corresponding  to  it,  something  therefore  that 
may  be  connected  with  that  conception  synthetically. 
But  such  judgments,  as  based  upon  perception,  can 
never  extend  beyond  objects  of  sense,  and  therefore  hold 
true  only  for  objects  of  possible  experience. 


40 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


74  TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC.  5o 

i . General  Logic. 

There  are  two  ultimate  sources  from  which  knowledge 
comes  to  us  : either  we  receive  ideas  in  the  form  of 
impressions,  or,  by  our  spontaneous  faculty  of  conception, 
we  know  an  object  by  means  of  those  ideas.  In  the 
former  case,  the  object  is  given  to  us ; in  the  latter  case, 
it  is  thought  in  relation  to  the  impressions  that  arise  in 
our  consciousness.  Perception  and  conception,  there- 
fore, are  the  two  elements  that  enter  into  all  our 
knowledge.  To  every  conception  some  form  of  percep- 
tion corresponds,  and  no  perception  yields  knowledge 
without  conception.  Both  may  be  either  pure  or 
empirical  • empirical , if  sensation,  which  occurs  only  in 
the  actual  presence  of  an  object,  is  implied;  pure , if 
there  is  no  intermixture  of  sensation.  We  may  call 

75  sensation  the  matter  of  sensuous  knowledge.  Hence 
pure  perception  contains  only  the  form  under  which  a 5 1 
definite  object  is  perceived,  and  pure  conception  the 
form  in  which  an  object  in  general  is  thought.  Pure 
perceptions  or  pure  conceptions  alone  are  possible  a 
priori , while  empirical  perceptions  or  empirical  concep- 
tions are  possible  only  a posteriori. 

If  sensibility  is  the  receptivity  of  the  mind  in  the  actual 
apprehension  of  some  impression,  understanding  is  the 
spontaneity  of  knowledge,  or  the  faculty  that  of  itself  pro- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC. 


41 


duces  ideas.  We  are  so  constituted  that  our  perceptio7i 
always  is  sensuous ; or  it  shows  merely  the  manner  in 
which  we  are  affected  by  objects.  But,  we  have  also 
understanding,  or  the  faculty  of  thinking  the  object  of 
sensuous  perception.  Neither  of  these  is  to  be  regarded 
as  superior  to  the  other.  Without  sensibility  no  object 
would  be  given  to  us,  without  understanding  none  would 
be  thought.  Thoughts  without  content  are  empty,  per- 
ceptions without  conceptions  are  blind.  It  is  therefore 
just  as  necessary  to  make  our  conceptions  sensuous, 
that  is,  to  add  the  object  to  them  in  perception,  as  it 
is  to  make  our  perceptions  intelligible,  that  is,  to  bring 
them  under  conceptions.  Neither  of  these  faculties 
or  capacities  can  do  the  work  of  the  other.  Under- 
standing can  perceive  nothing,  the  senses  can  think 

76  nothing.  Knowledge  arises  only  from  their  united  action. 

But  this  is  no  reason  for  confusing  the  function  of  either 
with  that  of  the  other;  it  is  rather  a strong  reason  for  52 
carefully  separating  and  distinguishing  the  one  from  the 
other.  Hence  it  is,  that  we  distinguish  ^Esthetic,  as  the 
science  of  the  universal  rules  of  sensibility,  from  Logic, 
which  is  the  science  of  the  universal  rules  of  under- 
standing. 

General  logic,  as  distinguished  from  the  special  logic  53 
or  organon  of  a particular  science,  is  either  pure  or 

77  applied;  but  only  the  former  is  in  the  strict  sense  a 

78  science.  There  are  two  rules  that  must  ever  be  kept  in  54 
mind  in  pure  general  logic.  (1)  As  general  logic,  it 
abstracts  from  all  content  of  thought,  and  from  all  dis- 
tinction of  objects,  and  deals  only  with  the  pure  form  of 
thought.  (2)  As  pure  logic,  it  has  no  empirical  prin- 
ciples. Psychology  has  no  influence  on  the  canon  of  the 


42 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


understanding,  and  therefore  it  does  not,  as  has  some- 
times been  supposed,  contribute  anything  to  pure  logic. 
Logic  is  a demonstrative  science,  and  whatever  it 
contains  must  be  certain  entirely  a priori. 

79  2.  Transcendental  Logic.  55 

Pure  general  logic,  then,  abstracts  from  all  the  content 
of  knowledge,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  from  all  relation 
of  knowledge  to  its  objects,  and  considers  merely  the 
logical  form  implied  in  the  relation  of  one  element  of 
knowledge  to  another,  or  the  universal  form  of  thought. 
Now,  we  have  learned  from  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic 
that  there  are  pure  as  well  as  empirical  perceptions,  and 
it  may  well  be,  that  a similar  distinction  obtains  between 
the  pure  and  the  empirical  thought  of  objects.  In  that 

S°  case,  there  will  be  a logic  that  does  not  abstract  from  all 
the  content  of  knowledge.  Containing  merely  the  rules 
of  the  pure  thought  of  an  object,  it  will  exclude  all 
knowledge,  the  content  of  which  is  empirical.  It  will 
also  refer  our  knowledge  of  objects  to  its  origin,  in 
so  far  as  that  origin  cannot  be  ascribed  to  objects  56 
themselves. 

81  Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  there  are  conceptions  which  57 
relate  to  objects  a priori , but  which,  as  mere  functions 
of  pure  thought,  stand  to  objects  in  quite  a different 
relation  from  that  in  which  perceptions  stand  to  them, 
whether  these  are  pure  or  sensuous.  As  these  concep- 
tions will  be  of  neither  empirical  nor  aesthetic  origin,  we 
get  the  idea  of  a science  of  pure  understanding  and  pure 
reason,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  examine  into  the  know- 
ledge which  we  obtain  by  thinking  objects  completely  a 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC. 


43 


priori.  Such  a science,  as  setting  forth  the  origin,  the 
limits,  and  the  objective  validity  of  pure  conceptions,  we 
must  call  Transcendental  Logic. 

g2  3.  Division  of  General  Logic  into  Analytic  and 

Dialectic. 

84  General  logic  analyzes  the  whole  formal  procedure  of  60 

understanding  and  reason  into  its  elements,  and  presents 
these  as  principles  by  which  the  logical  validity  of  know- 
ledge may  be  estimated.  This  part  of  logic,  which  is 
well  called  Analytic,  supplies  a negative  touchstone  of 
truth  . . . but  it  does  not  enable  us  to  determine 

85  positively  anything  in  regard  to  objects.  At  the  same 
time,  there  is  something  so  seductive  in  an  art  that 
enables  us  to  reduce  all  our  knowledge  to  the  form  of 
understanding,  however  empty  and  poor  in  content  it  may  61 
be,  that  general  logic,  although  it  is  merely  a canon  of 
judgment,  is  apt  to  be  used  as  an  organon  by  means  of 
which  new  truth,  or  rather  the  specious  appearance  of 
new  truth,  may  be  obtained.  When  it  is  thus  misused 
as  a supposed  organon,  logic  is  called  Dialectic. 


87  4.  Division  of  Transcendental  Logic  into  Analytic  and  62 

Dialectic. 

Just  as  in  Transcendental  ^Esthetic  we  isolated  the 
sensibility,  so  in  Transcendental  Logic  we  shall  isolate 
the  understanding,  and  throw  into  relief  that  element  in 
our  knowledge  which  has  its  origin  in  the  understanding 
alone.  This  pure  element  can  be  employed  in  actual 
knowledge,  only  on  condition  that  objects  are  presented 


44 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


in  perception  to  which  it  may  be  applied.  For,  without 
perception,  the  pure  element  of  knowledge  has  no  object, 
and  therefore  remains  perfectly  empty.  That  part  of 
Transcendental  Logic  which  sets  forth  the  pure  element 
in  knowledge  that  belongs  to  understanding,  and  the 
principles  without  which  no  object  whatever  can  be 
thought,  is  Transcendental  Analytic.  It  is  a logic  of 
truth,  because  no  knowledge  can  contradict  it  without 
losing  all  content,  that  is,  all  relation  to  an  object,  and  63 
therefore  all  truth.  But  there  is  a very  seductive  and 
deceptive  tendency  to  employ  that  pure  knowledge  of 
understanding  and  those  principles  by  themselves,  and  to 
apply  them  even  beyond  the  limits  of  experience.  Only 
in  experience,  however,  can  any  matter  or  object  be 
88  found  to  which  the  pure  conceptions  of  understand- 
ing may  be  applied.  There  is  thus  a danger  that 
understanding,  with  a mere  show  of  rationality,  may  make 
a material  use  of  its  purely  formal  principles,  and  pass 
judgments  upon  all  objects  without  distinction,  whether 
they  are  given  to  us  or  not,  and  perhaps  even  although 
they  cannot  be  given  to  us  at  all.  That  which  is  merely 
a canon  for  the  criticism  of  understanding  in  its  empirical 
use,  is  misused,  when  it  is  supposed  to  be  an  organon 
that  may  be  employed  universally  and  without  restriction, 
and  when  it  permits  understanding  to  venture  upon 
synthetic  judgments  about  objects  in  general,  and  to  pro- 
nounce and  decide  upon  them.  Pure  understanding  is 
then  employed  dialectically.  The  second  part  of  Tran- 
scendental Logic  must  therefore  consist  of  a criticism  of 
dialectical  illusion.  It  is  called  Dialectic,  not  because  it 
is  an  art  of  producing  illusion  dogmatically — a favourite 
art  of  too  many  metaphysical  jugglers — but  because  it  is 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC. 


45 


a criticism  of  understanding  and  reason  in  their  hyper- 
physical use ; a criticism,  the  aim  of  which  is  to  expose 
their  specious  and  groundless  pretensions  to  the  dis-  64 
covery  and  extension  of  knowledge  through  purely 
transcendental  principles,  and  to  preserve  understanding 
from  all  sophistical  illusion. 


46 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


89  TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 

BOOK  I.— ANALYTIC  OF  CONCEPTIONS. 

Chapter  I. — Guiding-thread  for  the  Discovery 
of  the  Categories. 

90  The  first  part  of  Transcendental  Analytic  deals  with  the  65 
conceptions,  the  second  part  with  the  judgments  of  pure 
understanding. 

92  It  is  the  privilege  as  well  as  the  duty  of  transcendental  67 
philosophy,  to  proceed  in  the  search  for  its  conceptions 
upon  a definite  principle  ; for  these  conceptions  spring 
from  the  understanding  pure  and  unmixed,  and  must 
therefore  be  connected  together  in  the  unity  of  a single 
conception  or  idea.  This  one  fundamental  conception  is 

a systematic  principle,  by  the  application  of  which  we 
may  be  certain  a priori  that  we  have  found  out  all  the 
pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  and  have  assigned  to 
each  its  proper  place  in  the  whole  system. 

Section  P.—~  The  Logical  Use  of  Understanding. 

Understanding  has  already  been  defined,  negatively, 
as  a non-sensuous  faculty  of  knowledge.  Now,  as 
without  sensibility  we  can  have  no  perception,  under-  68 

93  standing  cannot  be  a faculty  of  perception.  But,  apart 
from  perception,  the  only  other  mode  of  obtaining 
knowledge  is  by  means  of  conceptions.  Therefore  the 
knowledge  that  is  due  to  understanding,  or  at  least  to 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


47 


human  understanding,  is  a knowledge  by  means  of  con- 
ceptions ; it  is  not  perceptive,  but  discursive.  All  per- 
ceptions, as  sensuous,  rest  upon  affections,  whereas 
conceptions  rest  upon  functions.  By  function  I mean 
the  unity  of  act,  in  which  various  ideas  are  brought  under 
a common  idea.  Conceptions  are  based  on  the  spon- 
taneity of  thought,  sensuous  perceptions  on  the  receptivity 
of  impressions.  Now  the  only  use  that  understanding 
can  make  of  these  conceptions  is  to  judge  by  means  of 
them.  And,  as  without  perception  there  is  no  direct 
consciousness  of  an  object,  a conception  is  never  related 
directly  to  an  object,  but  always  indirectly,  through  a 
perception  or  through  another  conception.  Judgment  is 
therefore  the  indirect  knowledge  of  an  object,  or  the 
knowledge  of  knowledge.  In  every  judgment  there  is  a 
conception  which  holds  true  of  various  ideas,  and, 
among  others,  of  one  which  is  directly  referred  to  an 
object.  Thus,  in  the  judgment  that  all  bodies  are 
divisible,  the  conception  of  divisibility  applies  to  various 
other  conceptions,  but  it  is  in  an  especial  way  related  to 
the  conception  of  body,  as  this  again  is  related  to  certain 
94  objects  that  we  directly  perceive.  Of  these  objects  we 
are  therefore  conscious  only  indirectly  in  the  conception 
of  divisibility.  Accordingly,  all  judgments  are  functions 
of  unity,  because  they  do  not  consist  in  the  direct  know- 
ledge of  an  object,  but  bring  that  and  other  knowledge 
under  the  unity  of  a higher  and  more  comprehensive  con- 
ception. And  as  we  can  reduce  all  acts  of  understanding 
to  judgments,  understanding  itself  may  be  said  to  be  a 
faculty  of  judgment.  For,  as  we  have  seen  above,  under- 
standing is  the  faculty  of  thought.  To  think  is  to  know 
by  means  of  conceptions.  But  conceptions,  as  predi- 


4s 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


cates  of  possible  judgments,  are  relative  to  the  idea  of  an 
object  not  yet  determined.  By  the  conception  of  body 
is  meant  something — metal,  for  instance — which  may  be 
known  by  means  of  that  conception.  Body  is  a 
conception , just  because  it  contains  under  it  other  deter- 
minations by  means  of  which  it  may  be  referred  to  actual 
objects.  It  is  thus  the  predicate  of  a possible  judgment, 
such  as,  that  every  metal  is  a body.  We  may, 
therefore,  find  out  all  the  possible  functions  of  judgment 
if  we  can  but  tell  what  are  all  the  possible  functions  of 
unity  in  judgment.  And  this,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next 
section,  can  quite  readily  be  done. 

95  Section  II. — 9.  The  logical  Function  of  Understanding  1° 
in  Judgment. 

If  we  abstract  from  all  the  content  of  a judgment,  and 
only  pay  heed  to  the  mere  form  of  understanding,  we 
find  that  the  functions  of  thought  in  judgment  may  be 
brought  under  four  heads,  each  of  which  contains  three 
subdivisions.  Thus  we  get  the  following  table  : — 

1.  Quantity  of  Judgments. 

Universal. 

Particular. 

Singular. 

3.  Relation. 
Categorical. 
Hypothetical. 
Disjunctive. 

4.  Modality. 

Problematic. 

Assertoric. 

Apodictic. 


2.  Quality. 
Affirmative. 
Negative. 
Infinite. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


49 


02  Section  III. — io.  The  Pure  Conceptions  of  Understanding  76 
or  Categories. 

General  Logic,  as  has  been  said,  abstracts  from  all  the 
content  of  knowledge,  and  looks  to  some  other  source, 
whatever  that  may  be,  for  the  content  that  it  is  to  trans- 
form by  analysis  into  conceptions.  Transcendental 
Logic,  on  the  other  hand,  has  lying  before  it  a complex  7 7 
of  a priori  sensibility,  which  it  receives  from  Transcen- 
dental ^Esthetic ; without  this  complex,  as  a material 
upon  which  to  operate,  the  conceptions  of  pure  under- 
standing would  be  without  content  or  perfectly  empty. 
Now,  space  and  time  have  not  only  themselves,  as  pure 
a priori  perceptions,  a complexity  of  content;  but,  as 
they  are  the  conditions  without  which  the  mind  could 
not  be  receptive  of  impressions,  and  therefore  could  not 
be  conscious  of  objects,  they  must  always  affect  our  con- 
ception of  objects.  Conception,  however,  is  due  to 
the  spontaneous  activity  of  thought,  and  hence  the  com- 
plex content  of  pure  perception  must  first  be  surveyed, 
taken  up  into  thought  and  combined,  before  there  can  be 
any  knowledge.  This  act  I call  synthesis. 

B3  By  synthesis,  in  its  most  general  sense,  is  meant  the 
act  of  putting  various  ideas  together,  and  grasping  their 
multiplicity  in  one  consciousness.  Such  synthesis  is  pure, 
if  the  multiplicity  is  given,  not  empirically  but  a priori , as 
in  the  case  of  space  and  time.  Now,  before  we  can 
analyze  any  idea,  we  must  first  have  the  idea,  and  hence 
the  content  of  a conception  cannot  originally  come  into 
consciousness  by  analysis.  It  is  by  synthesis  of  various 
elements,  whether  those  elements  are  given  empirically  or 
a priori , that  we  first  get  knowledge.  No  doubt  the 


5° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


synthesis  may  at  first  be  crude  and  confused,  and  it  may 
stand  in  need  of  analysis,  but  yet  it  is  by  synthesis 
that  the  various  elements  are  gathered  together  and 
united  in  the  knowledge  of  a certain  concrete  object. 

It  is  to  synthesis,  therefore,  that  we  must  first  direct  ^g 
our  attention,  if  we  would  learn  the  true  origin  of  our 
knowledge. 

Synthesis  in  general,  as  we  shall  afterwards  see,  is  due 
solely  to  the  operation  of  imagination,  a blind  but  indis- 
pensable function  of  the  soul,  without  which  we  should 
have  no  knowledge  whatever,  but  of  which  we  are 
seldom  even  conscious.  To  bring  this  synthesis  to  con- 
ceptions is  the  function  of  understanding,  and  it  is  only 
by  this  operation  of  understanding  that  we  obtain  what 
can  properly  be  called  knowledge. 

104  Pure  synthesis , viewed  in  its  most  general  aspect,  is  the 
pure  conception  of  understanding.  By  this  pure  syn- 
thesis I understand  that  which  rests  upon  a basis  of  a 
priori  synthetic  unity.  Thus  in  arithmetical  addition,  as 
is  readily  seen  in  the  case  of  larger  numbers,  the  synthesis 
conforms  to  a conception,  because  it  proceeds  on  a 
common  basis  of  unity,  as,  for  instance,  the  decade.  By 
this  conception  the  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  a complex  is 
made  necessary. 

By  analysis  various  ideas  are  brought  under  a single 
conception,  as  is  shown  in  general  logic.  But  it  belongs 
to  transcendental  logic  to  tell  us  how  the  pure  synthesis  of 
ideas  is  brought  to  conceptions.  The  first  element  that 
enters  into  the  knowledge  of  all  objects  a priori  is  the 
complex  content  of  pure  perception.  The  second  79 
element  is  the  synthesis  of  this  content  by  imagination. 
But  as  even  this  is  not  enough  to  constitute  knowledge, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


51 


a third  element  is  supplied  by  understanding,  in  the 
conceptions  which  give  unity  to  this  pure  synthesis,  and 
which  consist  solely  in  the  consciousness  of  this  necessary 
synthetic  unity. 

The  same  function  which  gives  unity  to  various  ideas 
05  in  a judgment  also  gives  unity  to  the  mere  synthesis  of 
various  ideas  in  a perception ; and  this  synthesis,  in  its 
most  general  expression,  is  the  pure  conception  of  under- 
standing. Understanding  at  once  gives  analytic  unity  to 
conceptions,  and  synthetic  unity  to  the  complex  content 
of  perception  ; and  indeed  the  logical  form  of  judgment 
presupposes  and  rests  upon  the  very  same  acts  of  thought 
as  those  by  which  a transcendental  content  is  given  to 
the  various  determinations  of  our  consciousness.  Hence 
it  is  that  the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  as  they 
are  fitly  called,  apply  to  objects  a priori,  and  therefore 
do  not  fall  within  the  view  of  general  logic. 

In  this  way  there  arises  exactly  the  same  number  of 
pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  applying  a priori  to 
all  objects  of  perception,  as  there  are  logical  functions  of 
judgments  in  the  preceding  table;  for  those  functions 
completely  specify  understanding,  and  give  a perfect 
measure  of  its  powers.  We  shall  call  the  pure  concep- 
tions categories , after  Aristotle,  because  our  object  is  the  8° 
same  as  his,  although  our  method  and  results  are  widely 
different. 


06  Table  of  Categories. 

1.  Quantity. 
Unity. 

Plurality. 

Totality. 


52 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


2.  Quality. 
Reality. 


Inherence  and  Subsistence 
(. substantia  ct  accidens). 


3.  Relation. 


Negation. 


Causality  and  Dependence 
(cause  and  effect). 


Limitation. 


Community  (reciprocity 
between  the  active  and 
the  passive). 


4.  Modality. 


Possibility 

Existence 

Necessity 


Impossibility. 

Non-existence. 

Contingency. 


This,  then,  is  a list  of  all  the  primary  pure  conceptions 
of  synthesis  that  understanding  contains  within  itself  a 
priori.  Because  it  contains  these  pure  conceptions,  it  is 
called  pure  understanding,  and  only  by  them  can  it 
understand  anything  in  the  complex  content  of  perception, 
that  is,  think  an  object.  The  table  has  not  been  left  to 
the  uncertain  suggestions  of  empirical  induction,  but  has 
been  drawn  up  systematically,  on  the  basis  of  a single 
principle,  namely,  the  faculty  of  judgment,  or,  what  is  the  81 
same  thing,  the  faculty  of  thought. 

109  11. 

The  table  of  categories  suggests  some  nice  points,  which, 
perhaps,  might  be  found  to  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  scientific  form  of  all  knowledge  of  reason.  (1) 

1 1 o The  four  classes  of  categories  naturally  fall  into  two 
groups ; those  in  the  first  group  being  concerned  with 
objects  of  perception,  pure  as  well  as  empirical,  while 
those  in  the  second  group  are  concerned  with  the  exist- 
ence of  those  objects,  as  related  either  to  one  another 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


53 


or  to  understanding.  The  first  may  be  called  the 
mathematical,  the  second  the  dynamical  categories.  The 
former,  as  is  obvious,  have  no  correlates,  the  latter  have 
correlates.  This  distinction  must  have  some  ground 
in  the  nature  of  understanding.  (2)  It  is  also  suggestive 
that  the  number  of  categories  in  each  class  is  three, 
because  usually  all  a priori  division  must  be  by  dichotomy. 

To  this  it  must  be  added  that  the  third  category  in  each 
class  arises  from  the  union  of  the  second  category  with 

1 1 the  first.  Thus  totality  or  allness  is  just  plurality  regarded 
as  unity , limitatioJi  is  reality  combined  with  negation , 
community  is  causality  in  which  two  substances  mutually 
determine  one  another,  and  lastly , necessity  is  just  existence 
given  by  mere  possibility. 

t6  Chapter  II. — Deduction  of  the  Categories.  84 
13.  Principles  of  a Transcendental  Deduction. 

There  is  a distinction  in  law  between  the  question  of 
right  ( quid  juris)  and  the  question  of  fact  (.quid  facti ). 
Both  must  be  proved,  but  proof  of  a right  or  claim  is 

17  called  its  deduction.  Now,  among  the  variety  of  con- 85 
ceptions  that  make  up  the  very  mixed  web  of  human 
knowledge,  there  are  certain  conceptions  that  put  in  a 
claim  for  use  entirely  a priori,  and  this  claim  of  course 
stands  in  need  of  deduction.  It  is  useless  to  refer  to  the 
fact  of  experience  in  justification  of  such  a claim,  but  at 
the  same  time  we  must  know  how  conceptions  can 
possibly  refer  to  objects  of  experience,  although  those 
objects  have  not  been  derived  from  experience.  An  86 
explanation  of  the  manner  in  which  conceptions  can 
relate  a priori  to  objects,  I call  a transcendental 


54 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


deduction ; and  from  it  I distinguish  an  empirical 
deduction , which  simply  tells  us  how  a conception  has 
been  acquired  by  experience  and  reflection  on  experience. 
The  former  proves  our  right  to  the  use  of  a certain  con- 
ception, the  latter  merely  points  out  that  as  a matter  of 
fact  it  has  come  into  our  possession  in  a certain  way. 

We  had  no  difficulty  in  explaining  how  space  and  89 
time,  although  they  are  themselves  known  a priori,  are 
yet  necessarily  related  to  objects,  and  make  possible  a 
synthetic  knowledge  of  objects  which  is  independent  of 
all  experience.  For,  as  it  is  only  by  means  of  these  pure 
forms  of  sense  that  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  object  in 
2 empirical  perception,  space  and  time  are  pure  percep- 
tions, which  contain  a prioii  the  condition  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  objects  as  phenomena,  and  therefore  synthesis 
in  them  has  objective  validity. 

The  categories  of  understanding,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  not  conditions  under  which  objects  are  given  in 
perception  ; hence  objects  might  certainly  be  presented 
to  us,  even  if  they  were  not  necessarily  related  to 
functions  of  understanding,  as  their  a priori  condition. 
Here,  therefore,  a difficulty  arises  that  we  did  not  meet 
with  in  the  field  of  sensibility.  The  difficulty  is,  how  sub- 
jective conditions  of  thought  should  have  objective  validity, 
or,  in  other  words,  how  they  should  be  conditions  with- 
out which  no  knowledge  of  objects  would  be  possible. 
Take,  for  instance,  the  conception  of  cause.  Here  we  90 
have  a peculiar  sort  of  synthesis,  in  which  something 
B is  conceived  as  following  upon  something  else  quite 
different  A,  in  conformity  with  a rule.  It  is  hard  to  see 
why  phenomena  should  be  subject  to  such  an  a priori 
conception.  Why  should  not  the  conception  be  perfectly 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


55 


empty,  and  without  any  phenomenal  object  corresponding 
to  it  ? 

123  We  cannot  avoid  the  toil  of  such  investigations  by  91 
saying  that  experience  is  perpetually  giving  us  examples 
of  such  conformity  to  law  on  the  part  of  phenomena,  and 
that  we  are  thus  enabled  to  form  an  abstract  conception 
of  cause,  and  to  be  certain  of  its  objective  validity.  The 
conception  of  cause  cannot  possibly  originate  in  that  way  ; 
and  hence  we  must  either  show  that  it  rests  completely 
a priori  upon  understanding,  or  we  must  discard  it 

1 24  altogether  as  a mere  fiction  of  the  brain.  For  the  con- 
ception demands  that  something  A should  be  of  such  a 
nature  that  something  else  B follows  from  it  Jiecessarily, 
and  in  conformity  with  an  absolutely  universal  rule.  No 
pure  conception  of  understanding  can  be  the  product  of 
empirical  induction  without  a complete  reversal  of  its 
nature  and  use. 

126  The  transcendental  deduction  of  all  a priori  concep- 94 
tions  must  therefore  be  guided  by  the  principle,  that 
these  conceptions  must  be  the  a priori  conditions  of  all 
possible  experience.  Conceptions  which  make  experience 
possible  are  for  that  very  reason  necessary.  An  analysis 

of  the  experience  in  which  they  occur  would  not  furnish 
a deduction  of  them,  but  merely  an  illustration  of  their 

127  use.  Were  they  not  the  primary  conditions  of  all  the 
experience  in  which  objects  are  known  as  phenomena, 
their  relation  to  even  a single  object  would  be  utterly 
incomprehensible. 


56 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


Section  II. — A Priori  Conditions  of  Experience  * 

It  would  be  quite  a sufficient  deduction  of  the  96 
categories,  and  justification  of  their  objective  applica- 
tion, to  show  that,  apart  from  them,  no  object  whatever  97 
is  capable  of  being  thought.  But  there  are  two  reasons 
why  a fuller  deduction  is  advisable  : firstly,  because,  in 
thinking  an  object,  other  faculties  besides  understanding, 
or  the  faculty  of  thought  proper,  come  into  play ; and, 
secondly,  because  it  has  to  be  explained  how  under- 
standing can  possibly  be  a condition  of  the  knowledge  of 
real  objects.  We  must,  therefore,  begin  with  a considera- 
tion of  the  primary  activities  of  the  subject  that  are 
essential  in  the  constitution  of  experience  ; and  these  we 
must  view,  not  in  their  empirical,  but  in  their  transcen- 
dental character. 

If  consciousness  were  broken  up  into  a number  of 
mutually  repellent  states,  each  isolated  and  separated 
from  the  rest,  knowledge  would  never  arise  in  us  at  all, 
for  knowledge  is  a whole  of  related  and  connected 
elements.  When,  therefore,  I call  sensible  perception  a 
synopsis,  in  order  to  mark  the  complexity  of  its  content, 
it  must  be  remembered  that  in  this  synopsis  a certain 
synthesis  is  implied,  and  that  knowledge  is  possible  only 
if  spontaneity  is  combined  with  receptivity.  This  is  the 
reason  why  we  must  say  that  in  all  knowledge  there  is  a 
three-fold  synthesis  : firstly,  the  apprehension  in  perception 
of  various  ideas,  or  modifications  of  the  mind  ; secondly, 
their  reproduction  in  imagination  ; and,  thirdly,  their 
recognition  in  conception.  These  three  forms  of  synthesis 

*A11  that  comes  under  this  heading  is  taken  from  the  first  edition  of 
the  “ Critique  of  Pure  Reason,”  and  forms  what  is  called  in  the  preface 
(p.  x.)  the  “ subjective  deduction.” 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


57 


point  to  three  sources  of  knowledge,  which  make  under 
standing  itself  possible,  and  through  it  all  experience  98 
as  an  empirical  product  of  understanding. 

1.  Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Perception. 

Whatever  may  be  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  whether  they 
are  due  to  the  influence  of  external  things  or  are  produced 
by  internal  causes,  whether  as  objects  they  have  their 
source  a priori  or  in  experience,  as  modifications  of  the  99 
mind  they  must  all  belong  to  the  inner  sense.  All 
knowledge  is,  therefore,  at  bottom  subject  to  time  as  the 
formal  condition  of  inner  sense,  and  in  time  every  part  of 
it  without  exception  must  be  ordered,  connected,  and 
brought  into  relation  with  every  other  part.  This  is  a 
general  remark,  which  must  be  kept  in  mind  in  the  whole 
of  our  subsequent  inquiry. 

We  should  not  be  conscious  of  the  various  determina- 
tions that  every  perception  contains  within  itself  were  we 
not,  in  the  succession  of  our  impressions,  conscious  of 
time.  If  each  feeling  were  limited  to  a single  moment, 
it  would  be  an  absolutely  individual  unit.  In  order  that 
the  various  determinations  of  a perception,  as,  for  instance, 
the  parts  of  a line,  should  form  a unity,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  should  be  run  over  and  held  together  by  the 
mind.  This  act  I call  the  synthesis  of  apprehension.  It 
is  apprehension , because  it  goes  straight  to  perception  ; it 
is  synthesis , because  only  by  synthesis  can  the  various 
elements  of  perception  be  united  in  one  object  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Now,  this  synthesis  of  apprehension  must  be  employed 
a priori  also,  or  in  relation  to  determinations  not  given  in 
sensible  experience.  Otherwise  we  should  have  no 


58 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


consciousness  of  space  and  time  a priori , for  these  can  ioo 
be  produced  only  by  a synthesis  of  the  various  determi- 
nations that  are  presented  by  sensibility  in  its  original 
receptivity.  There  is  therefore  a pure  synthesis  of 
apprehension. 

2.  Synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagination. 

There  is  an  empirical  law  of  the  association  of  ideas. 
When  any  two  ideas  have  often  followed,  or  accompanied 
each  other,  an  association  between  them  is  at  last  formed, 
and  they  are  so  connected  that,  even  when  an  object  is 
not  present,  the  mind  passes  from  the  one  to  the  other  in 
conformity  with  a fixed  rule.  But  this  law  of  reproduc- 
tion presupposes  that  phenomena  are  themselves  actually 
subject  to  such  a rule,  and  that  the  various  elements  in 
these  phenomena  of  which  we  are  conscious  should  accom- 
pany or  follow  one  another  in  accordance  with  certain 
rules.  On  any  other  supposition  our  empirical  imagina- 
tion would  have  nothing  to  reproduce  in  any  way 
conforming  to  its  own  nature,  and  would  therefore  lie 
hidden  in  the  depths  of  the  mind  as  a dead,  and  to  us 
unknown  faculty.  Were  cinnabar,  for  instance,  some- 
times red  and  sometimes  black,  sometimes  light  and  101 
sometimes  heavy ; or  were  the  same  name  given  at  one 
time  to  this  object,  and  at  another  time  to  that,  without 
the  least  regard  to  any  rule  implied  in  the  nature  of  the 
phenomena  themselves,  there  could  be  no  empirical 
synthesis  of  reproduction. 

There  must,  therefore,  be  something  which  makes  the 
reproduction  of  phenomena  possible  at  all,  something 
which  is  the  a priori  ground  of  a necessary  synthetic 
unity.  That  this  is  so,  we  may  at  once  see,  if  we  reflect 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


59 


that  phenomena  are  not  things  in  themselves,  but  are 
merely  the  play  of  our  own  ideas,  and  therefore  at  bottom 
determinations  of  the  inner  sense.  Now,  if  we  can  show 
that  even  our  purest  a priori  perceptions  can  yield 
knowledge,  only  in  so  far  as  they  involve  such  a com- 
bination as  makes  a thoroughgoing  synthesis  of  reproduc- 
tion possible,  we  may  conclude  that  this  synthesis  of 
imagination,  being  prior  to  all  experience,  rests  upon  a 
priori  principles.  We  must  then  assume  a pure  tran- 
scendental synthesis  as  the  necessary  condition  of  all  102 
experience,  for  experience  is  impossible  unless  phenomena 
are  capable  of  being  reproduced.  Now,  if  I draw  a line 
in  thought,  or  think  of  the  time  from  one  day  to  another, 
or  even  think  of  a certain  number,  it  is  plain  that  I must 
be  conscious  of  the  various  determinations  one  after  the 
other.  But  if  the  earlier  determinations — the  prior  parts 
of  the  line,  the  antecedent  moments  of  time,  the  units  as 
they  arise  one  after  the  other — were  to  drop  out  of  my 
consciousness,  and  could  not  be  reproduced  when  I 
passed  on  to  the  later  determinations,  I should  never  be 
conscious  of  a whole ; and  hence  not  even  the  simplest 
and  most  elementary  idea  of  space  or  time  could  arise  in 
my  consciousness. 

The  synthesis  of  reproduction  is  therefore  inseparably 
bound  up  with  the  synthesis  of  apprehension.  And  as 
the  synthesis  of  apprehension  is  the  transcendental  ground 
of  the  possibility  of  all  knowledge — of  pure  a priori  as 
well  as  empirical  knowledge — the  reproductive  synthesis 
of  imagination  belongs  to  the  transcendental  functions  of 
the  mind,  and  may  therefore  be  called  the  transcendental 
faculty  of  imagination. 


6o 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


3.  Synthesis  of  Recognition  in  Conceptions.  103 

Were  I not  conscious  that  what  I think  now  is  identical 
with  what  I thought  a moment  ago,  all  reproduction  in 
the  series  of  ideas  would  be  useless.  The  idea  reproduced 
at  a given  moment  would  be  for  me  a perfectly  new  idea. 
There  would  be  no  identical  consciousness  bound  up 
with  the  act  of  producing  one  idea  after  another;  and  as 
without  such  consciousness  there  could  be  for  me  no 
unity,  I should  never  be  conscious  of  the  various 
members  of  the  series  as  forming  one  whole.  If,  in 
counting,  I should  forget  that  the  units  lying  before  my 
mind  had  been  added  by  me  one  after  the  other,  I should 
not  be  aware  that  a sum  was  being  produced  or  generated 
in  the  successive  addition  of  unit  to  unit ; and  as  the 
conception  of  the  sum  is  simply  the  consciousness  of  this 
unity  of  synthesis,  I should  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
number. 

At  this  point  it  is  necessary  to  have  a clear  idea  of  104 
what  we  mean  by  an  object  of  consciousness.  We  have 
seen  that  a phenomenon  is  just  a sensation  of  which  we 
are  conscious,  and  that  no  sensation  can  be  said  to  exist 
by  itself  as  an  object  outside  of  consciousness.  What, 
then,  do  we  mean  when  we  speak  of  an  object  as  corre- 
sponding to  our  knowledge,  and  therefore  as  distinct  from 
it  ? It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  object  can  be  thought^ of 
oniy  as  something  = x,  for  there  is  nothing  beyond  know- 
ledge that  we  can  set  up  as  contrasted  with  knowledge, 
and  yet  as  corresponding  to  it. 

It  is  plain  that  in  knowledge  we  have  to  do  with  105 
nothing  but  the  various  determinations  of  our  own 
consciousness;  hence  the  object  = x,  which  corresponds 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


61 


to  these  determinations,  if  it  is  supposed  to  be  distinct 
from  every  object  of  consciousness,  is  for  us  nothing  at 
all.  The  unity  which  the  object  demands  can  be  only 
the  formal  unity  of  consciousness  in  the  synthesis  of  its 
various  determinations.  In  saying  that  we  know  the 
object,  we  mean  that  we  have  introduced  synthetic  unity 
into  the  various  determinations  of  perception.  But  this 
is  impossible,  if  the  perception  could  not  be  produced  by 
a function  of  synthesis,  which,  in  conforming  to  a rule, 
makes  the  reproduction  of  those  determinations  a priori 
necessary,  and  renders  possible  a conception  that  unites 
them. 

There  can  be  no  knowledge  without  a conception,  I06 
however  indefinite  or  obscure  it  may  be,  and  a conception 
is  in  form  always  a universal  that  serves  as  a rule.  The 
conception  of  body,  for  instance,  as  a unity  of  the  various 
determinations  thought  in  it,  serves  as  a rule  in  our 
knowledge  of  external  phenomena.  Now,  it  is  always  a 
transcendental  condition  that  lies  at  the  foundation  of 
that  which  is  necessary.  There  must,  therefore,  be  a 
transcendental  ground  of  the  unity  of  consciousness  in 
the  synthesis  of  the  various  determinations  implied  in 
every  perception  ; and  this  ground  must  be  necessary  to 
the  conception  of  any  object  whatever,  and  therefore  to 
the  conception  of  every  object  of  experience.  In  no 
other  way  can  there  be  any  object  for  our  perceptions; 
for  the  object  is  nothing  but  that  something  — x,  the 
conception  of  which  involves  necessity  of  synthesis. 

This  original  and  transcendental  condition  is  just 
transcendental  apperception.  The  consciousness,  in  internal  IOy 
perception,  of  oneself  as  determined  to  certain  states,  is 
merely  empirical,  and  is  always  changing.  In  the  flux  of 


62 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


inner  phenomena  there  can  be  no  unchanging  or  per- 
manent self.  This  form  of  self-consciousness  is  usually 
called  inner  sense  or  empirical  apperception.  Now,  from 
empirical  data  it  is  impossible  to  derive  the  conception 
of  that  which  must  necessarily  be  numerically  identical. 
What  we  require,  in  explanation  of  such  a transcendental 
presupposition,  is  a condition  that  precedes  all  experience, 
and  makes  it  possible. 

No  knowledge  whatever,  no  unity  and  connection  of 
objects,  is  possible  for  us,  apart  from  that  unity  of 
consciousness  which  is  prior  to  all  data  of  perception, 
and  without  relation  to  which  no  consciousness  of  objects 
is  possible.  This  pure,  original,  unchangeable  conscious- 
ness I call  transcendental  apperception.  That  this  is  the 
proper  name  for  it  is  evident,  were  it  only  that  even  the 
purest  objective  unity,  that  of  the  a priori  conceptions  of 
space  and  time,  is  possible  only  in  so  far  as  perceptions 
are  related  to  it.  The  numerical  unity  of  this  appercep- 
tion is,  therefore,  just  as  much  the  a priori  foundation  of 
all  conceptions  as  the  various  determinations  of  space 
and  time  are  the  a priori  foundation  of  the  perceptions  of 
sense. 

It  is  this  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  which  108 
connects  all  the  possible  phenomena  that  can  be  gathered 
together  in  one  experience,  and  subjects  them  to  laws. 
There  could  be  no  such  unity  of  consciousness  were  the 
mind  not  able  to  be  conscious  of  the  identity  of  function, 
by  which  it  unites  various  phenomena  in  one  knowledge. 

The  original  and  necessary  consciousness  of  the  identity 
of  oneself  is  at  the  same  time  the  consciousness  of 
a necessary  unity  in  the  synthesis  of  all  phenomena 
according  to  conceptions.  These  conceptions  are 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


63 


necessary  rules,  which  not  only  make  phenomena  capable 
of  reproduction,  but  determine  perception  as  perception 
of  an  object,  that  is,  bring  it  under  a conception  of  some- 
thing in  which  various  determinations  are  necessarily 
connected  together.  It  would  be  impossible  for  the 
mind  to  think  itself  as  identical  in  its  various  determina- 
tions, and  indeed  to  think  that  identity  a priori , if  it  did 
not  hold  the  identity  of  its  own  act  before  its  eyes,  and 
if  it  did  not,  by  subjecting  to  a transcendental  unity  all 
the  synthesis  of  empirical  apprehension,  make  the,  con- 
nection of  the  various  determinations  implied  in  that 
synthesis  possible  in  accordance  with  a priori  rules. 

:g  15.  Possibility  of  any  Combination  whatever .* 

Though  a perception  is  merely  sensuous  or  receptive, 
the  various  determinations  of  consciousness  may  be  given, 
while  the  form,  as  simply  the  way  in  which  the  subject  is 
affected,  may  lie  a priori  in  the  mind.  But  the  combina- 
tion ( conjunctio ) of  those  determinations  can  never  come 
to  us  through  the  medium  of  sense,  and  therefore  cannot 
be  contained  even  in  the  pure  form  of  sensible  perception. 

o Combination  is  a spontaneous  act  of  consciousness,  and, 
as  such,  it  is  the  especial  characteristic  of  understanding, 
as  distinguished  from  sense.  All  combination,  therefore, 
whether  we  are  aware  of  it  or  not,  whether  it  is  a combina- 
tion of  the  various  determinations  of  perception  or  of 
several  conceptions,  and  whether  the  determinations  of 
perception  are  empirical  or  pure,  is  an  act  of  understand- 
ing. This  act  we  call  by  the  general  name  of  synthesis, 
to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  we  can  be  conscious  of 

*What  follows  (15-27)  constitutes  the  “objective  deduction”  of 
the  categories,  as  it  appears  in  the  second  edition  of  the  “ Critique.” 


64 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


nothing  as  combined  in  the  object,  which  we  have  not 
ourselves  previously  combined.  And  as  it  proceeds 
entirely  from  the  self-activity  of  the  subject,  combination 
is  the  element,  and  the  only  element,  that  cannot  be 
given  by  the  object.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  act  must 
in  its  origin  always  be  of  one  and  the  same  nature,  no 
matter  what  may  be  the  form  of  combination ; and  that 
the  resolution  or  analysis , which  seems  to  be  its  opposite, 
in  point  of  fact  always  presupposes  it.  If  understanding 
has  previously  combined  nothing,  there  is  nothing  for 
it  to  resolve ; for  without  the  combining  activity  of 
understanding  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  an  object 
at  all. 

By  combination,  however,  must  be  understood  not 
merely  the  synthesis  of  the  various  determinations  of 
sense,  but  their  essential  unity.  Combination  is  con- 
131  sciousness  of  the  synthetic  unity  of  various  determinations. 
The  consciousness  of  this  unity  cannot  be  the  result  of 
the  combination,  for  were  we  not,  in  being  conscious  of 
various  determinations,  also  conscious  of  their  unity,  we 
should  have  no  conception  of  combination  at  all.  Nor 
must  this  unity,  which  precedes  any  conception  of 
combination,  be  confused  with  the  category  of  unity 
(10);  for  all  categories  rest  upon  logical  functions  of 
judgment,  and,  in  these,  combination,  or  the  unity  of 
given  conceptions,  is  already  implied.  For  an  explana- 
tion of  the  unity  in  question,  which  is  qualitative  (12), 
we  must  go  further  back,  and  seek  it  in  that  which,  as  the 
ground  of  the  unity  of  various  conceptions  in  judgment, 
is  implied  in  the  possibility  even  of  the  logical  use  of 
understanding. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


65 


1 6.  The  origitial  Synthetic  unity  of  Apperception. 

The  “ / think  ” must  be  capable  of  accompanying  all 
132  my  ideas;  for,  otherwise,  I should  be  conscious  of  some- 
thing that  could  not  be  thought ; which  is  the  same  as 
saying,  that  I should  not  be  conscious  at  all,  or  at  least 
should  be  conscious  only  of  that  which  for  me  was 
nothing.  Now,  that  form  of  consciousness  which  is  prior 
to  all  thought,  is  perception.  Hence,  all  the  manifold 
determinations  of  perception  have  a necessary  relation  to 
the  “ I think"  in  the  subject  that  is  conscious  of  them. 
The  “I  think f however,  is  an  act  of  spojitaneity,  which 
cannot  possibly  be  due  to  sense.  I call  it  pure  appercep- 
tion, to  distinguish  it  from  empirical  apperception.  I call 
it  also  the  original  apperception , because  it  is  the  self- 
consciousness  which  produces  the  “I  think."  Now, 
the  “/  think  ” must  be  capable  of  accompanying  all 
other  ideas,  and  it  is  one  and  the  same  in  all  con- 
sciousness ; but  there  is  no  other  idea  beyond  the 
“ I think f to  which  self-consciousness  is  bound  in  a 
similar  way.  The  unity  of  apperception  I call  also  the 
transcendental  unity  of  self-consciousness,  to  indicate  that 
upon  it  depends  the  possibility  of  a priori  knowledge. 
For,  the  various  determinations  given  in  a certain  per- 
ception would  not  all  be  in  my  consciousness,  if  they  did 
not  all  belong  to  one  self-consciousness.  True,  I may 
not  be  aware  of  this,  but  yet  as  they  are  determinations 
of  my  consciousness,  they  must  necessarily  conform  to  the 
condition,  without  which  they  are  not  capable  of  standing 
33  together  in  one  universal  self-consciousness.  In  no  other 
way  would  they  all  without  exception  be  mine.  From  this 
original  combination  important  consequences  follow. 

E 


66 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


The  absolute  identity  of  apperception  in  relation  to  all 
the  determinations  given  in  perception,  involves  a 
synthesis  of  those  determinations,  and  is  possible  only 
through  consciousness  of  the  synthesis.  For,  the 
empirical  consciousness,  which  accompanies  each  deter- 
mination as  it  arises,  is  in  itself  broken  up  into  units,  and 
is  unrelated  to  the  one  identical  subject.  Relation  to 
a single  subject  does  not  take  place  when  I accompany 
each  determination  with  consciousness,  but  only  when  I 
add  one  determination  to  the  other,  and  am  conscious 
of  this  act  of  synthesis.  It  is  only  because  I am  capable 
of  combining  in  one  consciousness  the  various  determina- 
tions presented  to  me,  that  I can  become  aware  that  in 
every  one  of  them  the  consciousness  is  the  same.  The 
analytic  unity  of  apperception  is,  therefore,  possible  only 
134  under  presupposition  of  a certain  synthetic  unity.  The 
thought,  that  the  determinations  given  in  a perception  all 
belong  to  me,  is  the  same  as  the  thought,  that  I unite 
them,  or  at  least  that  I am  capable  of  uniting  them  in  one 
self-consciousness.  This  does  not  of  itself  involve  a 
consciousness  of  the  synthesis  of  determinations,  but  it  pre- 
supposes the  possibility  of  that  consciousness.  It  is 
only  because  I am  capable  of  grasping  the  various  deter- 
minations in  one  consciousness,  that  I can  call  them  all 
mine ; were  it  not  so,  I should  have  a self  as  many- 
coloured  and  various  as  the  separate  determinations  of 
which  I am  conscious.  Synthetic  unity  of  the  various 
determinations  of  perception  as  given  a priori , is 
therefore  the  ground  of  that  identity  of  apperception 
itself,  which  precedes  a priori  every  definite  act  of 
thought.  Now,  objects  cannot  combine  themselves,  nor 
can  understanding  learn  that  they  are  combined  by 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


67 


35  observing  their  combination.  All  combination  is  the 
work  of  understanding,  and  in  fact  understanding  is  itself 
nothing  but  the  faculty  of  combining  a priori , and 
bringing  under  the  unity  of  apperception,  the  various 
determinations  given  in  perception.  The  unity  of 
apperception  is,  therefore,  the  supreme  principle  of  all 
our  knowledge. 

This  principle  of  the  necessary  unity  of  apperception, 
is  no  doubt  in  itself  an  identical  and  therefore  an  analytic 
proposition ; but  it  also  reveals  the  necessity  for  a 
synthesis  of  the  various  determinations  given  in  percep- 
tion, because  without  such  synthesis  the  thoroughgoing 
identity  of  self-consciousness  is  inconceivable.  In  the 
simple  consciousness  of  self,  no  variety  of  determination 
is  given  ; such  variety  of  determination  can  be  given 
only  in  the  perception  which  is  distinguished  from  the 
consciousness  of  self,  and  can  be  thought  only  by  being 
combined  in  one  consciousness.  An  understanding  in 
which  the  consciousness  of  self  should  at  the  same  time 
be  a consciousness  of  all  the  complex  determinations  of 
objects,  would  be  perceptive ; but  our  understanding  can 
only  think,  and  must  go  to  sense  for  perception.  I am 
conscious  of  my  self  as  identical  in  the  various  determina- 
tions presented  to  me  in  a perception,  because  all 
determinations  that  constitute  one  perception  I call  mine. 
But  this  is  the  same  as  saying,  that  I am  conscious  of  a 
necessary  synthesis  of  them  a priori, , or  that  they  rest 
upon  the  original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception,  under 

36  which  all  the  determinations  given  to  me  must  stand,  but 
under  which  they  can  be  brought  only  by  means  of  a 
synthesis. 


68 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


17.  The  synthetic  unity  of  Apperception  is  the  supreme 
principle  of  Understanding. 

In  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic,  we  have  seen  that  the 
supreme  principle,  without  which  perception  in  its 
relation  to  sensibility  is  impossible,  is,  that  all  the 
determinations  of  perception  should  stand  under  the 
formal  conditions  of  space  and  time.  Now,  the  supreme 
principle,  without  which  perception,  in  its  relation  to 
understanding  is  impossible,  is,  that  all  determinations  of 
perception  should  stand  under  conditions  of  the  original 
synthetic  unity  of  apperception.  Under  the  former  stand 
all  determinations  of  perception,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
given  to  us ; under  the  latter,  in  so  far  as  they  must  be 
capable  of  being  combined  in  one  consciousness.  Apart 
from  the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception,  nothing  can  be 
thought  or  known,  because  the  determinations  given  in 
perception,  not  having  the  act  of  apperception,  “ / think f 
in  common,  would  not  be  comprehended  in  one  self- 
consciousness. 

Speaking  quite  generally,  understanding  is  the  faculty 
of  knowledge.  Knowledge  consists  in  the  consciousness 
of  certain  given  determinations  as  related  to  an  object. 
An  object , again,  is  that,  in  the  conception  of  which  the 
various  determinations  of  a given  perception  are  united. 
Now,  all  unification  of  determinations  requires  unity  of 
consciousness  in  the  synthesis  of  the  determinations. 
Hence,  the  unity  of  consciousness  is  absolutely  necessary, 
to  constitute  the  relation  of  determinations  to  an  object, 
give  them  objective  validity,  and  make  them  objects  of 
knowledge ; and  on  that  unity  therefore  rests  the  very 
possibility  of  understanding. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


69 


The  principle  of  the  original  synthetic  unity  of  apper- 
ception, as  being  completely  independent  of  all  conditions 
of  sensuous  perception,  is  the  supreme  condition  of  the 
pure  use  of  understanding,  and  upon  this  pure  use  rests 
the  whole  of  its  empirical  use.  Space,  as  the  mere  form 
of  external  sensuous  perception,  does  not  of  itself  yield 
any  knowledge  : it  but  supplies  the  various  elements  of 
a priori  perception  that  are  capable  of  becoming 
8 knowledge.  To  know  anything  spatial,  as,  for  instance  a 
line,  I must  draw  it,  and  so  produce  by  synthesis  a 
definite  combination  of  the  given  elements.  Thus,  the 
unity  of  the  act  of  combination  is  at  the  same  time 
the  unity  of  the  consciousness  in  which  the  line  is 
thought,  and  only  in  this  unity  of  consciousness  is  a 
determinate  space  known  as  an  object.  The  synthetic 
unity  of  consciousness  is,  therefore,  an  objective  con 
dition  of  all  knowledge.  It  is  not  merely  a condition 
which  I must  observe  in  knowing  an  object,  but  it  is  a 
condition  under  which  every  perception  must  stand, 
before  it  can  become  a7i  object  for  me  at  all.  Without  this 
synthesis,  the  various  determinations  would  not  be  united 
in  one  consciousness. 

Although  it  is  thus  proved,  that  the  synthetic  unity  of 
consciousness  is  the  condition  of  all  thought,  the  unity  of 
consciousness,  as  has  been  already  said,  is  in  itself  an 
analytic  proposition.  For,  it  says  only,  that  all  the 
determinations  of  which  / am  conscious  in  a given  per- 
ception must  stand  under  the  condition,  which  enables 
me  to  regard  them  as  mine , or  as  related  to  my  identical 
self,  and  so  to  comprehend  them  as  synthetically  com- 
bined in  one  apperception,  through  the  “ I think  ” 
expressed  in  all  alike. 


7° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


But  this  is  not  the  principle  of  every  possible  under- 
standing, but  only  of  an  understanding,  through  the  pure 
apperception  of  which,  in  the  consciousness  “law,”  no 
39  determinations  are  given.  If  we  had  an  understanding, 
which,  by  its  mere  self-consciousness,  presented  to  itself 
the  manifold  determinations  of  perception  ; an  under- 
standing, which,  by  its  very  consciousness  of  objects, 
should  give  rise  to  the  existence  of  these  objects  ; such  an 
understanding  would  not  require,  for  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness, a special  act  of  synthesis  of  manifold  deter- 
minations. But  this  act  of  synthesis  is  essential  to 
human  understanding,  which  thinks,  but  does  not 
perceive.  It  is,  indeed,  the  supreme  principle  of  human 
understanding.  Nor  can  we  form  the  least  conception 
of  any  other  possible  understanding,  whether  of  one  that 
itself  perceives,  or  of  one  that  is  dependent  upon 
sensibility  for  its  perception,  but  not  upon  a sensibility 
that  stands  under  the  conditions  of  space  and  time. 


1 8.  Objective  unity  of  Self-consciousness. 

The  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  is  that  unity 
through  which  all  the  determinations  given  in  a percep- 
tion are  united  in  a conception  of  the  object.  It  is, 
accordingly,  called  objective , and  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  subjective  u?iity  of  consciousness,  which  is  a 
determination  of  the  inner  sense,  through  which  the 
complex  of  perception  is  given  empirically  to  be  com- 
bined into  an  object.  Whether  I shall  be  empirically 
conscious  of  certain  determinations  as  simultaneous,  or 
40  as  successive,  depends  upon  circumstances,  or  empirical 
conditions.  Hence,  the  empirical  unity  of  consciousness, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


71 


through  the  association  of  the  elements  of  perception,  is 
itself  a phenomenon,  and  is  perfectly  contingent.  But 
the  pure  form  of  perception  in  time,  as  merely  perception 
in  general,  stands  under  the  original  unity  of  conscious- 
ness just  because  the  various  determinations  given  in  it 
are  necessarily  related  to  an  “I  think."  It  therefore 
stands  under  that  original  unity  by  means  of  the  pure 
synthesis  of  understanding,  which  is  the  a priori  ground 
of  the  empirical  synthesis.  Only  the  original  unity  of 
apperception  is  objective;  the  empirical  unity,  with 
which  we  are  not  here  concerned,  and  which  besides  is 
only  derived  from  the  other,  under  given  conditions  in 
concreto,  is  merely  subjective.  To  one  man,  for  instance, 
a certain  word  suggests  one  thing,  to  another  a different 
thing.  In  what  is  empirical,  the  unity  of  consciousness 
does  not  hold  necessarily  and  universally  of  that  which 
is  given. 

19.  The  Logical  Form  of  all  Judgments  consists  in  the 
objective  unity  of  the  Conceptions  they  contain. 

141  A judgment  is  simply  the  way  in  which  given  ideas  are 
brought  to  the  objective  unity  of  apperception.  This  is 

142  the  force  of  the  copula  “ is,’’  which  just  marks  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  objective  unity  and  the  subjective 
unity  of  given  ideas.  It  indicates  their  relation  to  the 
original  apperception,  and  their  necessary  unity.  This 
holds  good  even  if  the  judgment  is  itself  empirical  and 
therefore  contingent.  I do  not  mean,  that,  in  the  pro- 
position, “ Bodies  are  heavy,”  the  idea  of  heavy  is 
necessarily  connected  with  the  idea  of  body  in  empirical 
perception,  but  that  they  are  connected  with  each  other 
in  the  synthesis  of  perceptions  through  the  necessary 


72 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


unity  of  apperception.  That  is  to  say,  the  two  ideas  are 
connected  with  each  other  in  conformity  with  the  prin- 
ciples by  which  ideas  are  objectively  determined  and 
become  knowledge.  Now,  those  principles  are  all 
derived  from  the  supreme  principle  of  the  transcendental 
unity  of  apperception.  Through  this  principle  alone, 
ideas  are  related  in  the  way  of  judgment,  and  become 
objectively  valid.  Thus  we  get  a sufficient  test  of  the 
distinction  between  the  relation  of  ideas  in  a judgment, 
and  a relation  of  the  same  ideas  that  is  only  of  subjective 
validity,  as,  for  instance,  a relation  depending  upon  the 
laws  of  association.  In  the  latter  case,  all  that  I could 
say  would  be,  that  if  I lift  a body,  I have  a sensation  of 
weight,  but  not,  that  the  body  is  heavy.  To  say  that  the 
body  is  heavy,  means,  that  the  two  ideas  of  heavy  and 
body  are  connected  together  in  the  object,  whatever  the 
state  of  the  subject  may  be,  and  not  merely  that  they  are 
contiguous  in  my  observation,  repeat  it  as  often  as  I 
please. 

143  20.  All  sensuous  Perceptio7is  stand  under  the  Categories  as 
conditions  under  which  alone  their  various  determin- 
ations can  come  together  in  one  Consciousness. 

The  various  determinations  given  in  a sensuous  per- 
ception stand  under  the  original  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception,  because  in  no  other  way  could  there 
possibly  be  any  unity  of  perception  (17).  But  that  act 
of  understanding,  by  which  the  determinations  given  in 
consciousness,  whether  these  are  perceptions  or  concep- 
tions, are  brought  under  a single  apperception,  is  the 
logical  function  of  the  judgment  (19).  Hence,  all  the 
elements  given  in  an  empirical  perception  are  determined 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


73 


by  one  of  the  logical  functions  of  judgment,  and  thus 
brought  into  one  consciousness.  But  the  categories  are 
just  the  functions  of  judgment,  in  so  far  as  these  are 
applied  in  determination  of  the  various  elements  of  a 
given  perception  (13).  Therefore,  the  various  determina- 
tions in  a given  perception  necessarily  stand  under  the 
categories. 

46  2 2.  The  Category  has  no  other  application  in  K710W- 

ledge  than  to  Objects  of  Exp  erieiice. 

To  think  an  object  is  not  the  same  thing  as  to  know 
it.  Knowledge  involves  two  elements  : firstly,  the  con- 
ception or  category,  by  which  an  object  in  general  is 
thought ; secondly,  the  perception  by  which  it  is  given. 
If  no  perception  could  be  given,  corresponding  to  the 
conception,  I should  no  doubt  be  able  to  think  an  object 
so  far  as  its  form  was  concerned,  but  as  there  would  be 
no  object  in  which  that  form  was  realized,  I could  not 
possibly  have  knowledge  of  any  actual  thing.  So  far  as 
I could  know,  there  would  be  nothing,  and  could  be 
nothing,  to  which  my  thought  might  be  applied.  Now, 
the  ^Esthetic  has  shown  to  us  that  all  the  perception  that 
we  can  have  is  sensuous ; hence  the  thought  of  an  object 
in  general,  by  means  of  a pure  conception  of  understand- 
ing, can  become  knowledge,  only  by  being  brought  into  re- 

47  lation  with  objects  of  sense.  Sensuous  perception  is  either 
the  pure  perception  of  space  and  time,  or  the  empirical 
perception  of  that  which  is  directly  presented  through 
sensation  as  actually  in  space  and  time.  By  the  deter- 
mination of  space  and  time  themselves,  we  can  obtain 
that  a priori  knowledge  of  objects  which  mathematics 
supplies.  But  this  knowledge  is  only  of  the  form  of 


74 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


phenomena,  and  it  is  still  doubtful  if  actual  things  must 
be  perceived  in  this  form.  Mathematical  conceptions, 
therefore,  can  be  called  knowledge,  only  if  it  is  presup- 
posed that  there  are  actual  things  which  cannot  be 
presented  to  us  except  under  the  form  of  that  pure 
sensuous  perception.  Now,  things  in  space  and  time  are 
given  to  us  only  through  empirical  observation,  that  is,  in 
perceptions  that  are  accompanied  by  sensation.  Hence, 
the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  even  if  they  are 
applied  to  a priori  perceptions,  as  in  mathematics,  do 
not  yield  a knowledge  of  things.  Before  there  can  be 
any  knowledge,  the  pure  perceptions,  and  the  concep- 
tions of  understanding  through  the  medium  of  pure 
perceptions,  must  be  applied  to  empirical  perceptions. 
The  categories,  therefore,  give  us  no  knowledge  of  actual 
things,  even  with  the  aid  of  perception,  except  in  so  far 
as  they  are  capable  of  being  applied  to  empirical  percep- 
tion. In  other  words,  they  are  merely  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  empirical  knowledge.  Now,  such  knowledge 
is  called  experience.  Hence  the  categories  have  a share 
148  in  the  knowledge  of  those  things  only  that  are  objects  of 
possible  experience. 


23- 

The  above  proposition  is  of  the  greatest  importance, 
for  it  marks  out  the  limits  of  the  pure  conceptions  of 
understanding  in  their  application  to  objects,  just  as 
Transcendental  Histhetic  marked  out  the  limits  of  the 
pure  forms  of  sensuous  perception.  Space  and  time  are 
but  the  conditions  under  which  objects  that  are  relative 
to  our  senses  are  capable  of  being  presented  to  us,  and 
therefore  they  apply  only  within  the  limits  of  experience. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


75 


Beyond  those  limits  they  have  no  meaning  whatever,  for 
they  are  only  in  the  senses,  and  have  no  reality  apart 
from  them.  The  pure  conceptions  of  understanding  are 
free  from  this  limitation,  and  extend  to  objects  of  percep- 
tion of  any  kind,  whether  that  perception  is  like  or  unlike 
ours,  if  only  it  is  sensuous,  and  not  intellectual.  But 
this  extension  of  conception  beyond  our  sensuous  per- 
ception does  not  help  us  in  the  least.  For,  the  concep- 
tions are  in  that  case  quite  empty,  and  we  are  therefore 
unable  even  to  say  that  there  are  any  objects  correspond- 
ing to  them.  They  are  mere  forms  of  thought  without 
objective  reality,  for  we  have  no  perception  at  hand,  and 
therefore  no  object,  to  which  the  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception,  which  is  the  sole  content  of  those  forms  of 
thought,  could  be  applied.  Only  our  sensuous  and 
empirical  perception  can  give  to  them  meaning  and 
reality. 

If  I suppose  an  object  of  a non-sensuous  perception  to 
be  given,  I can,  no  doubt,  think  of  it  as  having  all  the 
predicates  implied  in  my  presupposition.  I can  say  that 
the  object  has  none  of  the  determinations  proper  to 
sensuous  perception  : that  it  is  not  extended  or  in  space, 
that  its  duration  is  not  time,  that  there  is  in  it  no  change 
or  succession  of  states  in  time,  etc.  But  no  real  know- 
ledge of  an  object  is  gained  by  merely  indicating  how  it 
is  not  perceived,  so  long  as  I cannot  tell  what  is  the  con- 
tent of  its  perception.  I cannot  in  that  way  understand 
even  the  possibility  of  an  object  to  which  my  pure 
conception  could  apply,  for  I am  unable  to  bring  forward 
a perception  corresponding  to  such  an  object,  and  can 
say  only  that  my  perception  can  never  bring  me  into 
contact  with  it.  But  what  most  concerns  us  here,  is. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


76 

that  to  a tiling  of  that  nature,  not  even  a single  category 
could  be  applied.  I could  not  say,  for  instance,  that 
such  a thing  is  a substance,  that  is,  a thing  that  can  exist 
as  subject,  but  never  as  mere  predicate.  For,  how  could 
I apply  the  conception  of  substance,  when,  in  the  absence 
of  all  empirical  perception,  I should  not  even  know  that 
anything  corresponding  to  my  idea  could  exist  at  all? 


o 24.  The  application  of  the  Categories  to  objects 
of  sense. 

Understanding  is  capable  of  applying  its  pure  concep- 
tions to  any  object  of  perception,  whether  the  perception 
is  the  same  as  ours  or  not,  if  only  it  is  sensuous.  But 
what  this  shows  is  that  those  conceptions  are  but  mere 
forms  of  thought,  which  in  themselves  yield  no  knowledge 
of  a determinate  object.  As  we  have  seen,  the  synthesis, 
or  combination  of  various  elements  implied  in  these  forms 
of  thought,  is  relative  merely  to  the  unity  of  apperception, 
and  only  111  relation  to  that  unity  does  it  make  possible 
any  a priori  knowledge,  or  rather  that  knowledge  which 
rests  upon  understanding.  It  is,  therefore,  not  only 
transcendental,  but  also  purely  intellectual.  But  there 
lies  in  us  a certain  form  of  a priori  sensuous  perception, 
which  is  bound  up  with  our  sensibility,  or  the  receptive 
side  of  our  consciousness.  Hence  understanding,  by  its 
spontaneity,  is  capable  of  determining  the  inner  sense,  by 
bringing  the  various  elements  given  in  pure  perception 
into  conformity  with  the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception. 
Thus  it  can  think  synthetic  unity  of  the  apperception  of 
the  elements  implied  in  a priori  sensuous  perception  as 
the  condition  under  which  all  objects  of  human  percep- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


77 


tion  must  necessarily  stand.  In  this  way  the  categories, 
which  in  themselves  are  mere  forms  of  thought,  obtain 

51  objective  reality,  or  application  to  objects  that  can  be 
given  to  us  in  perception.  These  objects,  however,  are 
merely  phenomena,  for  only  to  phenomena  do  the  a 
priori  forms  of  perception  apply. 

This  synthesis  of  the  units  of  sensuous  perception, 
which  is  possible  and  necessary  a priori , may  be  called 
figural  synthesis  ( synthesis  speciosa),  to  distinguish  it  from 
that  intellectual  synthesis  ( synthesis  intellectualis),  which 
is  thought  in  the  mere  category  as  applicable  to  all  the 
determinations  of  a perception.  Both  are  transcendental , 
not  merely  because  they  precede  a priori  other  know- 
ledge, but  because  they  make  other  a priori  knowledge 
possible. 

But  the  figural  synthesis,  when  it  is  considered  merely 
in  relation  to  the  original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception, 
that  is,  to  the  transcendental  unity  which  is  thought  in 
the  categories,  must  be  called,  in  distinction  from  the 
purely  intellectual  combination,  the  transcendental  syn- 
thesis of  imagination.  Imagination  is  the  faculty  of 
setting  before  the  mind  in  perception  an  object  that  is 
not  itself  present.  Now,  all  our  perception  is  sensuous, 
and  hence  imagination  can  give  a perception  correspond- 
ing to  the  conceptions  of  understanding,  only  under  the 
subjective  condition  of  time.  Imagination  therefore 
pertains  to  sensibility.  At  the  same  time  its  synthesis  is 

52  the  expression  of  spontaneous  activity  ; for,  unlike  sense, 
imagination  is  not  simply  capable  of  being  determined, 
but  it  is  itself  determining  ; and  hence  it  can  a priori 
determine  sense  in  its  form,  in  accordance  with  the  unity 
of  apperception.  Imagination,  then,  is  in  one  point  of 


7* 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


view  the  faculty  of  determining  the  sensibility  a priori  ; 
and  its  synthesis  of  the  elements  of  pure  perception,  con- 
forming as  it  does  to  the  categories,  must  be  called  the 
transcendental  synthesis  of  imagination.  This  synthesis 
is  the  result  of  an  action  of  understanding  on  the  sensi- 
bility, or  it  is  the  first  application,  and  so  the  condition 
of  all  other  applications,  of  understanding  to  objects  that 
we  are  capable  of  perceiving.  The  figural  synthesis  is 
distinguished  from  the  intellectual  synthesis  simply  in 
this,  that  the  latter  is  due  purely  to  understanding  in 
isolation  from  imagination.  In  so  far  as  imagination  is  a 
spontaneous  activity,  I sometimes  call  \X.  productive  imagin- 
ation, to  distinguish  it  from  reproductive  imagination,  the 
synthesis  of  which  is  entirely  dependent  upon  empirical 
laws  of  association.  As  this  latter  synthesis  in  no  way 
helps  to  explain  how  a priori  knowledge  is  possible,  it 
belongs  to  psychology,  not  to  transcendental  philosophy. 

26.  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories  as 
employed  in  Experience. 

In  the  metaphysical  deduction  it  has  been  proved  that  the 
categories  have  their  origin  a priori , because  they  per- 
fectly agree  with  the  universal  logical  functions  of 
thought.  In  the  transcendental  deduction  (20,  21),  we 
have  seen  how  the  categories  make  possible  the  a priori 
knowledge  of  objects  of  perception  in  general.  We 
have  now  to  explain  how,  by  means  of  the  categories,  we 
are  capable  of  knowing  a priori  objects  of  which  we  are 
conscious  only  when  our  senses  are  actually  affected. 
What  we  propose  to  explain  is  not  how  there  can  be  an 
a priori  knowledge  of  sensible  objects  as  regards  the  form 
of  perception,  but  how  there  can  be  an  a priori  know- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


79 


ledge  of  the  laws  by  which  the  combination  of  objects 

160  is  effected,  or,  as  we  may  say,  what  are  the  laws  imposed 
upon  nature,  without  which  there  would  be  no  nature 
at  all. 

The  first  thing  to  be  observed  is  that  by  synthesis  of 
apprehension  is  meant  the  putting  together  of  various 
determinations  in  an  empirical  perception,  an  act  without 
which  there  could  be  no  observation  or  empirical  con- 
sciousness of  a phenomenal  object. 

In  space  and  time  we  have  a priori  forms  of  outer  as 
well  as  inner  perception  ; and  to  these  the  synthesis  of 
apprehension  must  always  conform,  because  in  no  other 
way  can  apprehension  take  place  at  all.  But  space  and 
time  are  more  than  mere  forms  of  sensuous  perception  : 
they  are  themselves  perceptions  that  contain  a complex 
of  elements,  and  these  elements  are  conceived  to  be  deter- 
mined a priori  to  unity  (see  Transcendental  ^Esthetic). 
Along  with  these  perceptions  (not  in  them)  there  is  pre- 
supposed a priori , as  condition  of  all  synthesis  of 

1 6 1 apprehension,  a unity  of  synthesis  of  the  various  determin- 
ations of  inner  and  outer  perception  ; and  this,  again, 
implies  that  whatever  can  be  perceived  as  in  space  and 
time  must  submit  to  combination.  This  synthetic  unity 
can  only  be  the  combination,  in  conformity  with  the 
categories,  of  the  various  elements  of  any  given  perception 
in  an  original  consciousness,  in  so  far  as  the  combination 
is  applied  to  our  sensuous  perception.  Hence,  all  synthesis, 
including  even  that  through  which  sensible  observation  is 
pos^le^jlaxidspnider  the  categories.  And,  as  experience 
is  knowledge  by  means  of  connected  observations,  the 
categories  are  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  experience, 
and  therefore  hold  a priori  of  all  objects  of  experience. 


So 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


162  I observe  a house,  for  instance,  by  the  apprehension  of 
various  determinations  given  in  empirical  perception. 
The  necessary  unity  of  space,  and  of  external  sensuous 
perception  in  general,  is  presupposed,  and  I draw  as  it 
were  an  outline  of  the  house,  in  conformity  with  this 
synthetic  unity  of  its  determinations  in  space.  But,  if  ] 
abstract  from  the  form  of  space,  the  very  same  synthetic 
unity  has  its  seat  in  understanding,  and  is  the  category  of 
quantity , or  the  category  of  the  synthesis  of  the  homo- 
geneous in  any  perception  whatever.  To  this  category, 
therefore,  the  synthesis  of  apprehension — that  is,  the 
observation — must  completely  conform. 

163  Categories  are  conceptions  which  a priori  prescribe 
laws  to  phenomena,  and  therefore  to  nature  as  the  sum 
total  of  all  phenomena  ( natura  materialiter  spectata ). 
Now,  the  categories  are  not  derived  from  nature,  nor  do 
they  adapt  themselves  to  nature  as  their  model,  for  in 
that  case  they  would  be  merely  empirical.  How,  then, 
one  asks,  can  it  be  shown  that  nature  must  adapt  itself  to 
them  ? How  can  the  categories  determine  a priori  the 
combination  of  the  complex  phenomena  of  nature,  instead 
of  going  to  nature  to  find  out  how  phenomena  are  com- 
bined ? Here  is  the  solution  of  the  problem. 

164  It  is  no  more  wonderful  that  the  laws  of  phenomena  in 
nature  must  agree  with  understanding  and  its  a priori 
form,  or  faculty  of  combining  any  complex  given  to  it, 
than  that  phenomena  themselves  must  agree  with  the 
form  of  a priori  sensuous  perception.  Just  as  phenomena 
have  no  existence  at  all,  apart  from  a subject  that  has 
senses,  so  there  exist  no  laws  in  phenomena,  apart  from 
a subject  that  has  understanding.  Things  in  themselves 
would  of  course  have  laws  of  their  own,  even  if  they  did 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


81 


not  come  within  the  knowledge  of  the  subject  through 
his  understanding.  But  phenomena  are  merely  the 
manner  in  which  things  appear  in  consciousness,  and  give 
no  knowledge  of  what  things  may  be  in  themselves.  As 
mere  appearances  they  are  subject  to  no  law  of  con- 
nection but  that  which  is  imposed  by  the  connective 
faculty.  Now,  it  is  imagination  that  connects  the  various 
units  of  sensuous  perception,  and  imagination  is  de- 
pendent upon  understanding  for  the  unity  of  its  intellec- 
tual synthesis,  and  upon  sensibility  for  the  complexity  of 
apprehension.  But  nothing  can  come  under  observation 
without  a synthesis  of  apprehension,  and  this  empirical 
synthesis  is  dependent  upon  the  transcendental  synthesis, 
and  therefore  upon  the  categories.  Hence,  all  that  can 
165  be  observed,  or  can  come  to  empirical  consciousness, 
that  is,  all  phenomena  of  nature,  must  depend  for  com- 
bination upon  the  categories.  In  the  categories,  there- 
fore, nature  as  a system  of  necessary  laws  ( natura 
formaliter  spectata)  has  its  ground  and  origin.  Pure 
understanding,  however,  cannot  by  mere  categories  pre- 
scribe a priori  any  laws  to  phenomena  other  than  those 
universal  laws  of  nature  -that  apply  to  all  objects  in  space 
and  time.  Special  laws,  as  relating  only  to  what  is 
empirically  determined,  cannot  be  completely  derived  from 
the  categories,  although  they  must  all,  without  exception, 
stand  under  the  categories.  To  learn  what  are  the  special 
laws  of  nature,  we  must  go  to  experience  ; but  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  only  the  a priori  laws  imposed  by 
understanding  tell  us  what  is  necessary  for  any  experience 
whatever,  and  what  is  capable  of  being  known  as  an 
object  of  experience. 


F 


82 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


27.  Result  of  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

We  cannot  think  an  object  without  categories  ; we 
cannot  know  an  object  so  thought  without  perceptions 
that  correspond  to  categories.  Now,  all  our  perceptions 
are  sensuous,  and  therefore  all  our  knowledge  of  objects 
that  are  presented  in  perception  is  empirical.  But 

66  empirical  knowledge  is  experience.  Hence  there  can  be 
no  a priori  knowledge,  except  of  objects  that  are  capable 
of  entering  into  experience. 

But  although  such  knowledge  is  limited  to  objects  of 
experience,  it  is  not  therefore  altogether  derived  from 
experience.  For  pure  perceptions  as  well  as  pure  con- 
ceptions are  elements  in  knowledge,  and  both  are  found 
in  us  a priori.  There  are  only  two  ways  in  which  we  can 
account  for  a necessary  coincidence  of  the  data  of 
experience  with  the  conceptions  which  we  form  of  its 
objects  : either  that  experience  must  make  the  concep- 
tions possible,  or  the  conceptions  must  make  experience 

67  possible.  The  former  supposition  is  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  the  categories,  not  to  speak  of  pure  sensuous 
perception  ; for  the  categories,  as  a priori  conceptions, 
are  independent  of  experience,  and  to  derive  them  from 
experience  would  be  a sort  of  generatio  aequivoca.  The 
alternative  supposition,  which  involves  what  may  be 
called  an  epigenesis  of  pure  reason,  must  therefore  be 
adopted,  and  we  must  hold  that  the  categories,  as  pro- 
ceeding from  understanding,  contain  the  grounds  of  the 
possibility  of  any  experience  whatever. 

68  Short  Statement  of  the  Deduction. 

What  has  been  shown  in  the  deduction  of  the  cate- 
gories is  that  the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  on 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


83 


which  all  theoretical  a priori  knowledge  is  based,  are  only 
principles  that  make  experience  possible.  In  other 
169  words,  they  are  principles  for  the  general  determination  of 
phenomena  in  space  and  time,  a determination  that 
ultimately  flows  from  the  principle  of  the  original  syn- 
thetic unity  of  apperception  as  the  form  of  understanding 
in  relation  to  space  and  time,  the  original  forms  of 
sensibility. 


BOOK  II.— THE  ANALYTIC  OF  JUDGMENTS. 

17 1 Transcendental  judgment.  13 

If  understanding  is  called  the  faculty  of  rules,  judgment 
will  be  the  faculty  of  subsumption  under  rules,  that  is,  the 
faculty  of  deciding  whether  something  stands  under  a 
given  rule  or  not  ( casus  datae  legis).  Now  pure  general 
logic  does  not,  and  indeed  cannot,  lay  down  rules  for  the 
application  of  judgment.  For,  as  it  abstracts  from  all  the 
content  of  knowledge,  its  sole  business  is  to  analyze  the 

•72  pure  form  of  knowledge,  as  expressed  in  conceptions,  I3 
judgments,  and  inferences,  and  from  this  analysis  to 
derive  formal  rules  for  the  general  use  of  understanding. 

174  The  business  of  transcendental  logic,  on  the  other  hand,  13 
is  to  lay  down  definite  rules  which  may  enable  judgment 

to  make  a correct  and  certain  use  of  the  conceptions  of 
understanding.  For  transcendental  philosophy  has  the 
peculiarity  that  it  not  only  brings  to  light  the  rules,  or 
rather  the  universal  condition  of  rules,  implied  in  the 

175  pure  conceptions  of  understanding,  but  it  is  able  also  to 
indicate  a priori  the  case  to  which  each  rule  should  be 


84 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


applied.  The  reason  of  its  superiority  in  this  respect 
over  all  other  theoretical  sciences,  except  mathematics, 
is  that  the  conceptions  with  which  it  deals  relate  to 
objects  a priori. 

The  transcendental  doctrine  of  judgment  consists  of  i 3 
two  chapters.  The  first  treats  of  the  sensuous  condition 
without  which  no  pure  conceptions  of  understanding  can 
be  used.  This  is  called  the  schematism  of  understanding. 
The  second  deals  with  the  synthetic  judgments,  which 
arise  a priori  when  the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding 
are  brought  into  use  under  that  condition,  and  which 
underlie  all  other  a priori  knowledge.  It  treats,  in  other 
words,  of  the  principles  of  pure  understanding. 

176  Chapter  I.— The  Schematism  of  the  Categories.  13 

In  all  subsumption,  the  object  of  which  we  are  conscious 
must  be  homogeneous  with  the  conception  under  which  it 
is  brought ; in  other  words,  the  conception  must  contain 
some  determination  that  is  also  present  in  the  object 
subsumed  under  it.  This  in  fact  is  what  we  mean  when 
we  say  that  an  object  is  contained  under  a conception. 
The  empirical  conception  of  a plate , for  instance,  is 
homogeneous  with  the  pure  geometrical  conception  of  a 
circle,  because  the  roundness  which  is  thought  as  a deter- 
mination of  the  plate  is  presented  as  a perception  in  the 
circle. 

Now,  a pure  conception,  or  category,  is  quite  hetero- 
geneous from  an  empirical  perception,  or  indeed  from 
any  sensuous  perception,  and  hence  no  pure  concep- 
tion can  ever  be  found  realized  in  a perception.  No 

177  one  will  say  that  the  category  of  cause  can  be  made 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


85 


visible  to  sense,  or  can  be  presented  in  a particular 
perception  as  a property  of  it.  How  then  can  a percep- 
tion be  subsumed  under  a pure  conception?  How  can 
a category  be  applied  in  determination  of  an  object  of 
sense?  It  is  because  this  very  natural  and  very  important  138 
question  demands  an  answer  that  a transcendental  doc- 
trine of  judgment  is  necessary.  It  must  be  shown  how 
pure  conceptions  of  understanding  can  possibly  be  applied 
to  phenomena.  In  other  sciences  it  is  not  necessary  to 
show  that  conceptions  are  applicable  to  objects,  because 
the  general  conception  of  the  object  is  not  in  the  same 
way  distinct  and  heterogeneous  from  the  object  as 
presented  in  concreto. 

Manifestly  there  must  be  some  third  thing,  which  is 
homogeneous  on  the  one  hand  with  the  category,  and  on 
the  other  hand  with  the  object  of  sense,  and  which  thus 
makes  the  application  of  the  one  to  the  other  possible. 

This  mediating  idea  must  be  pure , or  free  from  any 
empirical  element,  and  yet  it  must  be  at  once  intellectual 
and  sensuous.  Such  an  idea  is  the  transcendental  schema. 

The  category  contains  the  pure  synthetic  unity  of  any 
elements  of  which  we  can  be  conscious  as  different. 
Time,  as  the  formal  condition  of  the  various  determina- 
tions of  inner  sense,  and  therefore  of  the  connections  of 
all  our  ideas,  contains  a priori  in  pure  perception  a variety 
of  differences.  Now,  a transcendental  determination  of 
time  is  so  far  homogeneous  with  the  category  which 
j y 3 gives  unity  to  it,  that  it  is  universal , and  rests  upon  an  a 
priori  rule.  But,  on  its  other  side,  that  determination  is  ^ 
to  a certain  extent  homogeneous  with  the  object  of  sense, 
since  time  is  present  in  every  object  of  which  we  can  be 
empirically  conscious.  By  means  of  the  transcendental 


86 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


determination  of  time  or  schema,  the  category  may  there- 
fore be  applied  to  phenomena,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing, 
the  phenomenon  may  be  subsumed  under  the  category. 

179  In  itself  a schema  is  merely  a product  of  imagination  ; 14c 
but,  as  in  producing  it  imagination  does  not  seek  to  set 
before  itself  an  individual  object  of  perception,  but  to 
produce  unity  in  the  general  determination  of  sensibility, 
we  must  distinguish  between  the  schema  and  the  image. 

If  I set  down  five  points  one  after  the  other,  thus 

I have  before  me  an  image  of  the  number 

five.  But  if  I think  simply  of  number — of  any  number  at 
all,  be  it  five. or  a hundred — my  thought  is  rather  of  the 
method  by  which  a certain  sum,  say  a thousand,  may  be 
presented  in  an  image,  in  conformity  with  a certain  con- 
ception, than  itself  an  image.  It  would,  in  fact,  be  very 
hard  to  compare  the  image  of  so  large  a number  as  a 
thousand  with  the  conception  of  it.  Now,  the  conscious- 
x8o  ness  of  a universal  process  of  imagination,  by  which  an 
image  is  provided  for  a conception,  is  what  I call  the 
schema  of  a conception. 

In  point  of  fact,  schemata,  and  not  images,  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  our  pure  sensuous  conceptions.  No  image  141 
of  a triangle  can  ever  be  adequate  to  the  general 
conception  of  triangle.  The  conception  includes  all 
triangles — right-angled,  obtuse-angled,  etc. ; and,  hence, 
the  image  which  I can  set  before  myself  can  never  reach 
to  the  universality  of  the  conception,  but  occupies  only  a 
part  of  its  sphere.  The  schema  of  the  triangle  can  exist 
nowhere  but  in  thought  : it  is  simply  a rule  for  the 
synthesis  of  imagination,  in  the  determination  of  pure 
figures  in  space.  Much  less  can  a single  object  of 
experience,  or  an  image  of  a single  object,  reach  to  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


87 


universality  of  an  empirical  conception.  The  direct 
relation  of  an  empirical  conception  is  to  the  schema  of 
imagination,  or  the  rule  by  which  a perception  is  deter- 
mined in  conformity  with  that  conception.  The  concep- 
tion of  a dog,  for  instance,  is  a rule  for  the  guidance  of 
imagination  in  tracing  out  the  figure  of  a certain  four- 
footed  animal ; but  it  cannot  be  restricted  to  any  single 
determinate  figure  that  experience  can  supply,  nor  can  it 
even  be  presented  in  concreto  in  any  possible  image  that  I 
am  capable  of  imagining.  This  schematism  of  our  under- 
standing, in  its  application  to  phenomena  and  to  their 
pure  form,  is  an  art  hidden  away  in  the  depths  of  the 
jgj  human  soul,  the  secret  of  which  we  need  not  hope  to 
drag  forth  to  the  light  of  day.  This  much  may  be  said  : 
that  the  image  is  a product  of  the  empirical  faculty  of 
productive  imagination ; while  the  schema  of  sensuous 
conceptions,  as,  for  instance,  of  figures  in  space,  is  a 142 
product,  and  as  it  were  a monogram,  of  pure  a priori 
imagination,  which  makes  the  consciousness  of  an  image 
possible  at  all.  An  image  is  necessarily  connected  with 
a conception  through  the  schema,  and  is  in  no  case  quite 
congruent  with  the  conception.  But  what  distinguishes 
the  schema  of  a pure  conception  of  understanding  as 
such,  is  that  it  cannot  be  presented  in  an  image  at  all, 
but  is  simply  the  pure  synthesis,  which  conforms  to  a rule 
of  unity  expressed  in  the  category.  Such  a schema  is  a 
transcendental  product  of  imagination.  It  is  a determina- 
tion of  the  inner  sense  according  to  conditions  of  its  form 
of  time  in  view  of  all  ideas,  a determination  which  is 
necessary,  if  ideas  are  to  be  brought  together  a priori 
in  one  conception,  in  conformity  with  the  unity  of 
apperception. 


88 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


82  The  pure  image  of  all  magnitudes  ( quatita ) that  are 
presented  in  outer  sense  is  space  ; the  pure  image  of  all 
objects  of  sense,  inner  as  well  as  outer,  is  time.  But 
quantity  ( quantitas ),  as  a conception  of  understanding, 
has  as  its  schema  number,  or  the  idea  of  the  successive 
addition  of  homogeneous  unit  to  homogeneous  unit. 
Number  is,  therefore,  the  unity  of  synthesis  implied  in  143 
putting  together  any  homogeneous  units  of  perception 
whatever,  a unity  which  results  from  the  generation  of 
time  itself  in  the  apprehension  of  the  perception. 

The  category  of  reality  is  the  conception  of  that  which 
corresponds  to  any  sensation  whatever,  and  therefore  of 
that,  the  very  idea  of  which  is  that  it  has  being  in  time  ; 
the  category  of  negation  is  the  conception  of  that,  the 
very  idea  of  which  is  that  it  has  no  being  in  time.  The 
opposition  of  reality  and  negation  therefore  rests  upon 
the  distinction  between  a time  as  filled  and  the  same 
time  as  empty.  And,  as  time  is  merely  the  form  of  per- 
ception, that  which  in  the  phenomenon  corresponds  to 
sensation  is  the  transcendental  matter,  or  reality,  of  all 
objects  as  actual  things.  Now,  every  sensation  has  a 
degree  or  magnitude  by  which  it  is  capable  of  filling  the 
same  time  more  or  less,  or,  in  other  words,  of  occupying 
the  inner  sense,  with  more  or  less  completeness,  down  to 
the  vanishing  point  ( = o = negatio).  Hence,  there  is 

83  a relation  and  connection,  or  rather  a transition  from 
reality  to  negation,  which  makes  us  capable  of  setting 
every  reality  before  ourselves  as  a quantum.  The  schema 
of  reality,  as  the  quantity  of  something  so  far  as  it  fills  a 
time,  is  just  this  continuous  and  uniform  generation  of 
reality  in  time,  by  the  gradual  descent  from  a sensation 
that  has  a certain  degree  in  time  to  its  disappearance,  or, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  89 

what  is  the  same  thing,  the  gradual  ascent  from  the 
negation  of  sensation  to  its  definite  degree. 

The  schema  of  substance  is  the  permanence  of  the  144 
real  in  time,  or  the  idea  of  the  real  as  presupposed  in  the 
empirical  determination  of  time,  and  as  persisting  while 
all  else  changes.  Time  does  not  itself  pass  away,  but  the 
changeable  in  time  passes  away  in  its  particular  being. 
What  corresponds  in  the  phenomenon  to  time,  which  is  in 
itself  unchangeable  and  permanent,  is  the  unchangeable 
in  existence,  or  substance ; and  only  in  reference  to 
substance  can  the  succession  and  the  co-existence  of 
phenomena  be  determined  in  time. 

The  schema  of  cause,  and  of  the  causality  of  a thing 
in  general,  is  the  real  which  is  supposed  never  to  exist 
without  being  followed  by  something  else.  It  consists, 
therefore,  in  the  succession  of  various  determinations,  in 
so  far  as  that  succession  is  subject  to  a rule. 

The  schema  of  community  (reciprocal  action),  or  of 
the  reciprocal  causality  of  substances  as  regards  their 
184  accidents,  is  the  co-existence  in  conformity  with  a uni- 
versal rule  of  the  determinations  of  one  substance  with 
those  of  another. 

The  schema  of  possibility  is  the  harmony  of  the 
synthesis  of  different  ideas  with  conditions  of  time  in 
general.  Opposites,  for  instance,  cannot  exist  in  the 
same  thing  at  the  same  time,  but  only  the  one  after  the 
other.  The  schema  of  possibility  therefore  determines 
how  a thing  is  capable  of  being  known  at  any  time. 

The  schema  of  actuality  is  existence  in  a determinate  145 
time. 

The  schema  of  necessity  is  the  existence  of  an  object 
at  all  times. 


9° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


From  all  this  it  is  plain  that  the  schema  of  every  one 
of  the  categories  is  in  some  way  relative  to  time.  The 
schema  of  quantity  is  the  generation  or  synthesis  of  time 
itself  in  the  successive  apprehension  of  an  object  ; the 
schema  of  quality,  the  synthesis  of  sensation,  as  implied 
in  observation,  with  the  consciousness  of  time,  or,  in 
other  words,  it  is  the  filling  up  of  time  ; the  schema  of 
relation,  the  relation  of  different  perceptions  to  one 
another  at  all  times,  or  in  conformity  with  a rule  for  the 
determination  of  time  ; lastly,  the  schema  of  modality, 
in  its  three  forms,  time  itself  as  the  correlative  of  the 
determination  whether  and  how  an  object  belongs  to 
time.  The  schemata  are,  therefore,  just  a priori  determi- 
nations of  time  in  conformity  with  rules.  Following  the 
order  of  the  categories,  we  find  that  these  rules,  which 
1 85  apply  to  all  possible  objects  of  experience,  relate  to  the 
series  of  time,  the  content  of  time,  the  order  of  time,  and  the 
comprehension  of  time. 

We  thus  see  that  the  schematism  of  understanding, 
through  the  transcendental  synthesis  of  imagination,  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  way  in  which  the  various 
determinations  of  perception  are  reduced  to  unity  in  the 
inner  sense,  and  so  indirectly  to  the  unity  of  apperception, 
the  function  that  corresponds  to  the  receptivity  of  inner 
sense.  The  schemata  are,  therefore,  the  true  and  only  146 
conditions  under  which  the  categories  obtain  significance, 
by  being  brought  into  relation  with  objects.  In  the  end, 
therefore,  the  categories  have  no  other  application  than 
to  objects  of  a possible  experience.  They  merely  serve 
to  bind  phenomena  together  under  universal  rules  of 
synthesis,  by  means  of  a necessary  a priori  unity  that  has 
its  source  in  the  necessary  combination  of  all  conscious- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


91 


ness  in  the  original  unity  of  apperception.  Thus  it  is 
that  the  categories  make  phenomena  fit  for  a thorough- 
going connection  in  one  experience. 

Within  this  whole  of  possible  experience  all  our  know- 
ledge lies,  and  in  the  universal  relation  to  possible 
experience  consists  that  transcendental  truth  which 
precedes  empirical  truth  and  makes  it  possible. 

But  no  one  can  fail  to  see  that,  although  only  the 

186  schemata  of  sensibility  can  realize  the  categories,  they 
none  the  less  restrict  them.  For  the  schemata  limit  the 
categories  by  conditions  that  lie  outside  of  understanding 
and  in  sensibility.  The  schema  is  in  harmony  with  the 
category,  but  it  is  properly  merely  the  sensuous  appear- 
ance or  sensuous  conception  of  an  object.  Now.  it  is 
naturally  supposed  that  the  sphere  of  a conception 
previously  restricted  is  enlarged  when  the  restriction  is 
taken  away.  Hence  it  may  be  thought  that  the  categories  14 
in  their  purity,  or  apart  from  all  conditions  of  sensibility, 
hold  true  of  things  as  they  really  are  ; while  the  schemata 
present  them  only  as  they  appear.  On  this  view  the 
categories  will  have  a much  wider  meaning  than  the 
schemata,  and  will  be  quite  independent  of  them.  And 
this  is  so  far  true  that,  even  apart  from  all  sensuous  con- 
ditions the  categories  are  not  meaningless,  for  they  still 
have  the  logical  meaning  of  the  unity  of  our  ideas  of  ob- 
jects. But  no  conception  has  in  itself  objective  meaning, 
because,  apart  from  the  conditions  of  sensibility,  there  is 
no  object  to  which  it  can  be  applied.  Substance,  for 
instance,  viewed  apart  from  the  sensuous  determination 

of  permanence,  simply  means,  that  which  can  be  thought 
only  as  subject,  never  as  the  predicate  of  anything  else. 

187  But  such  an  idea  has  no  meaning  for  us,  because  it  tells 


92 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


200 


202 


203 


us  nothing  whatever  about  the  actual  nature  of  the  thing 
that  is  thought  to  be  an  ultimate  subject.  Without 
schemata,  therefore,  the  categories  are  only  functions  of 
understanding  for  conceptions,  and  give  no  knowledge 
of  objects.  Meaning  comes  to  them  from  sensibility,  and 
sensibility  realizes  understanding  only  by  restricting  it. 


Chapter  II. — Principles  of  Pure  Understanding.  148 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  we  have  considered  the 
transcendental  faculty  of  judgment  with  reference  only 
to  the  universal  conditions,  under  which  it  is  justified  in 
employing  the  categories  for  the  production  of  synthetic 
judgments.  We  have  now  to  set  forth,  in  systematic 
order,  the  judgments  which  understanding,  under  that 
critical  provision,  actually  produces  a priori.  The 
table  of  categories  will  no  doubt  be  a safe  and  natural 
guide.  Accordingly  we  find  that  all  the  principles  of  161 
pure  understanding  are— 

1.  Axioms  of  Perception. 

2.  Anticipations  of  3.  Analogies  of 

Observation.  Experience. 

4.  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought. 


1.  Axioms  of  Perception. 

The  principle  of  these  is  : All  perceptions  are  extensive 
magnitudes. 

Proof. 

By  an  extensive  magnitude,  I mean  a magnitude  in  162 
which  the  idea  of  the  parts  necessarily  precedes  and 
makes  possible  the  idea  of  the  whole.  I cannot  have 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


93 


the  idea  of  a line,  however  small  it  may  be,  with- 

out drawing  it  in  thought ; only  by  producing  its  parts 
one  after  the  other,  beginning  from  a certain  point,  do  163 
I mark  out  the  line  as  a perception.  Similarly  with 
every  portion  of  time,  even  the  smallest.  I am  con- 
scious of  time  only  in  the  successive  advance  from  one 
moment  to  another,  and  it  is  by  the  addition  of  all  the 
parts  that  a definite  quantity  of  time  is  at  last  generated. 
Now,  either  space  or  time  is  present  in  every 

204  phenomenon  as  its  pure  element ; and  as  this  pure 

element  can  be  known  in  apprehension  only  by  a 

successive  synthesis  of  part  with  part,  every  perception 
is  an  extensive  magnitude.  No  phenomenon,  therefore, 
can  be  perceived  at  all  without  being  perceived  as  an 
aggregate  or  collection  of  previously  given  parts,  a 
characteristic  which  does  not  hold  good  of  every  sort  of 
magnitude,  but  only  of  those  magnitudes,  which,  from 
their  very  nature,  are  apprehended  and  presented  in 
consciousness  as  extensive. 

On  this  successive  synthesis  of  productive  imagina- 
tion in  the  generation  of  figures,  Geometry,  as  the 
mathematics  of  extension,  is  based.  The  axioms  of 
geometry  express  the  conditions  of  sensuous  perception 
a priori,  without  which  no  schema  of  any  pure  concep- 
tion of  an  external  object  is  possible ; as,  for  instance, 
that  between  any  two  points  only  one  straight  line  can  be 
drawn  ; that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a space, 
etc.  Such  axioms  as  these  properly  apply  only  to 
magnitudes  ( quanta ) as  such. 

As  to  quantity  ( guantitas ),  that  is,  the  answer  to  the 
question  how  large  a thing  is,  there  are,  strictly  speaking, 
no  axioms,  although  several  of  the  propositions  referring  164 


94  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

to  it  are  synthetic  and  immediately  certain  ( indemon - 
strabilia).  The  propositions,  that  if  equals  be  added  to 
equals  the  wholes  are  equal,  and  that  if  equals  be  taken 
from  equals  the  remainders  are  equal,  are  analytic  pro- 

205  positions  ; for  I am  directly  conscious  that  the  quantity 
generated  in  the  one  case  is  identical  with  the  quantity 
generated  in  the  other ; these  propositions,  therefore, 
have  no  title  to  be  called  axioms,  which  must  needs  be 
a priori  synthetic  propositions.  There  are,  indeed, 
simple  numerical  propositions  which  are  synthetic;  but, 
unlike  the  synthetic  propositions  of  geometry,  they  are 
not  universal,  and  therefore  even  they  cannot  be  called 
axioms,  but  only  numerical  formulae.  That  7 + 5 = 1 2 is 
not  an  analytic  proposition.  For  neither  the  idea  of  7, 
nor  that  of  5,  nor  the  idea  of  the  combination  of  the  two, 
yields  the  number  12.  But,  while  it  is  synthetic, 
the  proposition  7 + 5 = 12  is  merely  individual.  The 
synthesis  of  the  homogeneous  can  here  take  place  only 
in  one  way,  although  no  doubt  the  numbers  may  afterwards 
be  employed  universally.  If  I say  that  a triangle  may  be 
constructed  out  of  three  lines,  any  two  of  which  are 
together  greater  than  the  third,  I have  before  my  mind 
the  mere  function  of  productive  imagination,  which  may 
draw  the  lines  greater  or  smaller,  and  bring  them  1 
together  in  all  sorts  of  angles  at  will.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  number  7 is  possible  only  in  one  way,  and  the 
number  12  can  be  produced  only  by  the  synthesis  of  5 

206  with  it.  If  mere  numerical  formulae  like  this  are  to  be 
called  axioms,  the  number  of  axioms  will  be  infinite. 

This  transcendental  principle  of  the  mathematics  of 
nature  greatly  enlarges  our  a priori  knowledge.  It  shows, 
as  nothing  else  can  show,  that  mathematics  in  all  its 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


95 


precision  is  applicable  to  objects  of  experience ; and  this, 
so  far  from  being  self-evident,  has  been  the  occasion  of 
much  controversy.  Phenomena  are  not  things  in  them- 
selves. Empirical  perception  is  possible  only  through 
the  pure  perception  of  space  and  of  time  ; and,  therefore, 
whatever  geometry  says  of  pure  perception  is  beyond 
dispute  true  also  of  empirical  perception.  All  attempts 
to  evade  this  conclusion,  by  showing  that  objects  of 
sense  need  not  conform  to  the  rules  of  geometrical 
construction — for  instance,  the  rule  of  the  infinite  divisi- 
bility of  lines  and  angles — must  be  at  once  set  aside. 
Were  such  a contention  true,  the  objective  truth  of 
geometry,  and  therefore  of  all  mathematics,  would  be 
overthrown,  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  say  why  and 
how  far  mathematics  should  be  applied  to  phenomena  at 
all.  The  synthesis  of  spaces  and  times,  as  the  essential 
forms  of  all  perception,  is  that  which  makes  the  appre- 
hension of  a phenomenon  even  possible,  and  hence  it  is  166 
the  condition  of  all  external  experience,  and  so  of  all 
knowledge  of  external  objects.  Whatever  pure  mathe- 
matics proves  to  be  true  of  space  and  time  must  necessarily 
hold  good  of  all  external  objects.  All  objections  to  the 
truth  of  applied  mathematics  are  but  the  chicanery  of  an 
ill-advised  reason,  which  wrongly  seeks  to  free  objects 
of  sense  from  the  formal  condition  of  our  sensibility, 
and  to  treat  them  as  if  they  were  things  in  themselves 
apprehended  by  understanding.  If  phenomena  were 
really  things  in  themselves,  we  could  know  nothing  what- 
ever of  them  a priori;  and  as  no  synthetic  judgments 
can  be  based  upon  pure  conceptions  of  space,  geometry, 
as  the  science  of  the  properties  of  space,  would  itself  be 
impossible. 


96 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


2.  Anticipations  of  Observation. 

The  principle  of  these  is  : In  all  phenomena  the  real, 
which  is  an  object  of  sensation,  has  intensive  magnitude 
or  degree. 

Proof. 

209  If  it  should  turn  out  that  in  all  sensations  as  such,  how-  167 
ever  they  may  differ  from  one  another,  there  is  something 
that  can  be  known  a priori ; this  would,  in  a very  special 
sense,  deserve  to  be  called  an  anticipation.  For  by  this 
name  we  should  call  attention  to  the  remarkable  fact  that 

it  is  possible  to  say  something  a priori  about  the  nature 
of  empirical  objects,  that  is,  about  that  very  element  in 
them  which  is  due  to  experience. 

If  no  heed  is  paid  to  the  succession  of  different 
sensations,  apprehension  by  means  of  mere  sensation 
is  found  to  occupy  only  a moment.  Here  there  is  no 
successive  synthesis,  advancing  from  the  consciousness  of 
the  parts  to  the  consciousness  of  the  whole,  and  therefore 
that  in  the  phenomenon  which  is  called  sensation  has  no 
extensive  magnitude.  The  absence  of  sensation  from  the 
moment  that  it  fills  would  therefore  carry  with  it  the 

210  consciousness  of  that  moment  as  empty  = 0.  Now  that  168 
which  in  empirical  perception  corresponds  to  sensation  is 
reality  ( realitas  pliaeno?jienon ) ; that  which  corresponds  to 
the  absence  of  sensation  is  negation  = o.  But  every 
sensation  is  capable  of  diminution,  so  that  it  can  decrease 
and  gradually  disappear.  Between  reality  in  the  pheno- 
menon and  negation,  there  is,  therefore,  a continuous 
series  of  many  possible  intermediate  sensations,  the 
difference  between  any  two  of  which  is  always  less  than 
the  difference  between  the  given  sensation  and  zero  or 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


97 


complete  negation.  That  is  to  say,  the  real  in  the 
phenomenon  always  has  a quantity,  but  of  this  quantity 
there  is  no  consciousness  in  apprehension,  because 
apprehension,  so  far  as  it  is  due  to  the  inner  sensation, 
takes  place  in  one  moment,  and  does  not  consist  in 
a successive  synthesis  of  different  sensations,  and  there- 
fore does  not  advance  from  the  parts  to  the  whole. 
Hence  the  real  has  magnitude,  but  not  extensive 
magnitude. 

Now,  a magnitude  that  is  apprehended  only  as  unity, 
plurality  being  conceived  in  it  as  simply  approximation 
to  negation  = o,  I call  an  intejisive  magnitude.  Every 
reality  in  a phenomenon  has  therefore  intensive  magni- 
tude or  degree.  This  reality  may  be  regarded  as  a cause, 
either  of  sensation  or  of  some  other  reality  in  the  pheno- 
menon, for  instance,  a change.  The  degree  of  reality  is 
then  called  momentum , as  when  we  speak  of  the  momen- 
tum of  gravity,  to  indicate  a quantity,  the  apprehension  of  i(,g 
which  is  not  successive  but  instantaneous.  I make  this 
remark  merely  in  passing,  for  this  is  not  the  place  to  treat 
of  causality. 

Every  sensation,  then,  and  consequently  every  reality 
in  a phenomenon,  however  small  it  may  be,  has  an 
intensive  magnitude  or  degree  that  can  always  become 
less,  and  between  reality  and  negation  there  is  a con- 
tinuous series  of  possible  realities,  and  of  possible  smaller 
perceptions.  The  colour  red,  for  instance,  has  a degree 
which,  however  small  it  may  be,  is  never  the  smallest 
possible ; and  so  with  heat,  the  momentum  of  gravity,  etc. 

The  property  of  magnitudes,  by  which  no  part  in  them 
is  the  smallest  possible,  or  no  part  is  simple,  is  called  their 

continuity.  Space  and  time  are  quanta  continua , because 

G 


98 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


no  part  of  them  can  be  presented  that  is  not  enclosed 
between  limits  (points  or  moments),  and  therefore  each 
part  of  space  is  itself  a space,  each  part  of  time  is  itself  a 
time.  Space  consists  only  of  spaces,  time  of  times. 
Points  and  moments  are  but  limits,  that  is,  mere  places 
of  limitation  in  space  and  time,  and  as  'such  always 
presuppose  the  perceptions  which  they  are  to  limit  or 
determine.  Mere  places  are  not  constituent  parts,  which 
can  be  given  prior  to  space  or  time,  and  out  of  which  i 
space  and  time  can  be  made  up.  Such  magnitudes  may 
also  be  called  fluent , because  the  synthesis  of  productive 
imagination,  by  which  they  are  generated,  is  a progression 

212  in  time,  the  continuity  of  which  is  usually  designated  by 
the  term  flux  or  flowing. 

All  phenomena  are  continuous  magnitudes,  and  that 
in  two  ways  : as  pure  perceptions,  they  are  continuous 
extensive  magnitudes,  and  as  perceptions  of  sense  contain- 
ing sensation,  and  therefore  reality,  they  are  continuous 
intensive  magnitudes.  When  the  synthesis  of  determina- 
tions is  interrupted,  we  have  an  aggregate  of  various 
objects  of  sense,  not  a single  phenomenon  as  a quantum. 
Such  an  aggregate  is  produced,  not  by  continuing  without 
break  the  productive  synthesis  with  which  we  begin,  but 
by  continually  renewing  a synthesis  that  is  continually 
coming  to  an  end. 

As  all  phenomena,  whether  they  are  viewed  extensively  i 

213  or  intensively,  are  continuous  magnitudes,  the  continuity 
of  all  change,  or  transition  of  a thing  from  one  state  into 
another,  might  readily  be  proved  here,  and  indeed  proved 
mathematically.  But  the  causality  of  a change,  as  pre- 
supposing empirical  principles,  does  not  come  within  the 
province  of  transcendental  philosophy.  Understanding 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


99 


can  give  us  no  hint  a priori  that  there  can  be  a cause, 
which  is  capable  of  changing  the  state  of  things,  that  is, 
determining  them  to  the  opposite  of  a given  state.  It  is 
not  simply  that  we  cannot  understand  a priori  how  this 
can  take  place— for  there  are  many  other  instances  of  a 
similar  failure  in  a priori  knowledge, — but  that  only  certain 
determinations  of  objects  are  capable  of  change  at  all, 
and  what  these  determinations  are  we  can  learn  only 
from  experience,  although  no  doubt  the  cause  must  lie  in 
that  which  is  unchangeable.  The  only  data  that  we  have 
here  before  us,  are  the  pure  conceptions  implied  in  all 
possible  experience,  which  contain  nothing  empirical ; 
nor  can  we  avail  ourselves  of  the  primary  facts  of  experi- 
ence which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  pure  physics  without  172 
destroying  the  unity  of  our  system. 

At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  showing  that 
the  principle  of  understanding  now  under  consideration 
is  of  great  value  in  enabling  us  to  anticipate  perceptions  of 
sense,  and  even  to  some  extent  to  supply  their  place,  by 
guarding  us  against  all  false  inferences  that  might  be 
drawn  from  their  absence. 

4 If  all  reality  in  perception  has  a degree,  between  which 
and  negation  there  is  an  infinite  series  of  ever  smaller 
degrees,  and  if  each  sense  must  have  a definite  degree  of 
receptivity  for  sensations,  it  is  evident  that  no  perception, 
and  therefore  no  experience,  can  prove,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly, by  any  possible  ingenuity  of  reasoning,  that  a 
phenomenon  is  absolutely  destitute  of  reality.  That  is  to 
say,  there  is  no  way  of  proving  from  experience  that  there 
is  empty  space  or  empty  time.  For,  in  the  first  place, 
the  complete  absence  of  reality  from  a perception  of 
sense  can  never  be  observed ; and,  in  the  second  place, 


100 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


the  absence  of  all  reality  can  never  be  inferred  from  any 
variation  in  the  degree  of  reality  of  a phenomenon,  nor 
ought  it  ever  to  be  brought  forward  in  explanation  of  that 
variation.  For,  although  the  whole  perception  of  a 
certain  definite  space  or  time  is  real  through  and  through, 
so  that  no  part  of  it  is  empty ; yet,  as  every  reality  has  a 
degree,  which  may  diminish  by  infinite  degrees  down  to 
nothing  (the  void),  while  the  extensive  magnitude  of  the  17 
phenomenon  remains  unchanged,  there  must  be  an  infinity 
of  degrees  with  which  space  or  time  may  be  filled  ; hence 
the  intensive  magnitude  may  be  greater  or  less  in  different 
phenomena,  although  the  extensive  magnitude  of  the 
perception  remains  the  same. 

217  The  quality  of  sensation — colour,  taste,  etc., — is  always  17 
merely  empirical,  and  cannot  be  known  a priori.  But 
the  real  that  corresponds  to  sensations  in  general,  and  is 
opposed  to  negation  = o,  stands  merely  for  that  the  very 
conception  of  which  implies  being,  and  it  has,  therefore, 
no  other  meaning  than  the  synthesis  in  empirical  con- 
sciousness generally.  In  the  inner  sense,  that  empirical  j* 
consciousness  can  be  raised  from  o to  any  higher  degree, 

so  that  the  extensive  magnitude  of  a perception  may  be 
greater  or  less,  even  when  the  intensive  magnitude 
remains  the  same.  Thus,  the  degree  of  sensation  excited 
by  an  illuminated  surface,  may  be  as  great  as  that  pro- 
duced by  a number  of  less  illuminated  surfaces,  the 
aggregate  extent  of  which  is  twice  as  large.  In  consider- 

2 18  ing  the  intensive  magnitude  of  a phenomenon,  we  may, 
therefore,  abstract  entirely  from  its  extensive  magnitude, 
and  think  only  of  the  sensation,  filling  a single  moment, 
as  generated  by  a synthesis  that  advances  uniformly  from 
o to  the  given  empirical  consciousnes.  Thus,  while  all 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


10  I 


sensations  as  such  are  given  a posteriori,  it  can  be  known 
a priori  that  to  all  belongs  the  property  of  having  a 
degree.  It  is  remarkable  that  of  quantity  in  general  only 
a single  quality — the  quality  of  continuity,  can  be  known 
a priori , but  that  of  quality,  or  the  reality  of  phenomena, 
nothing  more  than  the  intensive  quantity , or  the  posses- 
sion of  degree,  can  be  known  a priori , while  all  else  has 
to  be  learned  from  experience. 


3.  Analogies  of  Experience. 

The  principle  of  these  is : Experience  is  possible  only 
through  the  consciousness  of  a necessary  connection  of 
perceptions  of  sense. 

Proof. 

1 9 The  three  modi  of  time  are  permanence,  succession,  and  1 
co-existence.  All  the  relations  of  phenomena  in  time  will 
therefore  be  expressed  in  three  rules,  which  precede  all 
experience  and  make  it  possible  at  all.  These  rules  state 
all  the  conditions  under  which  phenomena  can  possibly 
exist,  in  conformity  with  their  unity  in  time. 

20  The  principle  of  all  three  analogies  rests  upon  the  neces- 
sary unity  of  apperception  in  all  empirical  consciousness, 
or  perceptions  of  sense,  at  every  moment  of  time.  And 
as  the  unity  of  apperception  is  the  a priori  condition  of 
all  perception,  that  principle  is  based  upon  the  synthetic 
unity  of  all  phenomena  as  regards  their  relation  in  time. 
The  original  apperception  is  related  to  the  inner  sense, 
which  contains  all  possible  objects  of  consciousness,  or, 
more  exactly,  it  is  related  a priori  to  the  form  of  inner 
sense,  as  the  manner  in  which  the  manifold  determinations 
of  empirical  consciousness  are  ordered  in  time.  Now,  in 


102 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


original  apperception  all  those  determinations  are  to  be 
united,  as  regards  their  relations  in  time  ; for  nothing  can 
enter  into  my  knowledge,  or  be  mine,  nothing  can  be  for 
me  an  object,  that  does  not  stand  under  the  a priori 
transcendental  unity  of  apperception.  This  synthetic 
unity  in  the  temporal  relation  of  all  perceptions  is,  there- 
fore, determined  a priori , and  is  expressed  in  the  law, 
that  all  empirical  determinations  in  time  must  stand 
under  universal  rules  of  determination  in  time.  The  17b  : 
Analogies  of  Experience  must  therefore  be  rules  of  this 
kind. 

These  Analogies  have  the  peculiarity,  that  they  are  not 
concerned  with  the  synthesis  of  empirical  perception, 
implied  in  the  consciousness  of  objects  of  sense,  but  only 
with  the  existence  of  such  objects,  and  the  relatio7is  to  one 
another  by  which  their  existence  is  determined.  Now,  a 
x phenomenon  may  be  so  determined  a priori , that  the  rule 
of  its  synthesis  yields  at  once  the  perception  which  is 
presented  to  us  in  every  empirical  instance  of  it;  or,  in 
other  words,  the  rule  may  not  only  tell  us  the  character 
of  the  synthesis,  but  may  set  the  object  before  us  as  a 
perception.  But  the  existence  of  phenomena  cannot  thus 
be  known  a priori.  We  may  indeed  in  this  way  come  to 
know  that  something  exists,  but  we  cannot  definitely 
know  what  it  is,  nor  can  we  anticipate  how  it  will  differ 
from  other  objects,  when  it  is  empirically  perceived. 

The  two  principles  already  discussed,  which  I called 
mathematical,  to  indicate  that  they  justify  the  application 
of  mathematics  to  objects  of  sense,  showed  merely  how 
phenomena  were  possible,  and  how  their  perceptive 
form,  as  well  as  the  real  of  sense  perception,  could 
be  generated  in  conformity  with  rules  of  a mathe- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  I03 

matical  synthesis.  Both  principles,  therefore,  entitle  us 
to  estimate  phenomena  numerically  and  quantitatively. 

The  degree  of  sensation  of  sunlight,  for  instance,  may  be  179 
determined  a priori , or  constructed,  by  putting  together, 
say,  200,000  illuminations  of  the  moon.  Those  princi- 
ples may  therefore  be  called  constitutive. 

It  is  quite  different  with  the  principles  that  show  how 
the  existence  of  phenomena  comes  under  a priori  rules. 

222  Existence  cannot  be  constructed  ; all  that  can  be  done  is 
to  state  the  rules  that  determine  the  relations  of  existence, 
and  these  rules  yield  only  regulative  principles.  Here, 
therefore,  there  can  be  neither  axioms  nor  anticipations. 

If  in  observation  something  is  presented  as  related  in 
time  to  something  else,  as  yet  unknown,  it  is  impossible 
to  tell  what  that  something  else  may  be,  or  what  may  be 
its  jnagnitude ; all  that  we  can  tell  is  how  the  two  per- 
ceptions, to  exist  at  all,  must  be  connected  with  each 

other An  analogy  of  experience  is,  there-  180 

fore,  merely  a rule  which  states  the  conditions  under 
which  observations  of  sense  may  be  reduced  to  the  unity 
of  experience.  Incompetent  to  tell  us  the  conditions  of 
observation,  so  far  as  its  empirical  element  is  concerned, 
it  is  not  a principle  constitutive  of  objects  of  sense  or 
phenomena,  but  is  merely  regulative.  In  like  manner, 
the  postulates  of  empirical  thought  are  regulative  prin- 
ciples. The  certitude  is  as  great  for  the  regulative  as 
for  the  mathematical  or  constitutive  principles,  for  both 
are  a priori,  but  the  kind  of  evidence  is  different. 

62  In  regard  to  the  general  method  of  proof  in  philosophy,  734 
it  must  be  observed  that  a demonstration  is  an  apodictic 
proof  which  rests  upon  direct  perception.  But,  in  the 


io4 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


case  of  discursive  knowledge,  even  those  judgments 
which  are  based  upon  a priori  conceptions,  and  are  there- 
fore apodictic,  cannot  be  proved  by  a direct  appeal  to 
perception.  It  is  only  mathematics  that  admits  of 
demonstrative  evidence,  for  mathematics  alone  derives 
its  knowledge,  not  from  conceptions,  but  from  the  con- 
struction of  conceptions — that  is,  from  the  perception 
which  corresponds  to  certain  conceptions  and  can  be 
presented  a priori.  Even  the  solution  of  an  algebraic 
equation  is  a process  of  construction,  though  not  of 
geometrical  construction ; for,  it  consists  in  presenting 
conceptions  in  perception  by  means  of  symbols,  and 
especially  conceptions  of  the  relation  of  quantities. 
Although,  therefore,  in  its  method  algebra  is  not  heur- 
istic, it  is  able  to  guard  against  error  in  its  results  by 
placing  all  the  conceptions  that  it  employs  directly  before 
the  eyes.  But,  while  mathematics  views  the  universal  in 
concreto — that  is,  in  pure  perception,  where  every  error  be- 
comes immediately  visible — philosophical  knowledge  has 
to  dispense  with  this  advantage,  and  to  consider  the  univer- 

763  sal  in  abstractor  or  through  the  medium  of  conceptions. 

It  is  therefore  contrary  to  the  true  spirit  of  philosophy,  735 
and  especially  of  pure  philosophy,  to  boast  of  its  dogmatic 
procedure,  and  to  bedeck  itself  with  the  orders  and  the 
titles  of  mathematics.  Such  empty  boasts  can  only 
retard  the  progress  of  philosophy,  and  prevent  it  from 
detecting  the  illusion  into  which  reason  falls  when  it  is 
unaware  of  its  true  limits. 

764  Apodictic  propositions  may  be  distinguished  as  either  736 
dogmata  or  mathemata.  By  a dogma  is  meant  a synthetic 
proposition  which  is  directly  derived  from  conceptions ; 

by  a mathema,  one  that  is  obtained  by  the  construction 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  105 

of  a conception.  Of  these  two  classes  of  a priori 
synthetic  propositions,  popular  language  permits  us  to 
apply  the  term  dogma  only  to  philosophical  knowledge, 
for  we  should  hardly  call  a proposition  in  arithmetic  or 
geometry  a dogma.  The  ordinary  use  of  words  thus 
confirms  the  distinction  we  have  drawn  between  judg- 
ments that  are  derived  from  conceptions,  and  judgments 
that  rest  upon  the  construction  of  conceptions. 

Now,  it  is  impossible  to  find  in  the  whole  domain  of 
pure  speculative  reason  a single  synthetic  judgment  that 
is  directly  derived  from  conceptions.  For,  reason  is 
765  unable  to  obtain  from  its  pure  ideas  any  synthetic  judg- 
ment which  holds  true  objectively.  It  is  true  that,  by 
means  of  the  conceptions  of  understanding,  reason  is  able  737 
to  show  that  there  are  certain  principles  which  rest  upon 
a solid  foundation  ; but  these  principles  it  does  not 
directly  derive  from  conceptions,  but  only  indirectly,  by 
showing  the  relation  of  the  conceptions  in  question  to 
something  that  is  perfectly  contingent — namely,  possible 
experience.  If  something  is  presupposed  as  an  object  of 
possible  experience,  no  doubt  those  principles  are 
apodictically  certain  ; but,  in  themselves,  or  directly,  they 
can  never  be  known  a priori.  Thus,  no  one,  simply 
from  the  conceptions  contained  in  it,  can  see  what  is  the 
foundation  of  the  proposition,  that  whatever  happens  has 
its  cause.  Such  a proposition  can  certainly  be  shown 
readily  enough  to  be  apodictic,  if  it  is  applied  only 
within  the  field  of  experience  ; but  it  cannot  be  a dogma. 

It  must  be  called  a principle , and  not  a theorem , because 
it  has  the  peculiar  property,  that  it  is  the  condition  of 
that  by  which  it  is  proved — namely,  experience,  and 
must  always  be  presupposed  as  essential  to  experience 


io6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


Now,  if  in  the  speculative  use  of  pure  reason  there  are 
no  dogmata,  all  dogmatic  methods,  whether  they  are 
borrowed  from  the  mathematician  or  are  peculiar  to  the 
individual  thinker,  are  self-condemned.  For  they  only 
serve  to  conceal  defects  and  errors,  and  to  give  rise  to 
philosophical  illusion,  instead  of  securing  the  true  aim  of 
philosophy,  which  is  to  exhibit  every  step  of  reason  in 
the  clearest  possible  light.  Yet  the  method  of  philosophy, 
though  it  is  not  dogmatic,  may  always  be  systematic.  For 

766  our  reason  is  itself  subjectively  a system,  though,  if  we  738 
regard  it  merely  as  a source  of  pure  conceptions,  it  is  not 
a system  of  knowledge,  but  only  a system  by  which  our 
investigations  may  be  carried  on  : in  other  words,  it 
supplies  the  principles  of  unity  for  knowledge,  and  must 
look  to  experience  to  supply  the  materials  to  be  determined 
in  accordance  with  these  principles. 

224  A.  First  Analogy.  182 

Principle  of  the  Permanence  of  Substance. 

In  all  the  changes  of  phenomena  substance  is  perma- 
nent, and  its  quantum  in  nature  neither  increases  nor 
diminishes. 

Proof. 

225  Our  apprehension  of  the  various  determinations  of  a 
phenomenon  is  always  successive,  and  therefore  is  always 
changing.  Hence  there  is  nothing  in  apprehension, 
taken  by  itself,  that  enables  us  to  say  whether  those 
determinations  are,  as  an  object  of  experience,  co-existent 
or  successive.  An  object  of  experience  is  possible  only 

226  if  there  is  something  that  always  is,  something  perman- 
ent and  persistent , all  change  and  co-existence  being 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


107 


nothing  but  so  many  modes  of  time  in  which  that 
permanent  something  exists.  Only  in  the  permanent  can 
there  possibly  be  the  relations  of  simultaneity  and  succes- 
sion, which  are  the  sole  relations  in  time.  The  permanent  183 
is  therefore  the  substratum  of  the  empirical  consciousness 
of  time  itself,  and  only  in  it  is  any  determination  of  time 
possible  at  all.  Permanence  is  time  considered  quite 
generally,  as  the  constant  correlate  of  all  change  and  all 
concomitance  of  actual  objects  of  experience.  For, 
change  does  not  affect  time  itself  but  only  phenomena  in 
time;  just  as  co-existence  is  plainly  not  a mode  of  time 
itself,  the  parts  of  time  not  being  together,  but  following 
one  another.  If  it  is  said,  that  time  itself  comes  into 
being  part  by  part,  we  must  suppose  that  there  is  another 
time  in  which  it  successively  comes  to  be.  Only  through 
the  permanent  does  existence  in  a number  of  successive 
moments  acquire  a magnitude , which  we  call  duration. 

In  mere  succession,  taken  by  itself,  existence  is  always 
vanishing  and  appearing,  and  never  has  even  the  smallest 
magnitude.  Apart  from  the  permanent,  there  is  therefore 
no  relation  of  time.  Now,  time  cannot  be  perceived  by 
itself ; hence  the  permanent  is  the  substratum  of  all  the 
determinations  of  phenomena  in  time,  and  therefore  the 
condition  without  which  there  could  be  no  synthetic  unity 
in  our  perceptions,  that  is,  in  experience.  Thus  we  learn 
that  all  existence  and  all  change  in  time  must  be  regarded 
as  simply  a modus  of  the  existence  of  that  which  does 
not  change  but  persists.  In  all  phenomena  the  per- 
manent is  therefore  the  object  itself,  that  is,  the  substance 
( phaenomenoti ),  while  all  that  changes,  or  can  change,  per-  184 
tains  merely  to  the  manner  in  which  substance  or  substances 
exist,  and  therefore  to  the  determinations  of  substance. 


ioS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


229  The  determinations  of  a substance  are  called  accidents.  186 
They  are  always  real,  because  they  are  just  the  manner 

in  which  the  substance  exists,  whereas  negations  are 
merely  determinations  which  affirm  that  a substance  does 

230  not  exist  in  a certain  manner.  If  we  wish  to  say,  that 
what  is  real  in  a substance  has  a special  sort  of  existence, 
as,  for  instance,  that  motion  is  the  manner  in  which 
matter  exists,  we  are  wont  to  speak  of  this  mode  of  ex- 
istence as  inherence , to  distinguish  it  from  the  existence 
of  the  substance,  which  is  called  subsistence.  But  this  is 
apt  to  lead  to  much  misapprehension,  and  it  is  more  precise  187 
and  more  correct  to  say,  that  an  accident  is  simply  the 
manner  in  which  the  existence  of  a substance  is  positively 
determined.  At  the  same  time,  the  conditions  under 
which  understanding  in  its  logical  use  operates,  gives  a 
kind  of  independence  to  that  in  the  existence  of  a sub- 
stance which  can  change  while  the  substance  remains 
unchanged,  and  this  changing  element  we  are  led  to  view 

as  standing  in  relation  to  the  really  permanent  and 
radical  element.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  category 
of  substance  is  put  among  the  categories  of  relation  ; for, 
although  strictly  speaking  it  does  not  itself  contain  a 
relation,  it  yet  is  the  condition  of  relations. 

The  conception  of  change  can  be  properly  understood 
only  by  reference  to  the  idea  of  permanence.  Coming 
to  be  and  ceasing  to  be  are  not  changes  of  that  which 
comes  to  be  or  ceases  to  be.  Change  is  a mode  of 
existence  that  follows  upon  another  mode  of  existence  of 
the  very  same  object.  All  that  changes  is  permanent , 
and  only  its  state  alters.  As  this  alteration  affects  only 
the  determinations,  which  can  cease  to  be  or  begin  to  be, 

231  we  may  say,  in  words  that  sound  somewhat  paradoxical, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  I09 

that  only  the  permanent  changes,  while  the  changeable 
is  subject  to  no  change,  but  only  to  an  alternation , in 
which  certain  determinations  cease  to  be  as  others  begin 
to  be. 

Change,  then,  can  be  observed  only  in  substances.  188 
An  absolute  beginning  or  cessation  can  by  no  possibility 
be  observed,  but  only  a determination  of  that  which  is 
permanent ; because  only  by  reference  to  that  which  is 
permanent  can  there  be  any  consciousness  of  the  transi- 
tion from  one  state  into  another,  and  from  not  being  to 
being.  And  these  states  can  be  known  empirically  only 
as  alternating  determinations  of  that  which  is  permanent. 

If  we  suppose  something  absolutely  to  begin  to  be,  we 
must  also  suppose  that  there  was  a point  of  time  in  which 
that  something  was  not.  But  with  what  are  we  to  con- 
nect this  point  of  time,  if  not  with  something  that  already 
is  ? For,  an  empty  time,  if  we  suppose  such  to  precede 
the  point  of  time  in  question,  is  not  a possible  object  of 
perception ; and  if  we  connect  what  is  supposed 
absolutely  to  begin  to  be  with  things  that  existed  before 
it,  and  continue  to  exist  up  to  the  moment  of  its  origina- 
tion, that  which  is  supposed  absolutely  to  begin  to  be 
must  be  really  a determination  of  the  permanent  that 
existed  before  it.  So,  also,  that  which  absolutely  ceases 
to  be  requires  us  to  presuppose  the  empirical  conscious- 
ness of  a time  in  which  there  was  nothing  to  observe. 

Substances,  then,  are  the  substrates  of  all  determina- 
tions of  phenomena  in  time.  If  some  substances  could 
come  into  being,  and  others  cease  to  be,  even  the  sole 
condition,  under  which  the  empirical  unity  of  time  is 
possible,  would  be  taken  away.  We  should  in  that  case 
2 be  compelled  to  suppose,  that  phenomena  were  in  two 


I 10 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


distinct  times,  and  that  existence  flowed  away  in  two 
parallel  streams.  But  this  is  absurd,  for  there  is  only  one 
time , and  different  times  are  not  side  by  side,  but  follow  r39 
one  another. 

Permanence  is  therefore  a necessary  condition,  without 
which  phenomena  cannot  be  determined  as  things  or 

225  objects  in  a possible  experience.  The  permanent  is  the 
substance,  or  the  real,  in  a phenomenon,  which,  as  the 
substratum  of  all  change,  always  remains  the  same.  And 
as  substance  can  be  subject  to  no  change  in  existence,  its 
quantum  in  nature  can  neither  increase  nor  diminish. 

232  B. — Second  Analogy. 

Principle  of  Causal  Snccession. 

All  changes  take  place  in  conformity  with  the  law  of  the 
connection  of  cause  and  effect. 

Proof. 

234  The  apprehension  of  the  various  determinations  of  a 
phenomenon  is  always  successive.  The  ideas  of  the  parts 
follow  one  another  in  consciousness.  Whether  the  parts 
follow  one  another  in  the  object  also,  is  a different 
thing.  Now,  anything  whatever  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious, anything  of  which  we  have  an  idea,  we  may 
certainly  call  an  object ; but  it  is  not  so  easy  to  say  what 

235  is  meant  when  the  term  object  is  applied  to  a phenome-  190 
non.  In  this  case  by  an  object  must  be  understood,  not 

a mere  idea,  but  only  that  in  the  idea  which  stands  for 
an  object.  But  in  so  far  as  by  an  object  we  mean  merely 
our  own  ideas  as  objects  of  consciousness,  there  is  no 
distinction  between  actual  objects  of  sense  and  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


Ill 


apprehension  or  reception  of  them  in  the  synthesis  of 
imagination.  So  far  we  must  therefore  say  that  the 
various  determinations  of  phenomena  are  always  pro- 
duced in  the  mind  successively.  Were  phenomena 
things  in  themselves,  no  man  could  tell  how  the  various 
determinations,  as  they  arise  one  after  the  other  in  con- 
sciousness, might  be  connected  in  the  object.  As  we 
cannot  go  outside  of  our  own  consciousness,  there  is  no 
possible  way  of  knowing  how  things  may  be  in  them- 
selves, apart  from  the  ideas  through  which  we  are 
affected  by  them.  But,  although  phenomena  are  not 
things  in  themselves,  and  yet  are  the  only  things  that 
can  be  presented  to  us  as  knowledge,  it  is  necessary  to 
explain  what  there  is  in  phenomena  themselves  that  can 
connect  their  various  determinations  in  time,  while  yet 
the  consciousness  of  those  determinations  is  in  apprehen- 
sion always  successive.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  appre- 
hension of  the  various  determinations  contained  in  the 
perception  of  a house  is  successive.  But  no  one  would 
think  of  saying  that  the  determinations  of  the  house  itself 
236  are  successive.  Now,  when  I ask  how  an  object  is  to  be 
conceived  from  the  transcendental  point  of  view,  I find 
that  the  house  is  not  a thing  in  itself,  but-  only  a phe- 
nomenon, that  is,  it  is  the  consciousness  of  something,  I9I 
the  transcendental  object  of  which  is  unknown.  The 
question  therefore  is,  what  is  meant  by  the  connec- 
tion of  various  determinations  in  the  phenomenon  itself, 
that  phenomenon  being  yet  no  thing  in  itself.  Here  that 
which  lies  in  the  successive  apprehension  is  considered  as 
mere  modes  of  my  consciousness,  while  the  phenomenon 
which  is  given  to  me,  although  it  is  nothing  but  a complex 
of  these  modes,  is  yet  regarded  as  their  object,  and  the  con- 


I T 2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


ception  which  I derive  from  them  is  held  to  harmonize 
necessarily  with  that  object.  It  soon  becomes  evident 
that,  as  truth  consists  in  the  agreement  of  knowledge 
with  its  object,  the  only  question  here  must  be  in  regard 
to  the  formal  conditions  of  empirical  truth.  The  phe- 
nomenon as  an  object  can  be  opposed  to  apprehension 
as  a series  of  states  of  consciousness,  only  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  a unique  mode  of  apprehension,  which  stands 
under  a rule  that  necessitates  the  connection  of  its  various 
determinations  in  a certain  way.  That  in  the  phenome- 
non which  contains  the  condition  of  this  necessary  rule 
of  apprehension,  is  the  object. 

Let  us  now  go  on  to  our  special  problem.  There  can 
be  no  empirical  observation  that  something  has  occurred, 
that  is,  that  something,  or  some  state,  has  come  to  be 
^ which  before  was  not,  unless  there  has  previously  been 
observed  something  that  does  not  contain  this  state  in 
itself.  For,  an  actual  thing  following  upon  an  empty  192 
time,  an  absolute  beginning  preceded  by  nothing,  can 
no  more  be  apprehended  than  empty  time  itself.  Every 
apprehension  of  an  event  is  therefore  a perception  that 
follows  upon  another  perception.  But,  as  this  is  true  in 
all  synthesis  of  apprehension,  even  in  such  a synthesis  as 
that  of  the  determinations  of  a house  already  instanced, 
there  is  nothing  in  the  mere  succession  of  perceptions  to 
distinguish  the  apprehension  of  an  event  from  any  other 
apprehension.  But  I note  further,  that  when  I am  con- 
scious of  a phenomenon  as  containing  an  event,  the 
perception  of  the  antecedent  state  A cannot  follow  the 
perception  of  the  consequent  state  B,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, B,  in  my  apprehension,  always  follows  A,  while  A 
never  follows  B but  can  only  precede  it.  I see,  for 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  1 1 3 

instance,  a ship  moving  down  stream.  I first  observe 
it  higher  up  the  stream,  and  then  lower  down,  and  it  is 
impossible  that  in  the  apprehension  of  the  phenomenon 
I should  first  observe  the  ship  lower  down  the  stream 
and  then  higher  up.  The  order  in  which  the  perceptions 
follow  one  another  in  my  apprehension  is  here  deter- 
mined, and  to  that  order  my  apprehension  is  tied  down. 

238  In  the  former  example  of  the  house,  my  apprehension 
might  begin  with  a perception  of  the  roof  and  end  with 
the  basement,  but  it  might  just  as  well  begin  from  below 
and  end  above,  or  again  the  units  of  my  empirical 
observation  might  be  apprehended  from  right  to  left  or 
from  left  to  right.  In  that  series  of  observations  there  193 
was  therefore  no  fixed  order  that  made  it  necessary  for 
my  apprehension  to  begin  at  a certain  moment  in  the 
empirical  combination  of  the  various  elements  of  percep- 
tion. But,  in  the  observation  of  any  event,  there  always 
is  a rule  that  makes  the  order  in  which  the  elements  of 
perception  follow  one  another  in  my  apprehension  a 
necessary  order. 

In  this  case,  therefore,  the  subjective  succession  of 
apprehension  must  be  derived  from  the  objective  succes- 
sio?i  of  the  phenomena.  Were  it  not  so,  there  would  be 
nothing  whatever  to  determine  the  order  of  succession 
in  my  apprehension,  and  to  distinguish  one  sort  of  phe- 
nomenon from  another.  Viewed  by  itself  a mere 
succession  of  apprehension  is  quite  arbitrary,  and  tells  us 
nothing  about  the  connection  of  the  elements  of  per- 
ception in  the  object.  The  objective  connection  must 
therefore  consist  in  the  order  in  which  the  elements  of 
perception  follow  each  other,  the  order  being  this,  that 

the  apprehension  of  one  event  follows  the  apprehension 

H 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


114 

of  another  event  in  conformity  with  a rule.  Thus  only  am 
I justified  in  saying,  that  there  is  succession  in  the  phe- 
nomenon, and  not  merely  in  my  apprehension,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  I cannot  possibly  have  the  apprehension  in 
any  other  order. 

In  conformity  with  this  rule,  there  must  lie  in  that 
9 which  precedes  any  event,  the  condition  for  a rule  by 
which  the  event  always  and  necessarily  follows ; but 
I cannot  say,  conversely,  that  I can  go  back  from  194 
the  event  and  apprehend  what  precedes  it.  No  pheno- 
menon goes  back  from  a given  point  of  time  to  an 
antecedent  point  of  time,  but  it  yet  is  related  to  some 
antecedent  point  of  time;  on  the  other  hand,  the  progression 
from  a given  time  to  the  precise  time  that  follows  is 
necessary.  Now  something  certainly  follows,  and  this  I 
must  necessarily  refer  to  something  else,  which  precedes 
it  and  upon  which  it  follows  necessarily  or  in  conformity 
with  a rule.  Accordingly,  the  event,  as  that  which  is 
conditioned,  points  back  with  certainty  to  some 
condition,  and  this  condition  is  what  determines  the 
event. 

When  therefore  we  have  experience  of  any  event,  we 
always  presuppose  that  something  has  gone  before, 
on  which  the  event  follows  according  to  a rule.  Other- 
wise I should  not  say  that  the  object  follows,  for  I am 
not  justified  in  saying  that  there  is  succession  in  an 
object  merely  because  there  is  a succession  in  my  19; 
apprehension,  but  only  because  there  is  a rule  that 
determines  the  succession  of  my  apprehension  by  relation 
to  what  precedes.  It  is  therefore  always  by  reference  to 
such  a rule  that  I make  my  subjective  synthesis  or 
synthesis  of  apprehension  objective,  and  under  this 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  115 

presupposition,  and  this  presupposition  only,  is  even 
the  experience  of  an  event  possible  at  all. 

No  doubt  this  seems  to  contradict  the  whole  view  of 
the  course  of  thought  that  the  facts  have  always  been 
held  to  warrant.  The  accepted  doctrine  is,  that,  from 
the  repeated  observation  and  comparison  of  many  cases 
in  which  certain  events  follow  certain  antecedents,  we  are 
241  first  led  to  the  discovery  of  a rule  according  to  which  the 
events  invariably  follow  those  antecedents,  and  then  by 
reflection  on  the  rule,  to  the  general  conception  of  cause. 

But  on  that  showing,  the  conception  of  cause  would  be 
merely  empirical,  and  the  rule  based  upon  it,  that  every  196 
event  has  a cause,  would  be  just  as  contingent  as  the 
experience  from  which  it  was  derived.  Having  no 
a priori  foundation,  but  resting  merely  on  induction, 
it  would  have  no  genuine  universality,  but  only  a purely 
suppositious  universality  and  necessity.  The  truth  is, 
that  here  the  same  principle  applies  as  in  the  case  of 
other  pure  a priori  elements,  for  instance,  space  and 
time : the  principle  that  we  can  derive  a clear  conception 
from  experience,  only  because  we  have  ourselves  put  it 
into  experience,  and,  indeed,  have  thereby  made  ex- 
perience possible  at  all.  No  doubt  we  cannot  have  a 
logically  clear  idea  of  cause,  as  a rule  that  determines 
the  series  of  events,  until  we  have  made  use  of  it  in 
experience,  but  it  is  none  the  less  true,  that  a tacit 
reference  to  that  rule,  as  a condition  of  the  synthetic 
unity  of  phenomena  in  time,  was  the  foundation  of 
experience  itself,  and  therefore  preceded  it  a priori. 

44  No  experience  whatever  is  even  possible  without  199 
understanding,  and  the  first  thing  that  understanding 
does,  is  not  to  make  the  conception  of  special  objects 


1 16 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


clear,  but  to  make  the  very  consciousness  of  an  object 

45  possible.  Now,  this  it  effects  by  conferring  upon  phen- 
omena and  their  existence  order  in  time,  assigning  a 
priori  to  each  of  them  as  consequent  a determinate  posi- 
tion in  time  relatively  to  what  precedes.  Were  such  20: 
position  in  time  not  assigned  to  phenomena,  they  would 
not  harmonize  with  time  itself,  all  the  parts  of  which  have 
their  position  determined  a priori.  Now,  the  determinate 
position  of  phenomena  cannot  be  learned  from  the 
relation  of  phenomena  to  absolute  time,  for  absolute 
time  cannot  be  observed ; on  the  contrary,  it  is  the 
phenomena  that  must  determine  for  one  another  their 
position  in  time,  making  the  order  in  time  in  which  each 
occurs  necessary.  That  which  follows  or  occurs,  must 
follow  in  conformity  with  a universal  rule,  on  that  which 
was  contained  in  a preceding  state.  Thus  arises  a series 

of  phenomena,  which,  by  the  action  of  understanding, 
necessarily  assumes  in  the  series  of  possible  perceptions 
the  very  same  order  and  unbroken  connection  which  are 
found  a priori  in  time  itself,  as  the  form  of  inner 
perception  in  which  all  perceptions  must  have  their 
position. 

The  perception  of  an  event  is  therefore  a possible 
experience,  which  becomes  an  actual  experience,  when  I 
regard  a phenomenon  as  determined  to  its  position  in 
time,  and  therefore  as  an  object  that  can  always  be  found 
in  the  connection  of  perceptions  in  accordance  with  a rule. 

46  This  rule,  by  which  a thing  is  determined  conformably 
with  the  succession  of  time,  is,  that  in  what  precedes  is  to 
be  found  the  condition  under  which  an  event  always 
or  necessarily  follows. 

The  proof  of  this  proposition  rests  entirely  upon  the  20 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


117 


following  grounds.  All  empirical  knowledge  implies  the 
synthesis  by  imagination  of  various  determinations. 
This  synthesis  is  always  successive,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  various  determinations  always  follow  one  another  in 
consciousness.  In  this  synthesis  of  imagination,  how- 
ever, there  is  no  fixed  order  of  succession,  for  the  series 
of  ideas  may  be  taken  just  as  well  backwards  as  forwards. 
But,  if  this  synthesis  is  a synthesis  of  apprehension, 
in  which  there  is  a consciousness  of  the  various  deter- 
minations contained  in  a given  phenomenon,  the  order  is 
determined  in  the  object,  or,  more  exactly,  there  is  in  our 
apprehension  an  order  of  successive  synthesis  that 
determines  an  object,  and  in  conformity  with  that  order 
something  must  necessarily  precede,  and  if  it  exists, 
something  else  must  necessarily  follow.  If,  therefore,  in 
my  observation  I am  to  obtain  the  knowledge  of  an  event, 
that  is,  of  something  that  actually  takes  place,  my 
observation  must  carry  with  it  an  empirical  judgment,  in 
which  the  succession  is  thought  as  so  determined  that  the 
event  in  question  is  preceded  by  something  else,  which  it 
follows  necessarily  or  according  to  a rule.  Were  this  not 
so,  were  I to  determine  the  antecedent  as  existing,  with- 
out being  forced  to  recognize  the  event  as  following,  I 
should  be  compelled  to  regard  the  succession  as  a mere 
subjective  play  of  my  imagination,  or,  if  I still  supposed 
it  to  be  objective,  I must  call  it  a mere  dream.  Hence 
that  relation  of  phenomena,  that  is  of  possible  perceptions,  202 
in  which  the  consequent  is  necessarily  determined  in 
its  existence  in  time  by  some  antecedent  in  accordance 
with  a rule — the  relation,  in  a word,  of  cause  and  effect 
— is  the  condition  of  the  objective  validity  of  our 
empirical  judgments  with  regard  to  the  series  of  percep- 


IIS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


tions,  and  therefore  the  condition  of  experience.  The 
principle  of  causality  thus  applies  to  all  objects  of 
experience  that  stand  under  the  conditions  of  succession, 
just  because  it  is  itself  the  ground  of  the  very  possibility 
of  such  experience. 

256  C. — Third  Analogy.  21 

Principle  of  Community. 

All  substances,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  observed  to 
co-exist  in  space,  are  in  thoroughgoing  reciprocity. 

Proof. 

258  Things  are  co-existent  which  exist  at  one  and  the  same 

time.  But  how  do  we  know  that  they  exist  at  one  and 
the  same  time  ? Only  if  in  the  synthesis  of  apprehension 
the  order  in  which  the  various  determinations  arise  in 
consciousness  is  indifferent,  or  can  go  either  from  A 
through  B,  C,  D,  to  E,  or  conversely  from  E to  A. 
Were  the  determinations  actually  to  follow  one  another 
in  time,  that  is,  in  an  order  that  began  with  A and  ended 
with  E,  it  would  be  impossible  for  apprehension  to 
start  from  E and  go  backwards  to  A;  for  A would 
in  that  case  belong  to  a time  that  was  past,  and  therefore 
could  no  longer  be  an  object  of  apprehension.  21 

Now,  suppose  that  a number  of  substances  could 
be  observed,  each  of  which  was  so  completely  isolated 
from  the  rest  that  none  acted  upon  any  other  or  was 

259  itself  acted  upon;  then  I say,  that  those  objects  could 
not  possibly  be  observed  to  co-exist , and  that  there  is  no 
way  in  which  by  empirical  synthesis  we  could  pass  from 
the  existence  of  one  to  the  existence  of  another.  If  the 
objects  are  assumed  to  be  separated  by  a space  that 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  II9 

is  quite  empty,  no  doubt  the  existence  of  each  might  be 
presented  in  turn  in  a series  of  observations;  but  this 
would  not  enable  us  to  say,  whether  the  different 
phenomena  themselves  followed  one  another  or  existed 
at  the  same  time. 

If,  therefore,  our  supposed  substances  are  to  be  known 
as  empirically  co-existent,  it  must  be  by  something  more 
than  its  mere  existence  that  A determines  the  position  in 
time  of  B,  and,  conversely,  B the  position  in  time  of  A. 
Now,  only  that  which  is  the  cause  of  a thing  or  of  its 
determinations,  can  determine  the  position  of  that  thing 
in  time.  And,  as  a substance  does  not  itself  begin  to  be 
in  time,  but  ally  its  determinations,  every  substance  must 
contain  in  itself  at  once  the  causality  of  certain  deter- 
minations in  another  substance,  and  the  effects  of  the 
causality  of  that  other  substance.  In  other  words,  if 
substances  are  to  to  be  known  in  experience  as  co-exist- 
ing, they  must,  directly  or  indirectly,  stand  with  one  12 
another  in  a relation  of  dynamical  community.  Now,  we 
must  regard  as  necessary  to  the  objects  of  experience, 
260  that  without  which  the  experience  of  these  objects  would 
itself  be  impossible.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  that  all 
substances,  in  so  far  as  they  are  co-existent  phenomenal 
Should  stand  with  one  another  in  thoroughgoing  com- 
munity of  reciprocity. 

The  word  community  is  here  used  in  the  sense  of 
dynamical  community  ( commercium ),  without  which  even 
local  community  | communio  spatii)  could  never  be  empiri- 
cally known.  Any  one  may  easily  gather  from  his  own 
experience,  that  only  continuous  influences  in  all  points 
of  space  can  lead  our  senses  from  one  object  to  another. 
The  light  which  plays  between  our  eye  and  the  heavenly 


120 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


bodies  produces  a mediate  community  between  us  and 
them,  and  shows  us  that  they  co-exist.  Nor  could  we 
change  our  position  empirically,  that  is,  observe  the 
change  in  our  position,  if  matter  were  not  everywhere, 
and  if  the  parts  of  a material  object  did  not  manifest 
their  simultaneous  existence  by  means  of  their  influence 
on  one  another.  It  is  in  this  indirect  way  that  we  learn 
the  co-existence  of  all  material  objects,  even  the  most 
distant.  Without  community  there  could  be  only  a 21 
number  of  detached  observations  ; the  chain  of  empirical 
261  ideas  constituting  experience  would  be  continually  begin- 
ning with  a new  object,  having  absolutely  no  connection 
with  that  which  preceded  it,  and  standing  with  it  in  no 
relation  of  time.  This  does  not  prove  that  there  is  no 
empty  space ; empty  space  there  may  perhaps  be,  to 
which  perception  cannot  reach,  and  where  there  is,  there- 
fore, no  empirical  knowledge  of  co-existent  objects  3 but 
such  a space  is  certainly  not  a possible  object  of 
experience. 

A word  by  way  of  further  explanation  may  be  useful. 

All  phenomena,  of  which  we  can  possibly  be  conscious 
in  experience,  must  in  our  mind  stand  in  the  community 
of  apperception.  And  so  far  as  we  can  be  conscious  of 
objects  as  co-existing,  we  must  be  conscious  that,  by 
reciprocally  determining  their  position  in  time,  they  con- 
stitute a whole.  If  this  subjective  community  is  to  rest 
upon  an  objective  ground,  or  to  hold  of  phenomena  as 
substances,  it  must  be  because  the  observation  of  one 
object  is  the  necessary  condition  of  the  observation  of 
another,  and  vice  versa.  Otherwise  we  must  say,  that 
the  succession  which  belongs  to  all  observation  viewed  as 
apprehension  holds  also  of  objects,  and  that  objects 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


I 2 I 


cannot  be  known  as  co-existing.  But  if  objects  can  be 
known  in  experience  as  co-existing,  there  must  be  a 
reciprocal  influence,  or  real  community  ( commercium ) of 
substances.  Through  this  commercium  phenomena,  in  so  215 

262  far  as  they  are  external  to  one  another  and  yet  stand  in 
connection,  are  members  of  a systematic  whole  ( compositum 
reale ) and  are  related  in  many  ways  within  that  whole. 

The  three  dynamical  relations,  from  which  all  others  flow, 
are  therefore  the  relations  of  inherence , consecution , and 
composition. 

These  are  the  three  Analogies  of  Experience.  They 
are  simply  the  principles  by  which  the  existence  of 
phenomena  in  time  is  determined,  in  conformity  with 
the  three  possible  modes  of  time.  There  is,  firstly,  the 
relation  to  time  itself  as  a magnitude,  the  magnitude  of 
existence,  that  is,  duration ; secondly,  the  relation  in 
time  as  a series,  the  parts  of  which  follow  one  another ; 
lastly,  the  relation  likewise  in  time  as  a sum  of  all  exis- 
tence, the  members  of  which  are  co-existent.  This  unity 
of  determination  in  time  is  dynamical  through  and 
through,  that  is,  time  is  not  regarded  as  that  in  which 
experience  directly  determines  to  each  existence  its  own 
place ; this  indeed  is  impossible,  because  it  is  not  possi- 
ble to  observe  an  absolute  time,  in  which  phenomena 
might  be  held  together.  The  unity  is  due  to  a rule  of 
understanding,  through  which  only  the  existence  of 
phenomena  can  obtain  synthetic  unity  in  conformity 
with  relations  of  time,  and  which  determines  to  each 
object  its  place  in  time,  and  that  too  a priori,  and  as 
holding  for  all  and  every  time. 

263  Nature,  in  the  empirical  sense  of  the  word,  is  the  216 


122 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


connected  system  of  phenomena  as  conforming  in  their 
existence  to  necessary  rules  or  laws.  There  are  therefore 
certain  laws,  and  these  a priori,  that  make  nature  possible 
at  all.  Empirical  laws  can  be  found  out  and  established 
only  by  means  of  experience,  and  even  they  are  subject 
to  those  primary  laws  that  make  experience  possible. 
Our  analogies,  therefore,  properly  exhibit  the  unity  of 
nature  in  the  connected  system  of  phenomena  under 
certain  exponents,  and  these  exponents  express  nothing 
but  the  relation  of  time,  as  embracing  all  existence  within 
itself,  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  a unity  that  is  possible 
only  in  the  synthesis  conformed  to  rules.  Taken  together 
they  affirm,  that  all  phenomena  belong,  and  must  belong, 
to  one  system  of  nature,  inasmuch  as,  apart  from  this 
a priori  unity,  there  could  be  no  unity  of  experience,  and 
therefore  no  determination  of  objects  in  experience. 


^ 4.  Postulates  of  all  Empirical  Thought. 

1.  That  which  agrees  with  the  formal  conditions  of 
experience,  or  conforms  to  pure  perception  and  pure 
conception,  is  possible. 

66  2.  That  which  is  bound  up  with  the  material  con- 

ditions of  experience,  or  with  sensation,  is  actual. 

3.  That  which,  in  its  connection  with  the  actual,  is 
determined  in  accordance  with  the  universal  conditions 
of  experience,  is  necessary , or  necessarily  exists. 

Explanation. 

The  categories  of  modality  have  this  peculiarity,  that 
they  do  not  in  the  least  enlarge  the  conception  to  which 
they  are  attached  as  predicates,  but  merely  express  its 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


123 


relation  to  the  faculty  of  knowledge.  Granting  the  con- 
ception of  a thing  to  be  quite  complete,  I may  yet  ask 
whether  the  object  is  possible  or  actual,  and  if  actual, 
whether  it  is  also  necessary.  Such  determinations  are 
not  conceived  to  belong  to  the  object  itself;  the  only 
point  is  how  the  object,  together  with  its  determinations, 
is  related  to  understanding  in  its  empirical  use,  to 
empirical  judgment  and  to  reason  as  applied  to  experience. 

267  (1)  The  first  postulate  demands  that  the  conception  of  220 
things  should  agree  with  the  formal  conditions  of  any 
experience  whatever.  Now  this  objective  form  of  experi- 
ence includes  all  synthesis  that  is  essential  to  the  know- 
ledge of  objects.  A conception  may  imply  synthesis,  but 

if  the  synthesis  does  not  belong  to  experience,  either  as 
being  derived  from  it,  or  as  forming  its  a priori  con- 
dition, the  conception  must  be  held  as  empty,  and  as 

268  not  related  to  any  object.  There  is,  for  instance,  no 
contradiction  in  the  conception  of  a figure  that  is  enclosed 
by  two  straight  lines,  for  the  conception  of  two  straight 
lines,  and  the  conception  of  two  such  lines  meeting,  do 
not  involve  the  negation  of  a figure:  the  impossibility  22: 
arises,  not  from  the  conception  in  itself,  but  from  the 
conditions  of  space  and  of  the  determination  of  space, 
which  prevent  the  construction  of  such  a figure.  But 
these  conditions  have  an  objective  reality  of  their  own, 

or  apply  only  to  possible  things,  because  they  contain  in 
themselves  the  a priori  form  of  experience  in  general. 

270  Setting  aside  everything  the  possibility  of  which  can  be  223 
learned  only  from  actual  experience,  let  us  limit  ourselves 

to  the  question  whether  anything  is  possible  through  a 

27 1 priori  conceptions.  Now,  I maintain  that  nothing  can  be 
determined  as  possible  through  such  conceptions  alone, 


124 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


but  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  merely  formal  and  objective 
conditions  of  experience  in  general. 

At  first  sight  it  no  doubt  seems  as  if  the  possibility  of 
a triangle  could  be  known  from  the  mere  conception  of 
it ; the  conception  certainly  is  independent  of  experi- 
ence, and  we  can  as  a matter  of  fact  give  to  it  an  object, 
that  is,  we  can  construct  the  triangle  completely  a priori. 

But  as  the  triangle  so  constructed  is  merely  the  form  of 
an  object,  it  would  remain  a mere  product  of  imagination,  224 
and  we  could  not  tell  whether  any  object  corresponding 
to  it  was  possible,  if  we  could  not  show  that  such  a figure 
is  thought  under  no  conditions  but  those  on  which  all 

272  objects  of  experience  rest.  It  is  true  that  we  are  able  to 
know  and  to  characterize  the  possibility  of  things  even 
prior  to  experience  ; but  this  we  can  do,  only  because  we 
are  able  to  determine  completely  a priori  the  formal 
relations  under  which  any  object  whatever  can  be  known  ; 
and  even  then  we  can  determine  the  possibility  of  things 
only  relatively  to  experience  and  within  the  limits  of 
experience. 

(2)  The  postulate  which  relates  to  the  knowledge  of  225 
things  as  actual  demands  perceptions  of  sense,  and  therefore 
sensations  of  which  we  are  conscious.  True,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  we  should  be  directly  conscious  through 
sense  of  the  object  that  is  to  be  known,  but  we  must  be 
aware  of  its  connection  with  some  actual  perception,  in 
accordance  with  those  analogies  of  experience  which 
exhibit  the  conditions  of  all  real  connection  in  experi- 

273  ence.  That  which  is  characteristic  of  actuality  is  found 
solely  in  the  perception  of  sense  that  gives  to  a concep- 
tion its  matter.  At  the  same  time,  we  may  know  even 
before  perception  that  a thing  actually  exists,  and  there- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


I25 


fore  is  in  a sense  a priori if  we  can  but  show  that  it  is 
inseparably  related  to  certain  perceptions,  in  accordance  226 
with  the  principles  or  analogies  that  determine  the 
empirical  connection  of  all  perceptions.  Thus  from 
observation  of  the  attraction  of  iron  filings,  we  know  that 
a magnetic  matter  pervades  all  bodies,  although  our 
organs  of  sense  are  so  constituted  that  we  cannot  directly 
perceive  it.  For,  by  the  laws  of  sensibility  and  the  con- 
text of  our  perceptions,  we  should  have  a direct  percep- 
tion of  that  matter  in  experience  were  our  senses  only 
fine  enough.  Our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  things, 
therefore,  extends  as  far  as  perception,  or  valid  inferences 
from  perception,  will  carry  us.  But  if  we  do  not  start 

2 74  from  experience,  and  proceed  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  the  empirical  connection  of  phenomena,  we  shall 
in  vain  try  to  guess  or  to  discover  the  existence  of  any- 
thing whatever. 

279  (3)  The  third  postulate  refers  to  material  necessity 

or  necessity  in  existence,  not  to  merely  formal  and 
logical  necessity  in  the  connection  of  conceptions.  Now, 
the  existence  of  an  object  of  sense  cannot  be  known 
completely  a priori,  but  only  comparatively  a priori. , or 
relatively  to  something  else  the  existence  of  which  is  227 
already  known ; hence  necessity  of  existence  can  never 
be  derived  from  conceptions,  but  only  from  the  connec- 
tion of  an  object  through  general  laws  of  experience  with 
what  has  been  perceived.  There  is  no  existence,  how- 
ever, that  can  be  known  to  be  necessary,  on  condition 
that  other  phenomena  have  been  presented,  except  the 
existence  of  effects  as  following  from  given  causes  in 
conformity  with  laws  of  causality.  It  is,  therefore,  not 
the  existence  of  things  or  substances  that  we  can  know  to 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


I 26 

be  necessary,  but  only  the  existence  of  their  state ; and 
2S0  the  existence  of  their  state  we  can  know  to  be  necessary 
only  from  its  connection,  in  accordance  with  empirical 
laws  of  causality,  with  other  states  given  in  perception. 
From  this  it  follows  that  the  criterion  of  necessity  lies 
entirely  in  the  law  of  possible  experience,  the  law  that 
whatever  happens  is  determined  a p}-iori  in  the  object 
through  its  cause.  We  cannot  know  any  effects  in  nature 
to  be  necessary  except  those  effects  the  causes  of  which 
are  given  to  us,  and  hence  the  criterion  of  necessity  in 
existence  does  not  apply  beyond  the  field  of  possible 
experience.  Nor  does  it  apply  even  within  experience 
to  the  existence  of  things  as  substances,  because  sub- 
stances can  never  be  regarded  as  empirical  effects,  or 
something  that  happens  and  begins  to  be.  Necessity  2 
applies  only  to  the  relations  of  phenomena  as  standing 
under  the  dynamical  law  of  causality,  and  to  the  possi- 
bility that  is  based  upon  it  of  concluding  a priori  from  a 
given  mode  of  existence  (the  cause)  to  another  mode  of 
existence  (the  effect). 


General  Remark  on  the  Principles  of  Judgment. 

288  It  is  very  remarkable  that  there  is  nothing  in  a cate- 
gory, taken  by  itself,  that  enables  us  to  say  whether  a 
real  thing  corresponding  to  it  is  possible,  and  that  a pure 
conception  of  understanding  can  be  shown  to  have 
objective  reality  only  if  a perception  is  brought  forward 
to  which  it  can  apply. 

291  But  what  is  still  more  remarkable  is  that  the  categories 
cannot  be  shown  to  be  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
things,  and  therefore  to  have  objective  reality,  without  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


127 


aid  not  only  of  perceptions,  but  even  of  external  percep- 
tions. Take,  for  instance,  the  pure  conceptions  of 
relation.  Here  we  find  (1)  that,  in  order  to  show  that 
there  is  something  permanent,  which  corresponds  to  the 
conception  of  substance,  and  thus  to  prove  the  objective 
reality  of  the  conception,  we  must  have  the  perception  of 
that  which  is  in  space,  in  other  words,  the  perception  of 
matter ; for  only  space  has  in  it  anything  permanent, 
whereas  time,  and  therefore  all  that  exists  in  the  inner 
sense,  is  in  perpetual  flux.  (2)  The  perception  which 
corresponds  to  the  conception  of  causality  is  change. 
Now,  to  have  a real  consciousness  of  change,  we  must 
have  the  perception  of  motion,  or  change  of  place,  and 
indeed  it  is  only  by  reference  to  motion  that  we  can 
realize  what  change  means.  No  pure  understanding  can 
comprehend  how  change  is  possible,  for  in  itself  change 
combines  determinations  that  contradict  one  another 
292  when  they  are  predicated  of  the  same  thing.  How,  in 
the  very  same  thing,  there  should  follow  from  a given 
state  another  state  that  is  its  opposite,  is  not  only  beyond 
the  power  of  reason  to  comprehend  without  a special 
instance,  but  without  perception  it  cannot  be  made 
intelligible  to  it  at  all.  The  only  perception  which 
fulfils  this  requirement  is  that  of  the  motion  of  a point  in 
space,  for,  by  its  presence  in  different  places,  the  point 
presents  us  with  a series  of  reciprocally  exclusive  deter- 
minations, and  thus  enables  us  to  realize  the  meaning  of 
change.  Even  in  the  case  of  inner  changes,  we  have  to 
figure  time,  the  form  of  inner  sense,  as  a line,  and  the 
inner  changes  themselves  as  the  generation  of  that  line, 
that  is,  as  motion.  Thus  it  is  by  means  of  external  per- 
ception that  we  make  intelligible  to  ourselves  the  various 


128 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


successive  states  in  which  we  ourselves  exist.  The  true 
explanation  of  this  is  that  no  change  can  possibly  be  an 
object  of  experience  apart  from  the  consciousness  of 
something  that  is  permanent,  and  that  in  inner  sense 
nothing  that  is  permanent  can  be  found.  (3)  Nor  can 
the  possibility  of  the  category  of  community  be  conceived 
by  reason  alone,  and  hence  its  objective  reality  can  be 
seen  to  be  possible  only  by  reference  to  perception,  and 
indeed  only  by  reference  to  external  perception  in  space. 
How  can  we  think  it  to  be  possible  that  there  should  be 
anything  in  the  existence  of  one  substance  to  affect 
reciprocally  the  existence  of  other  substances,  and  that, 

293  therefore,  because  there  is  something  in  the  former,  there 
must  be  something  also  in  the  latter  which  could  not  be 
understood  from  the  existence  of  the  latter  when  it  is 
considered  merely  by  itself?  This  is  what  community 
demands,  and  yet  it  is  inconceivable,  if  things  subsist  by 
themselves,  or  are  completely  isolated  from  one  another. 
The  answer  is  that  we  can  make  the  possibility  of  the 
community  of  substances,  that  is,  of  objects  of  experience, 
intelligible  to  ourselves  only  by  representing  them  in 
space,  and,  therefore,  in  external  perception.  For  space 
by  its  very  nature  contains  in  itself  a priori  formal 
external  relations,  and  these  are  conditions  of  the  possi- 
bility of  the  real  relations  of  action  and  reaction,  and 
therefore  of  community.  Similarly  it  might  readily  be 
shown  that  the  possibility  of  things  as  quanta,  and  there- 
fore the  objective  reality  of  the  category  of  quantity, 
requires  external  perception,  and  that  only  by  means  of 
external  perception  can  we  have  experience  even  of  any- 
thing in  inner  sense  as  a quantum. 

294  The  net  result  of  this  whole  section  is  this  : — All 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


129 


principles  of  pure  understanding  are  nothing  but  a priori 
principles  of  the  possibility  of  experience ; and  all  a 
priori  synthetic  propositions  relate  only  to  experience, 
and  indeed  from  that  relation  they  derive  their  possibility. 


Chapter  III. — Distinction  of  Phenomena  235 
AND  NOUMENA. 

295  We  have  seen  that,  whatever  understanding  produces  236 
from  itself,  it  holds  in  trust  solely  in  the  interest  of 

296  experience.  The  principles  of  pure  understanding, 
whether  as  mathematical  they  are  a priori  constitutive 
principles,  or  as  dynamical  merely  regulative  principles, 
contain  nothing  but  what  may  be  called  the  pure  schema 

for  a possible  experience.  For  experience  derives  its  237 
unity  entirely  from  the  synthetic  unity  which  understanding 
imparts,  originally  and  spontaneously,  to  the  synthesis  of 
imagination  in  relation  to  apperception  ; and  phenomena, 
as  the  data  for  a possible  knowledge,  must  therefore 
stand  a priori  in  relation  to  that  synthetic  unity  and  in 
harmony  with  it. 

2gj  Now  the  proposition  that  understanding  can  never  238 
make  a transcendental  use,  but  only  an  empirical  use,  of 
any  of  its  a priori  principles,  is  seen  to  have  very 

>98  important  consequences,  so  soon  as  it  is  thorougly  under- 
stood. A conception  is  employed  transcendentally 
when  it  occurs  in  a proposition  regarding  things  as  such 
or  in  themselves ; it  is  employed  empirically  when  the 
proposition  relates  merely  to  phenomena , or  objects  of  a 
possible  experience.  Only  the  empirical  use  is  admis-  239 
sible.  Every  conception  requires,  firstly,  the  logical 
form  of  conception  or  thought,  and,  secondly,  the  possi- 

1 


130 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


bility  of  an  object  being  empirically  given  to  which  it  may 
be  applied.  Where  no  such  object  can  be  given,  the 
conception  is  empty  and  meaningless,  containing  nothing 
but  the  logical  function  which  is  necessary  in  order  to 
form  a conception  out  of  any  data  that  may  be  given. 
Now,  the  only  way  in  which  an  object  can  be  presented 
is  in  perception.  And  this  perception  must  be  empirical ; 
for,  although  pure  perception  is  possible  a priori  before 
the  presentation  of  an  object,  yet,  as  it  is  a mere  form,  it 
can  by  itself  have  no  object  to  which  it  may  apply,  and 
therefore  it  can  have  no  objective  value  ascribed  to  it. 
Hence  all  conceptions,  and  with  them  all  principles,  even 
when  they  are  possible  a priori , are  none  the  less  relative 
to  empirical  perceptions  as  the  data  for  a possible  experi- 
ence. Apart  from  this  relation  they  have  no  objective 
validity,  but  are  a mere  play  of  imagination  or  of  under- 
standing. 

300  That  this  limitation  applies  to  all  the  categories,  and  to  240 
all  the  principles  derived  from  them,  is  evident,  if  only 
from  this,  that  we  cannot  give  a real  definition  of  even  a 
single  one  of  them,  or  in  other  words,  make  the  possi- 
bility of  their  object  intelligible,  without  directly  referring 
to  the  conditions  of  sensibility,  and  therefore  to  the  form 
of  phenomena.  The  categories  are  thus  necessarily  241 
limited  to  phenomena  as  their  sole  object,  and,  if  this 
limitation  is  taken  away,  all  meaning  or  objective  relation 
vanishes  from  them,  and  no  possible  instance  of  an 
object  can  be  adduced  to  make  the  conception  compre- 
hensible. 

303  There  is  therefore  no  way  of  avoiding  the  conclusion  246 
that  the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding  can  never  be 
employed  transcendentally,  but  only  empirically,  and  that 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC.  13I 

the  principles  of  pure  understanding  can  apply  only  to 
objects  of  sense,  as  conforming  to  the  universal  conditions 
of  a possible  experience,  and  never  to  things  as  such,  or 
apart  from  the  manner  in  which  we  are  capable  of 
perceiving  them. 

The  Transcendental  Analytic  has  brought  us  to  this 
important  conclusion,  that  understanding  can  never  do 
more  than  supply  by  anticipation  the  form  for  a possible 
experience ; and,  as  nothing  but  a phenomenon  can  be 
an  object  of  experience,  it  has  taught  us  that  under- 
standing cannot  possibly  transcend  the  limits  of  sensi- 
bility, beyond  which  no  objects  are  presented  to  us.  The 
principles  of  pure  understanding  are  merely  exponents  of  247 
phenomena,  and  for  the  proud  name  of  Ontology,  as  a 
science  that  claims  to  supply  in  a systematic  doctrine 
a priori  synthetic  knowledge  of  things  as  such,  must  be 
substituted  the  more  modest  claims  of  an  Analytic  of 
Pure  Understanding. 

309  If  from  empirical  knowledge  is  taken  away  all  that  253 
thought  contributes  in  its  categories,  there  is  no  longer 
any  knowledge  of  an  object.  By  mere  perception  nothing 
whatever  is  thought,  and  the  mere  fact  that  I am  con- 
scious of  an  affection  of  my  sensibility  does  not  entitle 
me  to  say  that  I am  conscious  of  my  affection  as 
related  to  any  object.  On  the  other  hand,  even  if  all 
perception  is  taken  away,  there  still  remains  the  form  of  254 
thought,  or  the  manner  in  which  the  various  elements  of 
a possible  perception  are  capable  of  being  combined  in 
relation  to  an  object.  The  categories  have  therefore  in 
this  sense  a wider  reach  than  perceptions  of  sense,  that 
they  think  objects  in  general,  without  looking  to  the 
particular  manner  in  which  they  may  be  presented.  But 


i32 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


although  they  are  so  far  independent  of  sensibility,  they 
do  not  determine  a larger  sphere  of  objects ; for  we  are 
not  entitled  to  say  that  non-sensuous  objects  can  be 
presented,  unless  we  can  show  that  a sort  of  perception 
is  possible  that  is  not  sensuous.  Now  this  we  cannot 
possibly  do. 

310  A conception  which  cannot  be  known  in  any  way  to 
have  objective  reality  may  be  called  problematic,  if  it  is 
not  self-contradictory,  and  if  it  is  bound  up  with  the 
knowledge  gained  through  certain  conceptions  the  range 
of  which  it  serves  to  limit.  Now  the  conception  of  a 
noumenon,  that  is,  of  a thing  that  cannot  be  an  object  of 
sense,  but  is  thought,  by  pure  understanding  alone,  as  a 
thing  in  itself,  is  certainly  not  self-contradictory ; for  we 
cannot  know  with  certainty  that  sensibility  is  the  only 
possible  mode  of  perception.  Moreover,  the  conception 
of  a noumenon  is  necessary  to  prevent  sensuous  percep- 
tion from  claiming  to  extend  to  things  in  themselves,  and 
to  set  a limit  to  the  objective  validity  of  sensuous  know- 
ledge. In  the  end,  however,  we  are  unable  to  understand  2 
how  such  noumena  are  possible  at  all,  and  the  realm 
beyond  the  sphere  of  phenomena  is  for  us  empty 
We  have  indeed  an  understanding  that  problematically 
stretches  beyond  the  sphere  of  phenomena,  but  we  have 
no  perception  in  which  objects  beyond  the  field  of  sensi- 
bility can  be  presented,  nor  can  we  conceive  how  such 

a perception  is  even  possible.  Hence  understanding 
cannot  be  employed  assertorically  beyond  the  world  of 
phenomena.  The  conception  of  a noumenon  is,  there- 

31 1 fore,  merely  the  conception  of  a limit,  a conception  which 
is  only  of  negative  use,  and  but  serves  to  check  the 
presumption  of  sensibility.  But  although  it  is  unable  to 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC. 


133 


establish  anything  positive  beyond  the  sphere  of  pheno- 
mena, the  idea  of  a noumenon  is  not  a mere  arbitrary 
fiction,  but  is  connected  in  the  closest  way  with  the 
limitation  of  the  sensibility  to  phenomena. 

The  positive  division  of  objects  into  phenomena  and 
noumena,  and  of  the  world  into  a sensible  and  intelligible 
world,  is  therefore  quite  inadmissible.  Certainly,  the 
distinction  of  conceptions  as  sensuous  and  intellectual  is 
legitimate.  But,  as  intellectual  conceptions  do  not 
determine  any  object  for  themselves,  they  can  have  no 
objective  validity.  If  abstraction  is  made  from  sense, 
how  shall  it  be  made  intelligible,  that  the  categories,  256 
which  are  then  the  only  means  of  determining  noumena, 
have  any  meaning  whatever  ? The  mere  unity  of  thought 
is  not  the  same  thing  as  the  determination  of  an  object  ; 
for  knowledge  also  requires  that  the  object  to  which 
that  unity  can  be  applied,  should  be  capable  of  being 
presented  in  a perception.  At  the  same  time,  if  the 
conception  of  a noumenon  is  interpreted  in  a problematic 
sense,  it  is  not  only  admissible  but  indispensable,  serving 
as  it  does  to  define  the  limits  of  sensibility.  In  that 
sense,  however,  a noumenon  is  not  a special  kind  of 
object  for  our  understanding,  namely,  an  intelligible 
object  • on  the  contrary  it  is  problematic  whether  there  is 
any  understanding  that  could  have  such  an  object  actually 
2 before  it.  Such  an  understanding  would  not  know  its 
object  discursively  by  means  of  categories,  but  intuitively  in 
a non-sensuous  perception  ; and  how  this  is  possible  we 
cannot  form  even  the  faintest  conception.  Still,  in  the  con- 
ception of  a noumenon  our  understanding  gets  a sort  of 
negative  extension  ; for  in  calling  things  in  themselves 
noumena,  and  viewing  them  as  not  objects  of  sense 


*34 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


it  rather  limits  the  sensibility  than  is  limited  by  sensi- 
bility. At  the  same  time,  understanding  cannot  limit 
sensibility  without  also  setting  limits  to  itself,  for  it  has 
instantly  to  add,  that  things  in  themselves  cannot  be 
known  by  means  of  categories,  and  all  that  remains  is 
to  think  them  under  a name  that  indicates  something 
unknown. 

315  There  are,  therefore,  no  principles  through  which  the  259 
conception  of  pure,  merely  intelligible  objects  could 
ever  be  applied,  for  we  cannot  imagine  any  way  in 
which  such  objects  could  be  presented  to  us.  The 
problematic  thought,  which  leaves  a place  open  for 
intelligible  objects,  serves  only,  as  a sort  of  empty  space, 
to  limit  the  empirical  principles,  without  containing  260 
within  it  or  indicating  any  object  of  knowledge  that 
lies  outside  the  sphere  of  those  principles. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


*35 


349  TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  293 

INTRODUCTION. 

1.  Transcendental  Illusion. 

351  We  have  here  nothing  to  do  with  optical  illusion,  295 

352  or  with  empirical  illusion  of  any  kind,  which  occurs  in 
the  empirical  use  of  correct  rules  of  understanding,  and 
arises  from  the  misleading  influence  of  imagination  upon 
judgment.  What  we  propose  to  consider  is  transcen- 
dental illusion , which  is  due  to  the  use  of  principles 
that  have  no  bearing  upon  experience,  and  therefore 
cannot  be  tested  by  experience.  Contrary  to  all  the 
warnings  of  criticism,  this  illusion  tempts  us  to  apply 
the  categories  beyond  experience,  and  cheats  us  with 
the  dream  of  an  extension  of  pure  understanding  be- 
yond the  limits  of  experience.  Principles  which  are 
applied  entirely  within  the  limits  of  possible  experience  296 
we  shall  call  immanent , those  which  seek  to  transcend 
these  limits  we  shall  call  transcendent.  In  calling  a 
principle  transcendent,  I do  not  mean  to  indicate  simply 
the  transcendental  use,  or,  as  we  should  rather  call  it, 
misuse  of  the  categories.  This  is  merely  a defect  in 
judgment,  when  it  has  not  been  chastened  by  criticism, 
and  therefore  does  not  pay  due  heed  to  the  limits 
within  which  alone  pure  understanding  has  full  sway. 

A principle  is  said  to  be  transcendent,  when  it  positively 


136 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


asserts  our  right  to  break  down  all  such  barriers, 
and  to  take  possession  of  an  entirely  new  realm,  into 
which  it  can  enter  only  if  all  limits  to  knowledge  have 
been  taken  away.  Transcendental  and  transcendent  are 
therefore  not  the  same  thing.  The  principles  of  pure 
understanding,  as  we  have  seen  above,  can  be  employed 
only  empirically,  never  transcendentally,  inasmuch  as 
they  do  not  extend  beyond  the  limits  of  experience. 
But  a principle  which  denies  those  limits,  or  even  com- 
mands us  to  transcend  them,  must  be  called  transcen- 
dent. Now,  if  our  Critique  succeeds  in  exposing  the 
illusion  of  these  pretended  principles,  the  principles 
which  are  employed  only  empirically  may  be  called,  in 
contrast  to  the  former,  immanent  principles  of  pure 
understanding. 

The  logical  illusion  of  a sophistical  syllogism  con- 
sists in  an  imitation  of  the  form  of  reason,  and  arises 
solely  from  a want  of  attention  to  the  rules  of  logic. 

It  therefore  vanishes  the  moment  our  attention  is  2 
aroused.  Transcendental  illusion,  on  the  other  hand, 
does  not  disappear,  even  when  it  has  been  brought 
under  the  light  of  transcendental  criticism,  and  when 
its  fallacy  has  been  clearly  detected ; as  is  the  case, 
for  instance,  in  the  proposition,  that  the  world  must 
have  a beginning  in  time.  The  explanation  of  this  is, 
that  in  our  reason,  considered  as  simply  a faculty  of 
human  knowledge,  there  lie  fundamental  rules  and 
maxims  of  its  use,  which  have  all  the  appearance  of 
objective  principles.  Hence  we  commonly  mistake  the 
subjective  necessity,  which  is  essential  to  the  connection 
by  understanding  of  our  conceptions,  for  an  objective 
necessity  in  the  determination  of  things  in  themselves. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


137 


354  Transcendental  Dialectic  must  therefore  be  satisfied 
with  bringing  to  light  the  illusion  in  transcendent  judg- 
ments, and  guarding  us  against  its  deceptive  influence ; 
but  it  can  never  put  an  end  to  the  illusion  and  cause  298 
it  to  disappear,  as  in  the  case  of  logical  illusion.  For, 
the  illusion  is  here  natural  and  unavoidable,  resting  as 

it  does  upon  subjective  principles  which  we  cannot 
help  supposing  to  be  objective.  So  closely  is  this  illus- 
ion interwoven  with  the  operations  of  human  reason 
that  even  after  it  has  been  detected  in  its  work  of 

355  deception,  it  never  fails  to  fascinate  the  reason  and 
to  lead  to  momentary  errors,  which  need  to  be  corrected 
again  and  again. 

2.  Pure  Reason  as  the  Seat  of  Transcendental 
Illusion. 

356  In  the  Analytic  it  has  been  shown  that  understanding  299 
is  the  faculty  of  rules  ; and  now  we  distinguish  reason 
from  understanding  by  calling  it  the  faculty  of  principles.  300 

By  a principle  is  usually  meant  any  sort  of  knowledge 
that  can  be  employed  as  a principle,  even  if  in  itself,  and 
from  the  point  of  view  of  its  origin,  it  is  not  a principle 
at  all.  Every  general  proposition,  which  can  stand  in  a 
syllogism  as  its  major  premise,  is  in  this  sense  called  a 
principle,  even  if  it  has  been  derived  by  induction  from 
experience. 

357  Strictly  speaking,  however,  only  that  knowledge  is  a 
principle  in  which  I know  the  particular  in  the  universal 

by  means  of  conceptions.  Now,  if  we  consider  the  301 
universal  a priori  propositions  of  pure  understanding  in 
themselves  and  according  to  their  origin,  they  are  very 
far  from  yielding  knowledge  by  means  of  conceptions. 


138  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

For  they  would  not  be  even  possible  a priori , if  we  could 
not  refer  to  pure  perception,  or  to  the  universal  conditions 
of  a possible  experience.  Understanding  cannot  possibly 

358  derive  synthetic  knowledge  from  conceptions,  and  such 
knowledge  is  what  I mean  when  I speak  of  principles  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 

359  If,  then,  understanding  is  the  faculty  of  reducing  302 
phenomena  to  the  unity  of  rules,  reason  is  the  faculty  of 
bringing  the  rules  of  understanding  under  principles. 
Reason  never  goes  directly  to  experience  or  to  any 
object,  but  seeks  by  means  of  conceptions  to  give  a 
priori  unity  to  understanding  and  its  various  knowledge. 

This  unity,  which  may  be  called  the  unity  of  reason,  is 
quite  different  in  kind  from  that  which  understanding  is 
capable  of  producing. 

363  The  question  arises,  then,  whether  pure  reason  in  306 
itself  contains  a priori  synthetic  principles  and  rules, 
and,  if  so,  what  those  principles  are. 

From  the  formal  and  logical  procedure  of  reason  in 
syllogisms  we  may  readily  learn  the  ground  upon  which 
the  transcendental  principle  of  pure  reason  in  its  synthetic 
knowledge  must  rest. 

Firstly,  in  the  process  of  inference  reason  does  not 
bring  perceptions  directly  under  rules,  as  understanding 
does  with  its  categories,  but  deals  with  conceptions  and 
judgments.  No  doubt  pure  reason  also  relates  to  objects 
of  perception,  but  its  direct  relation  is  not  to  perceptions, 
but  only  to  understanding  and  its  judgments.  It  is  307 
understanding  only  that  applies  directly  to  perceptions  of 
sense,  and  by  its  judgments  determines  them  as  objects. 

The  unity  of  reason  therefore  differs  essentially  from  the 
unity  of  a possible  experience  as  due  to  understanding. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


139 


The  proposition  that  whatever  happens  has  a cause,  is  not 
a principle  known  and  prescribed  by  reason.  It  makes 

364  the  unity  of  experience  possible,  and  borrows  nothing 
from  reason,  which  could  never  have  prescribed  such  a 
synthetic  unity  from  mere  conceptions,  that  is,  indepen- 
dently of  all  relation  to  possible  experience. 

Secondly,  reason  in  its  logical  use  seeks  to  reach  a 
premise  which  contains  the  universal  condition  of  the 
judgment  that  constitutes  the  conclusion  of  the  syllogism, 
and  the  syllogism  is  itself  simply  a judgment  in  which 
that  condition  is  subsumed  under  a universal  rule  con- 
tained in  the  major  premise.  Now,  as  reason  may  again 
seek  for  a universal  condition  of  that  rule,  or,  in  other 
words,  may  go  as  far  as  it  can  in  search  of  the  condition 
of  a condition,  by  means  of  a pro-syllogism,  it  is  plain 
that  the  peculiar  principle  of  reason  in  its  logical  use  is 
to  find  for  every  conditioned  knowledge  of  understanding 
the  unconditioned,  and  so  to  complete  the  unity  of 
knowledge. 

This  logical  maxim,  however,  can  be  regarded  as  a 
principle  of  pure  reason  only  if  we  assume  that  when  the 
conditioned  is  given  the  whole  series  of  conditions  in 
subordination  to  one  another,  and  therefore  the  uncon-  308 
ditioned,  is  actually  realized,  the  object  being  seen  in  itself 
and  in  the  whole  of  its  relations. 

Now,  such  a principle  of  pure  reason  is  manifestly 
synthetic ; for  while  it  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  con- 
ditioned, is  related  analytically  to  some  condition,  it  is 
not  possible  to  derive  the  unconditioned  from  it  by 

365  analysis.  From  that  principle  must  also  proceed  various 
other  synthetic  propositions,  of  which  pure  understanding 
knows  nothing.  These  propositions  will  be  transcendent , 


140 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


so  far  as  phenomena  are  concerned ; that  is  to  say,  it  will 
be  impossible  ever  to  make  an  adequate  use  in  experience 
of  the  supreme  principle  of  pure  reason.  That  principle 
will  therefore  be  essentially  different  from  all  the  principles 
of  understanding,  which  are  always  immanent  and  have 
no  object  but  to  make  experience  possible.  We  must 
therefore  inquire,  whether  the  principle  that  the  series  of 
conditions  extends  as  far  as  the  unconditioned  has  any 
objective  truth,  and  how  the  answer  to  this  question 
affects  our  view  of  the  empirical  use  of  understanding ; or  309 
whether  it  has  no  objective  truth,  but  is  simply  a logical 
rule,  telling  us  to  get  as  near  to  completeness  as  we 
possibly  can  in  the  ascent  to  ever  higher  conditions,  and 
so  to  bring  our  knowledge  to  the  highest  unity  of  which 
our  reason  is  capable. 


366 


BOOK  I. 


310 


^77  Section  II. — Transcendental  Ideas. 

In  the  Transcendental  Analytic  we  have  seen  how,  from 
the  mere  logical  form  of  our  knowledge,  there  arise  pure 
a priori  conceptions,  which  yield  the  consciousness  of 
378  objects  antecedently  to  all  experience,  or  rather  point  to 
the  synthetic  unity  that  alone  makes  an  empirical  know- 
ledge of  objects  possible.  By  conceiving  the  form  of 
judgments  as  supplying  conceptions  for  the  synthesis  of 
perceptions,  we  were  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  cate- 
gories, which  we  found  to  be  the  guide  of  understanding 
in  the  whole  of  its  empirical  use.  We  may  therefore 
expect  that  from  the  form  of  syllogisms,  as  applied  to  the 
synthetic  unity  of  perceptions  in  conformity  with  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  141 

categories,  will  arise  a special  class  of  a priori  conceptions, 
which  may  be  called  pure  conceptions  of  reason  or  tran- 
scendental  ideas,  and  which  will  determine  how  under- 
standing is  to  be  employed  within  the  realm  of  experience 
as  a whole  in  conformity  with  principles. 

A transcendental  conception  of  reason  is,  therefore,  322 
just  the  conception  of  the  totality  of  conditions  of  any- 
thing that  is  given  as  conditioned.  Now,  the  uncon- 
ditioned alone  makes  a totality  of  conditions  possible, 
while  conversely  the  totality  of  conditions  is  always  itself 
unconditioned ; hence  a pure  conception  of  reason  may 
be  defined,  generally,  as  a conception  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned, in  so  far  as  it  contains  a ground  for  the  synthesis 
of  the  conditioned. 

There  are  as  many  pure  conceptions  of  reason  as  323 
understanding  has  functions  of  relation  in  its  categories. 
Hence  we  have,  firstly,  the  unconditioned  of  the  cate- 
gorical synthesis  in  a subject;  secondly,  the  unconditioned 
of  the  hypothetical  synthesis  of  the  members  of  a series  ; 
thirdly,  the  unconditioned  of  the  disjunctive  synthesis  of 
the  parts  in  a system. 

Transcendental  ideas,  then,  are  problematic  conceptions  327 
of  pure  reason,  which  regard  all  empirical  knowledge  as 
determined  through  an  absolute  totality  of  conditions. 
They  are  not  mere  fictions,  but  spring  from  the  very 
nature  of  reason  itself,  and  therefore  stand  in  a necessary 
relation  to  the  whole  use  of  understanding.  And,  lastly, 
they  are  transcendent,  inasmuch  as  they  overleap  the 
limits  of  all  experience,  in  which  no  object  can  be  pre- 
sented that  is  adequate  to  the  transcendental  idea. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  because  tran- 
scendental conceptions  of  reason  are  only  ideas,  they  are 


142 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


therefore  superfluous  and  useless.  For,  although  ideas 
cannot  determine  an  object,  they  may  lie  at  the  basis  of 
understanding  as  an  unseen  canon,  for  its  extended  and 
consistent  use.  Adding  nothing  to  what  we  know  of  an 
object  by  means  of  the  conceptions  of  understanding, 
they  yet  may  guide  understanding  to  clearer  and  wider 
knowledge ; not  to  mention  that  they  may,  perhaps, 
make  the  transition  possible  from  the  sphere  of  nature  to 
the  sphere  of  morality. 

Section  III. — System  of  Transcendental  Ideas. 

All  transcendental  ideas  can  be  brought  under  three  334 
heads  : the  first,  containing  the  absolute  or  unconditioned 
unity  of  the  thinking  subject;  the  second,  the  absolute 
unity  of  the  series  of  conditions  of  phenomena ; the  third, 
the  absolute  unity  of  the  condition  of  all  objects  of  thought 
whatever. 

The  thinking  subject  is  the  object  of  psychology , the 
sum-total  of  all  phenomena  (the  world)  is  the  object  of 
cosmology,  and  the  being  that  contains  the  supreme  con- 
dition of  all  that  can  be  thought  (the  Being  of  all  beings) 
is  the  object  of  theology.  Pure  reason  therefore  supplies 
the  idea  for  a transcendental  doctrine  of  the  soul  ( psycho - 
logia  rationalis),  the  idea  for  a transcendental  science  of 
the  world  ( cosmologia  rationalis ),  and,  lastly,  the  idea  for  3^5 
a transcendental  knowledge  of  God  ( theologia  transcen- 
dentalism) 

It  is  readily  seen,  that  the  sole  aim  of  pure  reason  is  336 
absolute  totality  of  synthesis  on  the  side  of  the  conditions, 
and  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  absolute  completeness 
on  the  side  of  the  conditioned.  For  the  presupposition  that 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


x43 


the  series  of  conditions  should  be  complete  is  satisfied, 
if  reason  can  only  present  to  the  understanding  a priori 
a condition  that  is  itself  complete  and  unconditioned, 
leaving  it  to  understanding  to  descend  from  the  Condition 
to  the  conditioned. 

394  It  is  obvious  also,  that  those  three  ideas  display  a 337 
certain  connection  and  unity  among  themselves,  by 
means  of  which  pure  reason  is  able  to  reduce  its  know- 
ledge to  system.  To  advance  from  the  knowledge  of 
oneself  (the  soul)  to  a knowledge  of  the  world,  and 
through  it  to  a knowledge  of  the  Supreme  Being,  is  a 
progression  so  natural,  that  it  suggests  the  logical 

395  advance  of  reason  from  premises  to  conclusion. 


396  BOOK  II.  338 

The  Dialectical  Conclusions  of  Pure  Reason. 

We  may  say  that  the  object  of  a purely  transcendental 
idea  is  something  of  which  we  can  form  no  conception, 
although  the  idea  itself  has  arisen  with  absolute  necessity 
from  the  primary  laws  of  reason.  In  fact  it  is  impossible 
for  understanding  to  have  the  conception  of  an  object  that 
should  be  adequate  to  the  demands  of  reason,  for  this 
would  mean  that  we  should  have  a conception  that  could 
be  exhibited  and  brought  to  perception  in  a possible  ex- 

397  perience.  But  it  is  better,  because  less  misleading,  to  say,  339 
that  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  the  object  which 
corresponds  to  an  idea,  although  we  may  have  a pro- 
blematic conception  of  it. 

Now,  at  least  the  transcendental  or  subjective  reality 
of  the  ideas  of  reason  is  reached  by  a necessary  inference. 


144 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


There  are,  accordingly,  inferences  the  premises  of  which 
contain  nothing  empirical,  and  in  these  we  reason  from 
something  that  we  know  to  something  else  that  we 
cannot  comprehend,  but  to  which  by  an  unavoidable 
illusion  we  ascribe  objective  reality.  In  their  actual 
result  those  inferences  are  sophistical  rather  than  rational ; 
at  the  same  time  they  are  not  mere  arbitrary  fictions,  but 
spring  from  the  very  nature  of  reason,  and  in  that  sense 
are  well  entitled  to  be  called  rational.  They  are  sophis- 
tications of  pure  reason  itself,  which  even  the  wisest  man 
cannot  shake  off.  After  much  effort  he  may  avoid  posi- 
tive error,  but  he  need  not  hope  to  be  perfectly  free  from 
an  illusion  that  will  never  cease  to  mock  and  bewilder 
him. 

Corresponding  to  the  three  ideas,  there  are  three 
kinds  of  dialectical  inference.  In  the  first,  I reason  from  340 
398  the  transcendental  conception  of  the  subject,  which  is 
perfectly  simple,  to  the  absolute  unity  of  the  subject  itself, 
of  which  I.  have  no  conception  at  all.  This  dialectical 
illusion  I shall  call  the  transcendental  paralogism.  The 
second  kind  of  dialectical  inference  is  to  the  tran- 
scendental conception  of  an  absolute  totality  in  the  series 
of  conditions  to  any  given  phenomenon.  Here  I reason, 
that,  as  my  conception  of  the  unconditioned  synthetic 
unity  of  the  series  is  always  self-contradictory,  the  op- 
posite unity,  which  is  equally  inconceivable,  must  be 
regarded  as  true.  The  attitude  of  reason  in  this  form  of 
dialectical  inference  I shall  call  the  antinomy  of  reason. 

In  the  third  and  last  kind  of  sophistical  inference  of 
reason,  I conclude  from  the  totality  of  conditions  de- 
manded by  the  thought  of  objects  as  a whole,  in  so  far  as 
these  can  be  given,  to  the  absolute  synthetic  unity  of  all 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


z45 


conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things  in  general ; in  other 
words,  I reason  from  things  that  I cannot  know  through 
the  mere  transcendental  conception  of  them  to  a Being  of 
all  beings  that  I know  still  less,  since  the  transcendental 
conception  throws  no  light  upon  its  existence  or  its 
unconditioned  necessity.  This  sort  of  dialectical  in- 
ference I shall  call  the  ideal  of  pure  reason. 

399  Chapter  I. — The  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason.  34 1 

A logical  paralogism  is  an  inference  invalid  in  form, 
the  invalidity  of  which  is  quite  independent  of  its  content. 

A transcendental  paralogism  is  an  inference  also  invalid 
in  form,  but  its  formal  invalidity  has  a transcendental 
source.  The  wrong  conclusion  will  here  be  due  to  the 
very  nature  of  human  reason,  and  will  carry  with  it  an 
unavoidable  though  not  an  inexplicable  illusion. 

There  is  one  conception,  that  we  must  now  put  along 
with  the  transcendental  conceptions  contained  in  the 
table  of  categories,  but  without  in  any  way  changing  or 
adding  to  that  table.  This  is  the  conception,  or,  if  it  is 
preferred,  the  judgment,  “ I think."  It  is  easy  to  see, 
that  “ I think  ” is  the  common  vehicle  of  all  conceptions, 
and  therefore  of  transcendental  as  well  as  empirical  con- 
ceptions. As  the  vehicle  of  transcendental  conceptions 
it  is  itself  transcendental,  but  it  cannot  claim  a special 
place  in  the  list  of  these  transcendental  conceptions,  be- 

400  cause  it  merely  serves  to  indicate  that  all  thought  belongs 

to  consciousness.  And  although  it  is  pure,  or  free  from  all  342 
empirical  elements  or  impressions  of  sense,  it  yet  serves 
to  distinguish  between  two  different  kinds  of  objects,  from 
the  different  ways  in  which  they  are  related  to  conscious- 

K 


146 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


ness.  I,  as  thinking,  am  an  object  of  inner  sense,  and 
am  called  soul,  while  that  which  is  an  object  of  outer 
sense  is  called  body.  Accordingly,  the  very  term  I 
designates  the  thinking  being  which  is  the  object  of 
psychology.  Psychology,  therefore,  may  be  called  the 
rational  science  of  soul,  if  it  seeks  to  know  nothing  about 
the  soul  but  what  can  be  inferred,  independently  of 
all  experience,  from  the  conception  / as  present  in 
all  thought ; that  is,  if  no  attempt  is  made  to  determine 
the  I in  concreto  as  a particular  obj  ect  of  experience. 

Now,  the  rational  doctrine  of  the  soul  necessarily 
attempts  to  do  this  ; for,  if  the  smallest  empirical  element 
of  my  thought,  or  any  particular  perception  of  my  own 
state,  should  mingle  with  the  principles  of  the  science,  it 
would  no  longer  be  a rational,  but  would  be  merely  an 
empirical  doctrine  of  the  soul.  We  have  before  us,  then, 
what  claims  to  be  a science,  built  upon  the  single 
proposition,  “ I think,"  and  this  is  the  proper  place  to  try 
its  solidity,  or  want  of  solidity,  by  the  principles  of  a 
transcendental  philosophy.  It  is  not  a valid  objection  to 
rational  psychology  to  say,  that,  as  the  proposition 
“ I think"  expresses  the  perception  of  oneself  as  revealed 
in  experience,  the  doctrine  built  upon  that  perception  343 
1 can  never  be  purely  rational,  but  must  be  founded  in  part 
upon  an  empirical  principle.  For  this  inner  perception 
is  but  the  mere  apperception,  “ / think,"  which  is  the 
condition  of  all  transcendental  conceptions,  and  means,  I 
think  substance,  cause,  etc.  The  determination  of  the 
constitution  and  possibility  of  inner  experience  in  general, 
or  the  general  relation  of  one  perception  to  another, 
apart  from  the  particular  distinction  and  empirical  deter- 
mination of  perception,  cannot  be  regarded  as  empirical 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


147 


knowledge,  but  only  as  the  knowledge  of  what  any 
empirical  object  must  be.  Now  the  investigation  into 
the  possibility  of  experience  in  general  is  undoubtedly  a 
transcendental  investigation,  though  the  addition  of  even 
the  smallest  ingredient  of  sense,  were  it  only  the  feeling 
of  pleasure  or  pain,  to  the  pure  idea  of  self-consciousness, 
would  at  once  convert  a rational  into  an  empirical 
psychology. 

“ I think”  is  therefore  the  text  of  rational  psychology, 
and  from  this  single  proposition  the  whole  system  must  be 
derived.  It  is  easy  to  see,  that,  if  this  thought  is  to  be 
used  as  determining  the  self  as  an  object,  it  can  bring  to 
it  only  transcendental  predicates,  for  any  empirical  predi- 
cate whatever  must  destroy  the  purity  of  a rational  science, 
and  make  it  dependent  upon  experience. 

402  The  categories  will  naturally  be  our  guiding-thread,  but  344 
as  there  is  here  given  to  us  a thing,  the  / as  a thinking 
being,  we  shall  begin  with  the  category  of  substance, 
which  is  predicated  of  the  / as  a thing  in  itself.  The 
topic  of  the  rational  doctrine  of  soul,  from  which  all  else 
that  may  be  contained  in  it  is  derived,  is  therefore  as 
follows  : — 

1.  The  soul  is  substance. 

2.  As  to  quality,  simple.  3.  As  to  the  various  times 

in  which  it  exists,  numeri- 
cally identical,  that  is, 
unity  (not  plurality). 

4.  In  relation  to  possible  objects  in  space. 

403  Corresponding  to  these  elements,  the  transcendental  345 
doctrine  of  the  soul  contains  four  paralogisms.  That 
doctrine  is  therefore  wrongly  held  to  be  a science  of  pure 

404  reason  concerning  the  nature  of  our  thinking  self.  It  has 


148 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


no  foundation  but  the  simple  idea  /,  which  is  so  com-  346 
pletely  empty  of  all  content,  that  it  cannot  be  called  even 
a conception,  but  merely  a consciousness  that  accompanies 
all  conceptions.  This  /,  or  he,  or  it,  this  thing  that 
thinks,  is  nothing  but  the  idea  of  a transcendental  subject 
of  thought  = x,  which  is  known  only  through  the  thoughts 
that  are  its  predicates,  and  which,  apart  from  them,  can- 
not be  conceived  at  all.  We  turn  round  and  round  it  in 
a perpetual  circle,  for  we  can  make  no  judgment  about  it 
without  making  use  of  the  idea  of  it  in  our  judgment. 

Nor  can  this  inconvenience  be  avoided,  for  consciousness 
in  itself  is  not  so  much  the  distinct  idea  of  a particular 
object,  as  a general  form  of  all  the  ideas  through  which 
knowledge  of  objects  is  to  be  obtained,  and  indeed  the 
only  form  of  which  I can  say,  that  without  it  I can  think 
nothing  whatever. 

406  Now,  as  the  proposition,  “ I think?  taken  problem-  348 
atically,  contains  the  form  of  every  judgment  of  under- 
standing, and  accompanies  all  categories  as  their  vehicle, 
it  is  clear  that  the  inferences  from  it  must  rest  upon  a 
purely  transcendental  use  of  understanding,  in  which  all 
aid  from  experience  is  rejected.  After  what  has  already 
been  shown,  we  cannot  have  much  faith  in  the  success  of 
such  an  undertaking.  We  shall  therefore  follow  the  pure 
doctrine  of  soul  with  a critical  eye  through  all  its  predica- 
ments. 

But,  before  doing  so,  a general  remark  may  be  made, 
which  will  help  to  bring  out  the  real  character  of  those 
inferences.  I do  not  know  an  object  by  simply  thinking 
it,  but  only  by  determining  a given  perception  relatively 
to  the  unity  of  consciousness  in  which  all  thought  consists. 

To  know  myself  as  an  object,  it  is  therefore  not  enough 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


149 


simply  to  be  conscious  of  myself  as  thinking,  but  I must 
be  conscious  of  the  perception  of  myself  as  determined 
relatively  to  the  function  of  thought.  Now,  none  of  the 

407  modi  of  self-consciousness  in  thinking  are  by  themselves 
conceptions  of  objects  or  categories  : they  are  merely 
logical  functions,  which  can  give  me  no  knowledge  of 
myself  as  an  object,  because  they  can  give  no  knowledge 
of  an  object  at  all.  To  know  myself  as  an  object  of  my 
own  inner  perception,  I must  be  conscious  of  the  self  as 
object,  and  not  simply  as  determining  subject;  in  other 
words,  I must  be  conscious  of  the  various  determinations 
of  myself,  in  so  far  as  these  can  be  brought  together  in 
conformity  with  the  unity  of  apperception,  which  is  the 
universal  condition  of  all  combination  in  thought. 

(1)  There  is  no  doubt  that  in  any  judgment  I am  the 
determining  subject  of  the  relation  in  which  the  judgment 
consists.  The  proposition  that  I,  I that  think,  am  the 
subject  in  every  act  of  thought,  and  cannot  possibly  be 
regarded  as  a predicate  pertaining  to  thought,  is  not  only 
a necessary  but  even  an  ide?itical  proposition.  But  this 
does  not  mean  that  I am  conscious  of  myself  as  an  object 
in  such  a way  that  I can  determine  myself  as  a self- 
subsistent  being  or  substance.  The  latter  proposition  goes 
a very  long  way  indeed  beyond  the  former,  and  demands 
for  its  proof  data  that  will  certainly  never  be  found  in  the 
/ as  simply  thinking,  and  perhaps  will  never  be  found  in 
it  at  all,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  thinking. 

(2)  That  the  / of  apperception,  and  therefore  the  I in 
each  act  of  thought,  is  one , and  cannot  be  resolved  into  a 
plurality  of  subjects,  or  is  a logically  simple  subject,  is 
implied  in  the  very  conception  of  thinking,  and  may  be 

408  derived  from  it  by  mere  analysis.  But  this  does  not 


I5° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


mean  that  the  thinking  / is  a simple  substance , which 
would  be  a synthetic  proposition.  The  conception  of 
substance  is  always  relative  to  perceptions,  and  as  these 
in  us  can  only  be  sensuous,  they  lie  quite  beyond  the 
field  of  understanding  and  its  thinking.  But  it  is  precisely 
of  thought,  as  distinguished  from  perception,  that  we  are 
speaking,  when  we  say  that  the  / in  thinking  is  simple. 
Now,  in  all  other  cases,  it  is  a very  difficult  thing  to  tell 
what  in  any  given  perception  is  substance,  and  it  is  still 
more  difficult  to  say  whether  the  substance  can  be  simple, 
as,  for  instance,  whether  matter  is  made  up  of  simple 
parts.  It  would  therefore  be  a very  remarkable  thing 
indeed,  if  the  poorest  of  all  our  ideas  should  by  a sort  of 
revelation  enable  us  to  say  at  once  that  the  1 is  a simple 
substance. 

(3)  The  proposition,  that  in  the  various  determinations 
of  my  consciousness  I am  identical  with  myself,  is  like- 
wise implied  in  the  conceptions  themselves,  and  is  there- 
fore an  analytical  proposition.  But  this  identity  of  the 
subject  in  all  the  determinations  of  which  I can  be 
conscious  is  not  the  same  thing  as  a perception  in  which 
the  self  is  presented  as  an  object  which  can  be  recognized 
as  self-identical.  The  mere  consciousness  of  the  identity 
of  the  subject  in  all  its  determinations  does  not  mean 
the  identity  of  the  person,  if  by  that  is  meant,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  identity  of  one’s  own  substance  as  a 
thinking  being  in  all  changes  of  its  state.  No  mere 
analysis  of  the  proposition,  “ I think”  can  prove  identity 

409  in  this  latter  sense ; for  that  we  should  require  synthetic 
judgments  derived  from  an  actual  perception  of  the 
self. 

(4)  That  I distinguish  my  own  existence  as  a thinking 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  151 

being  from  things  outside  of  me,  one  of  which  is  my  own 
body,  is  also  an  analytic  proposition  ; for  by  other  I mean 
other  than  me , or  distinct  from  me.  But  this  does  not 
enable  me  to  know  whether  I could  be  conscious  of 
myself  at  all,  were  things  not  given  to  me  in  perception 
as  outside  of  me,  and  whether  I could  exist  merely  as  a 
thinking  being  without  being  also  a sensuous  being. 

The  analysis,  then,  of  my  consciousness  of  self  as  the 
subject  that  thinks,  does  not  enable  me  to  take  a single 
step  towards  the  knowledge  of  myself  as  an  object.  To 
suppose  so  is  simply  to  confuse  the  logical  analysis  of 
thinking  in  general  with  the  metaphysical  determination 
of  an  object. 

The  truth  is,  that  it  would  be  a great  stumbling-block, 
and,  indeed,  the  only  thing  that  our  Critique  could  have 
reason  to  fear,  if  it  could  be  shown  a priori. , that  all 
thinking  beings  are  in  themselves  simple  substances ; 
that,  as  a necessary  consequence,  personality  is  insepar- 
able from  them  ; and  that  they  are  conscious  of  their 
own  existence  as  separate  and  distinct  from  all  matter. 
Were  it  possible  in  this  way  to  take  a step  beyond  the 
10  world  of  sense,  and  to  enter  the  world  of  noumena , who 
should  then  deny  to  us  the  right  to  go  forward  in  this 
new  region,  to  settle  in  it,  and,  if  we  were  under  a lucky 
star,  to  take  complete  possession  of  it  ? For,  the 
proposition,  that  every  thinking  being  is  by  its  very 
nature  a simple  substance,  is  an  a priori  synthetic  pro- 
position ; firstly,  because  it  goes  beyond  the  conception 
with  which  it  starts,  and  adds  to  the  act  of  thinking  in 
general  the  mode  of  existence ; and,  secondly,  because  it 
adds  to  that  conception  the  new  predicate  of  simplicity, 
which  cannot  be  given  in  any  experience.  Hence  a priori 


!52 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


synthetic  propositions  would  be  possible  and  admissible, 
not  simply,  as  we  have  contended,  in  relation  to  objects 
of  a possible  experience,  and  indeed  as  principles  of  the 
possibility  of  experience,  but  even  as  determinations  of 
things  in  general  and  of  things  in  themselves.  This 
would  make  an  end  of  our  whole  Critique,  and  bring 
us  back  to  the  old  dogmatism.  The  danger,  however,  is 
not  so  great  as  it  seems,  as  may  be  seen  when  we  look  at 
the  matter  more  closely. 

The  whole  procedure  of  rational  psychology  is  vitiated 
by  a paralogism,  which  may  be  exhibited  in  the  following 
syllogism  : — 

That  which  can  be  thought  only  as  subject,  must 
exist  as  subject,  and  is  therefore  substance. 

A thinking  being  from  its  very  nature  can  be  thought 
only  as  subject. 

Therefore,  a thinking  being  can  exist  only  as  subject, 
that  is,  as  substance. 

Now,  in  the  major  premise  of  this  syllogism,  by  “that 
which  can  be  thought”  is  meant  a being  in  every 
relation  in  which  it  can  be  thought,  and  therefore  in 
relation  to  possible  perception.  But,  in  the  minor 
premise,  the  only  being  spoken  of  is  a “thinking  being,” 
or  one  that  is  conscious  of  itself  as  subject,  simply  from 
its  relation  to  thought  and  to  the  unity  of  consciousness, 
but  not  at  all  from  its  relation  to  a perception  by  which  it 
is  presented  to  thought  as  an  object.  The  conclusion  is, 
therefore,  reached  per  sophisma  figurae  dictionis. 

2 That  we  are  perfectly  right  in  resolving  this  famous 
argument  into  a paralogism  will  be  at  once  evident,  if  we 
call  to  mind  what  has  already  been  pointed  out.  The 
conception  of  a thing  that  can  exist  by  itself  as  a subject, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  1 53 

but  cannot  exist  as  a mere  predicate,  does  not  carry  with 
it  objective  reality.  We  cannot  possibly  know  that  there 
is  an  object  corresponding  to  the  conception,  because  we 
cannot  understand  how  an  object  of  that  sort  could 
exist  at  all.  If  by  the  term  “ substance  ” is  meant  an 
object  that  can  be  presented  to  us,  we  must  say  that  the 
indispensable  condition  of  the  objective  reality  of  our 
conception  is,  that  it  should  be  presented  to  us  in  a 

413  permanent  perception.  Now,  in  inner  perception  there 
is  nothing  permanent,  for  the  / is  merely  the  conscious- 
ness of  my  thinking.  So  long,  therefore,  as  we  limit 
ourselves  to  mere  thinking,  we  are  without  the  necessary 
condition  for  the  application  of  the  conception  of 
substance  to  the  self  as  a thinking  being ; we  are  unable, 
in  other  words,  to  say  that  the  self  is  an  independent 
subject.  And  along  with  the  objective  reality  of  the 
conception  of  substance  completely  disappears  the  sim- 
plicity of  substance,  leaving  only  the  logical  qualitative 
unity  of  self-consciousness  in  thinking  in  general,  a unity 
which  exists  whether  the  subject  is  composite  or  simple. 

421  Rational  psychology  is,  therefore,  not  a doctrine  which 
enables  us  to  add  anything  to  our  knowledge  of  self ; it 
is  merely  a discipline , which  sets  impassable  limits  to 
speculative  reason  in  this  field,  and  prevents  us,  on  the 
one  hand,  from  throwing  ourselves  into  the  arms  of  a 
soulless  materialism,  and  on  the  other  hand,  from  giving 
ourselves  up  to  a mystic  spiritualism  that  has  lost  its 
hold  of  actual  life.  The  refusal  of  reason  to  answer  our 
curious  questions  as  to  a life  beyond  the  present,  we 
ought  to  interpret  as  a hint  to  apply  our  self-knowledge 
to  fruitful  practical  ends,  and  to  turn  away  from  fruitless 
and  transcendent  speculations. 


*54 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


The  claim  of  rational  psychology  to  take  rank  as  a 
science,  rests  upon  a mere  misunderstanding.  The  unity 
of  consciousness,  which  is  the  supreme  condition  of  the 
422  categories,  is  simply  confused  with  a perception  of  the 
subject  as  object,  and  hence  we  suppose  that  we  may 
apply  to  the  subject  the  category  of  substance.  But  the 
unity  of  consciousness  is  merely  the  unity  implied  in  all 
thinking , and  by  means  of  this  unity  no  object  is  given, 
nor  can  the  category  of  substance,  which  always  presup- 
poses a given  perception,  be  applied  to  it.  There  is 
therefore  no  knowledge  of  the  subject  as  an  object.  The 
subject  no  doubt  thinks  the  categories,  but  that  is  no 
reason  for  saying  that  it  can  have  a conception  of  itself 
as  an  object  of  the  categories.  It  cannot  think  the 
categories  without  presupposing  its  own  pure  self-con- 
sciousness, and  therefore  self-consciousness  cannot  be 
brought  under  the  categories.  If  the  subject,  in  which 
the  consciousness  of  time  has  its  origin,  cannot  determine 
by  means  of  that  consciousness  its  own  existence  in  time, 
no  more  can  it  determine  itself  as  a mere  thinking  being 
by  means  of  the  categories. 

426  The  result  of  our  investigation,  then,  is,  that  the  dialecti- 
cal illusion  in  rational  psychology  arises  from  the  confu- 
sion of  an  idea  of  reason — the  idea  of  a pure  intelligence 
—with  the  perfectly  undetermined  conception  of  a 
thinking  being  in  general.  Abstracting  from  all  actual 
experience,  I first  think  of  myself  as  the  subject  of  a 
possible  experience,  and  then  I infer  that  I can  be 
conscious  of  my  own  existence  even  apart  from  experi- 

427  ence  and  the  empirical  conditions  of  experience.  But 
this  is  to  confuse  the  possible  abstraction  of  my  own 
existence  as  empirically  determined,  with  the  conscious- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


T55 


ness  of  a possible  separate  existence  of  my  thinking  self. 
Thus  arises  the  belief,  that  I have  an  actual  knowledge 
of  what  is  substantial  in  me  as  a transcendental  subject, 
when  in  truth  I have  in  my  thought  merely  the  unity  of 
consciousness  as  the  form  of  knowledge  that  is  presup- 
posed in  all  determination  of  objects. 

432  Chapter  II. — The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason.  405 

433  The  second  class  of  dialectical  arguments,  in  analogy  406 
with  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  has  for  its  content  the 
unconditioned  unity  of  objective  conditions  in  the  phen 
omenal  world.  The  transcendental  paralogism  produced 
merely  a one-sided  illusion,  in  regard  to  the  idea  of  the 
subject  of  our  thought;  nor  is  there,  in  that  connection, 
anything  whatever  in  the  conceptions  of  reason  to 
suggest  that  the  opposite  may  be  true.  It  is  quite  other- 
wise with  the  objective  syyithesis  of  phenomena,  where  407 
reason  thinks  to  establish  its  principle  of  unconditioned 
unity  with  the  greatest  ease,  until  it  finds,  as  it  soon  does, 
that  in  trying  to  do  so  it  becomes  involved  in  contradic- 
tions, which  force  it  to  give  up  all  pretensions  to  a 
rational  cosmology.  This  is  a new  experience  for  human 
reason,  for  here  it  falls  of  itself  into  a perfectly  natural  and 

434  unavoidable  Antithetic,  which  is  not  due  to  artificial 
refinements  or  logical  tricks. 

All  those  transcendental  ideas  which  relate  to  absolute 
totality  in  the  synthesis  of  phenomena,  I shall  call 
cosmical  conceptiotis.  I call  them  cosmical,  partly  because  408 
the  conception  of  the  world  as  a whole,  which  is  itself 
only  an  idea,  rests  upon  that  unconditioned  totality,  and 
partly  because  they  are  concerned  only  with  the  synthesis 


!56 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


of  phenomena,  and  therefore  with  objects  of  experience. 

435  On  the  other  hand,  absolute  totality  in  the  synthesis  of 
the  conditions  of  all  possible  things  gives  rise  to  an  ideal 
of  pure  reason,  and  this  idea,  although  it  is  no  doubt 
related  to  the  conception  of  the  world  as  a whole,  is  yet 
quite  distinct  from  it.  Just  as  the  paralogisms  of  pure 
reason  were  the  source  of  a dialectical  psychology,  so  the 
antinomy  of  pure  reason  will  set  before  our  eyes  the 
transcendental  principles  on  which  a pure  or  rational 
cosmology  is  supposed  to  rest. 


Section  I. — System  of  Cosmological  Ideas. 

It  must  be  observed,  firstly,  that  reason  does  not  of  409 
itself  give  rise  to  any  conception,  but  simply  seeks  to 
free  a cotiception  of  understanding  from  the  unavoidable 
limitation  of  a possible  experience  and  to  extend  it 
beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  though  still  without 
436  losing  its  connection  with  experience.  Demanding 
absolute  totality  on  the  side  of  the  conditions,  it  converts 
the  category  into  a transcendental  idea,  and  tries  to  give 
absolute  completeness  to  the  empirical  synthesis,  by 
carrying  it  up  to  the  unconditioned.  The  principle  by 
which  reason  is  here  guided,  is,  that  if  the  condi- 
tioned is  given,  the  whole  sum  of  conditions  required  to 
account  for  the  conditioned , and  therefore  the  absolutely 
unconditioned,  is  likewise  given.  But,  secondly,  the  only 
categories  which  can  be  so  employed,  are  those  which  in 
their  synthesis  constitute  a series  of  conditions  subordin- 
ated to  one  another,  not  those  in  which  the  conditions  are 
co-ordinate.  This  synthesis,  as  starting  from  the  side  of 
the  conditions,  and  going  back  step  by  step  to  the  more 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


I57 


remote  conditions  may  be  called  regressive,  to  distinguish 
it  from  a progressive  synthesis,  which  would  start  from 
the  nearest  consequent  on  the  side  of  the  conditioned 
and  gradually  advance  to  more  remote  consequents. 

The  former  proceeds  in  antecedentia,  the  latter  in  co?i- 
sequentia. 

442  When  we  have  rejected  the  categories  which  do  not  415 
conform  to  these  requirements,  we  find  that  there  are  but 
four  cosmological  ideas,  corresponding  to  the  four  titles 
of  the  categories,  that  necessarily  imply  a series  in  the 
synthesis  of  phenomena. 

1.  Absolute  completeness  in 
the  co?> position 

of  the  given  whole  of  all  phenomena. 

2.  Absolute  completeness  3.  Absolute  completeness 
in  the  divisio?i  in  the  origi?iatio?i 

of  a given  whole  in  the  world  of  a phenomenon  as  such, 
of  phenomena. 

4.  Absolute  completeness, 
as  regards  dependence  of  existence, 
of  the  changeable  in  the  phenomenal  world. 

448  Section  II. — Antithetic  of  Pure  Reason. 

By  the  term  Antithetic  we  may  denote,  not  the  dog- 
matic assertion  of  the  opposite  of  a thesis,  but  the 
conflict  between  two  propositions,  each  of  which  seems 
to  be  true,  but  neither  of  which  has  any  more  claim  to 
our  assent  than  the  other.  When  we  are  not  content  to  42 1 

449  apply  our  reason  to  objects  of  experience,  and  in  subor- 
dination to  the  principles  of  understanding,  but  venture 


416 


420 


45  3n 


454-5 


158  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  there  arise  certain 
pseudo-rational  propositions,  which  experience  can  nei- 
ther confirm  nor  overthrow.  Each  of  these  propositions 
is  not  only  in  itself  free  from  contradiction,  but  it  can 
appeal  to  the  very  nature  of  reason  in  support  of  its 
truth,  although,  unfortunately,  the  opposite  proposition 
can  make  out  just  as  good  a claim  to  be  regarded  as 
necessarily  true. 

The  antinomies  follow  in  the  order  of  the  transcenden- 
tal ideas  as  given  above. 


The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason. 
First  Conflict  of  the  Transcendental  Ideas. 


THESIS. 

The  world  has  a beginning 
in  time,  and  is  enclosed  within 
limits  of  space. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  the  world  has 
no  beginning  in  time.  Then, 
up  to  every  given  point  of  time 
an  eternity  must  have  elapsed, 
and  hence  an  infinite  series  of 
states  of  things  must  have 
passed  away  one  after  the 
other,  and  come  to  an  end  in 
the  world.  Now,  the  infinity 
of  a series  just  consists  in 
this,  that  the  series  can  never 
be  completed  in  a successive 


ANTITHESIS. 

The  world  has  no  begin- 
ning in  time,  and  no  limits 
in  space,  but  is  infinite  as 
regards  both  time  and  space. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  the  world  has 
a beginning.  Then,  as  no- 
thing can  begin  to  be  which 
has  not  been  preceded  by  a 
time  in  which  the  thing 
that  begins  was  not,  we  must 
hold  that  there  was  a time 
antecedent  to  that  in  which 
the  world  began  to  be,  that 
is,  an  empty  time.  But,  no- 
thing whatever  can  come  in- 
to being  in  an  empty  time, 


4251 


426- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


I59 


synthesis.  Hence  an  infinite 
series  of  states  cannot  have 
passed  away  in  the  world, 
and  therefore  a beginning  of 
the  world  is  a necessary  con- 
dition of  its  existence.  This 
was  the  first  thing  to  be 
proved. 

As  to  the  second  point, 
again  assume  the  opposite. 
Then,  the  world  must  present 
itself  to  us  as  an  infinite 
whole  of  coexistent  things. 
Now,  if  a magnitude  is  not 
presented  in  a perception  as 
within  certain  limits,  there  is 
no  other  way  in  which  we  can 
think  its  dimensions,  than  by 
the  synthesis  of  its  parts  ; 
and  the  magnitude  as  a whole 
we  can  think  only  by  the  re- 
peated addition  of  unity  to 
itself  until  the  synthesis  is 
complete.  Hence,  in  order 
to  think  the  world,  which  fills 
all  space,  as  a whole,  we 
must  suppose  the  successive 
synthesis  of  the  parts  of  an 
infinite  world  to  have  been 
completed.  But  this  is  the 
same  as  saying  that  an  infin- 
ite time  must  have  elapsed 
during  the  summation  of 
the  totality  of  coexisting 
things.  Now  this  is  im- 
possible. Hence  an  infinite 


for  no  part  of  an  empty  time 
has  in  it  any  condition  of  ex- 
istence rather  than  of  non-ex- 
istence, which  distinguishes 
it  from  any  other  part  ; and 
this  is  true,  whether  we  sup- 
pose things  to  originate  of 
themselves,  or  to  be  pro- 
duced by  some  other  cause. 
Hence,  although  many  series 
of  things  may  begin  in  the 
world,  the  world  itself  can 
have  no  beginning,  and  is 
therefore  infinite  as  regards 
time. 

As  to  the  second  point, 
let  us  begin  by  assuming  the 
opposite,  namely,  that  the 
world  is  finite  and  limited  as 
to  space.  Then,  the  world 
must  exist  in  an  empty  space 
which  has  no  limits.  Things 
must  therefore  not  only  be 
related  in  space , but  they 
must  also  be  related  to  space. 
But  the  world  is  an  absolute 
whole,  outside  of  which  no 
object  of  perception,  and, 
therefore,  no  correlate  of  the 
world,  can  be  found.  The  re- 
lation of  the  world  to  empty 
space  would  therefore  be 
the  relation  of  it  to  no  ob- 
ject. But  such  a relation, 
and  therefore  the  limitation 
of  the  world  by  empty  space, 


i6o 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


aggregate  of  actual  things 
cannot  present  itself  to  us 
as  a whole,  and  therefore  not 
as  a whole  all  the  parts  of 
which  coexist.  The  world 
is  therefore  not  infinitely  ex- 
tended in  space,  but  is  en- 
closed within  spatial  limits. 
And  this  was  the  second 
thing  to  be  proved. 


is  nothing  at  all.  Hence  the 
world  cannot  be  limited  as 
regards  space,  or,  the  world 
is  infinite  in  its  extension. 


462-3  Second  Conflict  of  the  Transcendental  Ideas. 


THESIS. 

Every  composite  substance 
in  the  world  is  made  up  of 
simple  parts,  and  nothing 
whatever  exists  but  the 
simple,  or  that  which  is 
composed  out  of  the  simple. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  composite 
substances  are  not  made 
up  of  simple  parts.  Then, 
if  we  think  all  composition 
to  be  away,  no  composite 
part  will  be  left.  And,  by 
hypothesis,  there  is  no 
simple  part.  Hence,  no- 
thing at  all  will  remain, 
and  therefore  no  substance. 
Either,  then,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  think  all  composi- 
tion to  be  away,  or  even 
after  composition  is  thought 


ANTITHESIS. 

No  composite  thing  in  the 
world  is  made  up  of  simple 
parts,  nor  does  anything 
simple  exist  anywhere  in  the 
world. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  a composite 
thing  or  substance  is  made 
up  of  simple  parts.  Then, 
as  no  external  relation,  and 
therefore  no  composition  out 
of  substances,  is  possible  ex- 
cept in  space,  the  composite 
thing  must  be  made  up  of 
exactly  the  same  number  of 
parts  as  the  space  which  it 
occupies.  Now,  space  is 
not  made  up  from  simple 
parts,  but  consists  of  spaces. 
Every  part  of  the  composite 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


1 61 


to  be  away,  there  must  be 
something  left,  which  exists 
without  composition,  that  is, 
the  simple.  In  the  former 
case,  the  composite  cannot 
be  made  up  of  substances, 
for  composition  is  merely  an 
accidental  relation  of  sub- 
stances, which  may  be  taken 
away  without  at  all  affect- 
ing their  existence  as  per- 
manent realities.  But,  by 
hypothesis,  substances  do 
exist,  and  hence  we  must 
adopt  the  other  supposition, 
that  the  composite  substan- 
ces in  the  world  consist  of 
simple  parts. 

It  directly  follows,  that  all 
the  things  in  the  world  are 
simple  ; that  composition  is 
merely  an  external  state  of 
those  things  ; and  that,  al- 
though we  can  never  take 
elementary  substances  out  of 
their  state  of  composition  and 
isolate  them,  reason  must 
think  of  them  as  the  prim- 
ary subjects,  which  exist  as 
simple  beings  antecedently 
to  all  composition. 


thing  must  therefore  occupy 
a space.  But  the  absol- 
utely primary  parts  of  every 
composite  thing  are  simple. 
Hence  each  of  those  simple 
parts  occupies  a space.  Now, 
as  every  real  thing,  which 
occupies  a space,  contains 
within  itself  a number  of 
parts  that  are  outside  of  one 
another,  and  is  therefore 
composite  ; and  as  this  real 
composite  thing  is  not  made 
up  of  accidents,  since  these 
could  not,  apart  from  sub- 
stance, be  outside  of  one 
another ; we  must  conclude, 
that  simple  substance  is  com- 
posite, which  is  absurd. 

The  second  proposition  of 
the  antithesis,  that  nowhere 
in  the  world  does  there  exist 
anything  simple,  is  only  in- 
tended to  mean,  that  the 
existence  of  the  absolutely 
simple  cannot  be  shown  from 
any  experience  or  perception, 
external  or  internal ; and  that, 
as  the  absolutely  simple  is 
therefore  a mere  idea,  the 
objective  reality  of  which 
can  never  be  presented  in 
experience,  it  is  without  all 
application  and  object  in  the 
explanation  of  phenomena. 
Let  it  be  even  admitted  that 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


162 


Third  Conflict  of  the 
THESIS. 

Causality  in  conformity 
with  laws  of  nature  is  not 
the  only  causality,  from  which 


an  object  might  be  found  in 
experience  corresponding  to 
that  idea,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  we  might  have  an  em- 
pirical perception  of  an  ob- 
ject which  contained  no  parts 
that  are  outside  of  one  an- 
other and  combined  to  a 
unity.  Yet  we  could  not 
legitimately  infer  the  impos- 
sibility of  finding  any  differ- 
ence of  parts  in  the  object 
from  the  fact  that  we  are  not 
conscious  of  such  difference. 
But  nothing  less  than  this 
will  establish  absolute  sim- 
plicity, and  hence  absolute 
simplicity  cannot  be  inferred 
from  any  perception,  no  mat- 
ter what  its  nature  may  be. 
As,  therefore,  an  absolutely 
simple  object  can  never  be 
presented  in  any  possible  ex- 
perience, and  as  the  world  of 
sense  must  be  regarded  as 
the  sum  total  of  all  possible 
experience,  it  follows  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  world 
that  is  absolutely  simple. 

Transcendental  Ideas. 

ANTITHESIS. 

There  is  no  freedom,  but 
all  that  comes  to  be  in  the 
world  takes  place  entirely 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  1 63 


all  the  phenomena  of  the 
world  can  be  derived.  To 
explain  those  phenomena  it 
is  necessary  to  suppose  that 
there  is  also  a free  causality. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  the  only  caus- 
ality is  that  in  conformity 
with  laws  of  nature.  Then, 
all  that  comes  to  be  presup- 
poses an  antecedent  state  up- 
on which  it  follows  according 
to  an  inviolable  rule.  Now, 
that  antecedent  state  must 
itself  be  something  that 
comes  to  be,  or  arises  in 
a time  in  which  it  pre- 
viously was  not ; for  if  it 
had  always  existed,  its  effect 
also  must  always  have  ex- 
isted, and  would  not  have 
just  come  to  be.  The  caus- 
ality of  the  cause  through 
which  something  comes  to 
be  must  therefore  itself  be  an 
event,  which  again,  accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  nature, 
presupposes  an  antecedent 
state  and  its  causality,  and 
this  again  a still  earlier 
state,  and  so  on.  If  there- 
fore all  that  comes  to  be 
must  conform  to  the  law  of 
nature,  there  is  never  an 
absolute  beginning,  but  only 
a relative  beginning,  and 


in  accordance  with  laws  of 
nature. 


Proof. 

Assume  that  there  is  free- 
dom, in  the  transcendental 
sense,  as  a special  kind  of 
causality  by  which  the  se- 
quence of  events  in  the  world 
may  be  explained  ; in  other 
words,  that  there  is  a faculty 
of  absolutely  bringing  into 
existence  a certain  state,  and 
therefore  a series  of  conse- 
quents of  that  state.  Then, 
not  only  must  this  spontane- 
ity originate  the  series,  but  it 
must  first  determine  itself  to 
originate  it,  and  its  act  must 
take  place  without  any  ante- 
cedent to  determine  it  in 
accordance  with  fixed  laws. 
But  every  beginning  of  an 
act  presupposes  a state  in 
which  the  cause  has  not  yet 
begun  to  act,  and  a dynami- 
cally first  beginning  of  the 
act  presupposes  a state  of 
that  cause  which  has  no 
causal  connection  with  the 
preceding  state,  and  in  no 
way  follows  from  it.  Tran- 
scendental freedom  is  there- 
fore opposed  to  the  law  of 


164 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


hence  there  can  be  no  com- 
pleteness in  the  ascending 
series  of  causes.  Now,  the 
law  of  nature  just  consists 
in  this,  that  nothing  can 
come  to  be  without  a cause 
sufficient  to  determine  it  a 
priori.  The  proposition,  that 
all  causality  is  possible  merely 
by  laws  of  nature,  is  therefore 
self-contradictory,  if  it  is 
taken  in  its  unlimited  uni- 
versality ; and  hence  that 
sort  of  causality  cannot  be 
the  only  one. 

We  must,  then,  admit  that 
there  is  another  sort  of  caus- 
ality, a causality  by  means 
of  which  something  may 
come  to  be,  the  cause  of 
which  is  not  itself  deter- 
mined according  to  neces- 
sary laws  by  another  cause 
antecedent  to  it.  This  will 
be  an  absolutely  spontaneous 
causality,  bringing  into  exist- 
ence by  itself  a series  of  phe- 
nomena which  arise  in  con- 
formity with  laws  of  nature. 
Hence,  without  transcenden- 
tal freedom  it  is  impossible 
ever  to  have  completeness, 
on  the  side  of  causes,  even 
in  the  series  of  phenomena 
which  follow  one  another  in 
the  course  of  nature. 


causality,  and  demands  such 
a connection  of  the  succes- 
sive states  of  efficient  causes 
as  makes  the  unity  of  ex- 
perience impossible.  As  it 
cannot  be  found  in  any  ex- 
perience, it  is  a mere  idea 
without  any  content.  In 
nature,  therefore,  and  not 
in  freedom,  we  must  seek 
for  the  order  and  connection 
of  all  events  that  occur  in 
the  world. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  1 65 

80- 1 Fourth  Conflict  of  the  Transcendental  Ideas. 


THESIS. 

There  exists  an  absolutely 
necessary  being,  which  be- 
longs to  the  world  either  as 
a part  or  as  the  cause  of  it. 

Proof. 

The  world  of  sense  is  not 
simply  the  sum  total  of  all 
phenomena,  but  it  contains  a 
series  of  changes.  Were 
there  no  such  changes,  we 
should  have  no  conscious- 
ness even  of  a series  of  time 
as  a condition  of  the  possi- 
bility of  the  world  of  sense. 
But  every  change  stands  un- 
der a condition,  which  pre- 
cedes it  in  time,  and  makes 
it  necessary.  Now,  every- 
thing that  is  presented  as  con- 
ditioned, presupposes  for  its 
existence  a complete  series  of 
conditions,  ending  in  the  per- 
fectly unconditioned,  which 
alone  is  absolutely  necessary. 
Something  absolutely  neces- 
sary must  therefore  exist,  if 
there  exist  a change  as  its  con- 
sequence. And  this  neces- 
sary existence  must  itself 
belong  to  the  world  of  sense. 
For  if  it  were  outside  that 
world,  we  should  have  to  say, 


ANTITHESIS. 

There  nowhere  exists  an 
absolutely  necessary  being, 
either  in  the  world,  or  out- 
side of  the  world  as  its  cause. 

Proof. 

Assume  that  the  world  it- 
self is  a necessary  being,  or 
that  a necessary  being  exists 
in  it.  Then,  either  there  is 
a beginning  in  the  series  of 
its  changes  that  is  absolutely 
necessary,  and  therefore  with- 
out a cause,  or  the  series  it- 
self, having  no  beginning,  is 
as  a whole  absolutely  ne- 
cessary and  unconditioned, 
though  it  is  contingent  and 
conditioned  in  all  its  parts. 
Now,  the  former  supposition 
contradicts  the  dynamical 
law  of  the  determination  of 
all  phenomena  in  time  ; and 
the  latter  supposition  contra- 
dicts itself,  because  the  ex- 
istence of  a series  cannot  be 
necessary  as  a whole,  if  no 
single  member  of  the  series 
is  necessary. 

Assume,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  there  is  an  absolutely 
necessary  cause  of  the  world, 
which  is  outside  of  the  world. 


452-3 


i66 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


that  the  series  of  changes  in 
the  world  derived  their  be- 
ginning from  a necessary 
cause  which  did  not  itself 
belong  to  the  world  of  sense. 
Now,  this  is  impossible.  For, 
as  the  beginning  of  a series 
in  time  can  be  determined 
by  that  only  which  is  in  a 
time  antecedent  to  the  series, 
the  highest  condition  of  the 
beginning  of  a series  of 
changes  must  exist  in  a time 
when  the  series  as  yet  was 
not.  Hence  the  causality  of 
the  necessary  cause  of  the 
changes,  and  therefore  also 
the  cause  itself,  must  belong 
to  time  and  to  phenomena  in 
time,  and  cannot  be  thought 
as  separated  from  that  sum 
total  of  all  phenomena  which 
constitutes  the  world  of  sense. 
Something  absolutely  neces- 
sary is  therefore  contained  in 
the  world  itself,  whether  that 
something  is  the  whole  series 
of  changes  in  the  world  or  a 
part  of  that  series. 


Then,  to  that  cause,  as  the 
highest  member  in  the  series 
of  the  causes  of  changes  in 
the  world,  would  originally 
be  due  the  beginning  of  the 
existence  of  those  changes 
as  a series.  But  the  cause 
must  itself  begin  to  act,  and 
its  causality  would  therefore 
belong  to  time,  and  so  to 
the  sum  total  of  phenomena  ; 
or,  in  other  words,  that  cause, 
as  belonging  to  the  world, 
would  not  itself  be  outside 
of  the  world.  But  this  is 
contrary  to  our  hypothesis. 
Hence,  neither  in  the  world, 
nor  as  a cause  outside  of  the 
world,  though  in  causal  con- 
nection with  it,  does  there 
exist  any  absolutely  neces- 
sary being. 


5°4  Section  IV. — Necessity  of  a Solution  of  the  Transcendental  47^ 
Problems  of  Pure  Reason. 

505  Transcendental  philosophy  cannot  admit,  that  any  477 
question  which  concerns  an  object  presented  to  the  pure 
reason  of  man  is  unanswerable  by  the  reason  that 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  I 67 

suggested  it.  It  is  vain  to  allege  our  unavoidable 
ignorance  and  the  unfathomable  depth  of  the  problem, 
as  a reason  for  avoiding  the  obligation  of  giving  a 
thorough  and  complete  answer.  The  very  conception 
which  enables  us  to  ask  the  question,  must  also  give 
us  the  means  of  answering  it,  because  the  object  to 
which  it  refers  has  no  existence  except  in  the  conception. 

506  It  is,  however,  only  in  connection  with  the  cosmo-  478 
logical  ideas  that  questions  arise  in  transcendental 
philosophy,  which  put  upon  us  the  obligation  to  answer 
them.  For  here  the  object  must  be  presented  in  experi- 
ence, and  the  only  question  is  whether  it  can  conform 
to  the  idea.  If  the  problem,  for  instance,  is  whether 
the  soul,  as  that  which  presents  itself  in  our  conscious- 
ness as  thinking,  is  in  its  own  nature  a simple  substance  ; 
or,  whether  there  is  an  absolutely  necessary  cause  of  all 
things ; the  object  is  transcendental,  and  therefore  itself 
unknown ; and  hence  we  have  to  inquire,  whether  there 
is  any  object  whatever,  corresponding  to  our  idea.  In 
this  case,  therefore,  we  may  confess  that  the  object  is 

5°7  unknown  to  us,  without  saying  that  it  cannot  possibly  479 
exist.  Only  the  cosmological  ideas  have  the  peculiarity, 
that  they  can  presuppose  their  object  and  the  empirical 
synthesis  essential  to  the  conception  of  it.  The  sole 
question  which  they  raise,  is,  whether  the  empirical 
synthesis  can  be  carried  so  far  as  to  comprehend  an 
absolute  totality  of  conditions.  Now,  as  there  is  here 
no  question  of  a thing  in  itself,  but  only  of  a thing  as  an 
object  of  possible  experience,  the  answer  to  the  trans- 
cendental problem  of  cosmology  cannot  be  found  in 
anything  outside  of  the  idea.  We  are  not  asking  what  is 
the  nature  of  any  object  in  itself;  we  are  not  even  asking 


i6S 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


what  can  be  presented  in  concreto  according  to  the  con- 
ditions of  experience  ; but  our  whole  question  is  in  regard 
to  what  is  contained  in  the  idea  itself,  to  which  the 
empirical  synthesis  will  be  found  merely  to  approximate, 
and  the  answer  must  be  derived  entirely  from  the  idea. 
Reason  cannot  evade  a solution  of  the  problem  by  putting 
all  the  responsibility  upon  the  unknown  object,  for  the 
idea  is  a pure  creation  of  reason  itself. 


525  Section  VII. — Critical  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  497 

Problem. 

The  whole  antinomy  of  pure  reason  rests  upon  this 
dialectical  argument : — 

If  the  conditioned  is  given,  the  whole  series  of  con- 
ditions is  given. 

But  objects  of  sense  are  given  as  conditioned. 

Therefore,  the  whole  series  of  conditions  of  objects  of 
sense  is  given. 

The  sophistical  character  of  the  argument  will  be  more 

526  readily  seen,  if  we  first  correct  and  define  some  of  the 
conceptions  contained  in  it. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  plain  and  undeniable, 
that,  if  the  conditioned  is  given,  a regress  in  the  series  of  498 
all  its  conditions  is  demanded  of  us.  The  very  conception 
of  the  conditioned  implies  that  something  is  referred  to  a 
condition,  and,  if  that  condition  is  itself  conditioned,  to  a 
more  remote  condition,  and  so  on  through  all  the  members 
of  the  series.  The  proposition,  therefore,  that  if  the  con- 
ditioned is  given  we  must  seek  for  the  whole  series  of 
conditions,  is  analytical,  and  can  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  a transcendental  criticism. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  1 69 

In  the  second  place,  if  the  conditioned  as  well  as  its 
condition  are  things  in  themselves,  not  only  is  the  regress 
to  the  condition  demanded , if  the  conditioned  is  given, 
but  it  is  actually  given  along  with  the  conditioned.  And, 
as  this  holds  of  all  members  of  the  series,  the  complete 
series  of  conditions,  and  therefore  the  unconditioned,  is 
given  at  the  same  time,  or,  rather,  it  is  presupposed  in 
virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  conditioned,  which  is  possible 
only  through  it,  is  given.  The  synthesis  of  the  con- 
ditioned with  its  condition  is  here  a mere  synthesis  of 
understanding,  which  assumes  to  present  things  as  they 
5^7  are , without  first  asking  whether  and  how  we  can  have 
a knowledge  of  them.  But,  if  I have  to  do  with 
phenomena,  which,  as  existing  only  for  consciousness, 
are  not  given  at  all  unless  they  are  empirically  known,  I 499 
cannot  in  the  same  sense  say,  that  if  the  conditioned  is 
given,  all  its  conditions  are  also  given,  and  hence  I can 
in  no  way  infer  the  absolute  totality  of  the  series  of 
conditions.  For  phenomena  in  our  apprehension  are 
themselves  nothing  but  an  empirical  synthesis  in  space 
and  time,  and  are  therefore  given  only  in  that  synthesis. 

It  does  not  follow,  because  the  conditioned  as  a 
phenomenon  is  given,  that  the  synthesis  which  con- 
stitutes its  empirical  condition,  is  given  along  with  or 
presupposed  in  it ; for  the  synthesis  exists  only  in  the 
regress  and  in  no  sense  apart  from  it.  What  we  can 
say,  in  such  a case,  is,  that  a regress , or  continuous 
empirical  synthesis,  on  the  side  of  the  conditions,  is 
enjoined  and  dematided , and  that  the  conditions  given 
in  that  regress  cannot  be  wanting. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  in  the  major  premise  of  the 
cosmological  argument,  the  conditioned  is  taken  in  the 


170  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

transcendental  sense  of  a pure  category  ; while  in  the 
minor  premise,  it  is  taken  in  the  empirical  sense  of  a 
conception  of  understanding  that  is  applied  to  mere 
phenomena.  Here  therefore  we  have  an  instance  of 

528  the  dialectical  fallacy  called  sophisma  figurae  dictionis.  500 
The  fallacy,  however,  is  not  artificial ; it  is  by  a per- 
fectly natural  illusion  that  reason  in  the  major  premise 
assumes  blindly,  that  if  something  is  given  as  con- 
ditioned, its  conditions  and  their  series  must  all  be 
present.  In  fact  the  assumption  is  just  the  logical 
postulate,  that  every  conclusion  must  have  complete 
premises.  Moreover,  the  connection  of  the  conditioned 
with  its  condition  is  naturally  thought  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  any  succession  in  time,  and  both  are 
assumed  to  be  given  together.  Nor  is  it  less  natural, 

in  the  minor  premise,  to  regard  phenomena  as  things 
in  themselves  and  as  objects  given  to  pure  under- 
standing, than  to  take  the  conditioned  in  the  sense  of  a 
pure  conception  in  the  major  premise,  where  abstraction 
has  been  made  from  all  the  conditions  of  perception 
without  which  objects  cannot  be  given  at  all.  Yet  this 
overlooks  an  important  distinction  between  these  con- 
ceptions. The  synthesis  of  the  conditioned  with  its  con- 
dition, and  indeed  with  the  whole  series  of  its  conditions, 
as  expressed  in  the  major  premise,  carries  with  it  no 
limitation  through  time  and  no  idea  of  succession.  But 
the  empirical  synthesis  and  the  series  of  conditions  in 
phenomena,  as  subsumed  in  the  minor  premise,  is 
necessarily  successive,  the  members  of  the  series  being 
given  as  following  one  another  in  time.  Here,  therefore, 

529  we  cannot  presuppose  absolute  totality  of  the  synthesis 
and  of  the  series  presented  in  it.  In  the  former  case  all 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  171 

the  members  of  the  series  are  given  in  themselves 
irrespective  of  any  condition  of  time ; but  in  the  latter 
case  they  are  possible  only  by  means  of  a successive  501 
synthesis,  and  can  be  given  as  a whole  only  if  that 
synthesis  can  actually  be  completed.  If,  then,  we  are 
to  settle  the  dispute  between  the  two  parties  to  the 
satisfaction  of  both,  we  must  be  able  to  show  that  they 
are  really  quarrelling  about  nothing,  and  that  a certain 

53°  transcendental  illusion  has  mocked  them  with  a reality  502 
where  none  is  to  be  found. 

53 2 If  we  regard  the  two  propositions  (a)  that  the  world  is  504 
infinite  in  extension,  and  (b)  that  the  world  is  finite  in 
extension,  as  contradictory  opposites,  we  assume  that 
the  world,  or  the  whole  series  of  phenomena,  is  a thing 

in  itself.  For,  whether  the  regress  in  the  series  of  its 
phenomena  is  denied  to  be  infinite,  or  denied  to  be  finite, 
in  both  cases  the  world  is  supposed  to  be  absolutely  real. 

But  if  I challenge  this  supposition,  or  rather  this  trans- 
cendental illusion,  and  deny  that  the  world  is  a thing  in 

533  itself,  the  contradictory  opposition  of  the  two  statements  505 
is  converted  into  a dialectical  opposition.  As  the  world 
does  not  exist  at  all  as  a thing  in  itself,  that  is,  indepen- 
dently of  the  regressive  series  of  my  ideas,  it  cannot  be 
said  to  be  in  itself  q ither  an  infinite  whole  or  a finite  whole. 
Apart  from  the  empirical  regress  in  the  series  of  pheno- 
mena, the  world  has  no  existence  whatever.  If,  therefore, 
that  series  is  always  conditioned,  and  as  a consequence  is 
never  given  as  complete,  the  world  cannot  be  an  uncon- 
ditioned whole,  and  therefore  cannot  exist  as  an  uncon- 
ditioned whole  that  is  either  infinite  in  magnitude  or 
finite  in  magnitude. 

What  has  been  said  of  the  first  cosmological  idea  is 


172  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

equally  true  of  the  other  three.  The  series  of  conditions 
exists  only  in  the  regressive  synthesis  itself,  not  in  an 
object  of  sense  given  as  an  independent  thing  prior  to  all 
regress.  Hence  I must  say  that  the  number  of  parts  in 
a given  phenomenon  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite.  A 
phenomenon  has  no  existence  in  itself,  and  its  parts  are 
only  given  in  and  through  the  regress  of  the  decomposing 
synthesis  ; and  this  regress,  being  never  absolutely  com- 
plete, cannot  be  said  to  be  either  finite  or  infinite.  The 
same  thing  holds  of  the  series  of  causes  that  proceed  in 
an  ascending  series,  and  of  the  series  that  proceeds  from 
534  conditioned  existence  to  unconditioned  necessary  exist- 
ence. Neither  series  can  be  regarded  as  in  itself  either 
finite  or  infinite  in  its  totality  ; for,  as  a series  of  subordin- 
ated ideas  consists  only  in  the  dynamical  regress  itself, 
it  cannot  possibly  exist  in  itself  before  that  regress  as  a 
self-subsistent  series  of  things  in  themselves. 

Thus  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason  in  its  cosmological 
ideas  disappears.  It  is  purely  dialectical,  or  a conflict 
due  to  an  illusion.  The  idea  of  absolute  totality,  which 
has  no  proper  meaning  except  as  a condition  of  things  in 
themselves,  is  wrongly  applied  to  phenomena,  which  exist 
only  in  our  consciousness,  and,  if  they  form  a series, 
only  in  a successive  regress,  but  which  have  no  other 
existence  whatever.  From  this  antinomy,  however,  we 
may  gain,  not  indeed  a dogmatic,  but  a critical  and 
doctrinal  advantage.  It  supplies  an  indirect  proof 
of  the  transcendental  ideality  of  phenomena,  which 
ought  to  convince  anyone  who  may  not  have  been  quite 
satisfied  with  the  direct  proof  in  the  Transcendental 
Aesthetic.  The  new  proof  would  consist  in  the  following 
dilemma  : — 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


173 


If  the  world  is  a self-existent  whole,  it  is  either  finite 
or  infinite. 

But  it  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite  (as  is  shown  in  the 
Antithesis  and  Thesis  respectively). 

535  Therefore  the  world  (the  sum  total  of  all  phenomena)  507 
is  not  a self-existent  whole. 

Phenomena  have,  therefore,  no  existence  apart  from  our 
consciousness  of  them  ; and  this  is  what  we  mean  when 
we  speak  of  their  transcendental  ideality. 


536  Section  VIII. — Regulative  Principle  of  Pure  Reason  qo8 

in  the  Cosmological  Ideas. 

By  the  cosmological  principle  of  totality,  a maximum 
in  the  series  of  conditions  of  the  objects  of  sense  is  not 
given , but  is  only  dematided.  Still,  that  principle  is  true 
if  it  is  taken  in  the  proper  sense.  No  doubt  it  is  not  an 
axiom , requiring  us  to  think  totality  as  actually  present  in 
the  object,  but  it  is  a problem  for  understanding,  and 
therefore  for  the  subject  of  understanding,  calling  upon 
him  to  begin  and  to  follow  out  the  regress  in  the  series  of 
conditions  for  that  which  is  given  as  conditioned,  in  con- 
formity with  the  completeness  contained  in  the  idea.  In 
the  presentation  of  sensible  objects  as  in  space  and  time, 
every  condition  which  we  are  capable  of  reaching  is 
found  to  be  itself  conditioned.  If  phenomena  were 
things  in  themselves,  we  might  perhaps  find  in  them 
something  unconditioned ; but,  as  a matter  of  fact,  they 
are  merely  empirical  objects,  and  as  such  can  appear  only 
under  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  the  condition  of  all 
our  perceptions.  The  principle  of  reason  is  therefore 

537  merely  a rule , which  demands  a regress  in  the  series  of  509 


1 74 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


conditions  of  given  phenomena,  and  will  not  permit  us 
to  assume  that  we  have  reached  anything  absolutely  uncon- 
ditioned. It  is  nota  principleof  thepossibility  of  experience 
and  of  the  empirical  knowledge  of  objects  of  sense,  and 
hence  it  cannot  be  ranked  with  the  fundamental  judgments 
of  understanding  ; for  every  experience  is  of  an  object, 
which,  as  conforming  to  the  conditions  of  perception,  is 
enclosed  within  limits.  Nor  is  it  a constitutive  principle 
of  reason,  which  enlarges  our  conception  of  the  world 
of  sense  beyond  all  possible  experience,  but  only  a 
principle  that  tells  us  to  continue  and  enlarge  our 
experience  as  far  as  we  possibly  can.  Refusing  to  admit 
that  any  given  empirical  limit  is  absolute,  the  principle 
of  reason  serves  as  a rule  which  postulates  what  must 
take  place,  if  we  make  the  regress,  but  does  not  anticipate 
what  is  present,  before  any  regress  is  made,  in  the  object 
as  it  is  in  itself.  I call  it,  therefore,  a regulative  principle 
of  reason,  to  indicate  that  it  is  not  a constitutive 
cosmological  principle,  that  is,  a principle  that  determines 
objects  of  sense  as  things  in  themselves  having  an 
absolute  totality  in  the  series  of  their  conditions.  That 
there  is  no  such  constitutive  principle,  I indicate  by 
calling  the  principle  of  reason  regulative,  and  in  this  way 
trying  to  prevent  what  otherwise  would  be  inevitable,  the 
transcendental  subreption  which  attributes  objective 
reality  to  an  idea  that  serves  merely  as  a rule. 

543  Section  IX. — Empirical  use  of  the  Regulative  Principle  515 

of  Reason. 

We  have  seen  that  no  transcendental  use  can  be  made 
of  pure  conceptions,  whether  these  belong  to  under- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


1 75 


standing  or  to  reason  ; that  absolute  totality  in  the  series 
of  conditions  in  the  world  of  sense  rests  entirely  upon  a 
transcendental  use  of  reason,  in  which  absolute  complete- 

544  ness  is  demanded  from  that  which  is  presupposed  as  a 
thing  in  itself;  and  that  such  completeness  cannot  be 
found  in  the  world  of  sense.  It  is  therefore  vain  to  ask 
whether  the  series  of  conditions  is  in  itself  absolutely 
limited  or  absolutely  unlimited ; the  only  question  is, 
how  far  we  ought  to  go  back  in  our  empirical  regress  in 
search  of  the  conditions  of  experience,  in  order  that, 
guided  by  the  rule  of  reason,  we  may  find  an  answer 
which  is  conformable  to  the  nature  of  the  object  in 
question. 

Now,  it  has  been  clearly  enough  shown  that  the 
principle  of  reason  is  not  a constitutive  principle  of 
objects  in  themselves,  but  is  merely  a rule  for  the  con- 
tinuation and  extension  of  a possible  experience.  If  we 
keep  this  steadily  before  our  eyes,  the  conflict  of  reason 
with  itself  is  at  an  end.  For  our  critical  solution  not 
only  does  away  with  the  illusion  in  which  the  contra- 
diction has  its  origin,  but  it  reveals  the  true  sense  in 
which  reason  is  in  harmony  with  itself.  Thus  the  mis- 
apprehension which  was  the  sole  cause  of  the  conflict  has 
been  removed,  and  a dialectical  principle  has  been  con- 
verted into  a doctrinal  principle. 

545  i.  Solution  of  the  First  Antinomy. 

546  For  the  solution  of  the  first  cosmological  problem,  we 
have  simply  to  determine,  whether,  in  the  regress  to  the 
unconditioned  extension  of  the  world  in  time  and  space, 
there  is  a regress  to  infinity , or  merely  a regress  that  is 
capable  of  being  continued  indefinitely  (in  mdefinitum). 


176  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

The  perfectly  general  idea  of  the  series  of  all  past 
states  of  the  world,  as  well  as  of  all  the  things  which  co- 
exist in  space,  is  merely  the  thought  of  a possible 
empirical  regress,  the  extent  of  which  has  not  yet  been 
determined.  Only  through  this  idea  can  there  arise  the 
conception  of  such  a series  of  conditions  of  a given 

547  perception.  Now,  the  world  as  a whole  exists  for  me 
only  as  a conception,  never  as  a perception.  Hence  I ^19 
cannot  reason  from  the  quantity  of  the  world  to  the 
quantity  of  the  regress,  and  determine  the  latter  by  the 
former ; on  the  contrary,  I can  form  a conception  of  the 
quantity  of  the  world  only  by  finding  out  the  quantity  of 
the  empirical  regress.  Of  the  empirical  regress,  how- 
ever, I can  never  say  more  than  that  I must  always 
advance  empirically  from  every  given  member  of  the 
series  of  conditions  to  a higher  and  more  remote  member. 

But  in  this  way  the  quantity  of  phenomena  as  a whole 
cannot  be  absolutely  determined,  and  hence  I cannot  say 
that  the  regress  proceeds  to  infinity.  To  say  that  it 
proceeds  to  infinity  would  be  to  anticipate  members  of 
the  regress  that  have  not  yet  been  reached,  and  to 
represent  their  number  as  so  great  that  no  empirical 
regress  could  ever  reach  them ; it  would  in  fact  be  to 
determine  the  quantity  of  the  world  (although  only 

548  negatively)  prior  to  the  regress,  which  is  impossible.  520 
The  first  or  negative  answer  to  the  first  cosmological 
problem  therefore  is,  that  the  world  has  no  first 
beginning  in  time,  and  no  extreme  limit  in  space. 

549  The  affirmative  answer  directly  follows,  that  the  regress  521 
in  the  series  of  phenomena  as  a determination  of  the 
quantity  of  the  world  proceeds  in  indefinitum.  This  is 
the  same  as  saying  that  the  world  of  sense  has  no 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


177 


550  absolute  quantity.  Every  beginning  is  in  time,  and  every  522 
limit  of  that  which  is  extended  is  in  space.  But  space 
and  time  belong  only  to  the  world  of  sense.  Hence, 
while  phenomena  in  the  world  are  conditionally  limited, 

the  world  itself  is  neither  conditionally  nor  uncon- 
ditionally limited.  Similarly,  as  the  world  cannot  be 
given  as  complete,  and  as  even  the  series  of  conditions  for 
that  which  is  given  as  conditioned  cannot  be  given  as 
complete , the  conception  of  the  quantity  of  the  world  is 

551  given  only  in  the  regress,  and  not  in  a collective  percep-  5 2 3 
tion  prior  to  it.  But  that  regress  consists  simply  in  the 
act  of  determining  the  quantity,  not  in  a determinate  con- 
ception, and  hence  it  does  not  yield  the  conception  of  a 
quantity  that  could  be  called  infinite  when  measured  by  a 
certain  standard.  The  regress,  therefore,  does  not  pro- 
ceed to  the  infinite,  as  if  the  infinite  could  be  presented, 
but  only  to  an  indefinite  distance,  and  it  is  only  in  the 
regress  that  any  quantity  of  experience  is  actually  given. 


2.  Solution  of  the  Second  Antinomy. 

If  I divide  a whole  that  is  presented  to  me  in  a per- 
ception, I proceed  from  something  conditioned  to  the 
conditions  which  make  it  possible.  The  division  into 
parts  ( subdivisio  or  decompositio ) is  a regress  in  the  series 
of  those  conditions.  The  series  could  be  presented  as 
an  absolute  totality,  only  if  the  regress  could  finally  reach 
perfectly  simple  parts.  But  if  all  the  parts  in  a con- 
tinuously progressive  decomposition  are  themselves  again 
divisible,  the  division  or  regress  from  the  conditioned  to 
its  conditions  proceeds  in  infinitum;  for  all  the  parts  or 
conditions,  being  contained  in  the  conditioned  itself, 

M 


r78 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


552  which  is  completely  presented  in  a perception  that  is  524 
enclosed  between  its  limits,  are  presented  along  with  the 
conditioned.  The  regress  in  this  case,  therefore,  cannot 

be  called  merely  a regress  in  indejinitum,  whereas  in  the 
first  cosmological  idea  that  was  the  only  kind  of  regress 
that  could  be  allowed,  inasmuch  as  it  was  necessary  to 
proceed  from  the  conditioned  to  conditions  outside  of  it, 
which  were  not  presented  along  with  the  conditioned, 
but  were  added  to  it  only  in  the  empirical  regress.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  not  permissible  to  say  of  a whole 
which  is  divisible  to  infinity,  that  it  is  made  up  of  an. 
infinite  number  of  parts.  For,  although  all  the  parts  are 
contained  in  the  perception  of  the  whole,  the  whole 
division  is  not  so  contained,  but  it  consists  only  in  the 
continuous  decomposition  or  regress  itself,  and  the  series 
has  no  existence  at  all  prior  to  the  regress.  As  this 
regress  is  infinite,  the  members  or  parts  reached  in  it  are 
certainly  all  contained  in  the  given  whole  viewed  as  an 
aggregate.  But  the  whole  series  of  the  stages  in  division 
is  not  contained  in  the  given  whole  ; for  these  constitute 
a successive  infinite,  which  is  never  complete,  and  there- 
fore never  reaches  an  infinite  multitude  of  parts,  nor  can 
its  parts  be  combined  into  a whole.  |!j; 

This  general  statement  may  easily  be  applied  to 
space.  Every  space  perceived  within  its  limits  is  a 
whole,  the  parts  of  which,  as  obtained  by  decomposition, 
are  always  themselves  spaces.  A space  is,  therefore,  525 
infinitely  divisible. 

553  From  this  a second  application  of  the  statement 
follows  quite  naturally.  The  divisibility  of  an  external 
object  or  body,  which  is  enclosed  within  its  limits, 
depends  upon  the  divisibility  of  the  space  that  is  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


179 


condition  of  the  perception  of  the  body  as  an  extended 
whole.  The  body  is,  therefore,  infinitely  divisible,  with- 
out, however,  being  made  up  of  an  infinite  number  of 
parts. 

Transition  from  the  Mathematical  to  the  Dynamical  528 
Antinomies. 

So  far  we  have  assumed  that  the  conditions  belonging 
to  the  conditioned  are  themselves  in  space  and  time. 

Now  this  assumption,  which  is  always  made  by  common 
sense,  was  the  real  source  of  the  apparent  conflict  of 
reason  with  itself.  For  it  forced  us  to  hold  that  all 
dialectical  conceptions  in  regard  to  totality  in  the  series 
of  conditions  for  that  which  is  given  as  conditioned  were 
of  exactly  the  same  character.  The  condition  was, 
therefore,  in  all  cases  connected  with  the  conditioned  as 
a member  of  the  same  series,  and  was  homogeneous  with 
it.  Hence  the  regress  in  the  series  of  conditions  was 
never  thought  as  complete,  or,  if  it  was  thought  as 
complete,  a member  of  the  series,  which  was  really 
conditioned,  was  falsely  supposed  to  be  the  first  member 
of  the  series,  and,  therefore,  to  be  unconditioned.  If  the 
557  object,  or  conditioned,  was  not  considered  merely  529 
according  to  its  magnitude,  at  least  the  series  of  con- 
ditions of  that  object  was  so  considered.  Thus  arose  a 
difficulty,  which  could  be  got  rid  of  in  no  other  way 
than  by  cutting  the  knot,  that  is,  by  recognizing  that 
reason  made  the  series  either  too  long  or  too  short  for 
understanding,  so  that  understanding  could  never  be 
coincident  with  the  idea  of  reason. 

But,  in  all  this  we  have  been  overlooking  an  essential 
distinction  that  obtains  between  the  objects,  that  is,  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


I So 

conceptions  of  understanding,  which  reason  tries  to  raise 
to  ideas.  Two  of  the  classes  of  categories  contained  in 
the  table  given  above  imply  a mathematical,  the  other  two 
a dynamical  synthesis  of  phenomena.  That  distinction 
becomes  important,  now  that  we  have  come  to  consider 
how  far  the  dynamical  conceptions  of  understanding  are 
adequate  to  the  idea  of  reason,  and  opens  up  an  entirely 
new  mode  of  escape  from  the  suit  in  which  reason  is 
involved.  In  the  former  suit  the  case  was  dismissed, 
because  both  parties  raised  a false  issue.  But  in  the 
558  dynamical  antinomies,  it  seems  as  if  reason  might  be  able  53 
to  establish  its  claims,  for  the  judge  has  himself  supplied 
the  proofs  which  were  wanting,  and  which  had  been 
overlooked  by  both  parties.  It  is,  therefore,  possible 
that  the  suit  may  be  adjusted  to  the  satisfaction  of  both 
sides,  a thing  that  was  impossible  in  the  case  of  the 
mathematical  antinomies. 

The  conditions  even  in  the  dynamical  ideas  are  no 
doubt  all  homogeneous,  in  so  far  as  we  look  merely  at 
the  extension  of  the  series,  and  ask  whether  it  conforms 
to  the  idea,  or  whether  the  idea  is  too  large  or  too  small 
for  it.  But  the  conception  of  understanding,  on  which 
the  idea  rests,  may  contain  merely  a synthesis  of  the  homo- 
geneous— which  is  certainly  the  case  in  the  composition 
or  division  of  every  magnitude — or  it  may  contain  also  a 
synthesis  of  the  heterogeneous.  This  latter  sort  of  syn- 
thesis is  at  least  conceivable  in  the  case  of  the  dynamical 
synthesis,  whether  it  takes  the  form  of  causal  connection 
or  of  the  connection  of  the  necessary  with  the  con- 
tingent. 

As,  in  the  mathematical  connection  of  the  series  of 
phenomena,  every  condition  is  itself  a part  of  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


181 


series,  no  condition  can  be  allowed  to  enter  that  is  not 
sensuous.  But,  in  the  dynamical  series  of  sensuous  con- 
ditions, a heterogeneous  condition,  or  one  that  is  not  a 
part  of  the  series,  is  not  inadmissible.  Such  a condition 

559  as  being  purely  intelligible,  would  lie  outside  of  the  series.  531 
Supposing  it  to  be  possible,  the  claims  of  reason  would 

be  sufficiently  satisfied  by  the  unconditioned  being  placed 
above  phenomena,  while  yet  the  series  of  phenomena 
would  not  cease  to  be  conditioned,  nor  would  it  be  cut 
short  in  defiance  of  the  principles  of  understanding. 

If  the  dynamical  ideas  admit  of  a condition  of  phe- 
nomena lying  outside  of  the  series  of  sensuous  conditions, 
a condition  which  is  not  itself  a phenomenon,  we  reach 
quite  a different  conclusion  from  that  to  which  we  were 
brought  in  the  case  of  the  mathematical  antinomies.  In 
these  we  were  forced  to  say,  that  both  of  the  contradic- 
tory dialectical  assertions  were  false.  But,  while  the 
dynamical  series  is  necessarily  conditioned  throughout  in 
so  far  as  it  is  a series  of  phenomena,  it  yet  is  connected 
with  a condition,  which,  though  it  is  empirically  uncon- 
ditioned, is  nun-sensuous.  Thus  satisfaction  is  given,  on 
the  one  hand  to  understanding , and  on  the  other  hand 
to  reason.  We  are  rid  of  the  dialectical  arguments,  which 
in  one  way  or  the  other  sought  unconditioned  totality  in 
mere  phenomena,  and  we  see  that  the  propositions  of 

560  reason  may  both  be  true  when  taken  in  their  proper  sense.  532 
This  we  could  not  possibly  show  in  the  case  of  the  cos- 
mological ideas  that  refer  only  to  a mathematically  un- 
conditioned unity,  for  in  them  no  condition  of  the  series 

of  phenomena  could  be  found,  which  was  not  itself  a 
phenomenon  and  therefore  one  of  the  members  of  the 


series. 


182 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


3.  Solution  of  the  Third  Antinomy. 

There  are  only  two  ways  in  which  we  can  conceive 
events  to  be  due  to  a cause : either  the  causality  is 
natural , or  it  springs  from  freedom.  By  natural  causality 
is  meant,  Tnat  connection  of  one  state  with  another  that 
precedes  it  in  the  world  of  sense,  in  which  the  second 
state  follows  the  first  in  conformity  with  a rule.  Now, 
the  causality  of  phenomena  rests  upon  conditions  of  time, 
and  the  preceding  state  cannot  always  have  existed,  for, 
if  it  had,  the  effect  produced  by  it  would  not  only  now 
have  come  into  being.  Hence  the  causality  of  the  cause 
of  something  that  happens  or  comes  into  being  must 
itself  have  come  into  being , and  by  the  principle  of  under- 
standing requires  another  cause  to  account  for  it. 

561  By  freedom,  again,  in  the  cosmological  sense,  is  meant,  533 
the  power  of  bringing  a state  into  existence  sfonta?ieously. 

The  causality  of  this  state  will  therefore  not  itself  stand 
under  another  cause,  which  determines  it  in  time  in  con- 
formity with  the  law  of  nature.  Taken  in  this  sense, 
freedom  is  a transcendental  idea ; for,  in  the  first  place, 
it  contains  in  it  nothing  borrowed  from  experience,  and, 
in  the  second  place,  its  object  cannot  be  presented  as 
determined  in  any  experience.  That  whatever  comes  to 
be  must  have  a cause,  is  a universal  law,  without  which 
there  can  be  no  experience  at  all.  As  the  causality  of 
this  cause  comes  to  be  or  originates,  it  must  itself  have  a 
cause.  Thus  the  whole  field  of  experience,  however  far 
it  may  extend,  contains  nothing  but  what  is  natural. 

But,  as  in  this  way  no  absolute  totality  of  conditions  in 
the  way  of  causality  can  be  obtained,  reason  creates  for 
itself  the  idea  of  a spontaneity,  which  can  begin  to  act 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


183 


purely  of  itself,  without  being  determined  to  activity 
by  another  cause,  as  the  law  of  natural  causality  de- 
mands. 

563  Now,  if  phenomena  were  things  in  themselves,  and  535 
space  and  time  forms  of  the  existence  of  things  in  them- 
selves, the  conditions  would  always  be  members  of  exactly 
the  same  series  as  the  conditioned.  Here,  therefore, 

as  in  the  other  transcendental  ideas,  the  antinomy  would 
arise,  that  the  series  must  inevitably  be  too  large  or  too 
small  for  understanding.  But  it  is  characteristic  of  the 
dynamical  conceptions  of  reason,  that  they  do  not 
consider  an  object  with  regard  to  its  magnitude,  but 

564  only  with  regard  to  its  existence.  In  this  case,  therefore,  536 
we  may  abstract  from  the  magnitude  of  the  series  of 
conditions  and  direct  our  attention  solely  to  the  dynami- 
calrelations  of  condition  and  conditioned.  Thus  we  at 
once  come  upon  the  difficulty,  whether  freedom  is  pos- 
sible at  all,  and  if  it  is,  whether  it  can  exist  along  with 
the  universality  of  the  natural  law  of  causality.  ' Can  we 
affirm,  disjunctively,  that  every  effect  in  the  world  must 
arise  either  from  nature  or  from  freedom,  or  must  we  say, 
that  in  different  relations  .the  same  event  is  due  both  to 
nature  and  to  freedom  ? That  every  event  in  the  world 

of  sense  is  connected  with  a preceding  event  according 
to  an  unchangeable  law  of  nature,  has,  in  the  Transcen- 
dental Analytic,  been  shown  to  be  a fundamental  principle 
which  admits  of  no  exception.  The  only  question  now 
is,  whether,  assuming  that  principle,  the  same  effect  may 
not  only  be  determined  in  accordance  with  nature,  but 
may  also  depend  upon  freedom,  or  whether  freedom  is 
completely  excluded  by  that  inviolable  rule.  Here  the 
common  but  false  presupposition  of  the  absolute  reality 


1S4  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

of  phenomena  shows  its  baleful  influence  and  confuses 
our  reason.  If  phenomena  are  things  in  themselves, 
freedom  cannot  be  saved.  For,  nature  will  then  be  the 
complete  and  adequate  cause  of  every  event,  and  the 
condition  of  an  event  will  be  contained  only  in  the  series 
of  phenomena  that  with  its  effect  is  necessary  according 

565  to  the  law  of  nature.  If,  however,  phenomena  are  not  537 
taken  to  be  more  than  they  really  are ; if  they  are  re- 
garded, not  as  things  in  themselves,  but  simply  as  objects 
connected  with  one  another  in  our  consciousness  in  con- 
formity with  empirical  laws  ; then  they  must  themselves 
have  their  source  in  that  which  is  not  a phenomenon. 
Such  an  intelligible  cause  is  not  determined  in  its  caus- 
ality by  phenomena,  although  the  effects  of  its  causality 
are  presented  to  us  as  phenomena,  and  can  therefore  be 
regarded  as  determined  by  other  phenomena.  The  in- 
telligible cause,  together  with  its  causality,  is  itself  outside 

of  the  series,  while  yet  its  effects  are  to  be  found  in  the 
series  of  empirical  conditions.  The  effect  can  therefore 
be  regarded  as  free  in  respect  of  its  intelligible  cause,  and 
may  at  the  same  time  be  viewed  on  its  phenomenal  side 
as  following  from  phenomena,  according  to  the  necessity 
of  nature. 

566  Possibility  of  Causality  through  Freedom.  538 

571  The  only  question  here  is  this:  granting  that  in  the  543 

whole  series  of  events  there  is  to  be  found  nothing  but 
the  necessity  of  nature,  is  it  yet  possible  to  regard  the 
very  same  event,  which  on  one  side  is  merely  an  effect  of 
nature,  as  on  the  other  side  an  effect  of  freedom,  or  is 
there  between  these  two  sorts  of  causality  a direct 
contradiction  ? 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


185 

Among  the  causes  in  the  phenomenal  world  there 
certainly  can  be  nothing  that  absolutely  and  from  itself 
could  cause  a series  to  begin  to  be.  Every  act  that  pro- 
duces an  event  is,  as  a phenomenon,  itself  an  event  or 
result,  which  presupposes  another  state  to  serve  as  cause. 
Everything  that  comes  to  be  is  therefore  merely  a 
contmuation  of  the  series,  and  nothing  that  begins  of 
itself  can  enter  into  the  series.  Hence  all  the  modes  in 

572  which  natural  causes  act  in  the  succession  of  time  are  544 
themselves  effects,  for  which  there  must  again  be  causes 
in  the  series  of  time.  It  is  vain  to  seek  in  the  causal 
connection  of  phenomena  foi^an  original  act  by  which 
something  may  come  to  be  that  before  was  not. 

But,  granting  that  the  cause  of  a phenomenal  effect  is 
itself  a phenomenon,  is  it  necessary  that  the  causality  of  its 
cause  should  be  entirely  empirical  ? May  it  not  be  that 
while  every  phenomenal  effect  must  be  connected  with  its 
cause  in  accordance  with  laws  of  empirical  causality,  this 
empirical  causality,  without  the  least  rupture  of  its  con- 
nection with  natural  causes,  is  itself  an  effect  of  a causality 
that  is  not  empirical  but  intelligible?  May  the  empirical 
causality  not  be  due  to  the  activity  of  a cause,  which 
in  its  relation  to  phenomena  is  original,  and  which  there- 
fore, in  so  far  as  this  faculty  is  concerned,  is  not  phen- 
omenal but  intelligible  ; although  as  a link  in  the  chain  of 
nature  it  must  be-regarded  as  also  belonging  entirely  to 
the  world  of  sense  ? 

574  Let  us  see  how  this  would  apply  to  experience.  Man  546 
is  one  of  the  phenomena  of  the  world  of  sense,  and  in  so 
far  one  of  the  natural  causes,  the  causality  of  which  must 
stand  under  empirical  laws.  Like  all  other  things  in 
nature,  he  must  have  an  empirical  character.  This 


1 86 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


character  vve  learn  from  an  observation  of  the  powers 
and  faculties  which  he  exhibits  in  the  production  of 
effects.  In  lifeless  nature,  or  in  the  mere  animal,  we  find 
no  reason  for  thinking  that  there  is  any  faculty  but  that 
which  is  sensuously  conditioned.  But  man,  who  knows 
all  the  rest  of  nature  solely  as  an  object  of  sense,  is 
aware  of  himself  also  by  mere  apperception,  and  that 
in  acts  and  inner  determinations,  which  he  is  quite  unable 
to  regard  as  due  to  impressions  of  sense.  On  the  one 
side,  he  is  no  doubt  for  himself  a phenomenon,  but, 
inasmuch  as  his  actions  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  recep- 
575  tivity  of  sense,  he  is,  on  the  other  side,  a purely  intel-  547 
ligible  object  with  respect  to  certain  of  his  faculties. 
These  faculties  we  call  understanding  and  reason ; and 
reason  in  particular  we  distinguish  in  quite  a peculiar  and 
especial  way  from  all  forces  that  are  empirically  con- 
ditioned, because  it  Contemplates  its  objects  purely  in  the 
light  of  ideas,  and  determines  understanding  in  accord- 
ance with  them. 

That  our  reason  actually  has  causality,  or  that  we  at 
least  suppose  it  to  have  causality,  is  evident  from  the 
imperatives  which  we  impose  upon  ourselves  as  rules  for 
our  own  conduct.  The  ought  Expresses  a kind  of  neces- 
sity and  connection  with  conditions  which  we  shall  look 
for  in  vain  in  all  the  rest  of  nature.  Understanding  can 
know  only  what  is,  has  been,  or  will  be.  It  is  impossible 
for  anything  to  exist  for  understanding  otherwise  than  as 
a matter  of  fact  it  does  exist  in  those  three  relations  of 
time ; nay,  if  we  fix  our  eyes  simply  upon  the  course  of 
nature,  the  ought  has  no  meaning  whatever.  It  is  as 
absurd  to  ask  what  nature  ought  to  be,  as  to  ask  what  sort 
of  properties  a circle  ought  to  have.  The  only  question 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


I87 


we  can  properly  ask  is,  what  comes  to  pass  in  nature  ? 
just  as  we  can  only  ask,  what  actually  are  the  properties 
of  a triangle  ? 

Now,  this  ought  expresses  a possible  activity,  the 
ground  of  which  is  a bare  conception,  whereas  a mere 

576  natural  activity  must  always  have  a phenomenal  ground.  54^ 
No  doubt  an  act  that  ought  to  be,  must  be  possible 
under  conditions  of  nature ; but  these  have  no  influence 

in  determining  the  will  itself,  but  only  in  determining  the 
effect  and  what  follows  from  it  in  the  phenomenon.  No 
matter  how  many  natural  influences,  how  many  sensuous 
impulses  may  be  brought  to  bear  upon  my  will,  they  can- 
not give  rise  to  the  ought.  The  volition  which  is  due 
to  such  influences  is  always  conditioned  and  by  no 
means  necessary,  and  the  ought  of  reason  confronts  such 
a volition  with  a limit  and  ideal,  nay,  forbids  or  author- 
izes it.  Whether  the  object  willed  is  sensuous  pleasure, 
or  even  the  good  which  is  the  object  of  pure  reason, 
reason  refuses  to  yield  to  the  influence  of  that  which 
is  given  empirically,  and  to  follow  the  order  of  things  as 
they  present  themselves  in  the  phenomenal  world.  With 
perfect  spontaneity  it  makes  for  itself  an  order  of  its  own 
in  accordance  with  ideas,  into  which  it  fits  the  empirical 
conditions,  and  guided  by  the  idea  of  this  order  it 
declares  actions  which  have  not  yet  taken  place,  and 
which  perhaps  never  will  take  place,  to  be  necessary. 
Thus  reason  assumes  that  it  has  in  itself  the  power  of 
originating  actions;  for  otherwise  it  would  not  expect  to 
find  in  experience  the  influence  of  its  ideas. 

Now  let  us  pause  here  for  a moment,  and  assume  that 

577  it  is  at  least  possible  for  reason  to  have  ca n sa  1 i iy -wltT  g -ip 
respect  to  phenomena.  Reason  though  it  be,  it  must  yet 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


I 38 

manifest  an  empirical  character.  For,  every  causg,  pre- 
supposes a rule,  in  conformity  with  which  certain  pheno- 
mena follow  as  effects,  and  every  rule  requires  uniformity__ 
in  the  way  of  effects.  It  is  upon  such  uniformity,  in  fact, 
that  the  conception  of  cause  as  the  faculty  of  producing 
an  effect  is  based.  This  uniformity  of  effect,  as  learned 
from  simply  observing  phenomenon,  may  be  called  the 
empirical  character  of  a cause,  and  this  empirical  charac- 
ter is  unchangeable,  although  the  effects  appear  in  change- 
able forms  according  as  the  accompanying  and  partly 
limiting  conditions  vary. 

Thus  the  will  of  every  man  has  an  empirical  character, 
which  is  simply  a certain  causality  of  his  reason,  in  so  far 
as  that  causality  manifests,  in  its  effects  in  the  pheno- 
menal world,  a rule  from  which  we  may  infer  the  kind 
and  degree  of  the  motives  from  which  his  actions  have 
been  done,  and  so  estimate  the  subjective  principle  of 
his  will.  This  empirical  character  must  itself  be  gathered 
from  our  observation  of  the  effects  of  his  causality  in  the 
phenomenal  world,  and  from  the  rule  with  which  experi- 
ence supplies  us.  It  is  therefore  solely  from  a considera- 
tion of  the  man’s  empirical  character  and  of  the  other 
causes  that  co-operate  with  it  in  conformity  with  the 
order  of  nature,  that  we  are  able  to  determine  his 
578  actions  on  their  phenomenal  side;  and  if  we  could  550 
trace  all  the  manifestations  of  his  will  to  their  source, 
we  could  tell  with  certainty  what  his  actions  in  every 
case  must  be,  and  show  that  they  necessarily  followed 
from  the  given  condition.  So  long,  therefore,  as  we 
look  only  at  a man’s  empirical  character,  we  cannot 
find  any  trace  of  freedom.  Yet  this  is  the  only  thing 
that  comes  before  us,  if  we  simply  observe  man,  and 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  1 89 

investigate  the  motives  of  his  actions  from  the  point 
of  view  of  anthropology. 

But  if  we  change  our  point  of  view,  and  consider  the 
very  same  actions  in  their  relation  to  reason, — by  which 
I do  not  mean  speculative  reason,  which  merely  explains 
how  the  actions  have  come  to  be,  but  reason  only  in  so 
far  as  it  isjjre  cause  that produces  them — if,  in  a word, 
we  view  a man’s  actions  in  their  relation  to  reason  as 
practical , we  find  that  they  come  under  an  entirely 
different  rule  and  order  from  the  order  of  nature.  We 
find,  it  may  be,  that  nothing  ought  to  have  taken  place , 
which  as  a matter  of  fact  has  taken  place  in  conformity 
with  the  course  of  nature,  and  could  not  but  take  place 
under  the  given  empirical  conditions.  But  sometimes  we 
find,  or  at  least  believe  that  we  find,  that  the  ideas  of 
reason  have  actually  proved  their  causality  with  reference 
to  the  actions  of  man  as  phenomena,  and  that  those 
actions  have  taken  place,  not  because  they  were  deter- 
mined by  empirical  causes,  but  because  they  were  deter- 
mined by  grounds  of  reason. 

579  Now,  if  we  could  say  that  reason  has  causality  in  regard  551 
to  phenomena,  should  we  be  entitled  to  say  that  reason 
acts  freely,  although  the  action  is  determined  with  absolute 
precision  and  necessity  in  its  empirical  character,  or  as  a 
mode  of  sense  ? The  empirical  character,  it  must  be 
observed,  will  in  that  case  be  itself  determined  in  the 
intelligible  character  or  manner  of  thinking.  The  in- 
telligible character,  however,  we  do  not  directly  know, 
and  hence  we  have  to  indicate  its  nature  by  means  of 
phenomena,  which  properly  give  us  a knowledge  only  of 
objects  of  sense,  and  therefore  only  of  the  empirical 
character.  Now,  the  action,  in  so  far  as  our  manner  of 


190 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


thinking  is  to  be  called  its  cause,  is  not  a result  that 
follows  according  to  empirical  laws  from  that  manner  of 
thinking  ; that  is,  it  is  not  preceded  by  the  conditions  of 
pure  reason,  but  only  by_the_effects  of  pure  reason  ips 
they  appear  in  the  inner  sense.  Pure  reason,  as  a faculty 
that  is  merely  intelligible,  is  not  subject  to  the  form  of 
time,  and  therefore  it  is  not  subject  to  the  conditions 
belonging  to  the  succession  of  time.  The  causality  of 
reason  in  the  intelligible  character  does  not  arise  or  begin 

5 So  to  be  at  a certain  time  in  order  to  produce  an  effect.  If  552 
it  did,  it  would  itself  be  subject  to  the  natural  law  of 
phenomena,  in  conformity  with  which  causal  series  are 
determined  in  time,  and  its  causality  would  then  be 
natural  and  not  free.  What  we  must  say  is,  that  if  reason 
can  have  causality  with  regard  to.  phenomena,  it  is  a 
faculty  by  means  of  which  the  sensuous  condition  of  an 
empirical  series  of  effects  first  begins  to  be.  For  the 
condition  which  lies  in  reason  is  not  sensuous,  and  there- 
fore does  not  itself  begin  to  be.  In  that  case  we  should 
find  what  we  missed  in  all  empirical  series,  that  the  con- 
dition of  a successive  series  of  events  might  itself  be 
empirically  unconditioned.  For  the  condition  would  lie 
outside  of  the  series  in-,  the  intelligible  character,  and 
would  therefore  be  subject  to  no  sensuous  condition,  and 
to  no  determination  of  time  through  preceding  causes. 

585  It  must  be  observed  that  we  have  had  no  intention  of  557 

586  proving  that  there  actually  is  freedom,  and  that  it  is  one  558 
of  the  faculties  which  are  the  cause  of  the  phenomena  of 
our  world  of  sense.  Freedom  has  here  been  viewed 
simply  as  a transcendental  idea,  which  leads  reason  to 
think  that  it  can  absolutely  bring  into  existence  the  series 

of  conditions  in  the  phenomenal  world  by  means  of  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC.  191 

sensuously  unconditioned,  and  thus  involves  it  in  an 
antinomy  with  its  own  laws — the  laws  which  it  lays  down 
for  the  understanding  in  its  empirical  work.  The  only 
thing  that  we  have  been  able  to  show,  or  that  we  have 
tried  to  show,  is  that  this  antinomy  has  its  source  in  a 
mere  illusion,  and  that  nature  at  least  does  not  contradict 
the  causality  of  freedom. 

4.  Solution  of  the  Fourth  Antinomy . 559 

In  what  immediately  precedes  we  have  considered  the 
changes  of  the  world  of  sense  in  their  dynamical  series — 
a series  each  member  of  which  stands  under  another  as 
its  cause.  We  shall  now  take  this  series  of  states  as  our 
guide  in  the  search  for  an  existence  that  may  serve  as  the 
supreme  condition  of  all  that  changes  ; that  is,  in  our 
search  for  the  necessary  being.  Here  we  have  to  deal, 
not  with  an  unconditioned  causality,  but  with  the  un- 
conditioned existence  of  substance  itself.  What  we  have 
before  us  is  therefore  really  a series  of  conceptions,  and 
not  a series  of  perceptions,  in  which  one  perception  is 
the  condition  of  the  other. 

Now,  it  is  easy  to  see  that,  as  every  object  in  the 
totality  of  phenomena  is  changeable,  and  therefore  is  con- 
ditioned in  its  existence,  no  member  of  the  series  of 
dependent  existence  can  possibly  be  unconditioned  ; in 
other  words,  we  cannot  regard  the  existence  of  any 
member  of  the  series  as  absolutely  necessary.  Hence,  if 
phenomena  were  things  in  themselves,  and  if  as  a con- 
sequence their  condition  always  belonged  to  one  and  the 
same  series  of  perceptions,  their  would  be  no  possibility 
of  introducing  a necessary  being  as  condition  of  the  560 
existence  of  phenomena  in  the  world  of  sense. 


192 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


But  there  is  a peculiar  distinction  between  the  dyna- 
mical and  the  mathematical  regress.  The  mathematical 
regress  has  to  do  only  with  the  composition  of  parts  into 
a whole,  or  the  division  of  a whole  into  parts ; and  as  in 
this  case  the  conditions  must  always  be  regarded  as  parts 
of  the  series,  and  therefore  as  homogeneous,  they  cannot 
but  be  phenomena.  But  in  the  dynamical  regress  we  are 
concerned,  not  with  the  possibility  of  an  unconditioned 
whole  formed  out  of  given  parts,  or  of  an  unconditioned 
part  for  a given  whole,  but  with  the  derivation  of  a state 
from  its  cause,  or  of  the  contingent  existence  of  substance 
itself  from  its  necessary  existence.  Here,  therefore,  there 
is  no  reason  why  the  condition  should  enter  into  the 
same  empirical  series  with  that  which  is  conditioned. 

Thus  a way  of  escape  from  the  apparent  antinomy  now 
under  consideration  is  opened  up  to  us.  Both  of  the 
conflicting  propositions  may  be  true  if  they  are  taken  in 
different  senses.  All  things  in  the  world  of  sense  may  be 
contingent,  and  therefore  have  only  an  empirically  con- 
ditioned existence,  while  yet  there  may  be  a condition  of 
the  whole  series  that  is  not  empirical ; that  is,  there  may 
be  an  unconditionally  necessary  being.  For,  this  necessary 
being,  as  the  intelligible  condition  of  the  series,  could  not 
589  belong  to  it  as  a member,  not  even  as  the  highest  member 
of  it,  nor  would  it  make  any  member  of  the  series 
empirically  unconditioned,  or  in  any  way  interfere  with 
the  empirically  conditioned  existence  of  all  the  members, 
which  form  the  world  of  sense  as  a whole.  Thus  the 
manner  in  which  an  unconditioned  existence  is  here  con- 
ceived as  the  condition  of  phenomena  is  different  from 
the  manner  in  which,  in  the  last  chapter,  we  sought  to 
explain  the  empirically  unconditioned  causality  of  free- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


193 


dom.  For  there  the  thing  itself  ( substantia  phaenomenon ) 
was  as  a cause  conceived  to  belong  to  the  series  of  con- 
ditions, and  only  its  causality  was  regarded  as  intelligible. 
Here,  on  the  other  hand,  the  necessary  being  must  be 
conceived  as  entirely  outside  of  the  series  of  the  sensible 
world  (as  ens  extramundanum ),  and  as  purely  intelligible. 

In  no  other  way,  indeed,  can  we  regard  it  as  free  from 
the  law  of  contingency  and  dependence  to  which  ail 
phenomena  are  subject. 

The  regulative  principle  of  reason  in  the  present  case 
may  therefore  be  stated  in  this  way.  Everything  in  the 
world  of  sense  has  an  empirically  conditioned  existence, 
and  no  property  of  a sensible  object  has  unconditioned 
necessity.  We  are  entitled  to  expect  that  in  a possible 
experience  there  will  be  found  an  empirical  condition  for 
every  member  of  the  series  of  conditions,  and  the  search 
for  such  conditions  we  ought  always  to  follow  up  as  far 
as  we  can.  Nothing  can  justify  us  in  referring  any 
particular  mode  of  existence  to  a condition  outside  of 
the  empirical  series,  or  even  in  regarding  a particular 
mode  of  existence  within  the  empirical  series  as  absolutely 
independent  and  self-subsistent.  At  the  same  time  there 
590  is  no  reason  to  deny  that  the  whole  series  may  be  de-  562 
pendent  upon  an  intelligible  being,  which  is  free  from 
every  empirical  condition,  and  is  itself  the  condition  of 
the  possibility  of  all  phenomena. 


593  Concluding  Remark  on  the  whole  Antinomy  of  Pure  565 

Reason. 

So  long  as  reason  in  its  conceptions  is  seeking  simply 
the  totality  of  conditions  in  the  world  of  sense,  and 

N 


194 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


trying  to  find  satisfaction  in  that  direction,  our  ideas  are 
cosmological , though  at  the  same  time  transcendental. 

But  the  moment  the  unconditioned,  in  which  we  are 
mainly  interested,  is  conceived  as  lying  entirely  outside 
of  the  world  of  sense,  and  therefore  beyond  all  possible 
experience,  our  ideas  become  transcendent.  For  then  they 
are  not  merely  ideas  which  reason  employs  in  seeking  to 
complete  experience — an  end  which  must  always  be  pur- 
sued, though  it  can  never  be  fully  attained  ; rather  they  are 
ideas  that  entirely  separate  themselves  from  experience, 
and  create  for  themselves  objects,  for  which  experience  sup- 
plies no  material,  and  which  cannot  rest  their  claim  to  ob- 
jective reality  upon  the  completion  of  the  empirical  series, 

594  but  only  upon  pure  a priori  conceptions.  Nevertheless,  the  566 
cosmological  idea  which  gave  rise  to  the  fourth  antinomy 
urges  us  to  take  this  step.  Finding  that  phenomena  are 
always  conditioned  modes  of  existence,  and  have  no 
support  in  themselves,  we  are  driven  to  look  about  for 
something  different  from  all  phenomena,  and  therefore 

for  an  intelligible  object  which  is  entirely  free  from  con- 

595  tingency.  Thus  the  very  first  step  which  we  take  beyond  567 
the  world  of  sense  compels  us  to  enter  upon  an  inquiry 
into  the  nature  of  the  absolutely  necessary  being,  and  to 
derive  from  our  conceptions  of  it  our  conceptions  of  all 
things  in  their  purely  intelligible  nature.  This  inquiry  is 
the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


195 


BOOK  II.— THE  IDEAL  OF  PURE  REASON. 

Section  /. — The  Ideal  in  General. 

We  have  seen  above  that  no  object  can  be  known 
by  means  of  the  pure  conceptions  of  understanding, 
if  these  are  isolated  from  all  conditions  of  sensibility ; 
for  the  conditions  of  objective  reality  are  then  absent, 
and  nothing  is  left  but  the  mere  form  of  thought.  On 
the  other  hand  pure  conceptions  can  be  presented 
in  concreto  if  they  are  brought  into  connection  with 
phenomena,  for  in  phenomena  they  obtain  the  appro- 
priate material  by  which  they  become  conceptions  of 
experience.  A conception  of  experience,  in  fact,  is 
simply  a conception  of  understanding  in  coJicreto.  Now, 
ideas  are  even  further  removed  from  objective  reality 
than  categories , for,  as  no  phenomenon  can  be  found 
to  which  they  might  apply,  they  cannot  be  presented 
596  in  concreto  at  all.  They  demand  a certain  complete-  568 
ness  which  is  beyond  the  reach  of  all  possible  empi- 
rical knowledge,  and  reason  has  in  them  merely  a 
systematic  unity,  to  which  it  brings  the  unity  that  is 
possible  in  experience  as  near  as  possible,  though  it  can 
never  hope  to  bring  experience  into  complete  harmony 
with  its  ideas. 

But  what  I call  the  ideal  seems  to  be  still  further 
removed  from  objective  reality  than  even  the  idea. 

By  the  ideal  I mean  the  idea,  not  merely  in  concreto , 
but  in  individuo : I mean,  in  other  words,  an  individual 
thing  that  is  determinable  or  even  determined  simply 
by  the  idea. 

599  Reason,  in  its  ideal,  aims  at  absolutely  complete  deter-  571 


196 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


mination  in  accordance  with  a priori  rules.  Hence  it 
sets  before  itself  an  object  which  it  conceives  as  capable 
of  thoroughgoing  determination  in  conformity  with  its 
own  principles.  The  conditions,  however,  that  are 
required  for  such  a determination  cannot  be  found  in 
experience,  and  thus  the  conception  is  itself  transcendent. 

Section  II — The  Transcendental  Ideal. 

601  The  proposition,  that  all  existence  is  completely  deter-  573 
mined , means,  that  to  know  a thing  completely,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  all  that  can  possibly  exist,  and  to 
determine  the  thing  in  question,  either  affirmatively  or 
negatively,  by  reference  to  our  ideal.  The  absolutely 
complete  determination  of  a thing  is  therefore  a mere  idea, 
which  can  never  be  presented  in  its  totality  in  concrcto. 

This  idea  has  its  source  entirely  in  reason,  which  pre- 
scribes the  rule  by  which  understanding  must  be  guided 

in  seeking  completeness  of  knowledge. 

The  idea  of  the  totality  of  all  possible  existence  will  be 
found  to  exclude  a number  of  predicates.  It  excludes, 
to  wit,  all  those  predicates  that  are  derived  from  other 

602  predicates  already  given,  as  well  as  those  that  cannot  574 
stand  along  with  them ; and  thus  it  leaves  us  with 

a conception  that  is  determined  absolutely  a priori, 
that  is,  with  the  conception  of  an  individual  object  which 
is  completely  determined  by  the  mere  idea  of  it.  This 
is  what  is  meant  by  an  ideal  of  pure  reason. 

603  Now,  a negation  cannot  be  definitely  thought,  except  in  573  L 
contrast  to  the  affirmation  that  is  its  opposite.  A man 

born  blind  has  no  idea  of  darkness,  because  he  has  no 
idea  of  light.  All  conceptions  of  negations  are  therefore 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


197 


derivative,  and  positive  realities  contain  all  the  data,  and 
so  to  speak,  the  matter  or  transcendental  content,  for  the 
possibility  and  the  complete  determination  of  all  things. 

This  transcendental  substratum  for  the  complete  deter- 
mination of  things,  which  is  presupposed  by  our  reason, 

604  is  simply  the  idea  of  a totality  of  reality  (omnitudo  576 
realitatis).  All  true  negations  are  therefore  merely 
limitations  of  that  unlimited  totality  of  reality  which 
reason  presupposes. 

It  is  by  supposing  a thing  in  itself  to  possess  this 
totality  of  reality  that  we  conceive  of  it  as  completely 
determined.  Moreover,  the  conception  of  this  thing  in 
itself  as  an  ens  realissimum  is  the  conception  of  an 
individual  being,  for,  in  determining  it,  we  are  forced  to 
assign  to  it  one  out  of  every  possible  pair  of  contra- 
dictory predicates,  namely,  that  predicate  which  expresses 
positive  being.  Thus  it  is  a transcendental  ideal  which 
necessarily  compels  us  to  conceive  of  all  that  exists  as 
completely  determined,  and  to  this  ideal,  as  constituting 
the  supreme  and  the  complete  material  condition  of 
their  possibility,  all  objects  must  be  referred  in  so  far  as 
their  content  is  concerned.  Nor  is  human  reason  capable 
of  having  any  other  genuine  ideal,  for  in  no  other  way 
can  a conception,  which  in  itself  is  general,  be  completely 
determined  from  itself,  and  recognized  to  be  the  idea  of 
an  individual  thing. 

605  Now,  it  is  self-evident  that  reason  can  think  of  things  577 
as  necesarily  completely  determined,  without  presuppos- 

606  ing  the  existence  of  a being  conforming  to  its  ideal.  It  578 
is  enough  that  the  idea  of  that  being  should  be  pre- 
supposed. In  its  ideal  reason  finds  the  prototype  of 
which  all  things  are  but  imperfect  copies  or  ectypes 


198  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

and  from  which  they  derive  the  material  of  their  possi- 
bility. To  this  ideal  things  approximate  more  or  less, 
but  they  must  always  remain  at  an  infinite  distance 
from  it. 

All  things,  then,  with  the  synthesis  of  various  deter- 
minations which  form  their  content,  are  regarded  as 
deriving  their  possibility  solely  from  that  which  contains 
all  reality  within  itself  and  alone  is  originally  possible. 

The  predicates  by  which  all  other  modes  of  being  are 
distinguished  from  the  truly  real  being,  are  all  negative, 
and  negations  are  merely  limitations  of  a higher  reality, 
and  ultimately  of  the  highest  reality  of  all,  from  which 
only  their  content  is  derived.  The  manifold  deter- 
minations of  things  are  therefore  simply  various  ways 
of  limiting  the  conception  of  the  highest  reality,  which 
is  their  common  substratum,  just  as  all  geometrical  figures 
are  merely  the  various  ways  in  which  infinite  space  is 
capable  of  being  limited.  Hence  the  object  which 
reason  sets  before  itself  as  an  ideal  is  also  called  the 
original  Being  (ens  origit,  arium) ; as  having  no  being 
higher  than  itself,  it  is  called  the  supreme  Being  ( ens 
summum);  and  it  is  also  named  the  Being  of  all  beings  579 
( ens  entitlin'),  to  indicate  that  all  other  beings  are  con- 
ditioned and  subject  to  it.  But  all  this  does  not  entitle 
us  to  say  that  there  is  an  actual  object  which  is  so 
related  objectively  to  other  things,  but  only  that  there 
is  an  idea  which  is  so  related  to  our  conceptions 
of  things.  Whether  a Being  of  such  transcendent 
perfection  actually  exists  we  are  left  in  complete 
ignorance. 

Again,  we  cannot  say  that  an  original  being  consists 
of  a number  of  derivative  beings,  for  each  of  these 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


199 


presupposes  the  original  being,  and  therefore  cannot 
constitute  it.  The  ideal  of  the  original  being  must 
therefore  be  conceived  as  simple. 

The  derivation  of  all  other  possibility  from  the 
original  being  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  a limitation 
of  its  supreme  reality,  and  as  it  were  a division  of  it 
into  parts ; for  the  original  being  would  in  that  case 
be  a mere  aggregate  of  derivative  beings,  and  this  we 
have  just  seen  to  be  impossible,  although  in  our  first 
rough  sketch  we  represented  the  matter  in  that  way. 

The  supreme  reality  we  must  conceive,  not  as  the  sum 
of  all  things,  but  as  the  necessary  condition  of  their 
possibility.  The  manifold  determination  of  things  must 
be  regarded,  not  as  a limitation  of  the  original  being 
itself,  but  as  its  complete  product,  to  which  will  belong 
our  whole  sensibility,  and  all  the  reality  in  the  phenom- 
enal world,  which  cannot  enter  as  an  ingredient  into  the 
idea  of  the  Supreme  Being. 

608  If  we  follow  out  this  idea  and  hypostatise  it,  we  shall  58c 
be  able  to  determine  the  original  being,  simply  from 
our  conception  of  the  supreme  reality,  as  one,  simple, 
all  sufficient,  eternal,  etc.  ; in  a word,  we  shall  be  able 
to  determine  it  in  its  unconditioned  completeness  through 
all  predicaments.  Now  this  is  the  conception  of  God, 
in  its  transcendental  sense,  and  thus  the  ideal  of  pure 
reason  is  the  object  of  a transcendental  theology. 

By  such  a use  of  the  transcendental  idea,  however, 
theology  oversteps  limits  set  to  it  by  its  very  nature. 
Reason  only  demands  the  conception  of  all  reality  as 
essential  to  the  complete  determination  of  things  ; it  does 
not  require  us  to  suppose  that  all  this  reality  should  be 
given  objectively,  and  should  itself  constitute  a thing. 


200 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


It  is  by  a mere  fiction  that  we  combine  the  manifold 
content  of  our  idea  into  an  ideal,  and  realize  it  in  a 
particular  being.  We  have  no  right  to  assume  without 
question  that  such  a substantiation  of  the  ideal  is  even 
possible  ; nor  can  it  be  said  that  any  of  the  consequences 
that  flow  from  such  an  ideal  have  the  least  bearing  upon 
the  complete  determination  of  things  in  general,  although 
it  was  only  for  the  sake  of  that  determination  that  the 
idea  was  put  forward. 

609  How,  then,  does  it  come  that  reason  derives  the  whole  581 
possibility  of  things  from  one  single  possibility,  namely,  that 

of  the  highest  reality,  and  why  does  it  assume  that  this 
reality  must  be  contained  in  a particular  original  being  ? 

The  answer  will  readily  present  itself  if  we  look  back  to 
what  has  been  shown  in  the  Transcendental  Analytic. 
There  we  found  that  objects  of  sense  are  possible  only  in 
relation  to  our  thought,  which  supplies  the  a priori 
element  or  empirical  form  that  is  implied  in  them.  But 
unless  the  matter  were  given,  that  is,  the  real  element  in 
the  phenomenal  object  which  corresponds  to  sensation, 
the  object  could  not  be  thought  at  all,  nor  could  we  com- 
prehend how  it  should  be  possible.  Now  an  object  of 
sense  can  be  completely  determined,  only  if  we  are  able 
to  compare  it  with  all  possible  determinations  of  pheno- 
mena, and  predicate  these  of  it  either  affirmatively  or 
negatively.  But  that  which  constitutes  the  thing  itself, 
or  the  real  element  in  the  phenomenon,  must  be  given, 

610  and  unless  it  is  given  the  object  cannot  be  thought  at  all.  582 
Now  the  real  element  of  all  phenomena  is  given  in  the 
one  all-embracing  experience ; and  hence  the  matter 
which  makes  all  objects  of  sense  possible  must  be  pre- 
supposed as  given  in  one  comprehensive  whole,  and  only 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


201 


by  the  limitation  of  this  whole  are  empirical  objects 
possible,  distinguishable  from  one  another,  and  capable 
of  complete  determination.  As  a matter  of  fact,  no  other 
objects  can  be  given  to  us  but  objects  of  sense,  and 
these  nowhere  but  in  the  context  of  a possible  experience. 
Hence  there  is  for  us  no  object  which  does  not  presup- 
pose the  comprehensive  whole  of  all  empirical  reality  as 
the  condition  of  its  possibility.  It  is  therefore  a natural 
illusion  which  leads  us  to  suppose  that  a principle  which 
properly  holds  only  of  things  that  are  presented  as  objects 
of  our  senses,  is  applicable  to  all  things  without  exception. 

We  simply  drop  the  limitation  to  phenomena,  and  imagine 
that  the  empirical  principle  of  our  conceptions  of  the 
possibility  of  phenomenal  objects  is  a transcendental 
principle  of  the  possibility  of  things  as  such. 

And  the  reason  why  we  afterwards  hypostatise  this 
idea  of  a comprehensive  whole  of  all  reality  is,  that  we 
change  dialectically  the  distributive  unity,  implied  in  the 
empirical  use  of  understanding,  into  the  collective  unity  of 
a whole  of  experience,  and  think  of  this  whole  of  pheno- 
mena as  an  individual  thing,  which  contains  all  reality 
i within  itself.  Our  next  step  is,  by  means  of  the  transcen-  583 
dental  subreption  already  mentioned,  to  confuse  this 
individual  thing,  which  includes  in  itself  all  empirical 
reality,  with  the  conception  of  a thing  that  constitutes  the 
supreme  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  things,  and 
supplies  the  real  conditions  for  their  complete  determina- 


202 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


Section  III. — Arguments  of  Speculative  Reason  for  the 
Existence  of  a Supreme  Being. 

614  The  natural  course  of  human  reason  in  seeking  to  586 
prove  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being  is  as  follows. 

First  of  all  reason  persuades  itself  that  some  necessary 
being  must  exist.  This  being  it  regards  as  having  uncon- 
ditioned existence.  Then  it  looks  out  for  that  which 

615  can  be  conceived  as  independent  of  all  conditions,  and  5^7 
this  it  finds  in  that  which  is  itself  the  sufficient  condition 

of  all  other  things,  that  is,  in  that  which  contains  all 
reality.  Now,  as  the  unlimited  All  is  absolute  unity,  and 
carries  with  it  the  conception  of  a single,  supreme  being, 
reason  concludes  that  a Supreme  Being  must  necessarily 
exist  as  the  original  condition  of  all  things. 

Let  us  suppose  that  every  step  in  this  argument  is 

6X6  valid.  Grant,  in  the  first  place,  that  from  any  given  588 
existence,  were  it  only  my  own,  I may  legitimately  infer 
the  existence  of  an  unconditionally  necessary  being. 
Grant,  secondly,  that  I must  regard  a being  which  con- 
tains all  reality  and  therefore  all  conditions,  as  uncondi- 
tionally necessary,  and  that  the  conception  of  this  being 
harmonizes  with  the  idea  of  absolute  necessity.  Admit- 
ting all  this,  we  yet  are  not  entitled  to  say  that  there  is 
anything  contradictory  of  absolute  necessity  in  the  con- 
ception of  a limited  being,  which  does  not  possess  the 
highest  reality.  For,  while  it  is  no  doubt  true  that  from 
the  conception  of  a limited  being  we  cannot  derive  the 
idea  of  the  unconditioned,  which  by  its  very  nature 
implies  a totality  of  conditions,  yet  it  by  no  means  follows 
that  a limited  being  must  in  its  existence  be  conditioned. 

On  the  contrary,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  us  from 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


203 


supposing  that  all  limited  beings  may  be  unconditionally 
necessary,  although  no  doubt  their  necessity  cannot  be 
inferred  merely  from  the  general  conception  which  we 
have  of  them.  The  argument  given  above  cannot,  there- 
fore, help  us  in  the  least  to  determine  the  nature  of  a 
necessary  being,  and  in  fact  it  leads  to  nothing  at  all. 

617  But  although  that  argument,  resting  as  it  does  upon  5^9 
the  internal  insufficiency  of  the  contingent,  is  undoubtedly 
transcendental,  it  yet  is  so  simple  and  natural  that  it 
never  fails  to  commend  itself  even  to  the  most  ordinary 
mind,  the  moment  its  bearing  is  understood.  We  see 
things  change,  arise  and  perish;  hence  they,  or  at  least 
their  state,  must  have  a cause.  But  for  every  cause  that 

618  can  be  presented  in  experience,  we  are  forced  to  seek  a 590 
new  cause.  Now,  where  should  we  more  naturally  expect 

to  find  the  first  cause  than  in  the  supreme  cause,  that  is, 
in  the  Being  which  originally  contains  within  itself  the 
sufficient  explanation  of  every  possible  effect,  and  which 
besides  is  so  easily  conceived  through  the  single  mark  of 
all-comprehensive  completeness  ? This  supreme  cause 
is  then  held  to  be  absolutely  necessary,  because  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  for  us  to  ascend  to  it  in  thought, 
while  yet  we  see  no  reason  for  going  beyond  it.  Hence, 
even  among  nations  that  are  in  a state  of  the  blindest 
polytheism,  some  gleams  of  monotheism  are  visible,  to 
which  they  have  been  brought,  not  by  reflection  and  deep 
speculation,  but  simply  by  following  the  path  that  gradu- 
ally and  naturally  opened  up  before  them. 

There  are  only  three  ways  in  which  the  existence  of 
God  may  be  sought  to  be  proved  on  the  basis  of  specula- 

619  tive  reason.  The  first  is  the physico-theological  proof,  the  591 
second  is  the  cosmological , and  the  third  the  ontological. 


204 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


This  is  the  order  in  which  the  three  proofs  come  before 
reason  as  it  gradually  widens  its  vision.  We  shall,  how- 
ever, examine  them  in  the  reverse  order,  for,  as  we  shall 
immediately  see,  while  experience  gives  the  first  impulse 
to  reason,  it  is  the  transcendental  conception  only  which 
leads  the  way,  and  sets  before  reason  the  goal  of  all  its 
efforts.  I shall  therefore  begin  with  an  examination  of 
the  transcendental  proof,  and  then  pass  on  to  consider 
how  far  that  proof  may  be  strengthened  by  the  addition 
of  empirical  elements. 


620  Section  IV. — The  Ontological  Proof.  592 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  obvious  that  the  concep- 
tion of  an  absolutely  necessary  being  is  a pure  conception 
of  reason.  It  is  a mere  idea,  the  objective  reality  of 
which  is  by  no  means  proved  by  the  fact  that  reason 
requires  it.  All  that  we  can  say  is  that  the  idea  of  an 
absolutely  necessary  being  points  to  a certain  ideal  com- 
pleteness, but  as  this  completeness  is  unattainable,  the 
idea  really  limits  the  sphere  cf  understanding  instead  of 
extending  its  knowledge  to  new  objects. 

People  have  at  all  times  spoken  of  an  absolutely 
necessary  being,  but  they  have  begun  by  seeking  to  prove 
its  existence  without  first  asking  whether  and  how  a thing 
of  that  sort  could  even  be  conceived.  It  is  certainly  easy 
enough  to  give  a verbal  definition  of  it,  as  something  the 

621  non-existence  of  which  is  impossible.  But  this  throws  no  593 
light  upon  the  conditions  which  force  us  to  regard 
the  non-existence  of  a thing  as  absolutely  unthinkable. 
Now  it  is  just  these  conditions  that  we  really  wish  to 
know.  We  wish  to  know  whether  under  the  conception 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


205 


of  a necessary  being  we  are  thinking  anything  at  all  or 
not.  To  speak  of  the  “ unconditioned,”  and  thus  to  take 
away  all  the  conditions  by  means  of  which  understanding 
is  able  to  regard  anything  as  necessary,  does  not  help  us 
to  understand,  whether  in  the  conception  of  an  uncon- 
ditionally necessary  being  we  are  thinking  of  a real  being, 
or,  as  may  perhaps  be  the  case,  of  nothing  at  all. 

It  has  commonly  been  supposed  that  this  conception, 
now  so  familiar  to  us,  but  originally  hit  upon  by  accident, 
might  be  justified  by  bringing  forward  a number  of 
examples,  and  that  thus  all  further  inquiry  into  its 
intelligibility  was  rendered  superfluous.  Every  geometrical 
proposition,  it  was  said,  as,  for  instance,  that  a triangle 
has  three  angles,  is  absolutely  necessary ; and  people 
talked  as  if  such  examples  entitled  them  to  say  that  they 
had  a perfectly  clear  conception  of  what  they  meant  by 
an  object  that  lay  entirely  beyond  the  sphere  of  human 
understanding. 

The  examples  brought  forward  were,  however,  all  with- 
out exception  taken  from  judgments , not  from  things  and 
their  existence.  But  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  a 
judgment  is  not  the  same  thing  as  an  absolute  necessity 
of  a thing.  The  absolute  necessity  of  a judgment  is  only 
a conditioned  necessity  of  the  thing  predicated,  that  is, 

2 of  the  predicate  in  the  judgment.  The  proposition  just  594 
cited  does  not  say  that  three  angles  are  absolutely 
necessary,  but  only  that,  if  a triangle  exists,  that  is,  is 
presented  in  perception,  it  must  contain  three  angles. 

But  this  mere  logical  necessity  has  proved  a fruitful 
source  of  illusion.  People  have  framed  a priori  the  con- 
ception of  a thing  that  seems  to  include  existence  within 
its  content,  and  have  then  assumed  that,  because  existence 


206 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


belongs  necessarily  to  the  object  as  conceived,  it  must 
also  belong  necessarily  to  the  thing  itself.  Thus  it  is 
inferred  that  there  is  an  absolutely  necessary  being, 
because  the  existence  of  that  being  is  thought  in  a con- 
ception that  has  been  arbitrarily  assumed,  and  assumed 
under  the  supposition  that  there  is  an  actual  object 
corresponding  to  it. 

If  in  an  identical  judgment  I retain  the  subject  after 
rejecting  the  predicate,  a contradiction  arises,  and  hence 
I say  that  the  predicate  belongs  to  the  subject  necessarily. 

But  if  I reject  the  subject  as  well  as  the  predicate,  there 
is  no  contradiction,  for  nothing  is  left  to  which  a contra- 
diction could  apply.  To  assume  that  there  is  a triangle, 
and  yet  to  deny  that  it  has  three  angles,  is  contradictory, 
but  there  is  no  contradiction  in  denying  both  the  triangle 
and  its  three  angles.  It  is  exactly  the  same  with  the 
623  conception  of  an  absolutely  necessary  being.  If  the  595 
existence  of  that  being  is  denied,  the  thing  itself  with  all 
its  predicates  is  at  the  same  time  denied.  How  can  this 
be  shown  to  involve  a contradiction  ? The  contradiction 
cannot  come  from  without,  for  the  thing  is  not  said  to  be 
necessary  because  of  its  relation  to  anything  external  • 
nor  can  it  come  from  within,  for,  in  denying  the  reality 
of  the  thing  itself,  the  reality  of  all  that  it  contains  is  at 
the  same  time  denied.  “ God  is  almighty  ” is  a necessary 
judgment.  The  predicate  “ almighty  ” cannot  be  denied, 
so  long  as  the  subject  “God”  is  affirmed,  for  the  con- 
ception of  God,  that  is,  of  an  infinite  being,  is  identical 
with  the  conception  of  a Being  that  is  “ almighty.”  But 
if  you  say,  “ There  is  no  God,”  neither  the  predicate 
“almighty”  nor  any  other  predicate  remains:  in  the 
denial  of  the  subject  every  possible  predicate  is  denied, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


207 


and  there  is  therefore  not  the  least  contradiction  in 
saying  that  God  does  not  exist. 

624  At  this  point,  however,  I am  told  that  there  is  one  59^ 
conception,  although  only  one,  the  object  of  which  can- 
not without  contradiction  be  denied  to  exist.  The  con- 
ception is  that  of  an  absolutely  necessary  Being.  This 
Being,  it  is  said,  possesses  all  reality,  and  such  a Being, 

as  I am  willing  to  admit,  we  are  justified  in  assuming  to 
be  possible.  Now  that  which  comprehends  all  reality, 
the  objector  goes  on,  must  also  comprehend  existence. 
Hence  existence  is  in  this  case  involved  in  the  con- 

625  ception  of  a thing  as  possible.  If,  therefore,  the  thing  is  597 
denied  to  exist,  even  its  internal  possibility  is  denied, 
and  this  is  self-contradictory. 

Now  I simply  ask,  whether  the  proposition,  that  this  or 
that  thing  exists , is  an  analytic  or  a synthetic  proposition. 

If  it  is  analytic,  nothing  is  added  to  the  thought  of  a 
thing  by  predicating  existence  of  it.  Either  the  thought 
in  you  must  itself  be  the  thing,  or  you  have  simply 
assumed  existence  to  be  implied  in  mere  possibility,  and 
then  derived  existence  from  internal  possibility,  which  is 
nothing  but  a wretched  tautology.  It  does  not  mend 
matters  to  use  the  word  “ reality  ” in  speaking  of  the 
conception  of  a thing,  and  the  word  “ existence  ” in 
speaking  of  the  conception  of  the  predicate.  Call  all 
that  is  assumed  “ reality,”  and  in  the  conception  of  the 
subject  the  thing  with  all  its  predicates  is  already  assumed 
to  be  actual,  and  this  assumption  is  simply  repeated  in 

626  the  predicate.  Admit,  on  the  other  hand,  as  every  598 
rational  being  must  admit,  that  every  proposition  which 
affirms  existence  is  synthetic,  and  how  can  it  be  any 
longer  maintained  that  the  predicate  of  existence  cannot 


2o8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


be  denied  without  contradiction  ? That  is  the  privilege 
of  analytic  propositions  only,  and  is  bound  up  with  their 
very  nature. 

The  illusion  which  arises  from  confusing  a logical 
predicate  with  a real  predicate,  that  is,  with  one  that 
determines  an  actual  thing,  stubbornly  resists  almost  all 
attempts  to  correct  it.  As  logic  abstracts  from  all  con- 
tent, anything  at  all  may  serve  as  a logical  predicate  ; 
nay,  the  subject  may  even  be  predicated  of  itself.  But  a 
determination  is  a real  predicate,  which  adds  something 
to  the  conception  of  the  subject  and  enlarges  it.  Hence 
it  must  not  be  assumed  in  the  conception  of  the  subject. 

Being  is  evidently  not  a real  predicate,  that  is,  a con- 
ception of  something  that  is  capable  of  being  added  to 
the  conception  of  a thing.  It  is  merely  the  ungrounded 
assertion  of  a thing  or  of  certain  determinations  as  an 
object  of  thought.  In  logic  being  is  simply  the  copula 
of  a judgment.  The  proposition,  God  is  omnipotent , 
contains  two  conceptions,  the  objects  of  which  are 
respectively  God  and  omnipotence ; and  the  word  is  adds 
627  no  new  predicate,  but  is  merely  a sign  that  the  predicate  599 
omnipotent  is  asserted  in  relation  to  the  subject  God. 

If,  then,  I take  the  term  God , which  is  the  subject,  to 
comprehend  the  whole  of  the  predicates,  including  the 
predicate  omnipotent , and  say,  God  is,  or  There  is  a God, 

I do  not  enlarge  the  conception  of  God  by  a new  predicate, 
but  I merely  bring  the  subject  in  itself  with  all  its 
predicates,  in  other  words,  the  object,  into  relation  with 
my  conception.  The  content  of  the  object  and  of  my 
conception  must  be  exactly  the  same,  and  hence  I add 
nothing  to  my  conception,  which  expresses  merely  the 
possibility  of  the  object,  by  simply  placing  its  object 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


209 


before  me  in  thought,  and  saying  that  it  is.  The  real 
contains  no  more  than  the  possible.  A hundred  real 
dollars  do  not  contain  a cent  more  than  a hundred 
possible  dollars.  The  one  signifies  the  conception,  the 
other  the  object  as  it  is  set  over  against  the  conception  ; 
but  if  the  object  contained  more  than  the  conception,  the 
conception  would  not  express  the  whole  object,  and 
would  therefore  be  an  inadequate  conception.  No  doubt 
there  is  in  my  purse  a hundred  dollars  more  if  I actually 
possess  them,  than  if  I have  merely  the  conception,  that 
is,  have  merely  the  possibility  of  them.  As  real,  the 
object  is  not  simply  contained  in  my  conception 
analytically,  but  it  is  added  to  it  synthetically,  the  con- 
ception as  such  being  merely  a determination  of  my  own 
state.  But  the  hundred  dollars  do  not  become  more 
than  a hundred  whether  they  exist  outside  of  my  con- 
ception or  not. 

628  No  matter  therefore  what  or  how  many  are  the  predi-  600 
cates  by  which  I think  a thing,  no  matter  if  I should 
think  it  even  in  the  completeness  of  its  determinations,  I 
add  absolutely  nothing  to  it  by  saying  that  it  is.  To 
think  of  a Being  of  the  highest  reality,  a Being  in  whom 
no  reality  is  wanting,  in  no  way  settles  the  question, 
whether  that  Being  does  or  does  not  exist.  For, 
although  my  conception  of  the  possible  real  content  of  a 
thing  may  want  nothing,  it  may  be  only  a conception, 
and  relatively  to  my  whole  state  of  thinking,  this  may 
be  awanting,  that  I have  no  knowledge  whether  the 
object  of  my  conception  is  also  possible  a posteriori. 

And  here  we  come  upon  the  true  source  of  the  difficulty. 
Were  it  an  object  of  sense  that  was  in  question,  we 

should  never  think  of  identifying  the  existence  of  the 

o 


210 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


thing  with  the  mere  conception  of  it.  In  that  case  we  at 
once  see  that  the  conception  of  a thing  signifies  merely 
the  agreement  of  the  object  with  the  universal  conditions 
of  all  possible  empirical  knowledge ; whereas,  by  the 
existence  of  a thing  we  mean  that  the  object  is  thought 
as  contained  in  the  context  of  experience  as  a whole. 

629  The  conception  of  the  object  is  not  in  the  least  enlarged  601 
by  its  connection  with  the  context  of  experience  as  a 
whole,  but  our  thought  is  enriched  by  the  possibility 

of  another  perception.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising 
that,  if  we  try  to  think  existence  simply  by  means  of 
the  pure  category,  we  cannot  mention  a single  mark 
which  distinguishes  existence  from  mere  possibility. 

The  conception  of  a Supreme  Being  is  in  many  re- 
spects a most  valuable  idea,  but,  just  because  it  is 

630  only  an  idea,  it  is  quite  incapable  by  itself  of  extend-  602 
ing  our  knowledge  of  actual  existence.  It  cannot  even 
enable  us  to  say  that  something  may  possibly  exist  apart 
from  the  idea.  Leibnitz  is  therefore  very  far  from  having 
shown  a priori , as  he  fondly  supposed  he  had  shown, 
that  so  sublime  an  ideal  Being  is  even  possible. 

The  labour  and  energy  spent  upon  the  famous  ontolog- 
ical or  Cartesian  proof  from  mere  conceptions  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a Supreme  Being  are  therefore  thrown  away,  and 
a man  has  no  more  chance  of  extending  his  knowledge 
by  means  of  mere  ideas  than  a merchant  can  better  his 
position  by  adding  a few  noughts  to  his  cash  account. 


631  Section  V. — The  Cosmological  Proof . 603 

632  The  cosmological  proof,  like  the  ontological,  affirms  604 
the  connection  of  absolute  necessity  with  the  highest 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


2 I I 


reality ; but,  instead  of  reasoning  from  the  highest  reality 
to  necessity  of  existence,  it  reasons  from  the  uncondi- 
tioned necessity  of  some  being  or  other  as  given  to  the 
unlimited  reality  of  that  being.  It  thus  enters  upon  a line  of 
reasoning  which  at  least  seems  to  be  natural,  whether  it  is 
to  be  called  rational  or  sophistical,  and  which  has  a certain 
persuasive  force  with  the  speculative  not  less  than  with 
the  common  intellect.  This  proof,  which  is  called  by 
Leibnitz  the  argument  a contingentia  mundi , we  shall 
now  state  and  examine. 

It  runs  thus  : — 

If 

anything  exists,  an  absolutely  necessary  Being  exists. 

Now, 

at  least,  I myself  exist. 

Therefore, 

an  absolutely  necessary  Being  exists. 

The  minor  premise  of  this  syllogism  contains  the 
statement  of  a particular  experience ; the  major  premise,  60 
the  inference  from  any  experience  at  all  to  the  existence 
of  something  that  is  necessary.  The  proof  therefore 
properly  starts  from  experience,  and  thus  it  does  not 
proceed  completely  a priori  or  ontologically.  For  that 
reason,  and  also  because  the  object  of  all  possible 
experience  is  called  the  world,  it  is  known  as  the 
cosmological  proof.  And  as  it  makes  abstraction  from 
all  the  special  properties  of  objects  of  experience  which 
make  our  world  different  from  any  other  possible  world, 
this  argument  is  distinguished  also  from  the  physico- 
theological  method  of  proof,  which  reasons  from  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  world  of  sense  as  it  is  presented  to 
our  observation. 


212 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


The  proof  then  goes  on  as  follows.  There  is  only  one 
way  in  which  the  necessary  being  can  be  determined,  or, 
in  other  words,  it  must  have  one  out  of  each  possible 
pair  of  opposite  predicates.  Hence  the  conception  of 
the  necessary  being  must  completely  determine  it.  Now 
there  is  only  a single  conception  possible,  which  com- 
pletely determines  a thing  a priori. , namely,  the  concep- 
tion of  the  ens  realissimum.  Therefore,  the  conception 
4 of  the  absolutely  real  being  is  the  only  one  under  which  606 
a necessary  being  can  be  thought,  that  is,  a Supreme 
Being  necessarily  exists. 

In  this  cosmological  argument  so  many  sophistical 
propositions  are  brought  together,  that  it  seems  as  if 
speculative  reason  had  exhausted  its  dialectical  skill  in 
producing  the  greatest  possible  transcendental  illusion. 

I shall  at  present  simply  mention  in  their  order  the 
sophisms  by  which  an  old  argument  has  been  clothed  in 
a new  form  and  an  appeal  made  to  the  agreement  of  two 
witnesses,  experience  and  reason,  when  in  reality  the 
only  witness  is  pure  reason,  which  assumes  a different 
dress  and  voice,  and  pretends  to  be  a second  witness. 

To  make  quite  sure  of  its  stability  this  proof  takes  its 
stand  upon  experience,  and  therefore  affects  to  be  differ- 
ent from  the  ontological  proof,  which  puts  its  entire  trust 
in  pure  a priori  conceptions.  But  the  only  use  the  cos- 
mological proof  makes  of  experience  is  to  enable  it  to 
make  the  first  step,  and  to  reach  the  conclusion  that 
some  sort  of  necessary  being  exists.  Experience,  how- 
ever, cannot  tell  us  what  may  be  the  nature  of  this 
necessary  being,  and  hence  reason  is  forced  to  make 
a perfectly  new  start,  and  to  seek  by  an  examination 
of  mere  conceptions  to  find  out  what  must  be  the  attri- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


213 


635  butes  of  such  a being  ; in  other  words,  it  asks  which  607 
among  all  possible  things  contains  in  itself  the  conditions 
essential  to  absolute  necessity.  The  required  conditions, 

as  it  comes  to  believe,  are  found  simply  and  solely  in 
the  conception  of  an  absolutely  real  being,  and  accord- 
ingly it  infers  that  this  is  the  absolutely  necessary  being. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  in  this  reasoning  it  is  assumed, 
that  the  conception  of  a being  of  the  highest  reality 
perfectly  coincides  with  the  conception  of  absolute  neces- 
sity of  existence,  and  that  we  can  therefore  reason  from 
the  one  to  the  other.  Now  this  was  also  the  assumption 
of  the  ontological  argument ; so  that  a principle  is  as- 
sumed and  made  the  basis  of  the  cosmological  proof 
which  it  was  the  express  object  of  that  proof  to  avoid 
using.  Absolute  necessity  is  existence  that  follows  from 
mere  conceptions.  If  it  is  said,  that  the  conception  of 
the  ens  realissimum  is  a conception,  and  indeed  the  only 
one,  which  is  appropriate  and  adequate  to  necessary 
existence,  it  must  also  be  admitted,  that  the  one  can 
be  inferred  from  the  other.  Plainly,  therefore,  it  is  the 
ontological  argument  from  mere  conceptions  which  gives 
to  the  so-called  cosmological  proof  all  its  force.  The 
appeal  to  experience  is  quite  idle,  serving  at  the  most  to 
suggest  the  conception  of  absolute  necessity,  but  not  to 
connect  that  conception  with  any  object  in  particular. 

The  moment  we  try  to  effect  the  connection,  we  are 
forced  to  leave  experience  altogether,  and  to  search  among 

636  pure  conceptions  for  one  which  contains  in  itself  the  con-  608 
ditions  of  the  possibility  of  an  absolutely  necessary  Being. 

But  if  in  this  way  we  could  be  sure  that  such  a Being 

is  possible  at  all,  its  existence  would  at  the  same  time  be 
established  ; for  the  argument  amounts  to  this,  that  of  all 


214 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


possible  beings  there  is  only  one  which  carries  with  it 
absolute  necessity  ; in  other  words,  that  there  is  only  one 
Being  which  exists  with  absolute  necessity. 

f>37  The  second  path,  then,  upon  which  speculative  reason  609 
enters  in  its  effort  to  reach  the  existence  of  the  Supreme 
Being,  is  not  only  equally  deceptive  with  the  first,  but  it 
has  the  additional  fault  of  leading  to  an  ignoraiio  elenchi. 

It  undertakes  to  lead  us  by  a new  way,  but  after  a short 
circuit  it  brings  us  back  to  the  very  path  that  it  had 
induced  us  to  abandon. 

I have  said  that  in  this  cosmological  proof  there  lies 
hidden  a whole  nest  of  dialectical  assumptions,  which 
transcendental  criticism  has  no  difficulty  in  detecting  and 
exposing.  I shall  content  myself  with  simply  enumerating 
them,  leaving  it  to  the  reader  who  is  familiar  with  our 
method  to  find  out  for  himself  wherein  their  fallacy  con- 
sists. 

We  find  in  it  (1)  the  transcendental  principle  of  reason- 
ing from  the  contingent  to  its  cause.  This  principle  is 
no  doubt  applicable  within  the  world  of  sense,  but  beyond 
that  world  it  has  no  meaning  whatever.  No  synthetic 
proposition  like  that  of  causality  can  be  derived  from  the 
purely  intellectual  conception  of  the  contingent.  The 
principle  of  causality  has  no  meaning,  and  no  criterion 
for  its  employment,  except  in  relation  to  the  world  of 
sense ; whereas,  in  the  cosmological  argument,  it  is  used 
for  the  very  purpose  of  taking  us  beyond  the  world  of 
sense. 

638  There  is  (2)  the  inference  to  a first  cause  from  the  610 
impossibility  of  an  infinite  series  of  causes  being  pre- 
sented one  after  the  other  in  the  world  of  sense.  This 
is  an  inference  which  reason  does  not  permit  us  to  employ 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


215 


as  a principle  even  within  experience,  much  less  to 
extend  it  beyond  experience,  where  there  is  no  chain  of 
causes  at  all. 

Also  (3)  the  false  self-satisfaction  of  reason  that  the 
series  is  complete  merely  because  all  the  conditions  of 
the  series  have  finally  been  eliminated.  It  is  overlooked 
that  there  can  in  that  case  be  no  necessity,  and  it  is 
simply  assumed  that  the  conception  is  complete  because 
there  is  no  longer  anything  to  serve  as  an  object  of 
conception. 

And  (4)  the  confusion  of  the  logical  possibility  of  the 
conception  of  reality  as  a complete  whole,  a conception 
which  no  doubt  is  self-consistent,  with  the  transcendental 
possibility  of  that  reality.  For  the  latter  there  is  needed 
a principle  that  shows  the  practicability  of  such  a syn- 
thesis, and  a principle  of  that  kind  can  apply  only  to  the 
field  of  possible  experience. 

642  Source  of  the  Dialectical  Illusion  in  all  Transcendental  614 

Proofs. 

Both  of  these  proofs  are  transcendental,  or  attempts  to 
prove  the  existence  of  God  independently  of  empirical 

643  principles.  What,  then,  in  these  transcendental  proofs  is  615 
the  'cause  of  the  dialectical  and  yet  natural  illusion,  by 
which  the  conception  of  necessity  is  connected  with  the 
conception  of  the  highest  reality,  and  by  which  that 
which  is  only  an  idea  is  realized  and  hypostatized  ? 

644  If  I am  forced  to  think  something  to  be  necessary  asa^1^ 
condition  of  the  existence  of  things  in  general,  and  if  yet 

I am  unable  to  think  of  a single  thing  which  is  in  itself 
necessary,  it  inevitably  follows  that  necessity  and  con- 


2l6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


tingency  can  have  no  meaning  as  applied  to  things  them- 
selves. Were  it  otherwise,  a contradiction  would  arise. 
Hence  neither  of  these  two  principles  can  be  objective. 

But  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  subjective 
principles  of  reason,  one  of  which  calls  upon  us  to  seek 
for  something  that  is  necessary  as  a condition  of  all  that 
is  presented  as  existing,  and  to  be  content  with  nothing 
short  of  a complete  a priori  explanation  ; while  the  other 
warns  us  that  we  need  never  hope  to  obtain  a complete 
explanation,  or,  in  other  words,  that  we  must  not  suppose 
anything  empirical  to  be  unconditioned  and  to  admit  of 
no  further  derivation.  Taken  in  this  sense,  the  two 
principles,  as  merely  heuristic  and  regulative , concern 
only  the  formal  interest  of  reason,  and  are  quite  con- 
sistent with  each  other.  The  one  says  that  in  our 
speculations  on  nature  we  should  proceed  as  if  there 
were  a necessary  first  cause  of  all  that  belongs  to  exist- 
ence; for  here  our  object  is  simply  to  bring  our  know- 
ledge to  systematic  unity,  an  object  that  may  be  attained 
if  we  only  keep  before  our  minds  the  idea  of  a supreme 
cause  as  a point  towards  which  we  should  direct  our 
64S  efforts.  The  other  warns  us  not  to  regard  any  single  617 
determination  relating  to  the  existence  of  things  as  an 
ultimate  cause,  that  is,  as  absolutely  necessary,  but  always 
to  view  it  as  conditioned,  and  therefore  to  keep  the  way 
ever  open  for  further  derivation.  But  if  all  that  is  observed 
to  belong  to  things  must  be  viewed  as  only  conditionally 
necessary,  nothing  that  is  presented  to  us  empirically  can 
be  regarded  as  absolutely  necessary. 

From  this  it  follows  that  we  must  conceive  that  which 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  be  outside  of  the  world.  Serving 
simply  as  a principle  for  producing  the  greatest  possible 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


217 


unity  in  phenomena  through  the  idea  of  a supreme  cause, 
it  can  never  be  realized  ui  the  world , because  the  second 
rule  bids  us  look  upon  all  empirical  causes  of  the  unity 
of  phenomena  as  derived. 

647  The  ideal  of  the  Supreme  Being  is  therefore  nothing  6 19 
but  a regulative  principle  of  reason,  telling  us  to  view  all 
connection  in  the  world  as  if  it  proceeded  from  an  all- 
sufficient  necessary  cause.  We  can  base  upon  it  a rule 

for  the  systematic  unity  which  is  necessary  m the  explana- 
tion of  the  world  according  to  universal  laws,  but  it  does 
not  entitle  us  to  assert  that  there  is  an  existence  necessary 
in  itself.  At  the  same  time  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the 
transcendental  subreption  by  which  this  formal  principle 
is  imagined  to  be  constitutive,  and  the  unity  of  the  world 
hypostatized.  It  is  the  same  here  as  with  space.  Space 
is  merely  a principle  of  sensibility,  but  as  it  originally 
makes  possible  all  the  figures  which  are  merely  different 
limitations  of  itself,  it  is  held  to  be  something  absolutely 
necessary  and  self-subsistent,  and  to  be  an  object  given  in 
itself  a priori.  Similarly,  the  systematic  unity  of  nature 
cannot  be  shown  to  be  a principle  of  the  empirical  use  of 
our  reason,  except  in  so  far  as  we  presuppose  the  idea  of 
an  absolutely  real  being  as  the  supreme  cause.  Accord- 
ingly, this  idea  is  supposed  to  be  an  actual  object,  and 
this  object,  because  it  is  the  supreme  condition  of  exist- 

648  ence,  is  regarded  as  necessary.  Thus  a regulative  prin-  620 
ciple  is  changed  into  a constitutive  principle.  That  such 

a substitution  has  actually  been  made  is  evident  from 
this,  that  if  I consider  that  Supreme  Being,  which  rela- 
tively to  the  world  is  absolutely  or  unconditionally 
necessary,  as  a thing  existing  by  itself,  I cannot  conceive 
what  such  necessity  means.  The  conception  of  necessity, 


2lS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


therefore,  is  one  which  lies  in  my  reason  merely  as  a 
formal  condition  of  thought,  not  as  a material  and 
hypostatic  condition  of  existence. 

Section  VI. — The  Physico-theological  Proof. 

If,  then,  neither  the  conception  of  things  in  general, 
nor  the  experience  of  any  existence  in  general. , can  yield 
what  we  require,  it  only  remains  to  try  whether  a 
determinate  experience  of  the  things  that  are  presented 
to  us  in  the  world,  and  of  their  constitution  and  order, 
may  not  enable  us  to  establish  the  existence  of  a 
Supreme  Being.  Such  a proof  we  should  call  the 
physico-theological.  Should  this  also  fail,  no  satisfactory 
proof  can  be  given,  on  the  basis  of  speculative  reason, 
of  the  existence  of  a Being  corresponding  to  our 
transcendental  idea. 

649  After  what  has  already  been  said,  it  is  soon  seen  62  s 
that  an  easy  and  conclusive  answer  to  this  last  problem 
may  be  expected.  For  how  can  any  experience  ever 
be  adequate  to  an  idea?  It  is  just  the  peculiarity  of  an 
idea  of  reason  that  no  experience  can  coincide  with  it. 

The  transcendental  idea  of  a necessary  and  all-sufficient 
Original  Being  is  so  transcendently  great,  and  is  raised 
so  far  above  all  that  is  empirical  and  conditioned,  that  we 
can  never  find  in  experience  material  enough  to  realize  it 
in  its  completeness.  We  are  therefore  forced  to  grope 
about  among  things  conditioned,  seeking  in  vain  for  an 
unconditioned,  of  which  no  law  of  empirical  synthesis 
can  give  us  an  example  or  even  the  least  indication. 

65 1 The  physico-theological  proof  must  always  be  mentioned  623 
with  respect.  It  is  the  oldest  and  simplest  proof  of  all, 
and  never  fails  to  commend  itself  to  the  popular  mind. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


219 


It  imparts  life  to  the  study  of  nature,  as  it  was  itself 
suggested  by  that  study,  and  receives  new  vigour  from  it. 

652  But  although  this  line  of  argument  must  be  admitted  624 
to  be  both  reasonable  and  useful,  it  cannot  be  shown  to 
have  any  claim  to  demonstrative  certainty.  On  the 
contrary,  it  must  be  maintained  that  the  physico-theo- 
logical  argument  in  proof  of  the  existence  of  a Supreme 
Being  cannot  stand  alone,  but  has  to  fall  back  upon  the 
ontological  argument,  which  it  simply  serves  to  introduce, 

in  order  to  make  up  for  its  own  deficiency.  The  ontologi- 
cal is  therefore  the  only  possible  argument. 

653  The  main  steps  in  the  physico-theological  argument  625 
are  these  : (1)  There  are  in  the  world  everywhere  distinct 
marks  of  adaptation  to  a definite  end,  an  adaptation 
which  has  been  carried  out  with  great  wisdom,  and  which 

is  traceable  in  a whole  indescribably  complex  in  content 
as  well  as  unlimited  in  extent.  (2)  This  adaptation  does 
not  at  all  belong  to  the  nature  of  things  that  exist  in  the 
world,  but  is  extraneous  and  accidental.  That  is  to  say, 
different  things  could  not  all  conduce  to  a single  end 
through  such  an  infinite  variety  of  means,  were  they  not 
specially  selected  and  adapted  to  that  end  by  a rational 
principle  acting  from  certain  preconceived  ideas.  (3) 
There  must  therefore  exist  a single  wise  and  sublime 
cause,  or  more  than  one,  and  this  cause  cannot  be  identi- 
fied with  the  blind,  all-powerful  productiveness  of  nature, 
but  must  be  an  intelligent  and  free  cause.  (4)  The  unity 

654  exhibited  in  the  mutual  relation  of  the  parts  of  the  world  626 
is  that  of  a skilfully  constructed  edifice  ; and  hence  the 
unity  of  the  cause  of  the  world  is  certain  so  far  as  our 
observation  extends,  and  by  ail  the  principles  of  analogy 

is  probable  even  beyond  its  range. 


I 


220 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


According  to  this  argument,  the  adaptation  and  harmony  627 
of  so  many  forms  of  nature  proves  contingency  merely  in 
the  form  of  the  world,  but  not  in  its  matter  or  substance. 

To  prove  the  latter,  it  would  be  necessary  to  show  that 
the  things  of  the  world  would  not  be  capable  of  such 
order  and  harmony,  if  they  were  not  in  their  substance  the 
product  of  supreme  wisdom.  But  to  prove  this,  we 
should  have  to  take  a totally  different  line  of  argument 
from  that  which  appeals  to  the  analogy  of  human  art. 

All  that  the  argument  from  design  can  possibly  prove  is 
an  architect  of  the  world,  who  is  very  much  limited  by  the 
adaptability  of  the  material  in  which  he  works  : it  cannot 
prove  a creator  of  the  world,  to  whose  idea  everything  is 
subject.  The  argument  is  therefore  very  far  from  being 
sufficient  to  prove  what  it  set  out  to  prove,  namely,  the 
existence  of  an  all-sufficient  Original  Being.  To  establish 
the  contingency  of  matter  itself,  we  would  need  to  have 
recourse  to  a transcendental  argument,  and  this  is  the 
very  thing  which,  in  the  argument  from  design,  we  have 
been  trying  to  avoid. 

The  physico-theological  argument  therefore  reasons 
from  the  contingent  character  of  the  order  and  adaptation 
everywhere  observable  in  the  world  to  the  existence  of  a 
cause  adequate  to  its  production.  But  as  this  cause  must 
be  conceived  as  something  perfectly  definite , it  can  only 
be  the  conception  of  a Being  who  possesses  all  power, 
wisdom,  etc.,  in  a word,  all  that  perfection  which  is 
characteristic  of  an  all-sufhcient  Being. 

Now,  I think  no  one  will  be  bold  enough  to  say  that  he  628 
can  tell  how  the  greatness  of  the  world  which  is  presented 
for  his  observation  is  related,  either  in  content  or  extent, 
to  omnipotence  3 how  the  order  of  the  world  is  related  to 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC. 


221 


supreme  wisdom,  and  the  unity  of  the  world  to  the 
absolute  unity  of  its  Author.  Hence  the  physico-theo- 
logical  argument  cannot  give  us  a definite  conception  of 
the  Supreme  Cause  of  the  world,  and  is  therefore  insuffi- 
cient as  the  principle  of  a theology,  which  is  itself  to  serve 
as  the  basis  of  religion. 

657  The  truth  is  that,  when  it  has  led  us  to  the  point  of  629 
admiring  the  greatness  of  the  wisdom,  power,  etc.,  of  the 
Author  of  the  world,  the  argument  from  experience 
cannot  take  us  any  further.  Accordingly,  we  abandon  it 
altogether,  and  go  on  to  reason  from  the  contingency 
which  we  had  inferred  at  the  very  beginning  from  the 
order  and  design  of  the  world.  From  this  contingency 

we  advance, by  means  solely  of  transcendental  conceptions, 
to  the  existence  of  something  absolutely  necessary. 
And,  finally,  from  the  conception  of  the  absolute  necessity 
of  the  first  cause,  we  proceed  to  the  thoroughly  deter- 
mined or  determining  conception  of  that  cause,  that  is, 
to  an  all-comprehensive  reality.  Thus  the  physico-theo- 
logical  proof,  foiled  in  its  attempt  to  prove  the  existence 
of  a Supreme  Being,  suddenly  falls  back  upon  the  cosmo- 
logical proof ; and  as  the  cosmological  is  simply  the 
ontological  proof  in  disguise,  the  argument  from  design 
really  fulfils  its  aim  by  means  of  pure  reason  only, 
although  it  began  by  disclaiming  all  connection  with  pure 
reason,  and  professed  to  make  use  of  nothing  that  was 
not  clearly  proved  by  experience. 

658  The  physico-theological  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  630 
Original  or  Supreme  Being,  therefore,  rests  upon  the 
cosmological  proof,  and  the  cosmological  upon  the  onto- 
logical. And  as  no  other  path  is  open  to  speculative 
reason  but  these  three,  the  ontological  proof  from  pure 


222 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


conceptions  of  reason  is  the  only  one  possible,  even  if  we 
admit  that  any  proof  of  a proposition,  which  goes  so  far 
beyond  understanding  as  employed  in  experience,  is 
possible  at  all. 

659  Section  VII. — Criticism  of  all  Speculative  Theology.  631 

667  Reason  in  its  purely  speculative  use  is  quite  incapable  639 
of  proving  the  existence  of  a Supreme  Being.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  of  very  great  value  in  this  way,  that  it 
is  able  to  correct  our  knowledge  of  that  Being,  should  it  640 
be  possible  to  obtain  a knowledge  of  it  in  any  other  way, 
to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  itself  and  with  all  the  aims 
of  our  intelligence,  and  to  purify  it  of  all  that  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  conception  of  an  Original  Being,  and  of 
all  admixture  of  empirical  limitations. 

*669  The  Supreme  Being  is  for  purely  speculative  reason  a 641 
mere  ideal,  but  still  a perfectly  faultless  ideal,  which 
completes  and  crowns  the  whole  of  human  knowledge. 

And  if  it  should  turn  out  that  there  is  a moral  theology, 
which  is  able  to  supply  what  is  deficient  in  speculative 
theology,  we  should  then  find  that  transcendental 
theology  is  no  longer  merely  problematic,  but  is  indis- 
pensable in  the  determination  of  the  conception  of  a 
Supreme  Being,  and  in  the  continual  criticism  of  reason, 
which  is  so  often  deluded  by  sense  and  is  not  always  in 
harmony  even  with  its  own  ideas.  Necessity,  infinity, 
unity,  existence  apart  from  the  world  (not  as  a soul  of 
the  world),  eternity  as  free  from  conditions  of  time, 

670  omnipresence  as  unaffected  by  conditions  of  space,  etc.,  642 
are  purely  transcendental  predicates,  the  purified  concep- 
tion of  which,  essential  as  it  is  to  every  theology,  can  be 
derived  only  from  a transcendental  theology. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


225 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 

241  Section  I.  — Transitio7i  from  ordinary  Moral  Conceptions  to 

the  Philosophical  Conception  of  Morality. 
Nothing  in  the  whole  world,  or  even  outside  of  the 
world,  can  possibly  be  regarded  as  good  without  limita- 
tion except  a good  will.  No  doubt  it  is  a good  and 
desirable  thing  to  have  intelligence,  sagacity,  judg- 
ment, and  other  intellectual  gifts,  by  whatever  name  they 
may  be  called;  it  is  also  good  and  desirable  in  many 
respects  to  possess  by  nature  such  qualities  as  courage, 
resolution,  and  perseverance ; but  all  these  gifts  of 
nature  may  be  in  the  highest  degree  pernicious  and 
hurtful,  if  the  will  which  directs  them,  or  what  is  called 
the  character,  is  not  itself  good.  The  same  thing  applies 
to  gifts  of  fortujie.  Power,  wealth,  honour,  even  good 

health,  and  that  general  well-being  and  contentment  with 
one’s  lot  which  we  call  happiness,  give  rise  to  pride  and 
not  infrequently  to  insolence,  if  a man’s  will  is  not  good  ; 
nor  can  a reflective  and  impartial  spectator  ever  look 
with  satisfaction  upon  the  unbroken  prosperity  of  a man 
who  is  destitute  of  the  ornament  of  a pure  and  good  will. 
A good  will  would  therefore  seem  to  be  the  indispensable 
condition  without  which  no  one  is  even  worthy  to  be 
happy. 

242  A man’s  will  is  good,  not  because  the  consequences 
which  flow  from  it  are  good,  nor  because  it  is  capable  of 


226 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


attaining  the  end  which  it  seeks,  but  it  is  good  in  itself, 
or  because  it  wills  the  good.  By  a good  will  is  not 
meant  mere  well-wishing ; it  consists  in  a resolute 
employment  of  all  the  means  within  one’s  reach,  and 
its  intrinsic  value  is  in  no  way  increased  by  sucgess-or 
lessened  by  failure. 

This  idea  of  the  absolute  value  of  mere  will  seems  so 
extraordinary  that,  although  it  is  endorsed  even  by  the 
popular  judgment,  we  must  subject  it  to  careful  scrutiny. 

243  If  nature  had  meant  to  provide  simply  for  the  mainten- 
ance, the  well-being,  in  a word  the  happiness,  of  beings 
which  have  reason  and  will,  it  must  be  confessed  that,  in 
making  use  of  their  reason,  it  has  hit  upon  a very  poor 
way  of  attaining  its  end.  As  a matter  of  fact  the  very 
worst  way  a man  of  refinement  and  culture  can  take  to 
secure  enjoyment  and  happiness  is  to  make  use  of  his 
reason  for  that  purpose.  Hence  there  is  apt  to  arise  in 
his  mind  a certain  degree  of  misology,  or  hatred  of  reason. 
Finding  that  the  arts  which  minister  to  luxury,  and  even 
the  sciences,  instead  of  bringing  him  happiness,  only  lay 
a heavier  yoke  on  his  neck,  he  at  length  comes  to  envy, 
rather  than  to  despise,  men  of  less  refinement,  who  follow 
more  closely  the  promptings  of  their  natural  impulses, 

244  and  pay  little  heed  to  what  reason  tells  them  to  do  or  to 
leave  undone.  It  must  at  least  be  admitted,  that  one 
may  deny  reason  to  have  much  or  indeed  any  value  in 
the  production  of  happiness  and  contentment,  without 
taking  a morose  or  ungrateful  view  of  the  goodness  with 
which  the  world  is  governed.  Such  a judgment  really 
means  that  life  has  another  and  a much  nobler  end  than 
happiness,  and  that  the  true  vocation  of  reason  is  to 
secure  that  end. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


227 


The  true  object  of  reason  then,  in  so  far  as  it  is  prac- 
tical, or  capable  of  influencing  the  will,  must  be  to 
produce  a will  which  is  good  in  itself,  and  not  merely 
good  as  a means  to  something  else.  This  will  is  not  the 
only  or  the  whole  good,  but  it  is  the  highest  good,  and 
the  condition  of  all  other  good,  even  of  the  desire  for 
happiness  itself.  It  is  therefore  not  inconsistent  with  the 
wisdom  of  nature  that  the  cultivation  of  reason  which  is 
essential  to  the  furtherance  of  its  first  and  unconditioned 
object,  the  production  of  a good  will,  should,  in  this  life 
at  least,  in  many  ways  limit,  or  even  make  impossible, 
the  attainment  of  happiness,  which  is  its  second  and 
conditioned  object. 

To  bring  to  clear  consciousness  the  conception  of  a 
245  will  which  is  good  in  itself,  a conception  already  familiar 
to  the  popular  mind,  let  us  examine  the  conception  of 
duty,  which  involves  the  idea  of  a good  will  as  manifested 
under  certain  subjective  limitations  and  hindrances. 

I pass  over  actions  which  are  admittedly  violations  of 
duty,  for  these,  however  useful  they  may  be  in  the  attain- 
ment of  this  or  that  end,  manifestly  do  not  proceed  from 
duty.  I set  aside  also  those  actions  which  are  not 
actually  inconsistent  with  duty,  but  which  yet  are  done 
under  the  impulse  of  some  natural  inclination,  although 
not  a direct  inclination  to  do  these  particular  _ actions ; 
for  in  these  it  is  easy  to  determine  whether  the  action 
that  is  consistent  with  duty,  is  done  from  duty  or  with 
some  selfish  object  in  view.  There  remains  the  only 
really  difficult  case,  that  in  which  we  have  a direct  in- 
clination to  do  a certain  action,  which  is  itself  in  con- 
formity with  duty.  The  preservation  of  one’s  own  life, 
for  instance,  is  a duty ; but,  as  everyone  has  a natural 


228 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


inclination  to  preserve  his  life,  the  anxious  care  which 
most  men  usually  devote  to  this  object,  has  no  intrinsic 
value,  nor  the  maxim  from  which  they  act  any  moral 
import.  They  preserve  their  life  in  accordance  with  duty, 
but  not  bccatise  of  dxXy.  But,  suppose  adversity  and  hope- 

246  less  sorrow  to  have  taken  away  all  desire  for  life  ; suppose 
that  the  wretched  man  would  welcome  death  as  a release, 
and  yet  takes  means  to  prolong  his  life  simply  from  a sense 
of  duty ; then  his  maxim  has  a genuine  moral  import. 

247  But,  secondly,  an  action  that  is  done  from  duty  gets  its 
moral  value,  not  from  the  object  which  it  is  intended  to 
secure,  but  from  the  maxim  by  which  it  is  determined. 
Accordingly,  the  action  has  the  same  moral  value 
whether  the  object  is  attained  or  not,  if  only  the 
principle  by  which  the  will  is  determined  to  act  is 

248  independent  of  every  object  of  sensuous  desire.  What 
was  said  above  makes  it  clear,  that  it  is  not  the  object 
aimed  at,  or,  in  other  words,  the  consequences  which  flow 
from  an  action  when  these  are  made  the  end  and  motive 
of  the  will,  that  can  give  to  the  action  an  unconditioned 
and  moral  value.  In  what,  then,  can  the  moral  value  of 
an  action  consist,  if  it  does  not  lie  in  the  will  itself,  as 
directed  to  the  attainment  of  a certain  object  ? It  can 
lie  only  in  the  principle  of  the  will,  no  matter  whether 
the  object  sought  can  be  attained  by  the  action  or  not. 
For  the  will  stands  as  it  were  at  the  parting  of  the  ways, 
between  its  a priori  principle,  which  is  formal,  and  its 
a posteriori  material  motive.  As  so  standing  it  must  be 
determined  by  something,  and,  as  no  action  wrhich  is 
done  from  duty  can  be  determined  by  a material  prin- 
ciple, it  can  be  determined  only  by  the  formal  principle  of 
all  volition. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


229 


From  the  two  propositions  just  set  forth  a third 
directly  follows,  which  may  be  thus  stated  : Duty  is  the 
obligation  to  act  from  reverence  for  la7c>.  Now,  I may 
have  a natural  inclination  for  the  object  that  I expect  to 
follow  from  my  action,  but  I can  never  have  reverence  for 
that  which  is  not  a spontaneous  activity  of  my  will,  but 
merely  an  effect  of  it ; neither  can  I have  reverence  for 
any  natural  inclination,  whether  it  is  my  own  or  another’s. 
If  it  is  my  own,  I can  at  most  only  approve  of  it ; if  it  is 
manifested  by  another,  I may  regard  it  as  conducive  to 
my  own  interest,  and  hence  I may  in  certain  cases  even 
be  said  to  have  a love  for  it.  But  the  only  thing  which  I 
can  reverence  or  which  can  lay  me  under  an  obligation 
to  act,  is  the  law  which  is  connected  with  my  will,  not  as  a 
consequence,  but  as  a principle ; a principle  which  is  not 
dependent  upon  natural  inclination,  but  overmasters  it, 
or  at  least  allows  it  to  have  no  influence  whatever  in 
determining  my  course  of  action.  Now  if  an  action  which 
is  done  out  of  regard  for  duty  sets  entirely  aside  the 
influence  of  natural  inclination  and  along  with  it 
every  object  of  the  will,  nothing  else  is  left  by  which 
the  will  can  be  determined  but  objectively  the  law 
itself,  and  subjectively  pure  revere?ice  for  the  law  as  a 
principle  of  action.  Thus  there  arises  the  maxim,  to 
obey  the  moral  law  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  all  my  natural 
inclinations. 

249  The  supreme  good  which  we  call  moral  can  therefore 
be  nothing  but  the  idea  of  the  law  in  itself,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  this  idea  which  determines  the  will,  and  not  any  con- 
sequences that  are  expected  to  follow.  Only  a rational 
being  can  have  such  an  idea,  and  hence  a man  who  acts 
from  the  idea  of  the  law  is  already  morally  good,  no 


23° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


matter  whether  the  consequences  which  he  expects  from  ' 
his  action  follow  or  not. 

Now  what  must  be  the  nature  of  a law,  the  idea  of 

250  which  is  to  determine  the  will,  even  apart  from  the  effects 
expected  to  follow,  and  which  is  therefore  itself  entitled 
to  be  called  good  absolutely  and  without  qualification  ? 
As  the  will  must  not  be  moved  to  act  from  any  desire  for 
the  results  expected  to  follow  from  obedience  to  a certain 
law,  the  only  principle  of  the  will  which  remains  is  that 
of  the  conformity  of  actions  to  universal  law.  In  all 
cases  I must  act  in  such  a way  that  / can  at  the  same- 
time  will  that  my  maxim  should  become  a universal  law. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  conformity  to  law  pure  and 
simple  ; and  this  is  the  principle  which  serves,  and  must 
serve,  to  determine  the  will,  if  the  idea  of  duty  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  empty  and  chimerical.  As  a matter  of 
fact  the  judgments  which  we  are  wont  to  pass  upon 
conduct  perfectly  agree  with  this  principle,  and  in  making 
them  we  always  have  it  before  our  eyes. 

May  I,  for  instance,  under  the  pressure  of  circum- 
stances, make  a promise  which  I have  no  intention  of 
keeping  ? The  question  is  not,  whether  it  is  prudent  to 
make  a false  promise,  but  whether  it  is  morally  right. 

251  To  enable  me  to  answer  this  question  shortly  and  con- 
clusively, the  best  way  is  for  me  to  ask  myself  whether 
it  would  satisfy  me  that  the  maxim  to  extricate  myself 
from  embarrassment  by  giving  a false  promise  should 
have  the  force  of  a universal  law,  applying  to  others  as. 
well  as  to  myself.  And  I see  at  once,  that,  while  I can 
certainly  will  the  lie,  I cannot  will  that  lying  should  be  a. 
universal  law.  If  lying  were  universal,  there  would,, 
properly  speaking,  be  no  promises  whatever.  I might 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


say  that  I intended  to  do  a certain  thing  at  some  future 
time,  but  nobody  would  believe  me,  or  if  he  did  at  the 
moment  trust  to  my  promise,  he  would  afterwards  pay 
me  back  in  my  own  coin.  My  maxim  thus  proves 
itself  to  be  self-destructive,  so  soon  as  it  is  taken  as  a 
universal  law. 

253  'Prrty/therp—Gonsists  in  the  obligation  to_actj£Qm  pure 
-reverence  for-the-rnoial  law.  To  this  motive_a.il  others 
must-give-way,  for  it  is  the  ^condition— of"  a will  which 
is^g-ood—f itself,  and  which  has  a value  with  which 
nothing  else  is  comparable. 

There  is,  however,  in  man  a strong  feeling  of  antagon- 
ism to  the  commands  of  duty,  although  his  reason  tells 
him  that  those  commands  are  worthy  of  the  highest 
reverence.  For  man..not-only  possesses  reason,  but  he 
has-certain.  natural  wants  and  inclinations,  the  complete 
satisfaction  of  which  he  calls  happiness.  These  natural 
inclinatrons^clamorously  demand  to  have  their  seemingly 
reasonable  claims  respected ; but  reason  issues  its 
commands  inflexibly,  refusing  to  promise  anything  to  the 
natural  desires,  and  treating  their  claims  with  a sort  of 
neglect  and  contempt.  From  this  there  arises  a natural 
dialectic,  that  is,  a disposition  to  explain  away  the  strict 
laws  of  duty,  to  cast  doubt  upon  their  validity,  or  at 
least,  upon  their  purity  and  stringency,  and  in  this  way 
to  make  them  yield  to  the  demands  of  the  natural 
inclinations. 

Thus  men  are  forced  to  go  beyond  the  narrow  circle 
of  ideas  within  which  their  reason  ordinarily  moves,  and 
to  take  a step  into  the  field  of  moral  philosophy,  not 
indeed  from  any  perception  of  speculative  difficulties,  but 
simply  on  practical  grounds.  The  practical  reason  of 


232 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


men  cannot  be  long  exercised  any  more  than  the 
theoretical,  without  falling  insensibly  into  a dialectic, 
which  compels  it  to  call  in  the  aid  of  philosophy  • and  in 
the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  rest  can  be  found  only  in  a 
thorough  criticism  of  human  reason. 

254  Section  II.  — Transition  from  Popular  Moral  Philosophy 

to  the  Metaphysic  of  Morality. 

So  far,  we  have  drawn  our  conception  of  duty  from  the 
manner  in  which  men  employ  it  in  the  ordinary  exer- 
cise of  their  practical  reason.  The  conception  of  duty, 
however,  we  must  not  suppose  to  be  therefore  derived  from 
experience.  On  the  contrary,  we  hear  frequent  com- 
plaints, the  justice  of  which  we  cannot  but  admit,  that  no 
one  can  point  to  a single  instance  in  which  an  action  has 
undoubtedly  been  done  purely  from  a regard  for  duty ; 
that  there  are  certainly  many  actions  which  are  not 
opposed  to  duty,  but  none  which  are  indisputably  done 

255  from  duty  and  therefore  have  a moral  value.  Nothing 
indeed  can  secure  us  against  the  complete  loss  of  our 
ideas  of  duty,  and  maintain  in  the  soul  a well-grounded 
respect  for  the  moral  law,  but  the  clear  conviction,  that 
reason  issues  its  commands  on  its  own  authority,  without 

256  caring  in  the  least  whether  the  actions  of  men  have,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  been  done  purely  from  ideas  of  duty. 
For  reason  commands  inflexibly  that  certain  actions 
should  be  done,  which  perhaps  never  have  been  done  ; 
actions,  the  very  possibility  of  which  may  seem  doubtful 
to  one  who  bases  everything  upon  experience.  Perfect 
disinterestedness  in  friendship,  for  instance,  is  demanded 
of  every  man,  although  there  may  never  have  been  a 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


233 


sincere  friend ; for  pure  friendship  is  bound  up  with  the 
idea  of  duty  as  duty,  and  belongs  to  the  very  idea  of 
a reason  which  determines  the  will  on  a priori  grounds, 
prior  to  all  experience. 

It  is,  moreover,  beyond  dispute,  that  unless  we  are 
to  deny  to  morality  all  truth  and  all  reference  to  a 
possible  object,  the  moral  law  has  so  wide  an  application 
that  it  is  binding,  not  merely  upon  man,  but  upon  all 
rational  beings,  and  not  merely  under  certain  contingent 
conditions,  and  with  certain  limitations,  but  absolutely 
and  necessarily.  And  it  is  plain,  that  no  experience 
could  ever  lead  us  to  suppose  that  laws  of  this  apodictic 
character  are  even  possible. 

257  There  is,  therefore,  no  genuine  supreme  principle  of 
morality,  which  is  not  independent  of  all  experience,  and 
based  entirely  upon  pure  reason.  If,  then,  we  are  to 
have  a philosophy  of  morality  at  all,  as  distinguished  from 
a popular  moral  philosophy,  we  may  take  it  for  granted 
without  further  investigation,  that  moral  conceptions, 
together  with  the  principles  which  flow  from  them,  are 
given  a priori  and  must  be  presented  in  their  generality 
(in  abstracto). 

258  Such  a metaphysic  of  morality,  which  must  be  entirely 
free  from  all  admixture  of  empirical  psychology,  theology, 
physics  and  hyperphysics,  and  above  all  from  all  occult 
or,  as  we  may  call  them,  hypophysical  qualities,  is  not 
only  indispensable  as  a foundation  for  a sound  theory  of 
duties,  but  it  is  also  of  the  highest  importance  in  the 
practical  realization  of  moral  precepts.  For  the  pure 
idea  of  duty,  unmixed  with  any  foreign  ingredient  of 
sensuous  desire,  in  a word,  the  idea  of  the  moral  law, 

259  influences  the  heart  of  man  much  more  powerfully 


234 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


through  his  reason,  which  in  this  way  only  becomes 
conscious  that  it  can  of  itself  be  practical,  than  do 
all  the  motives  which  have  their  source  in  experience. 
Conscious  of  its  own  dignity,  the  moral  law  treats  all 
sensuous  desires  with  contempt,  and  is  able  to  master 
them  one  by  one. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  evident,  that  all  moral 
conceptions  have  their  seat  and  origin  in  reason  entirely 
a priori,  and  are  apprehended  by  the  ordinary  reason  of 
men  as  well  as  by  reason  in  its  purely  speculative  activity. 
We  have  also  seen  that  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance, 
not  only  in  the  construction  by  speculative  reason  of  a 
theory  of  morality,  but  also  with  a view  to  the  practical 
conduct  of  life,  to  derive  the  conceptions  and  laws  of 
morality  from  pure  reason,  to  present  them  pure  and 
unmixed,  and  to  mark  out  the  sphere  of  this  whole 
practical  or  pure  knowledge  of  reason.  Nor  is  it  per- 
missible, in  seeking  to  determine  the  whole  faculty  of 
260  pure  practical  reason,  to  make  its  principles  dependent 
upon  the  peculiar  nature  of  human  reason,  as  we  were 
allowed  to  do,  and  sometimes  were  even  forced  to  do,  in 
speculative  philosophy ; for  moral  laws  must  apply  to 
every  rational  being,  and  must  therefore  be  derived  from 
the  very  conception  of  a rational  being  as  such. 

To  show  the  need  of  advancing  not  only  from  the 
common  moral  judgments  of  men  to  the  philosophical, 
but  from  a popular  philosophy,  which  merely  gropes  its 
way  by  the  help  of  examples,  to  a metaphysic  of  morality, 
we  must  begin  at-  the  point  where  the  practical  faculty  of 
reason  supplies  general  rules  of  action,  and  exhibit  clearly 
the  steps  by  which  it  attains  to  the  conception  of  duty. 

Everything  in  nature  acts  in  conformity  with  law. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


235 


Only  a rational  being  has  the  faculty  of  acting  in  con- 
formity with  the  idea  of  law,  or  from  principles;  only  a 
rational  being,  in  other  words,  has  a will.  And  as 
without  reason  actions  cannot  proceed  from  laws,  will  is 
simply  practical  reason.  If  the  will  is  infallibly  deter- 
mined by  reason,  the  actions  of  a rational  being  are 
subjectively  as  well  as  objectively  necessary;  that  is,  will 
must  be  regarded  as  a faculty  of  choosing  that  only  which 
reason,  independently  of  natural  inclination,  declares  to 
be  practically  necessary  or  good.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  will  is  not  invariably  determined  by  reason  alone,  but  is 
61  subject  to  certain  subjective  conditions  or  motives,  which 
are  not  always  in  harmony  with  the  objective  conditions; 
if  the  will,  as  actually  is  the  case  with  man,  is  not  in 
perfect  conformity  with  reason  ; actions  which  are  recog- 
nized to  be  objectively  necessary,  are  subjectively  con- 
tingent. The  determination  of  such  a will  according  to 
objective  laws  is  therefore  called^ obligatimL.  That  is  to 
say,  if  the  will  of  a rational  being  is  not  absolutely  good, 
we  conceive  of  it  as  capable  of  being  determined  by 
objective  laws  of  reason,  but  not  as  by  its  very  nature 
necessarily  obeying  them. 

The  idea  that  a certain  principle  is  objective,  and 
binding  upon  the  will,  is  a command  of  reason,  and  the 
statement  of  the  command  in  a formula  is  an  unperative. 

All  imperatives  are  expressed  by  the  word  ought , to 
indicate  that  the  will  upon  which  they  are  binding  is  not 
by  its  subjective  constitution  necessarily  determined  in 
conformity  with  the  objective  law  of  reason.  An  impera- 
tive says,  that  the  doing,  or  leaving  undone  of  a certain 
thing  would  be  good,  but  it  addresses  a will  which  does 
not  always  do  a thing  simply  because  it  is  good.  Now, 


236 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


that  is  practically  good  which  determines  the  will  by  ideas 
of  reason,  in  other  words,  that  which  determines  it,  not 
by  subjective  influences,  but  by  principles  which  are 
objective,  or  apply  to  all  rational  beings  as  such.  ___ Good^ 
and  pleasure  are  quite  distinct.  Pleasure  results  from  the 
influence  of  purely  subjective  causes  upon  the  will  of  the 
subject,  and  these  vary  with  the  susceptibility  of  this  or 
that  individual,  while  a principle  of  reason  is  valid  for  all. 

A perfectly  good  will  would,  like  the  will  of  man,  stand 
under  objective  laws,  laws  of  the  good,  but  it  could  not 
262  be  said  to  be  under  an  obligation  to  act  in  conformity  with 
those  laws.  Such  a will  by  its  subjective  constitution 
could  be  determined  only  by  the  idea  of  the  good.  In 
reference  to  the  Divine  will,  or  any  other  holy  will, 
imperatives  have  no  meaning ; for  here  the  will  is  by  its 
very  nature  necessarily  in  harmony  with  the  law,  and 
therefore  ought  has  no  application  to  it.  ['Imperatives 
are  formulae,  which  express  merely  the  relation  of  objec- 
tive laws  of  volition  in  general  to  the  imperfect  will  of 
this  or  that  rational  being,  as  for  instance,  the  will  of 
man./ 

Now,  all  imperatives  command  either  hypothetically  or 
categorically.  A hypothetical  imperative  states  that  a 
certain  thing  must  be  done,  if  something  else  which  is 
willed,  or  at  least  might  be  willed,  is  to  be  attained. 
The  categorical  imperative  declares  that  an  act  is  in  itself 
or  objectively  necessary,  without  any  reference  to  another 
end. 

Every  practical  law  represents  a possible  action  as 
good,  and  therefore  as  obligatory  for  a subject  that  is 
capable  of  being  determined  to  act  by  reason.  Hence 
all  imperatives  are  formulae  for  the  determination  of  an 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


237 


action  which  is  obligatory  according  to  the  principle  of  a 
will  that  is  in  some  sense  good.  If  the  action  is  good 
only  because  it  is  a means  to  something  else,  the  impera- 
tive is  hypothetical;  if  the  action  is  conceived  to  be  good 
in  itself,  the  imperative,  as  the  necessary  principle  of  a 
will  that  in  itself  conforms  to  reason,  is  categorical. 

An  imperative,  then,  states  what  possible  action  of 
mine  would  be  good.  It  supplies  the  practical  rule  for  a 
will  which  does  not  at  once  do  an  act  simply  because  it 
is  good,  either  because  the  subject  does  not  know  it  to  be 
good,  or  because,  knowing  it  to  be  good,  he  is  influenced 
by  maxims  which  are  opposed  to  the  objective  principles 
of  a practical  reason. 

The  hypothetical  imperative  says  only  that  an  action 
263  is  good  relatively  to  a certain  possible  end  or  to  a certain 
actual  end.  In  the  former  case  it  is  problematic,  in  the 
latter  case  assertoric.  The  categorical  imperative,  which 
affirms  that  an  action  is  in  itself  or  objectively  necessary 
without  regard  to  an  end,  that  is,  without  regard  to  any 
other  end  than  itself,  is  an  apodidic  practical  principle. 

Whatever  is  within  the  power  of  a rational  being  may 
be  conceived  to  be  capable  of  being  willed  by  some 
rational  being,  and  hence  the  principles  which  determine 
what  actions  are  necessary  in  the  attainment  of  certain 
possible  ends,  are  infinite  in  number. 

Yet  there  is  one  thing  which  we  may  assume  that  all 
finite  rational  beings  actually  make  their  end,  and  there 
is  therefore  one  object  which  may  safely  be  regarded, 
not  simply  as  something  that  they  may  seek,  but  as 
something  that  by  a necessity  of  their  nature  they  actually 
do  seek.  This  object  is  happiness.  The  hypothetical 
imperative,  which  affirms  the  practical  necessity  of  an 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


238 

264  action  as  the  means  of  attaining  happiness,  is  assertoric. 
We  must  not  think  of  happiness  as  simply  a possible  and 
problematic  end,  but  as  an  end  that  we  may  with  confi- 
dence presuppose  a priori  to  be  sought  by  everyone, 
belonging  as  it  does  to  the  very  nature  of  man.  Now 
skill  in  the  choice  of  means  to  his  own  greatest  well-being 
may  be  called  prudence , taking  the  word  in  its  more 
restricted  sense.  An  imperative,  therefore,  which  relates 
merely  to  the  choice  of  means  to  one’s  own  happiness, 
that  is,  a maxim  of  prudence,  must  be  hypothetical ; it 
commands  an  action,  not  absolutely,  but  only  as  a means 
to  another  end. 

Lastly,  there  is  an  imperative  which  directly  commands 
an  action,  without  presupposing  as  its  condition  that 
some  other  end  is  to  be  attained  by  means  of  that  action. 
This  imperative  is  categorical.  It  has  to  do,  not  with  the 
matter  of  an  action  and  the  result  expected  to  follow  from 
it,  but  simply  with  the  form  and  principle  from  which  the 
action  itself  proceeds.  The  action  is  essentially  good  if 
the  motive  of  the  agent  is  good,  let  the  consequences  be 
what  they  may.  This  imperative  may  be  called  the  im- 
perative of  morality. 

265  How  are  all  these  imperatives  possible?  The  question 
is  not,  How  is  an  action  which  an  imperative  commands 
actually  realized  ? but,  How  can  we  think  of  the  will  as 
placed  under  obligation  by  each  of  those  imperatives? 
Very  little  need  be  said  to  show  how  an  imperative  of  skill 
is  possible.  He  who  wills  the  end,  wills  also  the  means  in 
his  power  which  are  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  the 
end.  Looking  simply  at  the  act  of  will,  we  must  say  that 
this  proposition  is  analytic.  If  a certain  object  is  to 
follow  as  an  effect  from  my  volition,  my  causality  must  be 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


239 


conceived  as  active  in  the  production  of  the  effect,  or  as 
employing  the  means  by  which  the  effect  will  take  place. 
The  imperative,  therefore,  simply  states  that  in  the  con- 
ception of  the  willing  of  this  end  there  is  directly 
implied  the  conception  of  actions  necessary  to  this 
end.  No  doubt  certain  synthetic  propositions  are 
required  to  determine  the  particular  means  by  which 
a given  end  may  be  attained,  but  these  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  principle  or  act  of  the  will,  but 
merely  state  how  the  object  may  actually  be  realized. 

Were  it  as  easy  to  give  a definite  conception  of  happi- 

266  ness  as  of  a particular  end,  the  imperatives  of  prudence 
would  be  of  exactly  the  same  nature  as  the  imperatives  of 
skill,  and  would  therefore  be  analytic.  For,  we  should  be 
able  to  say,  that  he  who  wills  the  end  wills  also  the  only 
means  in  his  power  for  the  attainment  of  the  end.  But, 
unfortunately,  the  conception  of  happiness  is  so  indefinite, 
that,  although  every  man  desires  to  obtain  it,  he  is  unable 
to  give  a definite  and  self-consistent  statement  of  what  he 
actually  desires  and  wills.  The  truth  is,  that,  strictly  speak- 
ing, the  imperatives  of  prudence  are  not  commands  at  all. 
They  do  not  say  that  actions  are  objective  or  necessary , 
and  hence  they  must  be  regarded  as  counsels  ( consilia ),  not 

267  as  commands  ( praecepta ) of  reason.  Still,  the  impera- 
tive of  prudence  would  be  an  analytic  proposition,  if  the 
means  to  happiness  could  only  be  known  with  certainty. 
For  the  only  difference  in  the  two  cases  is  that  in  the  im- 
perative of  skill  the  end  is  merely  possible,  in  the  impera- 
tive of  prudence  it  is  actually  given  ; and  as  in  both  all 
that  is  commanded  is  the  means  to  an  end  which  is 
assumed  to  be  willed,  the  imperative  which  commands 
that  he  who  wills  the  end  should  also  will  the  means,  is  in 


240 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


both  cases  analytic.  There  is  therefore  no  real  difficulty 
in  seeing  hovv  an  imperative  of  prudence  is  possible. 

The  only  question  which  is  difficult  of  solution,  is, 
how  the  imperative  of  morality  is  possible.  Here  the  im- 
perative is  not  hypothetical,  and  hence  we  cannot  derive 
its  objective  necessity  from  any  presupposition.  Nor 
must  it  for  a moment  be  forgotten,  that  an  imperative  of 
this  sort  cannot  be  established  by  instances  taken  from 
experience.  We  must  therefore  find  out  by  careful  in- 
vestigation, whether  imperatives  which  seem  to  be  cate- 
gorical may  not  be  simply  hypothetical  imperatives  in 
disguise. 

268  One  thing  is  plain  at  the  very  outset,  namely,  that  only 
a categorical  imperative  can  have  the  dignity  of  a practical 
law , and  that  the  other  imperatives,  while  they  may  no 
doubt  be  called  principles  of  the  will,  cannot  be  called 
laws.  An  action  which  is  necessary  merely  as  a means  to 
an  arbitrary  end,  may  be  regarded  as  itself  contingent, 
and  if  the  end  is  abandoned,  the  maxim  which  prescribes 
the  action  has  no  longer  any  force.  An  unconditioned 
command,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  permit  the  will  to 
choose  the  opposite,  and  therefore  it  carries  with  it  the 
necessity  which  is  essential  to  a law. 

It  is,  however,  very  hard  to  see  how  there  can  be  a 
categorical  imperative  or  law  of  morality  at  all.  Such 
a law  is  an  a priori  synthetic  proposition,  and  we  cannot 
expect  that  there  will  be  less  difficulty  in  showing  how  a 
proposition  of  that  sort  is  possible  in  the  sphere  of 
morality  than  we  have  found  it  to  be  in  the  sphere  of 
knowledge. 

In  attempting  to  solve  this  problem,  we  shall  first  of 
all  inquire,  whether  the  mere  conception  of  a categorical 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


241 


imperative  may  not  perhaps  supply  us  with  a formula, 
which  contains  the  only  proposition  that  can  possibly  be 
a categorical  imperative.  The  more  difficult  question, 
how  such  an  absolute  command  is  possible  at  all,  will 
require  a special  investigation,  which  must  be  postponed 
to  the  last  section. 

If  I take  the  mere  conception  of  a hypothetical  imper- 
ative, I cannot  tell  what  it  may  contain  until  the  condition 
under  which  it  applies  is  presented  to  me.  But  I can  tell 
at  once  from  the  very  conception  of  a categorical  imper- 
269  ative  what  it  must  contain.  Viewed  apart  from  the  law, 
the  imperative  simply  affirms  that  the  maxim,  or  sub- 
jective principle  of  action,  must  conform  to  the  objective 
principle  or  law.  Now  the  law  contains  no  condition  to 
which  it  is  restricted,  and  hence  nothing  remains  but  the 
statement,  that  the  maxim  ought  to  conform  to  the  uni- 
versality of  the  law  as  such.  It  is  only  this  conformity  to 
law  that  the  imperative  can  be  said  to  represent  as 
necessary. 

There  is  therefore  but  one  categorical  imperative,  which 
may  be  thus  stated  : Act  in  conformity  with  that  maxim , 
and  that  maxim  only,  which  you  can  at  the  same  titne  will 
tc  be  a universal  law. 

Now,  if  from  this  single  imperative,  as  from  their  prin- 
cipb,  all  imperatives  of  duty  can  be  derived,  we  shall  at 
least  be  a’ue  to  indicate  what  we  mean  by  the  categorical 
imperative  and  what  the  conception  of  it  implies,  although 
we  shall  not  be  able  to  say  whether  the  conception  of 
duty  may  not  itself  be  empty. 

The  universality  of  the  law  which  governs  the  succession 
of  events,  is  what  we  mean  by  nature,  in  the  most  general 
sense,  that  is,  the  existence  of  things,  in  so  far  as  their 

Q 


242 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


existence  is  determined  in  conformity  with  universal 
laws.  The  universal  imperative  of  duty  might  therefore 
be  put  in  this  way : Act  as  if  the  maxim  from  which 
you  act  were  to  become  through  your  will  a universal  law 
of  nature. 

272  If  We  attend  to  what  goes  on  in  ourselves  in  every 
transgression  of  a duty,  we  find,  that  we  do  not  will  that 
our  maxim  should  become  a universal  law.  We  find  it 
in  fact  impossible  to  do  so,  and  we  really  will  that  the 
opposite  of  our  maxim  should  remain  a universal  law, 
at  the  same  time  that  we  assume  the  liberty  of  making  an 
exception  in  favour  of  natural  inclination  in  our  own  case, 
or  perhaps  only  for  this  particular  occasion.  Hence,  if 
we  looked  at  all  cases  from  the  same  point  of  view,  that 
is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  reason,  we  should  see  that 
there  was  here  a contradiction  in  our  will.  The  con- 
tradiction is,  that  a certain  principle  is  admitted  to  be 
necessary  objectively  or  as  a universal  law,  and  yet  is 
held  not  to  be  universal  subjectively,  but  to  admit  of 
exceptions.  What  we  do  is,  to  consider  our  action  at 
one  time  from  the  point  of  view  of  a will  that  is  in  perfect 
conformity  with  reason,  and  at  another  time  from  the 
point  of  view  of  a will  that  is  under  the  influence  of 
natural  inclination.  There  is,  therefore,  here  no  real 
contradiction,  but  merely  an  antagonism  of  inclination 
to  the  command  of  reason.  The  universality  of  the 
principle  is  changed  into  a mere  generality,  in  order  that 
the  practical  principle  of  reason  may  meet  the  maxim 
half  way.  Not  only  is  this  limitation  condemned  by  our 
own  impartial  judgment,  but  it  proves  that  we  actually 
recognize  the  validity  of  the  categorical  imperative,  and 

273  merely  allow  ourselves  to  make  a few  exceptions  in  our 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


243 


own  favour  which  we  try  to  consider  as  of  no  importance, 
or  as  a necessary  concession  to  circumstances. 

This  much  at  least  we  have  learned,  that  if  the  idea  of 
duty  is  to  have  any  meaning  and  to  lay  down  the  laws  of 
our  actions,  it  must  be  expressed  in  categorical  and  not 
in  hypothetical  imperatives.  We  have  also  obtained  a 
clear  and  distinct  conception  (a  very  important  thing), 
of  what  is  implied  in  a categorical  imperative  which  con- 
tains the  principle  of  duty  for  all  cases,  granting  such  an 
imperative  to  be  possible  at  all.  But  we  have  not  yet 
been  able  to  prove  a priori. , that  there  actually  is  such  an 
imperative  ; that  there  is  a practical  law  which  commands 
absolutely  on  its  own  authority,  and  is  independent  of 
all  sensuous  impulses;  and  that  duty  consists  in  obedience 
to  this  law. 

In  seeking  to  reach  this  point,  it  is  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  observe,  that  the  reality  of  this  principle  cannot 
possibly  be  derived  from  the  peculiar  constitution  of  human 
nature.  For  by  duty  is  meant  the  practically  unconditioned 
necessity  of  an  act,  and  hence  we  can  show  that  duty  is  a 
law  for  the  will  of  all  human  beings,  only  by  showing 
that  it  is  applicable  to  all  rational  beings,  or  rather  to  all 
rational  beings  to  whom  an  imperative  applies  at  all. 

74  The  question,  then,  is  this  : Is  it  a necessary  law  for 
all  rational  beings,  that  they  must  always  estimate  the 
value  of  their  actions  by  asking  whether  they  can  will  that 
their  maxims  should  serve  as  universal  laws  ? If  there 
is  such  a law,  it  must  be  possible  to  prove  entirely  a priori, 
that  it  is  bound  up  with  the  very  idea  of  the  will  of  a 
rational  being.  To  show  that  there  is  such  a connection 
we  must,  however  reluctantly,  take  a step  into  the  realm  of 
metaphysic : not,  however,  into  the  realm  of  speculative 


244  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

275  philosophy,  but  into  the  metaphysic  of  morality.  For 
we  have  here  to  deal  with  objective  practical  laws, 
and  therefore  with  the  relation  of  the  will  to  itself,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  determined  purely  by  reason.  All  relation  of 
the  will  to  what  is  empirical  is  excluded  as  a matter  of 
course,  for  if  reason  determines  the  relation  entirely  by  itself, 
it  must  necessarily  do  so  a priori. 

Will  is  conceived  of  as  a faculty  of  determining  itself 
to  action  in  accordance  with  the  idea  of  certain  laws.  Such 
a faculty  can  belong  only  to  a rational  being.  Now  that 
which  serves  as  an  objective  principle  for  the  self-deter- 
mination of  the  will  is  an  end , and  if  this  end  is  given 
purely  by  reason,  it  must  hold  for  all  rational  beings.  On 
the  other  hand,  that  which  is  merely  the  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  an  action  the  effect  of  which  is  the  end,  is 
called  the  means.  The  subjective  ground  of  desire  is  natural 
inclination,  the  objective  ground  of  volition  is  a motive  ; 
hence  there  is  a distinction  between  subjective  ends, 
which  depend  upon  natural  inclination,  and  objective 
ends,  which  are  connected  with  motives  that  hold  for  every 
rational  being.  Practical  principles  that  abstract  from 
all  subjective  ends  are  formal ; those  that  presuppose 
subjective  ends,  and  therefore  natural  inclinations,  are 
?naterial.  The  ends  which  a rational  being  arbitrarily  sets 
before  himself  as  material  ends  to  be  produced  by  his 
actions,  are  all  merely  relative ; for  that  which  gives  to 

276  them  their  value  is  simply  their  relation  to  the  peculiar 
susceptibility  of  the  subject.  They  can  therefore  yield 
no  universal  and  necessary  principles,  or  practical  laws, 
applicable  to  all  rational  beings,  and  binding  upon  every 
will.  Upon  such  relative  ends,  therefore,  only  hypothetical 
imperatives  can  be  based. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


245 


Suppose,  however,  that  there  is  something  the  existence 
of  which  has  in  itself  an  absolute  value,  something 
which,  as  an  end  in  itself,  can  be  a ground  of  definite 
laws  ; then,  there  would  lie  in  that,  and  only  in  that,  the 
ground  of  a possible  categorical  imperative  or  practical 
law. 

Now,  I say,  that  man,  and  indeed  every  rational  being 
as  such,  exists  as  an  end  in  himself,  not  merely  as  a 
means  to  be  made  use  of  by  this  or  that  will,  and  there- 
fore man  in  all  his  actions,  whether  these  are  directed 
towards  himself  or  towards  other  rational  beings,  must 
always  be  regarded  as  an  end.  No  object  of  natural 
desire  has  more  than  a conditioned  value  ; for  if  the 
natural  desires,  and  the  wants  to  which  they  give  rise,  did 
not  exist,  the  object  to  which  they  are  directed  would  have 
no  value  at  all.  So  far  are  the  natural  desires  and  wants 
from  having  an  absolute  value,  so  far  are  they  from  being 
sought  simply  for  themselves,  that  every  rational  being 
must  wish  to  be  entirely  free  from  their  influence.  The 
value  of  every  object  which  human  action  is  the  means 
of  obtaining,  is,  therefore,  always  conditioned.  And 
even  beings  whose  existence  depends  upon  nature,  not 
upon  our  will,  if  they  are  without  reason,  have  only  the 
relative  value  of  means,  and  are  therefore  called  things. 
Rational  beings,  on  the  other  hand,  are  called  persons , 
because  their  very  nature  shows  them  to  be  ends  in 
themselves,  that  is,  something  which  cannot  be  made  use 
of  simply  as  a means.  A person  being  thus  an  object  of 
respect,  a certain  limit  is  placed  upon  arbitrary  will. 
Persons  are  not  purely  subjective  ends,  whose  existence 
has  a value  for  us  as  the  effect  of  our  actions,  but  they 
are  objective  ends,  or  things  whose  existence  is  an  end 


246 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


in  itself,  for  which  no  other  end  can  be  substituted.  If 
all  value  were  conditioned,  and  therefore  contingent,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  show  that  there  is  any  supreme 
practical  principle  whatever. 

If,  then,  there  is  a supreme  practical  principle,  a 

277  principle  which  in  relation  to  the  human  will  is  a 
categorical  imperative,  it  must  be  an  objective  principle  of 
the  will,  and  must  be  able  to  serve  as  a universal 
practical  law.  For,  such  a principle  must  be  derived 
from  the  idea  of  that  which  is  necessarily  an  end  for 
every  one  because  it  is  an  end  in  itself.  Its  foundation 
is  this,  that  ratio Jial  nature  exists  as  an  end  in  itself. 
Man  necessarily  conceives  of  his  own  existence  in  this 
way,  and  so  far  this  is  a subjective  principle  of  human 
action.  But  in  this  way  also  every  other  rational  being 
conceives  of  his  own  existence,  and  for  the  very  same 
reason  ; hence  the  principle  is  also  objective , and  from 
it,  as  the  highest  practical  ground,  all  laws  of  the  will 
must  be  capable  of  being  derived.  The  practical  impera- 
tive will  therefore  be  this  : Act  so  as  to  use  humanity, 
whether  in  your  own  person  or  in  the  person  of  another , 
always  as  an  end , never  as  merely  a means. 

279  The  principle,  that  humanity  and  every  rational  nature 
is  an  end  in  itself,  is  not  borrowed  from  experience.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  because  of  its  universality  it  applies  to 
all  rational  beings,  and  no  experience  can  apply  so  widely. 
In  the  second  place,  it  does  not  regard  humanity  sub- 
jectively, as  an  end  of  man,  that  is,  as  an  object  which 
the  subject  of  himself  actually  makes  his  end,  but  as  an 
objective  end,  which  ought  to  be  regarded  as  a law  that 
constitutes  the  supreme  limiting  condition  of  all  subjective 
ends,  and  which  must  therefore  have  its  source  in  pure 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


247 


reason.  The  objective  ground  of  all  practical  laws 
consists  in  the  rule  and  the  form  of  universality,  which 
makes  them  capable  of  serving  as  laws,  but  their 
subjective  ground  consists  in  the  end  to  which  they  are 
directed.  Now,  by  the  second  principle,  every  rational 
being,  as  an  end  in  himself,  is  the  subject  of  all  ends. 
From  this  follows  the  third  practical  principle  of  the  will, 
which  is  the  supreme  condition  of  its  harmony  with 
universal  practical  reason,  namely,  the  idea  of  the  will  of 
every  rational  being  as  a will  which  lays  down  universal 
laws  of  action. 

280  This  formula  implies,  that  a will  which  is  itself  the 
supreme  lawgiver  cannot  possibly  act  from  interest  of  any 
sort  in  the  law,  although  no  doubt  a will  may  stand 
under  the  law,  and  may  yet  be  attached  to  it  by  the  bond 
of  interest. 

At  the  point  we  have  now  reached,  it  does  not  seem 
surprising  that  all  previous  attempts  to  find  out  the 
principle  of  morality  should  have  ended  in  failure.  It 
was  seen  that  man  is  bound  under  law  by  duty,  but  it  did 
not  strike  anyone,  that  the  universal  system  of  laws  to 
which  he  is  subject  are  laws  which  he  imposes  upon 
himself,  and  that  he  is  only  under  obligation  to  act 
in  conformity  with  his  own  will,  a will  which  by  the 

281  purpose  of  nature  prescribes  universal  laws.  Now  so  long 
as  man  is  thought  to  be  merely  subject  to  law,  no  matter 
what  the  law  may  be,  he  must  be  regarded  as  stimulated 
or  constrained  to  obey  the  law  from  interest  of  some 
kind  ; for  as  the  law  does  not  proceed  from  his  own  will, 
there  must  be  something  external  to  his  will  which 
compels  him  to  act  in  conformity  with  it.  This  perfectly 
necessary  conclusion  frustrated  every  attempt  to  find  a 


24S 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


supreme  principle  of  duty.  Duty  was  never  established, 
but  merely  the  necessity  of  acting  from  some  form  of 
interest,  private  or  public.  The  imperative  was  therefore 
necessarily  always  conditioned,  and  could  not  possibly 
have  the  force  of  a moral  command.  The  supreme 
principle  of  morality  I shall  therefore  call  the  principle 
of  the  autonomy  of  the  will,  to  distinguish  it  from  all  other 
principles,  which  I call  principles  of  heteronomy. 

The  conception  that  every  rational  being  in  all  the 
maxims  of  his  will  must  regard  himself  as  prescribing 
universal  laws,  by  reference  to  which  himself  and  all  his 
actions  are  to  be  judged,  leads  to  a cognate  and  very 
fruitful  conception,  that  of  a kingdom  of  ends. 

Sy  kingdom , I mean  the  systematic  combination  of 
different  rational  beings  through  the  medium  of  common 
laws.  Now,  laws  determine  certain  ends  as  universal, 
and  hence,  if  abstraction  is  made  from  the  individual 
differences  of  rational  beings,  and  from  all  that  is  peculiar 
to  their  private  ends,  we  get  the  idea  of  a complete 
totality  of  ends  combined  in  a system  ; in  other  words,  we 
are  able  to  conceive  of  a kingdom  of  ends,  which 
conforms  to  the  principles  formulated  above. 

All  rational  beings  stand  under  the  law,  that  each 
should  treat  himself  and  others,  never  simply  as  means, 
but  always  as  at  the  same  time  ends  in  themselves.  Thus 
there  arises  a systematic  combination  of  rational  beings 
through  the  medium  of  common  objective  laws.  This 
may  well  be  called  a kingdom  of  ends,  because  the 
object  of  those  laws  is  just  to  relate  all  rational  beings 
to  one  another  as  ends  and  means.  Of  course  this 
kingdom  of  ends  is  merely  an  ideal. 

2S2  Morality,  then,  consists  in  the  relation  of  all  action  to 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


249 


the  system  of  laws  which  alone  makes  possible  a kingdom 
of  ends.  These  laws  must  belong  to  the  nature  of  every 
rational  being,  and  must  proceed  from  his  own  will.  The 
principle  of  the  will,  therefore,  is,  that  no  action  should 
be  done  from  any  other  maxim  than  one  which  is  con- 
sistent with  a universal  law.  This  may  be  expressed  in 
the  formula  : Act  so  that  the  will  may  regard  itself  as  in 
its  maxims  laying  down  universal  laws.  Now,  if  the 
maxims  of  rational  beings  are  not  by  their  very  nature  in 
harmony  with  this  objective  principle,  the  principle  of 
a universal  system  of  laws,  the  necessity  of  acting  in 
conformity  with  that  principle  is  called  practical  obligation 
or  duly.  No  doubt  duty  does  not  apply  to  the  sovereign 
will  in  the  kingdom  of  ends,  but  it  applies  to  every 

284  member  of  it,  and  to  all  in  equal  measure.  Autonomy 
is  thus  the  foundation  of  the  moral  value  of  man  and  of 
every  other  rational  being. 

The  three  ways  in  which  the  principle  of  morality  has 
been  formulated  are  at  bottom  simply  different  statements 
of  the  same  law,  and  each  implies  the  other  two. 

292  An  absolutely  good  will,  then,  the  principle  of  which 
must  be  a categorical  imperative,  will  be  undetermined  as 
regards  all  objects,  and  will  contain  merely  the  form  of 
volition  in  general,  a form  which  rests  upon  the  autonomy 

293  of  the  will.  The  one  law  which  the  will  of  every  rational 
being  imposes  upon  itself,  and  imposes  without  reference 
to  any  natural  impulse  or  any  interest,  is,  that  the  maxims 
of  every  good  will  must  be  capable  of  being  made  a 
universal  law. 

How  such  an  a priori  synthetic  practical  proposition  is 
possible , and  why  it  is  necessary,  is  a problem  which  it  is 
not  the  task  of  a metaphysic  of  morality  to  solve.  We 


250 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


have  not  even  affirmed  it  to  be  true,  much  less  have  we 
attempted  to  prove  its  truth.  To  prove  that  practical 
reason  is  capable  of  being  employed  synthetically,  and 
that  morality  is  not  a mere  fiction  of  the  brain,  requires 
us  to  enter  upon  a criticism  of  the  faculty  of  practical 
reason  itself.  In  the  next  section  we  shall  state  the  main 
points  which  must  be  proved  in  a Critique  of  Practical 
Reason,  so  far  as  is  necessary  for  our  present  purpose. 


294  Section  [II. — Transition  from  the  Metaphysic  of  Morality 
to  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason. 

The  Idea  of  Freedom  as  the  Key  to  the  Autonomy  of 
the  Will. 

The  will  is  the  causality  of  living  beings  in  so  far  as 
they  are  rational.  Freedom  is  that  causality  in  so  far  as 
it  can  be  regarded  as  efficient  without  being  determined  to 
activity  by  any  cause  other  than  itself.  Natural  necessity 
is  the  property  of  all  non-rational  beings  to  be  determined 
to  activity  by  some  cause  external  to  themselves. 

The  definition  of  freedom  just  given  is  negative , and 
therefore  it  does  not  tell  us  what  freedom  is  in  itself;  but 
it  prepares  the  way  for  a positive  conception  of  a more 
specific  and  more  fruitful  character.  The  conception  of 
causality  carries  with  it  the  conception  of  determination 
by  law  (Gesetz),  for  the  effect  is  conceived  as  determined 
(gesetzt)  by  the  cause.  Hence  freedom  must  not  be 
regarded  as  lawless  (gesetzlos),  but  simply  as  independent 
of  laws  of  nature.  A free  cause  does  conform  to  un- 
changeable laws,  but  these  laws  are  peculiar  to  itself 4 
and,  indeed,  apart  from  law  a free  will  has  no  meaning 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


25  1 


whatever.  A necessary  law  of  nature,  as  we  have  seen, 
implies  the  heteronomy  of  efficient  causes  ; for  no  effect 
is  possible  at  all,  unless  its  cause  is  itself  determined  to 
activity  by  something  else.  What,  therefore,  can  freedom 
possibly  be  but  autonomy,  that  is,  the  property  of  the 
will  to  be  a law  to  itself?  Now,  to  say  that  the  will  in 
all  its  actions  is  a law  to  itself,  is  simply  to  say  that  its 
principle  is,  to  act  from  no  other  maxim  than  that  the 
object  of  which  is  itself  as  a universal  law.  But  this  is 
just  the  formula  of  the  categorical  imperative  and  the 
principle  of  morality.  Hence  a free  will  is  the  same 
thing  as  a will  that  conforms  to  moral  laws. 

If,  then,  we  start  from  the  presupposition  of  freedom 
of  the  will,  we  can  derive  morality  and  the  principle  of 
morality  simply  from  an  analysis  of  the  conception  of 
freedom.  Yet  the  principle  of  morality,  namely,  that  an 
absolutely  good  will  is  a will  the  maxim  of  which  can 
always  be  taken  as  itself  a universal  law,  is  a synthetic 
proposition.  For  by  no  possibility  can  we  derive  this 
property  of  the  maxim  from  an  analysis  of  the  conception 
of  an  absolutely  good  will.  The  transition  from  the  con- 
ception of  freedom  to  the  conception  of  morality  can  be 
made  only  if  there  is  a third  proposition  which  connects 
the  other  two  in  a synthetic  unity.  The  positive  conception 
of  freedom  yields  this  third  proposition,  and  hot  the  con- 
ception of  nature,  in  which  a thing  is  related  causally 
only  to  something  else.  What  this  third  proposition  is 
to  which  freedom  points,  and  of  which  we  have  an  a 
priori  idea,  can  be  made  clear  only  after  some  preliminary 
investigation. 


252 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


* 


Freedom  is  a property  of  all  Rational  Beings. 

It  cannot  in  any  way  be  proved  that  the  will  of  man  is 
free,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  will  of  all  rational 
beings  is  free.  For  morality  is  a law  for  us  only  in  so 
far  as  we  are  rational  beings,  and  therefore  it  must  apply  to 
all  rational  beings.  But  morality  is  possible  only  for  a 
free  being,  and  hence  it  must  be  proved  that  freedom  also 
296  belongs  to  the  will  of  all  rational  beings.  Now  I say, 
that  a being  who  cannot  act  except  under  the  idea  of 
freedom , must  for  that  very  reason  be  regarded  as  free  so 
far  as  his  actions  are  concerned.  / In  other  words,  even 
if  it  cannot  be  proved  by  speculative  reason  that  his  will 
is  free,  all  the  laws  that  are  inseparably  bound  up  with 
freedom  must  be  viewed  by  him  as  laws  of  his  will.  /And 
I say,  further,  that  we  must  necessarily  attribute  to  every 
rational  being  that  has  a will  the  idea  of  freedom,  because 
every  such  being  always  acts  under  that  idea.  {A  rational 
being  we  must  conceive  as  having  a reason  that  is 
practical,  that  is,  a reason  that  has  causality  with  regard 
to  its  objects.  Now,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  a 
reason  which  should  be  consciously  biassed  in  its  judg- 
ments by  some  influence  from  without,  for  the  subject 
would  in  that  case  regard  its  judgments  as  determined,  not 
by  reason,  but  by  a natural  impulse.  Reason  must  there- 
fore regard  itself  as  the  author  of  its  principles  of  action,  and 
as  independent  of  all  external  influences.  Hence,  as  prac- 
tical reason,  or  as  the  will  of  a rational  being,  it  must  be 
regarded  by  itself  as  free.  The  will  of  a rational  being,  in 
other  words,  can  be  his  own  will  only  if  he  acts  under  the 
idea  of  freedom,  and  therefore  this  idea  must  in  the 
practical  sphere  be  ascribed  to  all  rational  beings. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


253 


The  Interest  connected  with  Moral  Ideas. 

We  have  at  last  succeeded  in  reducing  the  true  con- 
ception of  morality  to  the  idea  of  freedom.  This,  how- 
ever, does  not  prove  that  man  actually  is  free,  but  only 
that,  without  presupposing  freedom,  we  cannot  conceive 
of  ourselves  as  rational  beings,  who  are  conscious  of 
causality  with  respect  to  our  actions,  that  is,  as  endowed 

297  with  will.  We  have  also  found  that  on  the  same  ground 
all  beings  endowed  with  reason  and  will  must  determine 
themselves  to  action  under  the  idea  of  their  freedom. 

From  the  presupposition  of  the  idea  of  freedom  there 
also  followed  the  consciousness  of  a law  of  action,  the 
law  that  our  subjective  principles  of  action,  or  maxims, 
must  always  be  of  such  a character  that  they  have  the 
validity  of  objective  or  universal  principles,  and  can  be 
taken  as  universal  laws  imposed  upon  our  will  by  our- 
selves. But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  should  I subject 
myself  to  this  principle  simply  as  a rational  being,  and 
why,  therefore,  should  all  other  beings  who  are  endowed 
with  reason  come  under  the  same  principle  ? Admitting 
that  I am  not  forced  to  do  so  by  interest — which  indeed 
would  make  a categorical  imperative  impossible — yet  I 
must  take  an  interest  in  that  principle  and  see  how  I come 
to  subject  myself  to  it. 

It  looks  as  if  we  had,  strictly  speaking,  shown  merely 
that  in  the  idea  of  freedom  the  moral  law  must  be  pre- 
supposed in  order  to  explain  the  principle  of  the  auto- 
nomy of  the  will,  without  being  able  to  prove  the  reality 
and  objectivity  of  the  moral  law  itself. 

298  It  must  be  frankly  admitted,  that  there  is  here  a sort 
of  circle  from  which  it  seems  impossible  to  escape.  We 


254 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


assume  that  as  efficient  causes  we  are  free,  in  order  to  ex- 
plain how  in  the  kingdom  of  ends  we  can  be  under  moral 
laws;  and  then  we  think  of  ourselves  as  subject  to  moral 
laws,  because  we  have  ascribed  to  ourselves  freedom  of 
will.  Freedom  of  will  and  self-legislation  of  will  are  both 
autonomy,  and,  therefore,  they  are  conceptions  which  im- 
ply each  other;  but,  for  that  very  reason,  the  one  cannot 
be  employed  to  explain  or  to  account  for  the  other. 


i How  is  a Categorical  Imperative  possible  l 

As  an  intelligence,  a rational  being  views  himself  as  a 
member  of  the  intelligible  world,  and  it  is  only  as  an 
efficient  cause  belonging  to  this  world  that  he  speaks  of 
his  own  causality  as  will.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  con- 
scious of  himself  as  also  a part  of  the  world  of  sense,  and 
in  this  connection  his  actions  appear  as  mere  phenomena 
which  that  causality  underlies.  Yet  he  cannot  trace  back 
his  actions  as  phenomena  to  the  causality  of  his  will,  be- 
cause of  that  causality  he  has  no  knowledge ; and  he  is 
thus  forced  to  view  them  as  if  they  were  determined 
merely  by  other  phenomena,  that  is,  by  natural  desires 
and  inclinations.  Were  a man  a member  only  of  the  in- 
telligible world,  all  his  actions  would  be  in  perfect  agree- 
ment with  the  autonomy  of  the  will ; were  he  merely  a 
part  of  the  world  of  sense,  they  would  have  to  be  regarded 
as  completely  subject  to  the  natural  law  of  desire  and 
inclination,  and  to  the  heteronomy  of  nature.  The  former 
would  rest  upon  the  supreme  principle  of  morality,  the 
latter  upon  that  of  happiness.  But  it  must  be  ob- 
served that  the  intelligible  world  is  the  condition  of  the 
world  of  sense,  and,  therefore,  of  the  laws  of  that  world. 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY.  255 

And  as  the  will  belongs  altogether  to  the  intelligible 
world,  it  is  the  intelligible  world  that  prescribes  the  laws 
which  the  will  directly  obeys.  As  an  intelligence,  I am 
therefore  subject  to  the  law  of  the  intelligible  world,  that 
is,  to  reason,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  I belong  on  the 
other  side  of  my  nature  to  the  world  of  sense.  Now,  as 
subject  to  reason,  which  in  the  idea  of  freedom  contains 
the  law  of  the  intelligible  world,  I am  conscious  of  being 
2 subject  to  the  autonomy  of  the  will.  The  laws  of  the 
intelligible  world  I must  therefore  regard  as  imperatives, 
and  the  actions  conformable  to  this  principle  as  duties. 

The  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  categorical  imper- 
atives, then,  is,  that  the  idea  of  freedom  makes  me  a 
member  of  the  intelligible  world.  Were  I a member  of 
no  other  world,  all  my  actions  would  as  a matter  of  fact 
always  conform  to  the  autonomy  of  the  will.  But  as  I 
perceive  myself  to  be  also  a member  of  the  world  of  sense, 
I can  say  only,  that  my  actions  ought  to  conform  to  the 
autonomy  of  the  will.  The  categorical  ought  is  thus  an 
a priori  synthetic  proposition.  To  my  will  as  affected  by 
sensuous  desires,  there  is  added  synthetically  the  idea  of 
my  will  as  belonging  to  the  intelligible  world,  and  there- 
fore as  pure  and  self-determining.  The  will  as  rational 
is  therefore  the  supreme  condition  of  the  will  as  sensuous. 
The  method  of  explanation  here  employed  is  similar  to 
that  by  which  the  categories  were  deduced.  For  the 
a priori  synthetic  propositions,  which  make  all  knowledge 
of  nature  possible,  depend,  as  we  have  seen,  upon  the 
addition  to  perceptions  of  sense  of  the  pure  conceptions 
of  understanding,  which,  in  themselves,  are  nothing  but 
the  form  of  law  in  general. 


256 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


303  Limits  of  Practical  Philosophy. 

Freedom  is  only  an  idea  of  reason,  and  therefore  its 
objective  reality  is  doubtful.  Thus  there  arises  a dialectic 
of  practical  reason.  The  freedom  ascribed  to  the  will 
seems  to  stand  in  contradiction  with  the  necessity  of 
3°4  nature.  It  is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  speculative 
philosophy  at  least  to  show  that  we  think  of  man  in  one 
sense  and  relation  when  we  call  him  free,  and  in  another 
sense  and  relation  when  we  view  him  as  a part  of  nature, 
and  as  subject  to  its  laws.  But  this  duty  is  incumbent 
upon  speculative  philosophy  only  in  so  far  as  it  has  to 
clear  the  way  for  practical  philosophy. 

306  In  thinking  itself  into  the  intelligible  world,  practical 
reason  does  not  transcend  its  proper  limits,  as  it  would  do 
if  it  tried  to  know  itself  directly  by  means  of  perception. 
In  so  thinking  itself,  reason  merely  conceives  of  itself 
negatively  as  not  belonging  to  the  world  of  sense,  without 
giving  any  laws  to  itself  in  determination  of  the  will. 
There  is  but  a single  point  in  which  it  is  positive,  namely, 
in  the  thought  that  freedom,  though  it  is  a negative 
determination,  is  yet  bound  up  with  a positive  faculty, 
and,  indeed,  with  a causality  of  reason  which  is  called 
will.  In  other  words,  will  is  the  faculty  of  so  acting  that 
the  principle  of  action  should  conform  to  the  essential 
nature  of  a rational  motive,  that  is,  to  the  condition  that 
the  maxim  of  action  should  have  the  universal  validity  of 
a law.  Were  reason,  however,  to  derive  an  object  of  will, 
that  is,  a motive,  from  the  intelligible  world,  it  would 
transcend  its  proper  limits,  and  would  make  a pretence 
of  knowing  something  of  which  it  knew  nothing.  The 
conception  of  an  intelligible  world  is  therefore  merely  a 


THE  METAPHYSIC  OF  MORALITY. 


257 


point  of  view  beyond  the  world  of  sense,  at  which  reason 
sees  itself  compelled  to  take  its  stand  in  order  to  think 
itself  as  practical.  This  conception  would  not  be  possible 
at  all  if  the  sensuous  desires  were  sufficient  to  determine 
the  action  of  man.  It  is  necessary,  because  otherwise  man 
would  not  be  conscious  of  himself  as  an  intelligence,  and, 
therefore,  not  as  a rational  cause  acting  through  reason  or 
operating  freely.  This  thought  undoubtedly  involves  the 
idea  of  an  order  and  a system  of  laws  other  than  the  order 
and  laws  of  nature,  which  concern  only  the  world  of  sense. 
Hence  it  makes  necessary  the  conception  of  an  intellig- 
ible world,  a world  which  comprehends  the  totality  of 
rational  beings  as  things  in  themselves.  Yet  it  in  no  way 
entitles  us  to  think  of  that  world  otherwise  than  in  its 
formal  condition,  that  is,  to  conceive  of  the  maxims  of 
the  will  as  conformable  to  universal  laws. 

Reason  would,  therefore,  completely  transcend  its 
proper  limits,  if  it  should  undertake  to  explain  how  pure 
reason  can  be  practical,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  to 
explain  how  freedom  is  possible. 

307  We  can  explain  nothing  but  that  which  we  can  reduce 
to  laws,  the  object  of  which  can  be  presented  in  a possible 
experience.  Freedom,  however,  is  a mere  idea,  the 
objective  reality  of  which  can  in  no  way  be  presented  in 
accordance  with  laws  of  nature,  and,  therefore,  not  in  any 
possible  experience.  It  has  merely  the  necessity  of  a 
presupposition  of  reason,  made  by  a being  who  believes 
himself  to  be  conscious  of  a will,  that  is,  of  a faculty 
distinct  from  mere  desire.  The  most  that  we  can  do  is 
to  defend  freedom  by  removing  the  objections  of  those 
who  claim  to  have  a deeper  insight  into  the  nature  of 

things  than  we  can  pretend  to  have,  and  who,  therefore, 

R 


258 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


declare  that  freedom  is  impossible.  It  would  no  doubt 
be  a contradiction  to  say  that  in  its  causality  the  will  is 
entirely  separated  from  all  the  laws  of  the  sensible  world. 
But  the  contradiction  disappears,  if  we  say,  that  behind 
phenomena  there  are  things  in  themselves,  which,  though 
they  are  hidden  from  us,  are  the  condition  of  phenomena  ; 
and  that  the  laws  of  action  of  things  in  themselves 
naturally  are  not  the  same  as  the  laws  under  which  their 
phenomenal  manifestations  stand, 
i While,  therefore,  it  is  true  that  we  cannot  comprehend 
the  practical  unconditioned  necessity  of  the  moral  impera- 
tive, it  is  also  true  that  we  can  comprehend  its  incompre- 
hensibility; and  this  is  all  that  can  fairly  be  demanded 
of  a philosophy  which  seeks  to  reach  the  principles  which 
determine  the  limits  of  human  reason. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON 


V.,  THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON 


19  BOOK  I.— ANALYTIC  OF  PURE  PRACTICAL 
REASON 

Chapter  I. — The  Principles  of  Pure  Practical 
Reason. 

1.  Definition. 

Practical  principles  are  propositions,  which  contain  a 
general  determination  of  the  will,  a determination  that 
has  under  it  various  practical  rules.  They  are  subjective 
principles,  or  maxims , if  the  condition  is  regarded  by  the 
subject  as  holding  only  for  his  own  will ; they  are 
objective  principles,  or  practical  laws , if  the  condition  is 
seen  to  be  objective,  or  to  hold  for  the  will  of  every 
rational  being. 


Remark. 

A man  may  make  it  his  maxim  to  avenge  every  injury 
that  is  done  to  him,  while  yet  he  sees  that  this  is  not  a 
21  practical  law,  but  is  merely  a maxim  of  his  own.  But  tell 
him,  that  he  ought  never  to  make  a deceitful  promise,  and 
he  recognizes  that  here  the  rule  concerns  only  his  will,  and 
holds  whether  the  special  ends  he  may  have  in  view  can 
be  attained  by  obeying  the  rule  or  not.  And  if  this  rule 
is  practically  right,  it  is  a categorical  imperative,  and 
therefore  a law.  Hence  practical  laws  concern  the  will 


262 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


only,  and  not  at  all  the  consequences  which  may  follow 
in  the  world  of  sense  through  its  causality. 


2.  Theorem  1. 

All  practical  principles  that  presuppose  an  object  or 
matter  of  desire  as  motive  of  the  will,  are  empirical,  and 
such  principles  cannot  yield  practical  laws. 

By  the  matter  of  desire  I mean  an  object  which  it  is 
desired  to  realize.  Now,  if  the  desire  for  this  object 
precedes  the  practical  rule,  and  is  the  condition  of  its 
being  made  a principle,  I affirm,  in  the  first  place,  that 
the  principle  must  be  empirical.  For  the  motive  of  the  will 
is  in  that  case  the  idea  of  an  object,  which  is  so  related 
to  the  subject,  that  the  faculty  of  desire  is  determined 
2 to  activity  by  it.  But  this  means,  that  the  subject 
expects  to  receive  pleasure  from  the  realization  of  the 
object.  This  pleasure  must  therefore  be  presupposed  as 
the  condition  without  which  the  will  would  not  be 
determined  to  activity.  Now,  it  is  impossible  to  know 
a priori  whether  an  object  will  bring  pleasure  or  pain,  or 
neither.  The  motive  must  therefore  be  altogether  em- 
pirical, and  so  also  must  be  the  material  principle  which 
is  based  upon  it. 

In  the  second  place,  a principle  that  rests  entirely  upon 
the  subjective  condition  of  a peculiar  sensibility  to 
pleasure  or  pain,  may  indeed  serve  as  a maxim  for  the 
sensitive  subject,  but  it  cannot  be  a law  even  for  him. 
Such  a principle  can  therefore  never  yield  a practical 
law. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON. 


263 


3.  Theorem  2. 

All  material  practical  principles  are,  as  such,  of  one 
and  the  same  kind,  and  are  reducible  to  the  general 
principle  of  self-love  or  individual  happiness. 

Pleasure  in  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  a thing,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  to  determine  the  desire  for  that  thing,  rests 
upon  the  sensibility  of  the  subject,  because  it  is  dependent 
upon  the  existence  of  the  thing  desired.  Pleasure  there- 
fore belongs  to  sense  or  feeling,  not  to  understanding ; 
for  understanding  implies  a relation  of  the  idea  to  an 
object  through  conceptions,  not  to  the  subject  by  means 
of  feelings.  Hence  pleasure  is  practical  only  in  so  far  as 
the  feeling  of  pleasure,  which  the  subject  expects  to  ex- 
perience in  the  realization  of  the  thing,  determines  the 
faculty  of  desire.  Now  the  consciousness  on  the  part  of 
a rational  being  of  agreeable  feeling  as  continuing  un- 
broken through  the  whole  of  his  life,  is  happiness , and  the 
principle  which  makes  happiness  the  highest  motive  of 
the  will,  is  the  principle  of  self-love.  Therefore  all 
material  principles,  which  assign  as  the  motive  of  the  will 
2 3 the  pleasure  or  pain  expected  from  the  realization  of  some 
object,  are  all  of  the  same  kind,  inasmuch  as  they  all 
belong  to  the  principle  of  self-love  or  individual  happiness. 


Corollary. 

All  material  practical  rules  assume  that  the  lower  faculty 
of  desire  determines  the  will,  and  if  there  were  no  purely 
formal  laws  sufficient  to  determine  the  will,  there  would 
be  no  higher  faculty  of  desire  at  all. 


264 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


Remark  1. 

It  is  a matter  for  surprise  that  men  of  intelligence 
should  imagine  that  a real  distinction  may  be  drawn 
between  the  lower  and  the  higher  faculty  of  desire,  on  the 
ground  that  some  ideas  which  are  associated  with  the 
feeling  of  pleasure  have  their  source  in  sense  and  others  in 
tinderstanding.  For  however  the  ideas  themselves  may 
differ  from  one  another,  and  whether  they  proceed 
from  understanding  or  even  from  reason,  as  distinguished 
from  sense,  the  feeling  of  pleasure,  which  is  the  real 
motive  by  which  the  will  is  determined  to  act,  is  always 
the  same  in  kind,  not  only  because  it  can  be  known  only 
empirically,  but  because  in  every  desire  the  same  vital 
energy  is  always  expressed.  The  only  difference  between 
25  pleasures  is  therefore  one  of  degree.  However  under- 
standing and  reason  may  be  employed  in  furthering 
individual  happiness,  the  principle  itself  contains  no 
other  motives  than  those  which  act  upon  the  will  through 
the  lower  faculty  of  desire.  We  are  therefore  forced  to 
say,  either  that  there  is  no  higher  faculty  of  desire  at 
all,  or  that  pure  reason  is  of  itself  practical,  that  is,  is  able 
to  determine  the  will  by  the  mere  form  of  the  practical 
rule,  independently  of  all  feeling,  and  therefore  of  all 
ideas  of  pleasure  and  pain. 

Remark  2. 

27  Even  if  all  finite  rational  beings  were  perfectly  agreed 
in  regard  to  the  objects  that  are  fitted  to  bring  pleasure 
or  pain,  and  also  in  regard  to  the  means  of  attaining  those 
objects,  the  principle  of  self-love  could  not  claim  to  be  a 
ptactical  law.  For  the  motive  would  not  even  then  cease 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  265 

to  be  subjective  and  empirical,  nor  would  it  possess  the 
necessity  which  every  law  implies,  namely,  the  objective 
necessity  based  upon  a priori  grounds. 

28  4.  Theorem  3. 

If  a rational  being  is  to  think  of  his  maxims  as  prac- 
tical universal  laws,  he  must  think  of  them  as  determining 
the  will,  not  by  their  matter,  but  simply  by  their  form. 

The  matter  of  a practical  principle  is  the  object  of  will. 
This  object  either  determines  the  will,  or  it  does  not.  In 
the  former  case,  the  rule  of  the  will  is  subjected  to  an 
empirical  condition;  in  other  words,  the  idea  which 
determines  the  will  is  dependent  upon  a certain  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  pain;  and  hence  there  can  be  no  practical 
law.  But,  if  all  matter  is  removed  from  the  law,  that  is, 
every  object  that  is  capable  of  determining  the  will, 
nothing  is  left  but  the  mere  form  of  a universal  system  of 
law.  Either,  therefore,  a rational  being  cannot  think  of 
his  subjective  practical  principles  or  maxims  as  universal 
laws ; or  it  is  the  mere  form  of  his  maxims  which  makes 
them  practical  laws,  and  enables  them  to  belong  to  a 
system  of  universal  laws. 


Remark. 

Any  man  of  common  sense  can  at  once  see  without 
being  told,  what  form  of  maxim  is  fitted  to  serve  as  a 
universal  law,  and  what  is  not.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
that  my  maxim  is  to  make  as  much  money  as  I can.  A 
man  at  his  death  has  left  in  my  hands  property  in  trust 
for  others,  but  he  has  not  left  in  writing  anything  to  show 
29  that  I received  the  money.  Can  I interpret  my  maxim 


266 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


in  this  way,  that  every  one  may  deny  having  received  a 
deposit,  if  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he  has  received 
it  ? It  is  at  once  obvious,  that  such  a principle,  the 
moment  it  is  stated  in  the  form  of  a law,  becomes  self- 
contradictory; for  if  it  were  a universal  principle  of  action, 
no  one  would  ever  leave  his  money  in  trust.  What  is  re- 
cognized as  a practical  law  must  be  universally  applicable; 
in  fact,  this  is  an  identical,  and  therefore  a self-evident 
proposition.  If  my  will  is  to  stand  under  a practical  law, 
I cannot  regard  my  natural  inclination — in  the  present 
case  my  avarice — as  a motive  that  harmonizes  with  a 
universal  practical  law.  So  far  is  such  a principle  from 
being  in  harmony  with  a universal  system  of  laws,  that  it 
destroys  itself  when  it  is  stated  in  the  form  of  a universal 
law. 


30  5.  Problem  I. 

Granting  that  the  mere  form  of  universal  law  is  the  only 
form  of  a maxim  that  is  sufficient  to  determine  a will;  the 
problem  is,  to  find  out  what  must  be  the  nature  of  a will 
that  is  determined  purely  by  that  form. 

The  mere  form  of  the  law  can  be  apprehended  only  by 
reason,  and  hence  it  is  not  an  object  of  sense,  nor  can  it 
belong  to  phenomena.  The  idea  which  is  to  determine 
the  will  is  essentially  different  from  the  principles  by  which 
events  follow  one  another  in  nature  in  accordance  with 
the  law  of  causality,  for  each  of  these  events  is  determined 
by  that  which  is  itself  a phenomenon.  Now,  if  nothing 
else  can  serve  as  a law  to  the  will  but  the  mere  form  of 
universal  law,  the  will  must  be  entirely  independent  of 
the  law  which  governs  phenomena  in  their  relation  to  one 
another,  namely,  the  law  of  natural  causality.  But  inde- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  267 

pendence  of  natural  law  is  freedom , in  the  strictest  or 
transcendental  sense  of  the  word.  Therefore,  a will  for 
which  only  the  mere  form  of  universal  law  can  serve  as 
the  form  of  its  maxim,  must  be  a free  will. 

6.  Problem  II. 

Granting  that  a will  is  free  ; the  problem  is  to  find  the 
law  which  alone  is  fitted  to  determine  it  necessarily. 

The  matter  of  the  practical  law,  or  the  object  of  the 
maxim,  can  be  given  only  in  experience.  Now  a free 
will  must  be  independent  of  all  empirical  or  sensuous 
conditions,  and  yet  it  must  be  capable  of  being  deter- 
mined to  activity.  Such  a will  must  find  its  principle  of 
determination  in  the  law  itself,  abstracted  from  all  the 
matter  of  the  law.  But  apart  from  its  matter,  the  law 
contains  nothing  but  the  form  of  law  in  general. 

1 Therefore,  the  form  of  law  in  general,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  contained  in  a maxim,  is  the  only  thing  capable 
of  determining  a free  will. 

Remark. 

Freedom  and  unconditioned  practical  law  mutually 
refer  to  each  other.  I do  not  here  ask,  whether  in  their 
actual  nature  they  are  different,  or  whether,  on  the 
contrary,  an  unconditioned  law  is  merely  pure  practical 
reason  as  conscious  of  itself,  and  therefore  identical  with 
the  positive  conception  of  freedom.  My  question  is, 
whether  our  knowledge  of  that  which  is  unconditionally 
practical,  starts  from  the  idea  of  freedom  or  from  the  idea 
of  a practical  law.  Now  the  idea  of  freedom  cannot  be 
primary.  For,  as  our  first  conception  of  freedom  is 


263 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


negative,  we  cannot  be  directly  conscious  of  it ; nor 
again,  can  it  be  derived  from  experience,  for  experience 
gives  us  a knowledge  only  of  the  law  of  phenomena,  or 
the  mechanism  of  nature,  and  nature  is  just  the  opposite 
of  freedom.  It  is  therefore  of  the  moral  law  that  we  are 
primarily  and  directly  conscious.  This  law  we  apprehend 
by  thinking  of  maxims  of  the  will  in  their  form.  Thus 
reason  presents  the  moral  law  as  a principle  of  action, 
which  no  sensuous  condition  can  outweigh,  nay,  as  a 
principle  which  is  completely  independent  of  all  sensuous 
conditions.  The  consciousness  of  the  moral  law,  there- 

411  fore,  leads  inevitably  to  the  conception  of  freedom.  To 
prevent  misunderstanding  it  must  be  observed,  that 
while  freedom  is  the  ratio  essendi  of  the  moral  law,  the 
moral  law  is  the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  freedom.  The  idea 
of  freedom  is  certainly  not  self-contradictory ; but,  if 
reason  did  not  first  give  us  a distinct  idea  of  the  moral 
law,  we  should  not  feel  justified  in  supposing  that  there 
was  such  a thing  as  freedom  at  all. 

32  7 . Supreme  Law  of  Pure  Practical  Reason. 

Act  so  that  the  maxims  of  your  will  may  be  in  perfect 
harmony  with  a universal  system  of  laws. 

Remark. 

33  The  consciousness  of  this  law  may  be  called  a fact  of 
reason.  For  it  is  impossible  to  derive  it  from  any  datum 
known  by  reason  antecedently  to  it,  as,  for  instance,  the 
consciousness  of  freedom.  It  forces  itself  upon  us  as  an 
a priori  synthetic  proposition,  which  is  independent  of 
any  perception,  either  pure  or  empirical.  If  we  were 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  269 

permitted  to  presuppose  freedom  of  will,  it  would  no 
doubt  be  an  analytic  proposition  ; but  the  presupposition 
of  freedom  as  a positive  conception  could  only  be 
justified  by  an  intellectual  perception,  and  we  have  no 
ground  to  assume  such  a perception.  To  apprehend 
this  law  in  its  true  nature,  however,  it  must  be  carefully 
observed,  that  it  is  not  given  in  the  sense  that  it  can 
be  verified  in  experience,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
the  one  fact  of  pure  reason.  It  is  therefore  in  relation  to 
this  fact  that  reason  proclaims  itself  to  be  the  source 
of  law  ( sic  voio,  sic  jubeo ). 

Corollary. 

Pure  reason  is  practical  purely  of  itself,  and  gives  to 
man  a universal  law,  which  is  called  the  moral  law. 

Remark. 

34  The  principle  of  morality  prescribes  a universal  law, 
which  is  independent  of  all  subjective  differences,  and 
which  serves  as  the  supreme  formal  ground  for  the 
determination  of  the  will.  For  this  very  reason,  that 
principle  is  a law  for  all  rational  beings  which  have  a will. 
Hence  it  is  not  restricted  to  man,  but  holds  for  all  finite 
beings  who  have  reason  and  will,  and  includes  even  the 
Infinite  Being,  as  the  Supreme  Intelligence.  In  the  case 
of  finite  beings,  the  law  takes  the  form  of  an  imperative ; 
for  while  we  may  presuppose  in  them  a pure  will,  we 
cannot  presuppose  that,  with  their  sensuous  wants  and 
desires,  they  are  possessed  of  a holy  will,  that  is,  a will 
which  is  incapable  of  maxims  that  contradict  the  moral 
law.  The  Supreme  Intelligence,  on  the  other  hand,  is 


270 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


incapable  of  any  maxim  which  is  not  also  an  objective 
law,  and  the  conception  of  holiness  which  must  therefore 
be  attributed  to  that  Being,  places  Him,  not  indeed  above 
all  practical  law,  but  above  all  laws  that  restrict  His  will, 
and  therefore  above  obligation  and  duty.  Yet  holiness  of 
will  is  for  finite  beings  a practical  conception,  serving 
35  as  the  necessary  ideal  to  which  they  can  approximate 
indefinitely.  This  ideal  the  pure  moral  law,  which  is 
therefore  itself  called  holy,  rightly  insists  upon  holding 
ever  before  their  eyes.  To  be  assured  of  the  infinite 
progress  of  one’s  maxims  and  of  their  unchangeability  as 
the  cause  of  a continuous  advance  constitutes  virtue  ; and 
this  is  the  utmost  that  the  practical  reason  of  finite  beings 
can  bring  about.  Virtue,  at  least  as  a faculty  acquired 
naturally,  can  never  be  complete,  for  we  cannot  have 
demonstrative  certainty  of  possessing  it,  and  nothing  can 
be  more  hazardous  than  an  appeal  to  one’s  private 
conviction  of  his  own  virtue. 

8.  Theorem  4. 

Autonomy  of  will  is  the  sole  principle  of  all  moral  laws, 
and  of  the  duties  which  are  in  conformity  with  them. 
Heteronomy  of  will,  on  the  other  hand,  not  only  supplies 
no  basis  for  obligation,  but  it  is  contradictory  of  the 
principle  of  obligation  and  of  the  morality  of  the  will. 
The  single  principle  of  morality  thus  consists  in  independ- 
ence of  all  matter  of  the  law,  that  is,  of  every  object 
of  desire,  and  in  the  determination  of  the  will  through 
the  mere  universal  form  of  law,  of  which  a maxim  must 
be  capable.  This  independence  of  all  matter  is  freedom 
in  the  negative  sense,  just  as  the  self-legislation  of  pure 
practical  reason  is  freedom  in  the  positive  sense.  Hence 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  27 1 

the  moral  law  simply  expresses  the  autonomy  of  pure 
practical  reason,  that  is,  of  freedom.  Autonomy  is 
therefore  the  formal  condition  of  all  maxims,  and  apart 
from  this  condition  there  can  be  no  harmony  of  the  will 
with  the  supreme  practical  law.  If  the  matter  of  volition, 
which  is  just  the  object  of  desire  as  connected  with  the 
law,  should  enter  into  the  practical  law  as  the  condition 
of  its  possibility , there  will  be  a heteronomy  of  the  will; 
for  the  will  must  then  follow  some  natural  impulse  or 
desire,  and  must  therefore  be  dependent  upon  the  law  of 
nature.  Plainly  the  will  in  that  case  does  not  give  law  to 
itself,  but  merely  prescribes  the  rational  course  to  be  taken 
in  following  certain  pathological  laws.  Our  maxims  cannot 
contain  in  themselves  the  form  of  universal  law,  and 
therefore  they  not  only  cannot  be  the  basis  of  obligation, 
but  they  contradict  the  principle  of  a pure  practical 
reason.  Even,  therefore,  if  the  action  which  proceeds 
6 from  them  should  be  in  harmony  with  moral  law,  they 
are  opposed  to  a truly  moral  disposition. 


Remark. 

Suppose  that  the  matter  of  my  maxim  is  my  own  happi- 
ness. This  is  an  object  which  every  finite  being  seeks, 
7 but  the  rule  which  prescribes  it  can  be  an  objective  practical 
law,  only  if  in  one’s  own  happiness  is  included  the  happi- 
ness of  others.  Hence  the  law,  to  further  the  happiness 
of  others,  does  not  originate  from  the  presupposition,  that 
everyone  makes  his  own  happiness  the  object  of  his  choice, 
but  only  from  this,  that  the  form  of  universality,  which 
reason  demands  as  the  condition  under  which  a maxim 
of  self-love  obtains  the  objective  validity  of  a law,  should 


272 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


determine  the  will.  It  is  not  the  securing  of  the  happi- 
ness of  others  that  really  determines  the  pure  will,  but  the 
pure  form  of  law,  which  limits  the  maxim  as  based  upon 
mere  desire,  by  imparting  to  it  the  universality  of  a law 
and  bringing  it  into  conformity  with  pure  practical  reason. 
Only  by  this  limitation,  and  not  by  the  addition  of  an 
external  impulse,  can  there  arise  the  conception  of  the 
obligation  to  extend  the  maxim  of  self-love  so  as  to  include 
the  happiness  of  others. 

45  I. — Deduction  of  the  Principles  of  Pure  Practical 

Reason. 

As  the  result  of  this  Analytic,  we  learn  that  pure  reason 
can  be  practical,  or,  in  other  words,  is  capable  of  deter- 
mining the  will  independently  of  all  that  is  empirical. 
This,  indeed,  is  established  not  by  an  inference,  but  by  a 
fact.  For  reason  actually  proves  itself  to  be  practical 
by  the  fact  of  autonomy  in  the  fundamental  principle  of 
morality,  by  which  it  determines  the  will  to  activity. 
Another  thing  that  we  have  learned  is,  that  this  fact  is 
inseparably  bound  up  with  the  consciousness  of  freedom  of 
will,  and,  indeed,  is  identical  with  it.  For  a rational 
being  is  conscious  that  in  his  will,  or  as  he  is  in  himself, 
he  belongs  in  the  sphere  of  action  to  an  intelligible  order 
of  things,  although  he  is  also  aware  that,  in  so  far  as  he 
belongs  to  the  world  of  sense,  his  will,  like  other  efficient 
causes,  is  necessarily  subject  to  the  laws  of  causality. 

There  is,  therefore,  a remarkable  contrast  between  the 
analytical  part  of  the  Critique  of  pure  practical  reason  and 
the  analytical  part  of  the  Critique  of  pure  speculative 
reason.  In  the  latter,  not  fundamental  principles,  but 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  273 

the  pure  perceptions  of  space  and  time,  constitute  the 
primary  data  by  reference  to  which  a priori  knowledge 
was  shown  to  be  possible,  and  possible  only  for  objects 
46  of  sense.  Speculative  reason  with  perfect  right  denied 
that  there  could  be  any  positive  knowledge  of  objects 
which  lie  beyond  the  sphere  of  experience,  and,  therefore, 
it  denied  all  knowledge  of  things  as  noumena.  At  the 
same  time  it  at  least  showed,  that  the  conception  of  nou- 
mena, as  a conception,  is  not  only  possible  but  necessary. 
It  proved,  for  instance,  that  there  is  nothing  inconsistent 
with  the  principles  and  limitations  of  pure  theoretical 
reason  in  the  idea  of  freedom,  taken  in  its  negative  sense. 
Speculative  reason,  however,  did  not  extend  our  know- 
ledge by  presenting  noumena  to  us  as  definite  objects, 
but  on  the  contrary  showed  that  we  are  shut  out  from  all 
knowledge  of  them. 

Nor  does  the  moral  law  present  things  to  our  conscious- 
ness as  noumena,  but  it  puts  us  in  possession  of  a fact 
which  nothing  in  the  whole  sensible  world,  nothing  that 
comes  within  the  range  of  theoretical  reason  in  its  widest 
use,  can  possibly  explain.  This  fact  points  to  a purely 
intelligible  world,  and  even  so  far  determines  its  character 
positively,  that  we  know  something  of  it,  namely,  a 
law. 

This  law  gives  to  the  world  of  sense,  or  rather  to  the 
sensuous  natureoi  rational  beings,  the  form  of  an  intelligible 
world  or  supersensible  nature , without  in  any  way  interfer- 
ing with  the  mechanism  of  the  world  of  sense.  Now, 
nature,  in  the  most  general  sense  of  the  word,  means  the 
existence  of  things  under  laws.  The  sensuous  nature  of 
rational  beings,  viewed  generally,  is  the  existence  of  such 
beings  under  empirically  conditioned  laws.  Relatively 

s 


274 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


to  reason,  this  is  heteronomy.  But  the  supersensible 
nature  of  rational  beings  is  their  existence  under  laws 
which  are  independent  of  all  empirical  conditions.  These 
laws,  therefore,  belong  to  the  autonomy  of  pure  reason. 
Now,  laws  which  are  of  such  a character  that  a knowledge 
of  them  is  presupposed  as  the  condition  of  the  existence  of 
things,  are  practical  laws.  The  supersensible  nature  of 
rational  beings  is,  therefore,  just  their  nature  as  under 
the  autonomy  of  pure  practical  reason.  But  the  law  of 
this  autonomy  is  the  moral  law,  which  is  therefore  the 
fundamental  law  of  a supersensible  nature  and  of  a purely 
intelligible  world.  The  counterpart  of  this  intelligible 
world  ought  to  exist  in  the  world  of  sense,  but  without 
interfering  with  its  laws.  The  intelligible  world  is  known 
only  by  reason,  and  might  be  called  the  archetypal  world 
( 'natara  archetypa);  the  world  of  sense,  in  so  far  as  the  idea 
47  of  the  intelligible  world  is  capable  of  determining  the  will 
and  producing  an  effect  upon  it,  we  might  call  the  ectypal 
world  ( natura  ectypa).  For,  in  point  of  fact  the  moral 
law  transfers  us  in  idea  into  a realm  of  nature  in  which 
pure  reason,  if  it  were  accompanied  by  adequate  physical 
power,  would  produce  the  highest  good,  and  determines 
our  will  to  give  to  the  world  of  sense  the  form  of  a system 
of  rational  beings. 

Now,  in  nature  as  it  actually  presents  itself  to  our  ex- 
perience, the  will,  free  as  it  is  in  itself,  is  not  determined 
to  maxims  which  by  themselves  could  be  the  foundation 
of  a system  of  universal  laws,  or  which  are  even  in  har- 
mony with  such  a system.  On  the  contrary,  the  maxims 
of  the  will  rest  upon  private  inclinations,  which  no  doubt 
constitute  a system  of  pathological  or  physical  laws,  but 
not  such  a system  as  would  be  possible  were  our  will 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  275 

determined  by  pure  practical  laws.  Yet  our  reason  makes 
us  conscious  of  a law  to  which  all  our  maxims  are  subject, 
just  as  if  an  ordered  system  of  nature  must  be  produced 
by  our  will.  This  law  must  therefore  be  the  idea  of  a 
system  of  nature,  which  is  not  presented  in  experience, 
but  which  yet  is  possible  through  freedom;  a supersensible 
system  of  nature,  to  which  we  ascribe  objective  reality,  at 
least  in  relation  to  action,  because  we  regard  it  as  the 
object  which  as  pure  rational  beings  we  ought  to  will. 

There  is  therefore  a distinction  between  the  laws  of  a 
nature  to  which  the  will  is  subject,  and  the  laws  of  a nature 

48  which  is  subject  to  the  will.  In  the  one  case,  the  object 
must  be  the  cause  of  the  idea  which  determines  the  will  ; 
in  the  other,  the  will  must  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
object;  or,  in  other  words,  the  causality  of  the  will  must 
be  determined  entirely  by  pure  reason.  In  this  latter 
connection,  therefore,  reason  must  be  called  pure  prac- 
tical reason. 

49  So  much  by  way  of  exposition  of  the  supreme  principle 
of  practical  reason.  The  deduction  of  that  principle,  that 
is,  the  justification  of  its  objective  and  universal  validity, 
and  the  proof  that  such  an  a priori  synthetic  proposition 
is  possible,  we  cannot  expect  to  find  so  easy  as  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  principles  of  pure  theoretical  understanding. 

50  The  objective  reality  of  the  moral  law  cannot  be 
established  by  any  appeal  of  theoretical  reason  either  to 
speculation  or  to  experience,  and  even  if  its  claim  to 
demonstrative  certainty  were  renounced,  it  could  not  be 
proved  a posteriority  means  of  experience.  Yet  it  rests 
upon  a solid  foundation  of  its  own. 

No  deduction  of  the  principle  of  morality  is  possible  in 
either  of  those  ways,  but  it  turns  out  that  the  true  metiiod 


276 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


of  deduction  is  just  the  reverse  of  what  we  might  have 
expected.  It  is  the  moral  law  which  serves  as  the 
principle  of  deduction  of  a faculty  which  cannot  be  known 
theoretically  or  proved  by  experience,  but  which  specula- 
tive reason  is  forced  to  admit  as  at  least  possible.  For 
the  moral  law  does  not  itself  stand  in  need  of  any  deduc- 
tion, yet  it  proves  not  simply  the  possibility  but  the 
1 actuality  of  freedom  in  beings  who  recognize  it  to  be 
binding  upon  themselves.  In  fact  the  moral  law  is  a law 
of  a free  cause,  and  therefore  a law  which  makes  a super- 
sensible system  of  nature  possible ; just  as  the  meta- 
physical law  of  events  in  the  world  of  sense  was  a law  of 
the  causality  of  a sensible  system  of  nature.  The  moral 
law  therefore  does  what  speculative  philosophy  fails  to  do:, 
it  determines  the  law  for  a causality  of  which  the  latter 
could  give  only  a negative  conception,  and  this  for  the 
first  time  gives  objective  reality  to  the  conception  of  a 
free  cause. 

The  moral  law  proves  its  own  reality  even  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Critique  of  Speculative  Reason,  by 
adding  to  the  merely  negative  conception  of  a free  cause, 
the  possibility  of  which  had  to  be  assumed  without  being 
understood,  the  positive  conception  of  a reason  which 
directly  determines  the  will.  Thus  the  moral  law  is  able 
to  give  objective,  though  only  practical,  reality  to  the 
ideas  of  reason ; and  therefore  practical  reason  makes 
immanent  the  use  of  ideas,  which  for  speculative  reason 
were  transcendent. 

The  determination  of  the  causality  of  beings  in  the 
world  of  sense,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  can 
never  be  unconditioned.  Yet,  for  every  series  of  condi- 
tions there  must  necessarily  be  something  that  is  uncon- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  277 

ditioned,  and  therefore  there  must  be  a causality  which  is 
completely  self-determined.  The  possibility  of  freedom, 
as  a faculty  of  absolute  spontaneity,  was  not  a postulate, 
but  an  analytic  proposition  of  pure  speculative  reason. 
But  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  find  in  experience  any 
particular  instance  of  an  action  that  conforms  to  the  idea 
of  freedom.  Hence  speculative  reason  could  only  defend 
the  thought  of  a free  cause  from  attack,  by  showing  that  a 
being  who  belongs  on  the  one  side  to  the  world  of  sense, 
may  yet  on  the  other  side  be  considered  as  a noumenon. 

2 It  therefore  maintained  that  there  is  nothing  contradictory 
in  the  supposition,  that  all  the  actions  of  a free  being  may 
be  physically  conditioned  in  so  far  as  they  are  regarded 
as  phenomena,  while  yet  in  so  far  as  in  acting  it  belongs  to 
the  intelligible  world,  its  causality  is  physically  uncondi- 
tioned. The  conception  of  freedom  thus  turned  out  to 
be  a regulative  principle  of  reason.  True,  no  knowledge 
of  the  nature  of  the  object,  of  which  free  causality  was 
affirmed,  was  thus  obtained,  but  an  obstacle  which 
hindered  us  from  admitting  its  existence  was  removed. 
For,  on  the  one  hand,  it  was  possible,  in  the  explanation 
of  events  in  the  world,  and  therefore  in  the  explanation 
of  the  actions  of  rational  beings,  to  allow  that  the 
mechanism  of  natural  necessity  might  be  followed  back 
ad  infinitum  from  conditioned  to  condition  ; while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  place  which  speculative  reason  leaves 
empty  was  kept  open,  namely,  the  realm  of  the  intelligible, 
and  to  this  realm  the  unconditioned  was  transferred. 
But  this  thought  could  not  be  7-ealized ; in  other  words,  it 
could  not  be  converted  into  the  knowledge  of  a being 
acting  freely,  nor  indeed  could  it  be  shown  that  the  know- 
ledge of  such  a being  was  even  possible.  Pure  practical 


278 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


reason,  however,  fills  up  the  place  left  empty  by  specula- 
tive reason  with  a determinate  law  of  causality  in  an 
intelligible  world,  namely,  the  moral  law.  Speculative 
reason  in  this  way  gains  nothing  in  the  way  of  insight,  but 
it  acquires  certainty  in  regard  to  the  problematic  concep- 
tion of  freedom,  inasmuch  as  this  conception  obtains 
undoubted  objective  reality , though  no  doubt  only  prac- 
tical reality.  We  cannot  even  say,  that  the  conception 
of  causality  in  this  way  obtains  any  extension  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  world  of  sense,  for  that  conception  has 
meaning  and  application  only  in  relation  to  phenomena, 
and  serves  simply  to  connect  them  with  one  another.  To 
justify  the  application  of  the  conception  of  causality  beyond 
phenomena,  it  would  be  necessary  to  show,  how  the 
logical  relation  of  reason  and  consequent  may  be  em- 
ployed synthetically  in  a mode  of  perception  that  is  not 
sensuous ; in  other  words,  it  would  have  to  be  explained 
how  a noumenal  cause  is  possible.  But  this  cannot  be 
done,  nor  has  practical  reason  any  motive  for  trying  to  do 
it.  It  is  sufficient  for  practical  purposes  to  show  that  the 
causality  of  man  as  a sensuous  being  can  be  determined 
by  pure  reason,  and  that  pure  reason  is  therefore  practical. 


53  II.  Extension  of  Practical  as  compared  with  Speculative 

Reason. 

58  Besides  the  theoretical  relation  in  which  it  stands  to- 
objects,  understanding  has  also  a relation  to  the  faculty 
of  desire,  and  is  therefore  called  will.  And  as  pure  under- 
standing, which  in  this  connection  is  called  reason,  is 
practical  through  the  mere  idea  of  law,  in  its  relation  to 
desire  it  is  rightly  called  pure  will.  The  objective  reality 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  279 

of  a pure  will,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  of  a pure 
practical  reason,  may  be  said  to  be  presented  a priori  in 
the  moral  law  as  a fact;  for  we  may  call  a determination 
of  the  will  which  is  bound  up  with  its  very  nature  a fact, 
without  meaning  to  imply  that  it  rests  upon  empirical 
principles.  Now,  the  conception  of  a will  carries  with  it 
the  conception  of  causality  ; and  therefore  the  conception 
of  a pure  will  implies  the  conception  of  a free  causality. 
By  a free  causality  is  meant,  a causality  which  cannot  be 
determined  by  laws  of  nature,  and  which  therefore  cannot 
59  be  proved  to  be  real  by  empirical  perception.  Its  objec- 
tive reality  can  however  be  justified  a priori  through  the 
pure  practical  law.  Now,  the  conception  of  a being  who 
has  free  will  is  that  of  a noumenal  cause.  That  this  con- 
ception is  not  self  contradictory  is  plain,  if  we  consider, 
that  the  conception  of  cause  has  its  source  entirely  in 
pure  understanding,  and  that  it  has  been  proved  to  have 
objective  reality  in  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 
Being  in  its  origin  independent  of  all  sensuous  conditions, 
the  conception  of  cause  is  not  in  itself  limited  to  pheno- 
mena, nor  is  there  anything  to  hinder  it  from  being 
applied  to  things  which  are  objects  of  pure  understanding. 
We  have,  however,  only  a sensuous  perception  to  which 
we  can  apply  it ; and  hence  a noumenal  cause,  though  it 
can  be  thought , remains  for  theoretical  reason  an  empty 
conception.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  seek  for  a theoreti- 
cal knowledge  of  the  nature  of  a being  that  has  a pure  will ; 
it  is  enough  to  show  that  there  is  such  a being,  and  that 
I may  therefore  combine  the  conception  of  causality  with 
the  conception  of  freedom.  This  combination  I am 
certainly  entitled  to  make,  for  the  conception  of  causality 
is  not  of  empirical  origin,  and  here  I do  not  claim  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


2S0 

light  to  make  any  other  than  a practical  use  of  it;  in 
other  words,  to  employ  it  in  relation  to  the  moral  law 
by  which  its  reality  is  determined. 

60  Moreover,  the  objective  reality  of  a pure  conception  of 
understanding  in  the  sphere  of  the  supersensible,  when  it 
has  once  been  introduced,  imparts  objective  validity  to 
all  the  other  categories,  although  only  in  so  far  as  these 
stand  in  necessary  connection  with  the  moral  law,  through 
which  the  pure  will  is  determined. 


61  Chapter  II. — The  Object  of  Pure  Practical 

Reason. 

To  determine  whether  a thing  is  an  object  of  pure  practical 
reason  or  not,  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  to  ask  whether 
we  are  physically  able  to  produce  it.  The  only  question  is, 
whether  we  ought  to  will  an  act,  if  we  had  the  power  to 
bring  the  object  into  existence  to  which  the  act  is  directed. 
The  moral  possibility  must  therefore  precede  the  act,  for 
it  is  the  law  of  the  will,  and  not  the  object,  which  is  to 
determine  the  act. 

62  The  only  objects  of  a practical  reason  ar z good  and  evil. 
The  one  is  a necessary  object  of  desire,  the  other  of 
aversion,  and  both  rest  upon  a principle  of  reason. 

Now,  as  pleasure  and  pain  cannot  be  connected  a 
priori  with  the  idea  of  an  object,  those  who  make  a 
feeling  of  pleasure  the  basis  of  their  moral  judgments, 
must  call  that  good  which  is  the  means  to  what  is 
agreeable,  and  that  evil  which  is  the  cause  of  what 
is  disagreeable  and  painful.  The  practical  maxims 
which  follow  from  this  conception  of  the  good,  can- 
not contain  as  the  object  of  the  will  anything  that  is 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON. 


28l 


good  in  itself,  but  only  that  which  is  good  relatively  to 
something  else. 

64  Weal  and  woe  are  terms  which  always  designate  merely 
a relation  to  our  own  state  of  feeling,  as  agreeable  or  dis- 
agreeable, pleasant  or  painful.  We  desire  an  object  as 
weal  or  avoid  it  as  woe  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  related  to  our 
sensibility,  and  to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  which 
the  object  produces  in  us.  Good  and  evil,  on  the  other 
hand,  always  imply  a relation  to  the  will , in  so  far  as  it  is 
determined  by  a law  of  reason  to  make  something  an 
object  for  itself.  In  this  connection  the  will  is  never 
determined  directly  by  the  idea  of  the  object,  but  is  a 
faculty  of  making  a rule  the  motive  of  its  action.  In  the 
proper  sense  of  the  word,  therefore,  good  and  evil  are  not 
related  to  the  state  of  sensation  of  the  person,  but  to  his 
action.  If  there  is  anything  absolutely  good  or  evil,  or 
anything  that  is  regarded  as  such,  it  cannot  be  the  object 
of  the  action,  but  only  the  mode  of  action,  the  maxim 
of  the  will,  and  therefore  the  agent  himself. 

66  Now,  if  there  be  a principle  which  is  thought  as  in  itself 
capable  of  determining  the  will,  independently  of  all  rela- 
tion to  possible  objects  of  desire,  it  is  an  a priori  practical 
law,  and  pure  reason  must  then  be  regarded  as  of  itself 
practical.  In  that  case  the  law  directly  determines  the 
will,  and  the  act  conforming  to  it  is  in  itself  good.  Hence 
a will,  the  maxim  of  which  is  always  in  harmony  with  law, 
is  absolutely  or  in  every  respect  good , and  the  supreme 
condition  of  all  good.  But  if,  on  the  contrary,  there  is 
something  which  precedes  the  maxim  of  the  will  and 
determines  desire,  something  which  presupposes  an  object 
fitted  to  produce  pleasure  or  pain;  and  if  therefore  the 
maxim,  to  seek  the  pleasant  and  avoid  the  painful,  deter- 


2S2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


mines  our  actions ; then  our  actions  are  good  only 
relatively,  or  as  means  to  another  end,  and  our  maxims 
can  never  be  laws,  although  no  doubt  they  are  practical 
precepts  of  reason. 

68  Now,  the  conceptions  of  good  and  evil,  as  consequences 
of  the  a priori  determination  of  the  will,  presuppose  a 
pure  practical  principle,  and  therefore  a causality  of  pure 

69  reason.  Hence  they  are  in  all  cases  modi  of  the  single 
category  of  causality,  in  so  far  as  that  category  is  deter- 
mined through  the  conception  of  a law  of  freedom  which 
reason  gives  to  itself.  Thus  reason  proves  itself  to  be 
practical.  But,  although  actions  are,  on  the  one  hand, 
under  the  law  of  freedom,  and  therefore  belong  only  to 
intelligence  ; they  are,  on  the  other  hand,  as  events  in  the 
world  of  sense,  also  under  the  law  of  phenomena.  Prac- 
tical reason  can  therefore  determine  itself  only  in  relation 
to  phenomena.  And  as  its  determinations  must  conform 
to  the  categories  of  understanding,  they  cannot  be  em- 
ployed theoretically,  with  the  object  of  bringing  the 
various  elements  of  sensuous  perception  a priori  under 
one  consciousness,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  subjecting 
a priori  the  various  desires  to  the  unity  of  consciousness, 
as  implied  in  a practical  reason,  or  pure  will,  which  issues 
its  commands  through  the  moral  law. 


7 1 The  Type  of  Pure  Practical  Judgment. 

Prior  to  the  conceptions  of  good  and  evil  the  will  has 
no  object.  But  these  conceptions  themselves  stand  under 
a practical  rule  of  reason,  which,  in  the  case  of  pure 
reason,  determines  the  will  a p7-iori  in  respect  of  its  object. 
Now,  to  decide  whether  an  action,  that  stands  under 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  283 

a rule  is  one  that  is  possible  for  us  in  the  world  of 
sense  or  not,  is  the  business  of  practical  judgment,  the 
function  of  which  is  to  apply  to  an  action  in  concreto  that 
which  in  the  rule  is  stated  universally  or  in  abstracto. 

73  But  there  is  no  perception,  and  therefore  no  schema, 
which  can  serve  as  the  middle  term  by  means  of  which 
the  law  of  freedom,  and  therefore  the  conception  of  the 
unconditionally  good,  can  be  applied  in  concreto.  Hence 
the  moral  law  can  be  applied  to  objects  of  nature  only 
through  understanding  and  not  through  imagination. 
Understanding,  however,  can  supply  no  schema  of  sensi- 
bility for  an  idea  of  reason,  but  only  a law.  Yet  this  law 
can  be  exhibited  i>i  concreto  in  objects  of  sense,  and 
may  therefore  take  the  form  of  a law  of  nature.  It  thus 
serves  as  the  instrument  of  practical  judgment,  and  may 
therefore  be  called  the  type  of  the  moral  law. 

The  rule  which  judgment  applies,  in  subordination  to 
the  laws  of  pure  practical  reason,  is  this  : Ask  yourself 
whether  you  could  regard  the  act  which  you  have  in  view 
as  possible  by  your  own  will,  if  it  were  to  occur  in  con- 
formity with  a law  of  nature.  As  a matter  of  fact  this  is 
the  rule  by  which  everyone  decides  whether  an  action  is 
morally  good  or  bad. 

74  It  is  therefore  permissible  to  take  the  nature  of  the 
world  of  sense  as  the  type  of  an  intelligible  nature , so  long 
as  I merely  conceive  of  the  latter  as  under  the  form  of 

■ law,  and  do  not  transfer  to  it  my  perceptions  and  what  is 
dependent  upon  them.  For  all  laws  are  as  laws  the  same 
in  kind,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  source  from  which 
they  spring. 


284 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


76  Chapter  III. — The  Motives  of  Pure  Practical 

Reason. 

What  is  essential  to  the  moral  value  of  every  action  is, 
that  the  moral  law  should  directly  determine  the  will.  It 
is  not  enough  that  the  will  should  be  determined  in 
harmony  with  the  moral  law.  If  feeling  of  any  sort  has 
to  be  presupposed  before  the  will  can  be  determined,  the 
will  is  not  determined  because  of  the  law,  and  therefore 
the  action  is  not  moral  but  simply  legal.  By  the  word 
“ motive”  we  must  understand  that  which  determines  the 
will  of  a being,  whose  reason  is  not  by  its  very  nature 
necessarily  in  harmony  with  the  objective  law.  Hence, 
firstly,  we  cannot  speak  of  a motive  in  connection  with  the 
divine  will ; and,  secondly,  the  only  motive  of  the  human 
will,  and  indeed  of  every  finite  rational  being,  must  be  the 
moral  law.  The  objective  ground  must  therefore  always 
be  at  the  same  time  the  only  and  the  sufficient  subjective 
ground  of  determination  of  an  action.  On  any  other 
supposition,  only  the  letter  of  the  law,  and  not  its  spirit, 
would  be  fulfilled. 

77  How  a law  can  of  itself  directly  determine  the  will,  is 
for  human  reason  an  insoluble  problem,  for  it  is  identical 
with  the  problem,  how  a free  will  is  possible.  What  we 
are  called  upon  to  show  a priori , is,  not  how  the  moral 
law  of  itself  can  supply  a motive,  but  what  influence  it 
has,  or  rather  must  have,  upon  the  mind  in  so  far  as  it 
does  supply  a motive. 

The  essential  thing  in  all  determination  of  the  will  by 
the  moral  law,  is,  that  the  will  as  free  should  not  only  be 
determined  without  the  co-operation  of  sensuous  desires, 
but  that  it  should  even  oppose  such  desires,  and  restrain 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON. 


0 


all  natural  inclinations  that  might  prevent  the  realization 
of  the  law.  So  far  the  influence  of  the  moral  law  is  merely 
negative,  and  its  character  as  a motive  can  be  known  only 
a priori.  For  every  natural  inclination  and  sensuous 
desire  is  based  upon  feeling,  and  the  negative  influence 
of  the  law  in  opposing  the  natural  inclinations  itself  takes 
the  form  of  feeling.  Hence  we  know  a priori , that  the 
moral  law  in  determining  the  will  by  thwarting  all  our 
inclinations,  must  produce  in  us  a feeling  that  may  be 
called  pain.  This  is  the  first  instance  we  have  found,  and 
perhaps  it  is  the  only  instance,  in  which  we  can  tell  from 
a priori  conceptions,  what  is  the  relation  of  knowledge 
to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain.  All  natural  inclinations 
without  exception  arise  from  self-regard , the  two  forms  of 
which  are  self-love  and  self-esteem.  Self-love,  which  is 
natural  and  belongs  to  us  prior  to  the  moral  law,  pure 
practical  reason  simply  restrains,  by  bringing  it  into  con- 
78  formity  with  the  law.  It  is  then  called  rational  self-love. 
But  self-esteem  it  completely  destroys,  for  no  man  can 
show  the  least  title  to  respect,  except  in  so  far  as  his  acts 
conform  to  the  moral  law.  The  moral  law,  however,  is 
in  itself  positive,  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  the  form  of  an 
intellectual  causality,  that  is,  of  a free  causality.  In  so  far 
as  it  counteracts  the  subjective  antagonism  of  the  natural 
inclinations,  and  weakens  self-esteem,  the  moral  law  is  an 
object  of  reverence ; and  in  so  far  as  it  completely  destroys 
self-esteem,  it  is  an  object  of  the  highest  reverence.  Thus 
it  gives  rise  to  a positive  feeling,  which  is  not  of  empirical 
origin,  but  is  known  a prioi-i.  Reverence  for  the  moral 

law  is  therefore  a feeling  whicli  has  an  intellectual  source, 
and  it  is  the  only  feeling  which  can  be  known  completely 
a priori , and  which  can  be  perceived  to  be  necessary. 


286 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


So  Not  only,  therefore,  is  the  moral  law  the  formal  con- 
dition of  action  through  pure  practical  reason  ; not  only 
is  it  a material,  though  merely  objective,  condition  of  the 
determination  of  those  objects  of  action  which  we  call 
good  and  evil ; but  it  is  also  the  subjective  condition  or 
motive  of  action,  inasmuch  as  it  has  an  influence  upon 
the  morality  of  the  subject,  and  produces  in  him  a feeling 
that  conduces  to  the  influence  of  the  law  upon  his  will. 
It  is  true  that  the  sensuous  feeling  which  is  implied  in  all 
our  inclinations  is  the  condition  of  the  feeling  of  reverence, 
but  the  cause  which  determines  it  lies  in  pure  practical 
reason.  The  feeling  of  reverence,  therefore,  is  in  its 
origin  not  pathological  but  practical.  Nor  is  reverence  for 
law  an  external  motive  to  morality,  but  it  is  morality 
itself,  regarded  subjectively  as  a motive.  As  an  effect 
upon  feeling,  it  presupposes  that  the  subject  of  it  has  a 
sensuous  nature,  and  is  therefore  finite.  Hence  we  cannot 
say  that  a Supreme  Being  feels  reverence  for  law,  nor  can 
we  say  that  even  a free  finite  being,  who  was  devoid  of 
sensibility,  would  have  such  a feeling;  for  in  neither  case 
is  there  any  natural  impulse  which  stands  in  opposition 
to  practical  reason. 

93  Critical  Examination  of  the  Analytic  of  Pure 
Practical  Reason. 

102  To  get  rid  of  the  apparent  contradiction  between  the 
mechanism  of  nature  and  freedom  in  the  same  act,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  what  has  been  said,  or  what  is  implied, 
in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  The  natural  necessity 
which  is  contradictory  of  freedom  attaches  only  to  the 
determinations  of  a thing  that  stands  under  conditions  of 
time.  Hence  it  applies  only  to  the  agent  in  his 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  287 

phenomenal  aspect.  In  regard  to  actions  the  ground  of 
which  lies  in  what  belongs  to  the  past  and  is  no  longer 
within  his  power , the  agent  is  certainly  not  free.  But  he 
is  conscious  of  himself  as  also  a thing  in  himself,  and 
from  this  point  of  view  he  looks  upon  his  own  existence 
as  not  standing  under  conditions  of  time , but  as  capable  of 
being  determined  only  by  laws  which  have  their  source 
in  reason.  Nothing  in  his  existence  can  in  this  connec- 
tion be  said  to  be  antecedent  to  the  determination  of  his 
will.  Every  action  that  he  does,  or,  more  generally, 
every  change  in  the  determinations  of  inner  sense,  and 
indeed  the  whole  series  of  such  changes,  he  regards,  in 
so  far  as  he  is  conscious  of  his  existence  as  an  intelligence, 
as  the  result  of  his  noumenal  causality,  never  as  determin- 
ing that  causality.  From  this  point  of  view  a rational  being 
can  say  with  truth,  that  every  wrong  act  done  by  him  he 
could  have  left  undone,  although  as  a phenomenon  the 
act  is  sufficiently  determined  and  must  inevitably  take 
place.  For  the  act,  together  with  all  in  the  past  that 
determines  it,  belongs  to  the  one  continuous  phenomenal 
manifestation  of  the  character  which  he  has  made  for  him- 
self. Looking  upon  himself  in  this  way  as  a cause  that 
is  independent  of  sensibility,  he  ascribes  to  himself  the 
causality  of  the  whole  phenomenal  manifestation  of  his 
being. 

104  There  is  another  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  combination 

105  of  freedom  and  the  mechanism  of  nature  in  a being  that 
belongs  to  the  world  of  sense.  Let  it  be  granted,  it  may 
be  said,  that  the  subject  as  an  intelligence  is  free  in  the 
performance  of  a certain  act,  although  as  a subject 
belonging  to  the  world  of  sense,  he  is  conditioned  by  the 
mechanism  of  nature.  Yet  if  God — the  universal  Original 


288 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


Being — is  admitted  to  exist,  He  must  be  regarded  as  the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  every  substance.  The  actions  of 
man  must  therefore  be  due  to  a power  which  lies  entirely 
outside  of  himself.  For  his  actions  must  be  referred  to 
a Supreme  Being,  who  is  distinct  from  himself,  and  upon 
this  Being,  his  existence,  as  well  as  all  that  is  referred  to 
his  causality,  must  be  absolutely  dependent. 

106  A short  solution  of  this  difficulty  is  not  far  to  seek. 
Existence  in  time  is  a purely  sensuous  mode  of  conscious- 
ness, which  belongs  only  to  thinking  beings  as  they  are 
in  the  world,  but  does  not  hold  of  them  as  they  are 
in  themselves.  By  the  creation  of  thinking  beings 

107  we  must  therefore  mean  the  creation  of  things  in 
themselves.  The  idea  of  creation  has  no  meaning,  in 
so  far  as  we  are  speaking  of  the  sensuous  mode  of 
apprehending  existence  or  causality,  but  can  refer  only  to 
noumena.  To  speak  of  beings  in  the  world  of  sense  as 
being  created,  is  to  speak  of  them  as  if  they  were 
noumena.  Now,  it  would  be  a contradiction  to  say  that 
God  is  the  creator  of  phenomenal  objects.  It  is  equally 
a contradiction  to  say  that,  as  creator,  He  is  the  cause  of 
actions  which  take  place  in  the  world  of  sense,  and  are 
therefore  phenomenal  objects,  though  it  be  admitted  that 
He  is  the  cause  of  the  existence  of  acting  beings  in  their 
character  as  noumena.  Let  us  assume,  then,  that  existence 
in  time  holds  only  of  phenomena,  not  of  things  in  them- 
selves. Now,  if  freedom  is  not  incompatible  with  the 
natural  mechanism  of  actions  regarded  as  phenomena,  it 
cannot  be  incompatible  with  the  fact  that  the  beings  who 
perform  the  actions  are  creatures.  For  creation  has  to  do 
only  with  their  existence  as  intelligences,  not  with  their 
sensible  existence,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  regarded  as 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  289 

the  ground  of  phenomena.  It  would  be  altogether 
different  if  beings  in  the  world  existed  as  things  in 
themselves  m time , for  then  the  creator  of  a substance 
would  at  the  same  time  be  the  author  of  the  whole 
mechanism  of  this  substance. 


1 12  BOOK  II.— DIALECTIC  OF  PURE  PRACTICAL 

REASON. 

Chapter  I. — General  Consideration. 

Pure  reason  is  always  dialectical,  whether  it  is  viewed  in 
its  speculative  or  in  its  practical  use.  In  both  cases  it 
seeks  to  comprehend  the  absolute  totality  of  conditions 
for  that  which  is  presented  as  conditioned,  and  such  a 
totality  cannot  possibly  be  found  anywhere  but  in  things 
in  themselves.  But  all  our  conceptions  of  things  have  to 
be  brought  into  relation  with  perceptions,  which  in  man 
are  always  sensuous,  and  hence  objects  cannot  be  known 
as  things  in  themselves,  but  only  as  phenomena.  It  is 
impossible  to  find  the  unconditioned  in  the  series  of  the 
conditioning  and  the  conditioned,  and  an  unavoidable 
illusion  arises  from  the  application  to  phenomena  of 
the  rational  idea  of  the  totality  of  conditions.  The 
deceptive  character  of  this  illusion  would  not  indeed 
be  observed,  if  it  did  not  betray  itself  by  the  self- 
contradiction  into  which  reason  falls,  when  it  seeks  to 
apply  the  principle  in  question,  namely,  that  the  con- 
ditioned presupposes  the  unconditioned.  Thus  necessity 
is  laid  upon  reason,  to  trace  back  this  illusion  to  its 
source,  and  this  is  a task  which  can  be  accomplished  only 

by  a thorough  criticism  of  the  whole  faculty  of  pure 

T 


2<)0  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

1 13  reason.  The  antinomy  of  pure  reason,  which  makes 
itself  apparent  in  its  dialectic,  thus  turns  out  to  be  the 
most  beneficial  error  into  which  human  reason  could 
possibly  have  fallen.  For  it  forces  us  to  look  about  for 
the  clue  by  which  we  may  escape  from  the  labyrinth  into 
which  we  have  wandered,  and  this  clue,  when  it  has  been 
found,  unexpectedly  leads  us  to  a point  where  a higher 
and  an  unchangeable  order  of  things  lies  before  us.  In 
this  higher  realm  we  find  that  we  already  exist,  and  in  it 
we  are  called  upon  to  continue  our  existence,  guiding 
ourselves  by  certain  definite  precepts  which  the  highest 
reason  lays  upon  us. 

How  the  natural  dialectic  of  pure  speculative  reason  can 
be  explained,  and  how  the  error  arising  from  a perfectly 
natural  illusion  may  be  guarded  against,  has  been  fully 
shown  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  But  reason  in  its 
practical  use  tails  into  as  great  a difficulty.  It  seeks  to 
find  the  unconditioned  for  the  practically  conditioned, 
which  depends  upon  the  natural  wants  and  inclinations, 
although  the  unconditioned  is  not  to  be  conceived  as 
determining  the  will,  but  simply  as  the  unconditioned 
totality  of  the  object  of  pure  practical  reason.  This  object 
is  the  highest  good. 

r 14  In  regard  to  the  dialectic  of  pure  practical  reason,  which 
is  connected  with  its  determination  of  the  idea  of  the 
highest  good,  a preliminary  remark  has  to  be  made.  The 
moral  law  must  of  itself  be  capable  of  determining  a pure 
will.  But  this  law  is  merely  formal,  or  prescribes  only  the 
form  of  that  maxim  which  can  be  a universal  law,  and 
hence  it  abstracts  from  all  matter,  that  is,  from  every  object 
of  volition.  Accordingly,  while  it  is  true  that  the  highest 
good  is  always  the  whole  object  of  a pure  practical  reason, 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  29 1 

or  a pure  will,  it  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  determining 
the  will.  The  moral  law  must  alone  determine  the 
pure  will,  and  its  sole  object  is  to  produce,  or  help  to 
produce,  such  a will.  For,  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
Analytic,  the  supposition  that  the  will  is  determined, 
prior  to  the  moral  law,  by  some  object  called  a good, 
and  that  from  it  the  supreme  principle  of  action  may 
si 5 be  derived,  invariably  gives  rise  to  heteronomy  and 
destroys  the  moral  principle. 


1 16  Chapter  II. — The  Summum  Bonum. 

The  conception  highest  contains  two  distinct  ideas, 
which  must  be  carefully  distinguished,  if  we  are  to 
avoid  needless  perplexities.  The  highest  may  mean 
either  the  supreme  ( supremum ),  or  the  complete 
(consummatuni).  The  supreme  is  a condition  which  is 
itself  unconditioned  or  is  not  subordinate  to  anything 
else  (originarium) . The  complete , again,  is  a whole  which 
is  not  part  of  a larger  whole  of  the  same  kind  ( perfectissi - 
mum).  Now  virtue,  or  the  worthiness  to  be  happy,  as 
we  have  seen  in  the  Analytic,  is  the  supreme  condition  of 
all  that  we  can  regard  as  desirable,  and  therefore  the 
supreme  condition  of  all  our  search  for  happiness. 
Virtue  is  therefore  the  supreme  good.  But  it  is  not  the 
whole  or  complete  good  which  finite  rational  beings 
desire  to  obtain.  The  complete  good  includes  happiness, 
and  that  not  merely  in  the  partial  eyes  of  the  person  who 
makes  it  his  end,  but  even  in  the  judgment  of  unbiassed 
reason,  which  regards  the  production  of  happiness  in  the 
world  as  an  end  in  itself.  If  we  suppose,  for  the  sake  of 
illustration,  that  there  exists  a rational  Being  who  has  all 


292 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


power,  it  cannot  be  in  accordance  with  the  whole  will  of 
such  a being,  that  his  creatures  should  be  unable  to  secure 
the  happiness  which  their  nature  demands  and  of  which 

1 1 7 their  obedience  to  the  moral  law  makes  them  worthy. 
The  highest  good  of  a possible  world  must  therefore 
consist  in  the  union  of  virtue  and  happiness  in  the 
same  person,  that  is,  in  happiness  exactly  proportioned 
to  morality.  By  the  highest  good  is  here  meant, 
therefore,  the  whole  or  complete  good.  In  this 
complete  good  virtue  is  always,  as  a condition, 
the  supreme  good,  having  no  condition  higher  than 
itself ; while  happiness  is  no  doubt  always  agreeable 
to  the  person  who  possesses  it,  but  it  is  not  good  simply 
in  itself,  and  in  all  respects  : it  is  good  only  under  the 
condition  that  a man’s  conduct  is  in  conformity  with 
the  moral  law. 

1 9 /.  The  Antinomy  of  Practical  Reason. 

In  the  highest  good  which  is  practical  for  us,  that  is, 
which  is  to  be  realized  through  our  will,  virtue  and 
happiness  are  conceived  as  necessarily  united,  so  that  the 
one  cannot  be  apprehended  by  practical  reason  as 
separated  from  the  other.  Now  the  connection  of  virtue 
and  happiness  must  be  known  either  by  analysis  or  by 
synthesis.  But  it  has  been  shown  not  to  be  known 
analytically,  and  hence  it  must  be  synthetic,  and  synthetic 
in  the  way  of  cause  and  effect.  For  we  have  here  to  do 
with  a practical  good,  that  is,  with  a good  which  is 
possible  only  by  means  of  action.  Either,  there- 
fore, the  desire  for  happiness  must  be  the  motive 
to  maxims  of  virtue,  or  the  maxims  of  virtue  must 
be  the  efficient  cause  of  happiness.  The  former 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  293 

is  absolutely  impossible  ; for,  as  the  Analytic  has  shown, 
maxims  which  make  the  desire  for  happiness  the 
motive  of  the  will,  are  not  moral  at  all,  and  cannot 
possibly  be  the  foundation  of  virtue.  The  latter  is  also 
impossible;  for  the  causal  connection  in  the  world  of 
events  which  follow  from  the  determination  of  the 
will,  does  not  conform  to  the  moral  disposition  of  the 

120  will,  but  depends  upon  a knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature 
and  upon  the  physical  power  to  make  use  of  them  for 
certain  ends.  Hence  the  most  scrupulous  adherence  to 
the  laws  of  morality  cannot  be  expected  to  bring  happi- 
ness into  connection  with  virtue,  and  to  lead  to  the 
attainment  of  the  highest  good. 

II.  Critical  Solution  of  the  Antinomy. 

The  solution  of  this  antinomy  is  of  the  same  nature  as 
the  solution  of  the  antinomy  of  pure  speculative  reason. 
The  first  of  the  two  propositions,  namely,  that  virtue  is 
the  result  of  the  search  for  happiness,  is  absolutely  false. 
The  second  proposition,  however,  is  not  absolutely  false, 
but  is  untrue  only  if  virtue  is  regarded  as  a form  of 
causality  in  the  world  of  sense.  In  that  case  it  is  assumed 
that  a rational  being  can  exist  only  as  a sensuous  being, 

1 21  and  the  proposition  is  therefore  conditionally  false.  Not 
only  can  I think  of  my  existence  as  a noumenon  in  the 
world  of  intelligence,  but  in  the  moral  law  I have  a purely 
ntellectual  principle  which  is  capable  of  determining  my 
causality  as  manifested  in  the  world  of  sense.  There  is, 
therefore,  nothing  impossible  in  the  idea  that  ajnoral ' 
disposition  should  necessarily  be  the  cause  of  happiness, 
not  indeed  directly,  but  indirectly,  or  through  the  medium 
of  an  intelligenTAuthor  of  nature.  Yet,  though  happiness 


294  the  philosophy  of  kant. 

might  thus  be  an  effect  of  virtue  in  the  world  of  sense,  the 
connection  of  virtue  and  happiness  in  a system  of  nature, 
which  is  merely  an  object  of  the  senses,  cannot  be  other 
than  contingent,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  established  in 
the  way  required  in  the  conception  of  the  highest  good. 

In  spite  of  the  apparent  self-contradiction  of  practical 
reason,  the  highest  good  is  necessarily  the  ultimate  end 
and  the  true  object  of  a moral  will.  For  the  highest 
good  is  practically  possible,  and  the  maxims  of  the  will, 
which  are  related  to  it  on  the  side  of  their  matter,  have 
objective  reality.  This  reality  was  at  first  brought  into 
doubt  by  an  antinomy  in  regard  to  the  connection  of 
morality  and  happiness  in  accordance  with  a universal 
law;  but  the  antinomy  arose  simply  from  the  false 
assumption  that  things  in  themselves  are  related  to 
phenomena  in  the  same  way  as  phenomena  are  related 
to  one  another. 

28'  IV.  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 

The  object  of  a will  that  is  capable  of  being  determined 
by  the  moral  law,  is  the  production  in  the  world  of  the 
highest  good.  Now,  the  supreme  condition  of  the  highest 
good  is  the  perfect  harmony  of  the  disposition  with  the 
moral  law.  Such  a harmony  must  be  possible,  not  less 
than  the  object  of  the  will,  for  it  is  implied  in  the 
command  to  promote  that  object.  Perfect  harmony  of 
the  will  with  the  moral  law  is  holiness,  a perfection  of 
which  no  rational  being  existing  in  the  world  of  sense 
is  capable  at  any  moment  of  his  life.  Yet  holiness  is 
demanded  as  practically  necessary,  and  it  can  be  found 
only  in  an  infinite  progress  towards  perfect  harmony 
with  the  moral  law.  Pure  practical  reason  therefore 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  295 

forces  us  to  assume  such  a practical  progress  towards 
perfection  as  the  real  object  of  our  will. 

Now,  this  infinite  progress  is  possible  only  if  we  pre- 
suppose that  the  existence  of  a rational  being  is  prolonged 
to  infinity,  and  that  he  retains  his  personality  for  all  time. 
This  is  what  we  mean  by  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
The  highest  good  is  therefore  practically  possible,  only  if 
we  presuppose  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  Thus 
immortality  is  inseparably  bound  up  with  the  moral  law. 
It  is  a postulate  of  pure  practical  reason,  that  is,  a pro- 
position that  cannot  be  proved  theoretically , but  depends 
upon  an  a priori  practical  law  of  unconditioned  validity. 

129  A finite  rational  being  is  capable  only  of  an  infinite 
progress  from  lower  to  higher  stages  of  moral  perfection. 
The  Infinite  Being,  who  is  free  from  the  limits  of  time, 
sees  in  this  series,  which  for  us  has  no  end,  a whole  that 
is  in  harmony  with  the  moral  law.  Holiness  He  demands 
inexorably  as  a duty  in  order  to  assign  to  everyone  his 
exact  share  in  the  highest  good  ; and  this  holiness  lies 
completely  before  Him  in  a single  intellectual  perception 
of  rational  beings.  Created  beings  can  hope  to  share  in 
the  highest  good  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  conscious  of 
having  stood  the  test  of  the  moral  law.  If  in  the  past 
they  have  advanced  from  lower  to  higher  degrees  of 
morality,  and  have  thus  proved  the  strength  of  their 
resolution,  they  may  hope  to  make  unbroken  progress  in 
the  future  as  long  as  they  live  here,  and  even  beyond  the 
present  life.  They  can  never  hope  in  this  life,  or,  indeed, 
at  any  imaginable  point  of  time  in  the  future  life,  to  be  in 

130  perfect  harmony  with  the  will  of  God,  but  they  may  hope 
for  this  harmony  in  the  infinite  duration  of  their  existence 
as  it  is  surveyed  by  God  alone. 


296 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OE  KANT. 


V The  Existence  of  God. 

The  moral  law  leads  us  to  postulate  not  only  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  but  the  existence  of  God. 
For  it  shows  us  how  happiness  in  proportion  to  morality, 
which  is  the  second  element  of  the  highest  good,  is 
possible,  and  to  postulate  it  for  reasons  as  perfectly  dis- 
interested as  in  the  former  case.  This  second  postulate 
of  the  existence  of  God  rests  upon  the  necessity  of 
presupposing  the  existence  of  a cause  adequate  to  the 
effect  which  has  to  be  explained. 

Happiness  is  the  state  of  a rational  being  existing  in 
the  world  who  experiences  through  the  whole  of  his  life 
whatever  he  desires  and  wills.  It,  therefore,  presupposes 
that  nature  is  in  harmony  with  his  whole  end,  as  well  as 
with  the  essential  principles  by  which  his  will  is 
determined.  Now,  the  moral  law,  being  a law  of  free 
beings,  commands  us  to  act  from  motives  that  are  entirely 
independent  of  nature  and  of  the  harmony  of  nature  with 
our  desires.  But  a rational  agent  in  the  world  is  not 
the  cause  of  the  world  and  of  nature  itself.  There  is  no 
reason  whatever,  in  the  case  of  a being  who  is  a part  of 
the  world  and  is  dependent  upon  it,  why  the  moral  law 
should  imply  a necessary  connection  between  happiness 
and  morality  proportionate  to  happiness.  For  the  will  of 
such  a being  is  not  the  cause  of  nature,  and  therefore  he 
1 has  no  power  to  bring  nature  into  complete  harmony  vTith 
his  principles  of  action.  At  the  same  time,  in  the  practical 
problem  of  pure  reason,  that  is,  in  the  necessary  pursuit 
of  the  highest  good,  such  a connection  is  postulated  as 
necessary.  He  ought  to  seek  to  promote  the  highest 
good,  and  therefore  the  highest  good  must  be  possible. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON. 


297 


He  must  therefore  postulate  the  existence  of  a cause  of 
nature  as  a whole,  which  is  distinct  from  nature,  and 
which  is  able  to  connect  happiness  and  morality  in  exact 
harmony  with  each  other.  Now,  this  supreme  cause  must 
be  the  ground  of  the  harmony  of  nature,  not  simply  with 
a law  of  the  will  of  a rational  being,  but  also  with  the 
consciousness  of  this  law  in  so  far  as  it  is  made  the 
supreme  principle  of  the  agent’s  will.  That  cause  must 
therefore  be  in  harmony  not  merely  with  the  form  of 
morality,  but  with  morality  as  willed  by  a rational  being, 
that  is,  with  his  moral  character.  The  highest  good  is 
thus  capable  of  being  realized  in  the  world,  only  if  there 
exists  a supreme  cause  of  nature  whose  causality  is  in 
harmony  with  the  moral  character  of  the  agent.  Now,  a 
being  that  is  capable  of  acting  from  the  consciousness  of 
law  is  a rational  being,  an  intelligence,  and  the  causality 
of  that  being,  proceeding  as  it  does  from  the  consciousness 
of  law,  is  a will.  There  is  therefore  implied,  in  the  idea 
of  the  highest  good,  a being  who  is  the  supreme  cause  of 
nature,  and  who  is  the  cause  or  author  of  nature  through 
his  intelligence  and  will,  that  is,  God.  If,  therefore,  we 
are  entitled  to  postulate  the  highest  derivative  good,  or  the 
best  world,  we  must  also  postulate  the  actual  existence  of 
the  highest  original  good,  that  is,  the  existence  of  God. 
Now,  it  is  our  duty  to  promote  the  highest  good,  and 
hence  it  is  not  only  allowable,  but  it  is  necessarily  bound 
up  with  the  very  idea  of  duty,  that  we  should  presuppose 
the  possibility  of  this  highest  good.  And  as  this  possi- 
bility can  be  established  only  under  condition  that  God 
exists,  the  presupposition  of  the  highest  good  is  inseparably 
connected  with  duty,  or,  in  other  words,  jj  is  morally 
necessary  to  hold  the  existence  of  God. 


298 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


38  VI.  The  Postulates  of  Pure  Practical  Reason. 

The  postulates  of  pure  practical  reason  are  not  theor- 
etical dogmas,  but  presuppositions  which  are  practically 
necessary.  They  do  not  enlarge  our  speculative  know- 
ledge, but  give  objective  reality  to  the  ideas  of  speculative 
reason  in  general,  and  justify  it  in  the  use  of  conceptions 
which  it  could  not  otherwise  venture  to  regard  as  even 
possible. 

These  postulates  are  immortality,  freedom  (in  the 
positive  sense,  as  the  causality  of  a being  who  belongs 
to  the  intelligible  world),  and  the  existence  of  God.  The 
first  rests  upon  the  practically  necessary  condition,  that 
existence  should  continue  long  enough  to  permit  of  the 
complete  realization  of  the  moral  law.  The  second  arises 
from  the  necessary  presupposition  of  man’s  independence 
of  the  world  of  sense,  and  his  capability  of  determining 
his  will  in  conformity  with  the  law  of  an  intelligible 
world,  that  is,  the  law  of  freedom.  The  third  depends 
upon  the  necessity  of  presupposing  a supreme,  self- 
existent  good,  that  is,  the  existence  of  God,  as  the 
condition  under  which  the  highest  good  may  be  realized 
in  such  an  intelligible  world. 

Our  reverence  for  the  moral  law  necessarily  compels 
us  to  seek  for  the  realization  of  the  highest  good,  and 
hence  the  reality  of  the  highest  good  must  be  presup- 
posed. By  means  of  the  postulates  of  practical  reason* 
we  are  brought  to  conceptions,  which  speculative  reason 

39  no  doubt  set  up  as  problems  to  be  solved,  but  which  it 
was  itself  unable  to  solve.  The  first  conception  is  that 
of  immortality.  This  conception  involved  speculative 
reason  in  paralogisms ; for  it  could  find  no  trace  of  the 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  299 

permanence  required  for  the  conversion  of  the  psycho- 
logical conception  of  an  ultimate  subject  into  the  real 
consciousness  of  a substance.  Practical  reason  supplies 
what  is  required,  by  the  postulate  of  a duration  adequate 
to  the  complete  realization  of  the  moral  law  in  the  highest 
good.  It  leads,  secondly,  to  the  cosmological  idea  of  an 
intelligible  world  and  the  consciousness  of  our  existence 
in  that  world.  This  idea  involved  speculative  reason  in 
an  antinomy , for  the  solution  of  which  it  had  to  fall  back 
upon  a problematic  conception,  the  objective  reality  of 
which  it  could  not  prove.  But  practical  reason,  by  means 
of  the  postulate  of  freedom,  shows  that  idea  to  have 
objective  reality.  Lastly,  practical  reason  brings  us  to 
the  conception  of  a Supreme  Being.  This  conception 
speculative  reason  was  able  to  think,  but  it  could  not 
show  it  to  be  more  than  a transcendental  ideal.  Practi- 
cal reason,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  meaning  to  this  idea, 
by  showing  that  a Supreme  Being  is  the  supreme  principle 
of  the  highest  good  in  an  intelligible  world,  and  is 
endowed  with  the  sovereign  power  of  prescribing  moral 
laws  in  that  world. 

Is  our  knowledge,  then,  actually  enlarged  by  practical 
reason  ? Is  that  which  for  speculative  reason  is  tran- 
scendent  for  practical  reason  immanent  ? Undoubtedly  it 
is,  but  only  in  relation  to  action.  Practical  reason 
cannot  give  us  a theoretical  knowledge  of  our  own  soul,  of 
the  intelligible  world,  or  of  a Supreme  Being,  as  these  are 
in  themselves.  All  that  it  can  do  is  to  unite  the  concep- 
tion of  them  in  the  practical  conception  of  the  highest 
good,  which  is  the  object  of  our  will,  and  to  unite  them 
entirely  a priori  through  pure  reason.  This  union  is 
effected  only  through  the  medium  of  the  moral  law,  and 


3°° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


merely  in  relation  to  that  which  it  commands  with  a view 
to  the  highest  good.  For  we  cannot  understand  how 
freedom  is  possible,  or  how  a free  cause  would  appear  to 
us  if  it  were  theoretically  and  positively  known  ; all  that 
we  can  say  is,  that  a free  cause  is  postulated  by  the  moral 
140  law  and  for  the  sake  of  the  moral  law.  The  same  remark 
applies  to  the  other  ideas.  No  human  intelligence  can 
ever  understand  how  immortality  and  the  existence  of 
God  are  possible  ; but,  on  the  other  hand,  no  sophistry 
will  ever  destroy  the  faith  of  even  the  most  unreflective 
man  in  their  reality. 


VII.  Possibility  of  an  extension  of  Pure  Practical  Reason 
without  a corresponding  extension  of  Pure  Speculative 
Reason. 

14 1 It  is  true  that  the  three  ideas  of  freedom,  immortality, 
and  God,  are  not  knowledge,  but  at  least  they  are 
thoughts  the  objects  of  which  are  not  impossible.  They 
are  necessary  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  that  which 
an  apodictic  practical  law  commands  us  to  make  our 
object,  and  in  this  sense  they  have  objective  reality. 
They  indicate  that  they  have  objects , although  we  cannot 
learn  from  them  how  they  are  related  to  these  objects. 
We  can  make  no  synthetical  judgments  in  regard  to 
them,  nor  can  we  determine  theoretically  how  they  are 
to  be  applied,  and  hence  we  cannot  be  said  to  have  any 
knowledge  of  them.  Reason  cannot  make  a theoretical 
use  of  them,  which  is  the  same  as  saying  that  they  are 
not  known  by  speculative  reason.  But,  while  the  ideas 
of  practical  reason  do  not  enlarge  our  theoretical  know- 
ledge, the  sphere  of  reason  itself  is  in  this  sense  enlarged, 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  30 1 

that  by  means  of  practical  postulates  we  learn  that  there 
are  objects  corresponding  to  those  ideas.  Conceptions 
which  before  were  problematic  thus  obtain  objective 
reality.  No  extension  of  our  knowledge  of  supersensible 
objects  has  taken  place,  but  there  has  been  an  extension 
of  theoretical  reason  and  of  our  knowledge  of  the  super- 
sensible in  general,  in  so  far  as  reason  has  been  forced 
to  admit  that  there  are  such  objects,  though  nothing 
definite  is  known  in  regard  to  them.  Even  for  this 
relative  extension  of  its  sphere  reason  is  indebted  entirely 
to  its  pure  practical  faculty. 

T43  If  these  ideas  of  God,  an  intelligible  world  or  kingdom 
of  God,  and  immortality,  are  further  determined  by 
predicates  borrowed  from  the  nature  of  man,  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  have  fallen  into  an  anthropomorphism, 
which  makes  pure  ideas  of  reason  sensuous,  or  that  in 
claiming  a knowledge  of  supersensible  objects  our  idea 
becomes  transcendent.  For  the  predicates  of  which  we 
make  use  are  those  of  intelligence  and  will,  and  these  we 
conceive  of  as  related  to  each  other  simply  in  the  way 
that  the  idea  of  the  moral  law  demands.  Hence  we 
make  only  a pure  practical  use  of  them.  Abstraction  is 
made  from  all  the  predicates  which  are  connected  with 
these  conceptions  psychologically,  and  are  learned  from 
the  observation  of  our  faculties  of  understanding  and  will. 
Of  a Supreme  Being,  for  instance,  we  cannot  say,  as  we 
can  say  of  man,  that  His  understanding  is  discursive, 
and  therefore  deals  directly  only  with  conceptions,  not 
with  perceptions ; that  His  perceptions  follow  one 
another  in  time ; that  His  will  is  always  dependent  for 
satisfaction  upon  the  existence  of  the  object  to  which  it 
is  directed,  etc.  Now,  when  abstraction  has  been  made 


302 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


from  such  predicates  as  these,  the  only  predicates  that 
are  left  are  those  which  belong  to  the  idea  of  a pure 
intelligence,  in  other  words,  those  that  are  implied  in  the 
mere  thought  of  a moral  law.  Thus  we  have  indeed  a 
knowledge  of  God,  but  only  in  a practical  relation.  If 
we  try  to  extend  our  knowledge  to  a theoretical  relation, 
we  get  the  idea  of  an  intelligence  which  does  not  think 
but  perceives,  and  a will  which  is  directed  to  objects 
upon  the  existence  of  which  its  own  satisfaction  does  not 
in  the  least  depend.  But  these  are  all  attributes  of  which 
we  can  form  no  conception  that  enables  us  to  have  a 
knowledge  of  a Supreme  Intelligence;  and  from  this  we 
learn,  that  they  can  never  be  made  use  of  in  a theory  of 
supersensible  beings,  but  must  be  limited  in  their  use  to 
the  practice  of  the  moral  law. 


48  VIII.  Faith  as  a Need  of  Pure  Reason. 

A need  of  pure  practical  reason  arises  from  the  duty  of 
making  the  highest  good  the  object  of  will,  and  seeking 
to  promote  it  with  all  one’s  power.  The  possibility  of  this 
highest  good  has  therefore  to  be  presupposed,  as  well  as 
the  conditions  without  which  it  would  not  be  possible, 
namely,  God,  freedom,  and  immortality.  The  duty  of  pro- 
moting the  highest  good  is  in  itself  apodictically  certain, 
and  is  entirely  independent  of  the  other  presuppositions. 
The  idea  of  duty  thus  stands  in  need  of  no  support  from 
any  theory  of  the  inner  nature  of  things,  the  hidden  pur- 
pose of  the  world’s  history,  or  the  existence  of  a Supreme 

49  Ruler,  to  show  that  it  is  binding  upon  us  in  the  most 
absolute  sense,  and  that  we  ought  to  act  in  conformity 
with  it.  But  the  influence  upon  the  agent  of  the  moral 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON.  303 

law,  that  is,  the  disposition  which  it  produces  in  him 
to  promote  the  highest  good  that  can  be  practically 
realized  by  us,  presupposes  at  the  very  least  that  the 
highest  good  is  possible.  If  it  were  not  possible,  we 
should  be  trying  to  realize  practically  what  could  not 
be -realized,  and  to  give  effect  to  an  idea  that  was  empty 
r and  without  any  object.  Thus  the  principle  which  deter- 
mines a moral  judgment  is  no  doubt  subjective  in  relation 
to  us ; but,  inasmuch  as  it  is  also  the  means  by  which 
an  object  that  is  practically  necessary  may  be  promoted, 
it  is  also  the  foundation  of  all  beliefs  which  possess 
moral  certitude.  That  principle,  therefore,  takes  the  form 
of  a faith  or  conviction  of  pure  practical  reason. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 


3°7 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 

J 77  INTRODUCTION. 

I.  Division  of  Philosophy. 

The  object  of  philosophy  is  to  search  for  the  principles 
by  which  reason  may  obtain  a true  knowledge  of  things. 
Now,  we  may  conceive  of  objects  either  from  the  theor- 
etical or  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  and  hence  the 
ordinary  division  of  philosophy  into  theoretical  and  practical 
is  perfectly  correct.  But,  in  making  this  division,  we 
must  be  sure  that  the  conceptions  upon  which  the  distinc- 
tion of  principles  rests  are  themselves  distinct. 

There  are  two,  and  only  two,  classes  of  conception  by 
reference  to  which  a distinction  may  be  made  in  the 
principles  of  philosophy.  These  are  conceptions  of  nature 
and  the  conception  of  freedom.  The  former  are  the  con- 
dition of  theoretical  knowledge  in  conformity  with  a priori 
principles  ; the  latter  in  itself  supplies  merely  a negative 
principle  of  theoretical  knowledge,  but  it  is  the  source  of 
principles  which  enlarge  the  sphere  of  the  will,  and  which 
are  therefore  called  practical.  Philosophy  has  thus  two 
main  divisions,  theoretical  philosophy  or  the  philosophy 
of  nature,  and  practical  or  moral  philosophy.  But  these 
terms  have  hitherto  been  grossly  misapplied,  both  in  the 
division  of  the  principles  of  philosophy  and  in  the 
178  division  of  philosophy  itself.  For  it  has  been  as- 


3°8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


sumed  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  what  is 
called  “practical”  in  the  sphere  of  nature,  and  what 
is  “practical”  relatively  to  the  idea  of  freedom.  Now, 
this  confusion  between  two  perfectly  distinct  conceptions 
has  made  the  division  of  philosophy  into  theoretical  and 
practical  unmeaning,  inasmuch  as  the  same  principle  is 
assumed  to  apply  to  both  spheres. 

The  will  as  a faculty  of  desire  is  simply  one  of  the 
many  causes  in  the  world  of  nature,  namely,  that  cause 
which  acts  from  conceptions.  All  that  is  possible  or 
necessary  through  will  is  said  to  be  practically  possible 
or  practically  necessary,  and  with  this  is  contrasted  that 
which  is  physically  possible  or  necessary,  that  is,  whatever 
is  the  effect  of  a cause  which  acts,  not  by  means  of  concep- 
tions, but  by  the  mechanism  of  lifeless  matter,  or  by  animal 
instinct.  But  this  in  no  way  settles  the  question,  whether 
it  is  a conception  of  nature,  or  an  idea  of  freedom, 
which  gives  the  rule  when  the  will  acts  as  a cause. 

The  distinction,  however,  is  of  the  greatest  conse- 
quence. For,  if  a conception  of  nature  determines  the 
will,  the  principles  are  technically  practical  ; whereas,  if 
the  will  is  determined  by  the  idea  of  freedom,  the 
principles  are  morally  practical.  And  as  the  divisions  of 
a science  of  reason  are  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
principles  on  which  each  rests,  the  former  will  belong  to 
theoretical  philosophy  or  the  science  of  nature,  the  latter 
to  practical  philosophy  or  the  science  of  morality. 

All  technically  practical  rules  of  art  and  skill,  or  of 
that  practical  sagacity  which  gives  us  a command  over 
men  and  enables  us  to  influence  their  wills,  so  far  as 
their  principles  rest  on  conceptions,  must  be  regarded  as 
corollaries  of  theoretical  philosophy Only  as 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.  309 

179  standing  under  the  conception  of  freedom  is  the  will  free 
from  nature,  and  hence  the  laws  of  freedom  together  with 
their  consequences  alone  constitute  practical  philosophy. 
The  practical  arts  of  surveying,  housekeeping,  farming, 
statesmanship,  dietetics,  etc.,  and  even  the  precepts  by 
which  happiness  may  be  attained,  are  merely  technically 
practical  rules.  Only  those  rules  which  rest  on  the  idea 
of  freedom  are  morally  practical.  For  such  rules  are  laws 
which  do  not,  like  those  of  nature,  rest  upon  sensuous 
conditions,  but,  on  the  contrary,  upon  a supersensible 
principle  ; and  hence  they  form  a separate  branch  of 
philosophy,  which  is  properly  called  practical  philosophy. 


1S0  II  The  Realm  of  Philosophy. 

The  term  field  simply  indicates  the  general  relation  of 
an  object  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  no  matter  whether 
the  conception  of  that  object  makes  knowledge  of  it 
possible  or  not.  That  part  of  a field  in  which  knowledge 
is  possible,  is  a solid  ground  or  territory  ( territorium ) for 
conceptions  and  their  appropriate  faculty.  That  part  of 
the  territory,  again,  for  which  laws  are  prescribed  in  con- 
ceptions, is  the  domain  or  realm  fiitio)  of  these  concep- 
tions and  their  correspondent  faculty.  Empirical  concep- 
tions have,  therefore,  nature,  as  the  sum  of  sensible 
objects,  for  their  territory ; but  that  territory  is  for  them 
not  a realm  but  merely  a dwelling-place  ( domicilium ),  for 
although  they  are  under  law  they  are  not  themselves 
the  source  of  law,  and  hence  the  rules  based  upon  them 
are  empirical  or  contingent. 

r8i  Although  understanding  and  reason  operate  on  the 
same  territory  of  experience,  their  laws  are  distinct,  and 


3io 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


do  not  interfere  with  each  other.  The  conceptions  that 
are  applicable  to  nature  have  as  little  influence  on  the 
law  of  freedom  as  the  latter  on  the  former.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  sensible  world  each  realm  is  perpetually 
limited  by  the  other,  but  in  their  laws  they  are  quite 
independent.  The  reason  why  they  do  not  constitute 
one  realm  is  that  the  conception  of  nature  has  a meaning 
only  in  relation  to  objects  of  perception  or  phenomena, 
not  in  relation  to  things  in  themselves ; while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  object  of  freedom  is  intelligible  as  a 
thing  in  itself,  but  cannot  be  given  in  a perception. 
There  can,  therefore,  be  no  theoretical  knowledge  of 
either  realm  as  a thing  in  itself,  or  supersensible  object. 

The  whole  unlimited  field  of  the  supersensible  thus 
lies  entirely  beyond  our  knowledge,  and  affords  no  solid 
ground,  and  therefore  no  realm,  either  for  understanding 
or  for  reason.  This  field  we  must  indeed  occupy  with 
1S2  ideas  in  the  interest  of  theoretical  as  well  as  of  practical 
reason,  but  we  can  produce  no  other  warrant  for  our 
occupation  of  it  than  a practical  one,  and  so  far  as 
theoretical  knowledge  is  concerned  the  supersensible 
therefore  remains  as  far  beyond  our  reach  as  ever. 

Between  the  sensible  realm  of  nature  and  the  super- 
sensible realm  of  freedom  a gulf  is  fixed,  which  is  as 
impassable  by  theoretical  reason  as  if  they  formed  two 
separate  worlds.  Yet  it  lies  in  the  very  idea  of  freedom 
to  realize  in  the  world  of  sense  the  end  presented  in  its 
laws,  and  hence  nature,  in  its  formal  aspect  as  conform- 
able to  law,  must  at  least  be  capable  of  harmonizing  with 
that  end.  There  must,  then,  be  a principle  which  unites 
the  supersensible  substrate  of  nature  with  the  supersen- 
sible, that  is  involved  practically  in  the  conception 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 


31 1 


of  freedom.  And  although  that  principle  does  not  lead 
to  a knowledge  of  the  supersensible,  and  hence  has  no 
realm  peculiarly  its  own,  it  yet  enables  the  mind  to  make 
the  transition  from  the  theoretical  to  the  practical  point 
of  view. 

III.  The  Critique  of  Judgment  as  connecting  link  between 
the  two  divisions  of  Philosophy. 

183  There  are  three  absolutely  irreducible  faculties  of  the 
mind,  namely,  knowledge,  feeling,  and  desire.  The 
laws  which  govern  the  theoretical  knowledge  of  nature 

184  as  a phenomenon,  understanding  supplies  in  its  pure 

185  a priori  conceptions.  The  laws  to  which  desire  must 
conform,  are  prescribed  a priori  by  reason  in  the  con- 
ception of  freedom.  Between  knowledge  and  desire 
stands  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain,  just  as  judgment 
mediates  between  understanding  and  reason.  We  must, 
therefore,  suppose  that  judgment  has  an  a priori  principle 
of  its  own,  which  is  distinct  from  the  principles  of 
understanding  and  reason.  And  as  pleasure  or  pain  is 
necessarily  associated  with  desire,  either  preceding  it  as 
in  «he  lower  desires  or  following  it  when  desire  is  deter- 
mined by  relation  to  the  moral  law,  we  must  further 
suppose  that  judgment  makes  possible  the  transition 
from  mere  knowledge  or  the  realm  of  nature  to  the  realm 
of  freedom,  as,  in  its  logical  use,  it  makes  possible  the 
transition  from  understanding  to  reason. 

IV.  Judgment  as  a Faculty  of  a priori  Laws. 

Judgment  in  general  is  the  faculty  of  thinking  the  par- 
ticular as  contained  under  the  universal.  If  the  universal, 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


that  is,  the  rule,  principle,  or  law,  is  given,  the  judgment 
which  subsumes  the  particular  under  it  is  determinant. 
But  if  only  the  particular  is  given,  for  which  the  universal 
has  to  be  found,  the  judgment  is  merely  reflective. 
rSu  The  determinant  judgment  subsumes  particulars  under 
the  universal  transcendental  laws  supplied  by  the  under- 
standing, and  has  no  need  to  seek  for  a law  of  its  own  by 
means  of  which  the  particulars  of  nature  may  be  brought 
under  the  universal.  But  nature  has  many  forms,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  modifications  of  the  universal  trans- 
cendental conceptions,  and  the  former  are  unaffected 
by  the  latter,  which  are  but  the  general  conditions, 
without  which  nature  as  a sensible  object  would  not 
be  possible  at  all.  There  must,  therefore,  be  laws 
for  those  forms  also,  and  such  laws,  as  being  empirical, 
may  be  contingent  so  far  as  our  intelligence  is  concerned, 
and  may  yet  be  regarded  as  following  necessarily  from  a 
principle,  which  is  the  condition  of  the  unity  of  the 
multifarious  forms  of  nature,  though  it  is  unknown  to  us. 
The  reflective  judgment,  which  is  compelled  to  ascend 
from  the  particular  to  the  universal,  therefore  requires  a 
principle  of  its  own  ; and  that  principle  it  cannot  borrow 
from  experience,  because  its  function  is  just  to  unite  all 
empirical  principles  under  higher  ones,  and  so  to  make 
their  systematic  connection  possible. 

The  principle  of  judgment  as  reflective  must  therefore 
be  conceived  as  if  it  were  a unity  imposed  on  nature  by 
an  intelligence  different  from  ours,  with  a view  to  the 
reduction  of  our  knowledge  of  nature  to  a system  of 
particular  laws.  We  cannot,  however,  assert  that  there 
actually  is  an  intelligence  of  this  kind,  for  judgment  does 
not  give  a law  to  nature  but  only  to  itself. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.  3 1 3 

187  Now  a conception  which  contains  the  ground  of  the 
actuality  of  an  object  is  an  end , and  by  the  agreement  of 
a thing  with  a character  which  is  only  possible  in  accord- 
ance with  ends,  we  mean  that  its  form  implies  purpose. 
The  principle  of  judgment,  in  its  relation  to  the  forms  of 
things  which  come  under  empirical  laws  in  general,  is 
thus  the  idea  that  in  all  its  manifold  variety  nature  is 
purposive.  That  is  to  say,  nature  is  conceived  as  if  the 
unity  of  its  manifold  empirical  laws  were  due  to  an 
intelligence. 

V.  The  Principle  that  the  Form  of  Nature  implies  Purpose 
is  a Transcendental  Principle  of  Judgment. 

A transcendental  principle  of  judgment  is  one  which 
enables  us  to  think  a priori  the  universal  condition 
without  which  things  could  not  be  objects  of  our  know- 
ledge at  all.  A metaphysical  principle,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  one  through  which  we  think  a priori  the  condition 
without  which  objects,  the  conception  of  which  must  be 
given  empirically,  cannot  be  further  determined  a priori. 
Thus  the  principle,  that  the  changes  of  empirical 
substances  must  have  a cause,  is  transcendental ; but  if 
we  say  that  their  changes  must  have  an  external  cause,  the 
principle  is  metaphysical.  In  the  former  case,  such 
merely  ontological  predicates,  or  pure  conceptions,  as 
substance  are  employed  ; in  the  latter  case,  the  empirical 
conception  of  a body  as  a movable  thing  in  space  is 
88  required,  although  when  this  has  once  been  obtained, 
the  predicate  of  motion  under  the  influence  of  external 
causes  may  be  deduced  quite  a priori.  Now,  the 
principle  that  nature  is  purposive,  is  a transcendental 
principle.  For  the  conception  of  objects,  so  far  as 


314 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


they  are  thought  as  standing  under  this  principle,  is 
merely  the  pure  conception  of  objects  of  possible 
experience  in  general,  and  therefore  contains  nothing 
empirical.  But  the  principle  that  actions  are  purposive, 
which  is  implied  in  the  idea  of  the  determination  of  a 
free  will,  is  a metaphysical  principle,  because  the  concep- 
tion of  desire  must  be  given  empirically.  At  the  same 
time  neither  principle  is  empirical,  but  both  are  a priori , 
for  the  predicate  may  be  connected  with  the  empirical 
conception  that  forms  the  subject  of  the  judgment 
completely  a priori , and  without  any  new  experience. 

The  conception  that  nature  is  purposive  is  a transcen- 
dental principle.  This  is  sufficiently  obvious  from  the 
a priori  maxims  of  judgment  which  are  employed  in 
scientific  inquiries  into  the  specific  laws  of  nature  Such 
maxims  are  continually  applied  as  occasion  demands,  in 
the  shape  of  axioms  of  metaphysical  wisdom  : “ Nature 
takes  the  shortest  way  (lex parsimoniae)  ” ; “Nature  makes 
no  leaps  ( lex  continui  in  natura ) ” ; “ Nature  has  many 
laws,  but  few  principles  (principia  praeter  necessitatem  non 
sunt  multiplicanda ),”  etc. 

To  attempt  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  these 
propositions  psychologically,  is  to  go  straight  against 
their  sense.  For  they  do  not  tell  us  what  happens,  that 
189  is,  by  what  rule  our  faculties  operate  or  how  we  actually 
judge,  but  they  prescribe  how  we  should  judge  ; and  a 
logical  necessity  of  this  sort  is  inexplicable  if  those 
principles  are  merely  empirical.  The  idea  that  nature  is 
purposive,  is  therefore  a transcendental  principle  and 
requires  a transcendental  deduction. 

That  which  is  at  once  seen  to  be  necessary  by  the 
principles  which  make  experience  possible,  are  the 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.  315 

universal  laws,  without  which  nature,  as  an  object  of 
sense,  is  not  conceivable  at  all  ; and  these  laws  rest  on 
the  categories  in  their  application  to  the  formal  a priori 
conditions  of  all  experience  that  we  can  possibly  have. 

In  relation  to  these  laws  judgment  is  determinant,  its 
sole  function  being  to  subsume  particulars  under  the  laws 
given  to  it.  Thus  understanding  says,  that  every  change 
has  a cause,  or  it  lays  down  a universal  law  of  nature. 
Transcendental  judgment,  on  the  other  hand,  merely 
presents  the  a priori  condition  on  which  subsumption 
under  the  conception  placed  before  it  by  understanding 
takes  place,  namely,  succession  in  the  determinations  of 
one  and  the  same  thing.  The  law  of  causality  is  therefore 
known  to  be  an  absolutely  necessary  condition  of  nature 
as  an  object  of  possible  experience.  But  the  objects  of 
empirical  knowledge  are  determined  in  many  other  ways 
than  by  the  formal  condition  of  time  ; at  any  rate  we 
may  say  a priori  that  they  are  at  least  capable  of  being 
determined  in  many  other  ways.  Hence  the  specific 
forms  of  nature  may  be  causes,  not  only  in  virtue  of  their 
common  character  as  belonging  to  nature  in  general,  but 
in  an  infinite  variety  of  ways  ; and  each  species  of  cause 
must  have  its  own  necessary  rule  or  law,  although  the 
nature  and  limits  of  our  knowledge  may  prevent  us  from 
comprehending  the  necessity  of  the  rule.  We  must, 
therefore,  suppose  the  empirical  laws  of  nature  to  be 
possibly  infinitely  various,  and  to  be  for  us  contingent  or 
incapable  of  being  known  a priori.  So  far  as  these 
empirical  laws  are  concerned,  nature,  as  a possible  unity 
of  experience  or  a system  of  laws,  must  accordingly  be 
regarded  as  contingent.  Yet  we  must  presuppose  and 
assume  such  a unity,  for  otherwise  the  thoroughgoing 


3l6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


connection  of  empirical  knowledge  in  a whole  of  experi- 
ence would  be  impossible.  The  universal  laws  of  nature 
no  doubt  enable  us  to  connect  things  in  a system,  so  far 
as  they  are  viewed  as  belonging  to  nature  in  the  most 
general  sense  of  the  term,  but  not  to  connect  them 
in  their  specific  character  as  particular  modes  of  nature. 
Judgment  must  therefore  assume  a priori,  as  a principle 
required  for  its  own  use,  that  what  in  the  empirical  laws 
of  nature  is  from  our  human  point  of  view  contingent,  yet 
involves  a unity  in  the  connection  of  the  multifarious  laws 
of  nature,  that  are  capable  of  being  experienced,  a unity 
which  can  certainly  be  thought  although  it  cannot  be 
comprehended  by  us.  Now,  a unity  which  is  demanded  by 
our  intelligence,  but  which  is  known  as  in  itself  contingent, 
necessarily  presents  itself  to  us  as  the  idea  that  objects 
are  purposive.  Hence  judgment,  in  relation  to  things 
that  may  stand  under  empirical  laws  not  yet  discovered, 
is  merely  reflective,  and  is  compelled  to  think  of  nature 
as  in  its  special  laws  purposive  as  regards  our  knowledge, 
a principle  which  is  expressed  in  such  maxims  of  judg- 
ment as  those  that  were  cited  above.  This  transcen- 
dental conception  of  purpose  in  nature  is  neither  a 
conception  of  nature  nor  of  freedom,  for  it  attributes 
nothing  to  nature  as  an  object,  but  merely  represents 
the  way  in  which  we  must  necessarily  proceed 
in  reflecting  on  natural  objects,  with  a view  to  a 
thoroughly  connected  experience.  It  is,  therefore,  a 
maxim  or  subjective  principle  of  judgment. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 


317 


193  VI.  The  Feeling  of  Pleasure  connected  with  the  Conception 

that  Nature  is  Purposive. 

The  reduction  of  the  special  laws  of  nature  to  unity  of 
principle  is  an  end  which  understanding  necessarily  seeks 
to  secure.  With  the  attainment  of  that  end  there  arises 
a feeling  of  pleasure  which  is  determined  by  a ground  a 
priori  for  everyone,  and  indeed  from  the  mere  adaptation 

194  of  the  object  to  our  faculty  of  knowledge.  . . • The  dis- 
covery that  two  or  more  heterogeneous  laws  of  nature 
may  be  combined  in  a common  principle  gives  rise  to  a 
very  marked  pleasure,  and  often  to  a feeling  of  wonder 
that  even  familiarity  does  not  destroy. 


195  VII  The  NPsthetic  Consciousness  of  Purpose  in  Nature. 

The  sesthetic  character  of  an  idea  is  determined  solely 
by  its  relation  to  the  subject;  its  logical  validity  has 
reference  to  the  object  as  capable  of  being  known.  In 
the  apprehension  of  a sensible  object  both  relations  are 
implied.  In  the  presentation  of  objects  as  outside  of  me, 
their  spacial  quality  is  merely  a subjective  element  of  my 
perception,  and  they  are  accordingly  thought  of  simply  as 
phenomena.  But  space  is  also  an  integral  element  in  the 
knowledge  of  phenomena.  Sensation , again,  while  no 
doubt  it  is  a purely  subjective  element  in  the  perception 
of  objects  as  without  us,  yet  affords  the  matter  (reale)  of 
that  which  is  given  as  existing,  and  hence  it  is  essential 
to  the  knowledge  of  those  objects.  But  the  feeling 
of  pleasure  or  pain , which  accompanies  our  knowledge  of 
sensible  objects,  does  not  enter  as  an  ingredient  into  know- 
ledge at  all , for  it  contributes  nothing  to  the  knowledge  of 


318  the  philosophy  of  kant. 

an  object,  though  it  may  be  the  result  of  that  knowledge. 

96  That  an  object  of  perception  should  be  purposive,  is 
therefore  no  property  of  the  object.  Such  an  object  is 
therefore  said  to  display  purpose  only  if  a feeling  of 
pleasure  is  immediately  connected  with  the  idea  of  it. 
Here  therefore  we  have  the  aesthetic  consciousness  of 

purpose  in  nature When  imagination,  as  the  faculty 

of  a priori  perception,  is  found  to  be  in  harmony  with 
understanding,  and  a feeling  of  pleasure  is  awakened  by  its 
exercise,  the  object  must  be  regarded  as  adapted  to  the 

reflective  judgment The  object  is  then  said  to  be 

beautiful , and  the  faculty  which  judges  it  to  be  so  is  called 
Taste. 

98  The  sensibility  to  pleasure  arising  from  reflection  on 
the  forms  of  things,  whether  of  nature  or  of  art,  indicates 
not  only  an  adaptation  of  objects  to  reflective  judgment, 
an  adaptation  which  is  in  conformity  with  the  conception 
of  nature  in  the  subject,  but  it  also  implies,  conversely, 
an  adaptation  of  the  subject  in  virtue  of  the  conception 
of  freedom  to  the  form  or  even  formlessness  of  objects. 
Hence  the  aesthetic  judgment  is  related  to  the  emotion 
of  the  sublime  as  well  as  to  the  feeling  of  the  beautiful. 
The  Critique  of  Esthetic  Judgment  has  therefore  two 
main  divisions. 

VIII.  Logical  Idea  of  Purpose  in  Nature. 

An  object  of  experience  may  be  viewed  as  purposive 
only  relatively  to  the  subject  that  is  conscious  of  it,  in 
other  words,  the  idea  that  it  is  purposive  may  rest  upon 
the  mere  harmony  of  the  form  of  the  object  with  our 
faculty  of  knowledge,  a form  which  is  directly  apprehended 
without  the  intermediation  of  any  conception.  But  the 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT.  319 

object  may  also  be  regarded  as  in  itself  purposive,  if 
the  form  of  the  thing,  as  given  in  a conception  which 
precedes  it  and  is  its  condition,  agrees  with  the  possi- 
1 99  bility  of  the  thing  itself.  The  former  rests  upon  the 
pleasure  immediately  felt  in  mere  reflection  upon  the 
form  of  an  object;  the  latter  requires  us  to  have  a 
definite  knowledge  of  an  object  through  a conception; 
and  as  this  knowledge  is  quite  independent  of  any  feel- 
ing of  pleasure  in  the  contemplation  of  the  object,  it  pre- 
supposes a judgment  of  understanding.  If  the  conception 
of  an  object  is  given,  the  work  of  judgment  lies  in  the 
presentation  (exhibitio)  of  a perception  corresponding  to 
it.  And  we  may  either,  as  in  art,  endeavour  to  realize  in 
perception  a conception  set  up  by  our  own  imagination 
as  an  end,  or  we  may  make  use  of  our  conception  of  an 
end  in  judging  of  certain  natural  objects,  as,  for  instance, 
in  judging  of  organized  bodies.  In  the  latter  case,  not 
merely  the  form  of  the  thing  implies  purpose , but  the 
thing  itself  as  a product  is  regarded  as  a natural  end. 
Now,  although  the  subjective  consciousness  of  purpose 
does  not  imply  any  conception  of  an  object,  we  may  still, 
by  analogy  with  the  conception  of  an  end,  attribute  to 
nature  as  it  were  a regard  for  our  faculty  of  knowledge ; 
hence  we  may  look  upon  natural  beauty  as  the  presentation 
of  the  conception  of  a formal  or  subjective  purpose,  and 
we  may  regard  natural  end  as  the  presentation  of  the  con- 
ception of  a real  or  objective  purpose.  The  former  is 
the  object  of  sesthetic  judgment  or  Taste,  the  latter  is  the 
object  of  certain  logical  judgments,  which  understanding 
and  reason  make  by  means  of  conceptions.  The  Critique 
of  Judgment  has  accordingly  two  parts,  dealing  respec- 
tively with  (zstlietic  judgment  and  teleological  judgment. 


320 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


2d  IX.  Connection  of  Understanding  and  Reason  through 

Judgment. 

Understanding  prescribes  the  a priori\&vis  which  make 
experience  or  a theoretical  knowledge  of  nature  as  an 
object  of  sense  possible.  Reason  prescribes  the  a priori 
laws  of  freedom,  and  being  itself  a supersensible  cause  in 
the  subject,  it  gives  rise  to  an  unconditionally  practical 
knowledge.  The  realm  of  nature,  which  is  under  the  laws 
of  understanding,  and  the  realm  of  freedom  which  con- 
forms to  the  laws  of  reason,  are  entirely  removed  from  all 
mutual  influence  by  the  great  gulf  which  sunders  the  super- 
sensible from  the  phenomenal  world.  The  idea  of  free- 
dom adds  nothing  to  the  theoretical  knowledge  of  nature, 
nor  does  the  conception  of  nature  affect  the  practical  laws 
of  freedom.  So  far,  therefore,  there  is  no  possibility 
of  throwing  a bridge  from  the  one  realm  to  the  other. 
But  while  it  belongs  to  the  very  idea  of  a free  cause  to  be 
independent  of  nature,  and  while  the  sensible  cannot 
determine  that  which  in  the  subject  is  supersensible;  yet 
the  converse  is  not  impossible  in  a certain  sense,  and  in 
fact  is  implied  in  the  very  conception  of  a free  cause,  the 
202  effect  of  which  ought  to  be  an  event  in  the  world.  The 
word  cause , when  applied  to  the  supersensible,  signifies 
merely  the  ground  which  determines  the  causality  of 
things  to  an  effect  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  nature ; 
and  while  the  possibility  of  causality  in  this  sense  cannot 
be  understood,  it  can  be  conclusively  shown  that  it  is  not 
self-contradictory,  as  some  have  maintained  it  to  be. 
The  effect  of  freedom  is  the  ultimate  end  which  ought  to 
exist  as  a phenomenon  in  the  world  of  sense,  and  the 
condition  of  its  possible  realization  is  presupposed  as 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT. 


321 


existing  in  the  nature  of  man  as  a sensible  being.  Judg- 
ment, as  presupposing  this  a priori  condition,  independ- 
ently of  the  practical,  supplies  us  with  the  conception  of 
purpose  in  nature,  a conception  which  mediates  between 
nature  and  freedom,  and  makes  possible  the  transition 
from  the  conception  of  conformity  to  law  to  the  concep- 
tion of  an  ultimate  end. 

The  fact  that  understanding  prescribes  a priori  laws  to 
nature,  shows  that  nature  is  known  merely  as  a phenom- 
enon, and  at  the  same  time  points  to  a supersensible 
substrate  of  nature.  This,  however,  leaves  the  nature  of 
this  substrate  quite  undetermined.  But  judgment,  by 
means  of  its  a priori  principle  for  estimating  nature 
203  according  to  possible  particular  laws,  brings  the  super- 
sensible substrate,  both  in  us  and  without  us,  within 
reach  of  determination  by  our  intellect.  Reason,  again, 
through  its  practical  a priori  law  actually  determines  it; 
and  thus  judgment  enables  us  to  make  the  transition  from 
the  realm  of  nature  to  that  of  freedom. 

As  to  the  higher  faculties  of  the  mind,  that  is,  those 
which  contain  an  autonomy,  understanding  contains  the 
constitutive  principles  of  knowledge ; judgment  those  for 
the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain;  reason  those  relative 
to  desire.  The  conception  supplied  by  judgment  of 
purpose  in  nature  is  one  of  the  conceptions  of 
nature,  but  it  is  merely  a regulative  principle  of  know- 
ledge. The  aesthetic  judgment,  as  concerned  with 
certain  objects  of  nature  or  art,  which  are  the  occasion  of 
that  principle  being  applied,  is  a constitutive  principle  in 
relation  to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain.  The  spon- 
taneity of  the  faculties  of  knowledge,  from  the  harmonious 

operation  of  which  that  pleasure  arises,  by  intensifying 

x 


3 22 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


the  susceptibility  of  the  mind  for  the  moral  feeling,  makes 
the  conception  of  purpose  in  nature  the  fit  connecting 
link  between  the  conception  of  nature  and  the  idea  of 
freedom  as  manifested  in  its  effects,  inasmuch  as  these 
imply  the  sensibility  of  the  mind  to  moral  feeling. 

The  following  table  exhibits  all  the  higher  faculties  in 
their  systematic  connection  : — 

204  Faculties  of  the  Mind.  Faculties  of  Knowledge. 

Knowledge.  Understanding. 

Feeling  of  Pleasure  or  Pain.  Judgment. 

Desire.  Reason. 


A priori  Principles. 
Subordination  to  Law. 
Purpose. 

Ultimate  End. 


Application  to 
Nature. 
Art. 

Freedom. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  323 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL 
JUDGMENT. 

274  Section  /. — Analytic  of  Teleological  Judgment. 

62.  Formal  Objective  Purpose. 

Geometrical  figures  drawn  on  a principle  often  show  a 
remarkable  objective  adaptation  to  the  purpose  for  which 
they  are  employed,  namely,  the  solution  of  several 
problems  by  a single  method,  or  of  one  problem  in  an 
infinite  variety  of  ways.  The  adaptation  is  here  evidently 
objective  and  intellectual,  not  subjective  and  eesthetic. 
But,  although  such  figures  are  adapted  to  the  end  in 
view,  namely,  the  production  of  a variety  of  geometrical 
forms,  they  are  regarded  as  possible  independently  of  the 
particular  use  made  of  them,  and  hence  their  adaptation 
to  that  end  is  not  the  condition  of  their  very  existence  in 

376  thought This  intellectual  adaptation  to  an  end  is 

therefore  no  doubt  objective,  and  not  like  aesthetic 
adaptation  subjective  ; but  it  is  not  real,  but  merely 
formal.  It  can  be  conceived  as  adaptation  in  general 
without  the  conception  of  end  being  presupposed,  and 
hence  it  is  not  an  instance  of  teleology. 

It  is  quite  different  when  a number  of  things  are  pre- 
sented as  without  me  and  enclosed  within  well-defined 
limits,  as,  for  example,  trees,  flowers,  and  walks  disposed 
in  regular  order  in  a garden;  for  these  are  actually  existing 
things  which  must  be  known  empirically,  and  not  merely 


324 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


an  idea  of  my  own  which  is  determined  a priori  according 
to  a principle.  The  adaptation  in  this  case  is  empirical 
or  real , and  presupposes  the  conception  of  an  end. 

378  63.  Relative  as  contrasted  with  Internal  Purpose. 

Experience  leads  our  judgment  to  the  conception  of  an 
objective  material  purpose,  that  is,  to  the  conception  of 

379  an  end  in  nature,  only  if  we  find  ourselves  compelled 
to  presuppose  the  activity  of  a cause  that  is  determined 
to  action  by  conceptions  as  the  necessary  condition  of  the 
existence  of  a given  effect.  This  may  occur  either  when 
the  effect  is  regarded  as  itself  a product  of  art,  or  when 
it  is  regarded  merely  as  material  for  the  art  of  other 
possible  natural  beings  ; in  other  words,  it  is  either  an 
end,  or  a means  for  the  ends  of  other  causes.  Purpose 
in  the  latter  case  is  called  utility  in  relation  to  man, 
advantage  when  we  are  speaking  of  other  creatures,  and 
is  merely  relative ; while  purpose  in  the  former  case  is  an 
internal  purpose  exhibited  in  a natural  being. 

A sandy  soil  is  most  advantageous  for  the  growth  of 
pine  trees.  Now,  when  the  sea  withdrew  from  the  land 
on  our  northern  shores,  it  left  behind  it  large  tracts  of 

380  sand,  on  which  pine  forests  have  grown  up.  Shall  we 
then  say  that  the  original  deposit  of  these  tracts  of  sand 
is  evidence  of  an  end  of  nature,  simply  because  it  is  of 
advantage  to  pine  trees  ? Manifestly  if  this  is  an  end  of 
nature,  the  sand  also  must  be  regarded  as  a relative  end, 
for  which  the  withdrawal  of  the  sea  was  a means.  So  also 
if  cattle,  sheep,  horses,  etc.,  are  to  exist,  grass  must  cover 

the  earth The  objective  purpose  here  supposed 

is  therefore  not  exhibited  by  things  themselves,  but  is 
merely  relative  or  contingent. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  325 

381  From  this  it  is  quite  plain,  that  purpose  can  be 
regarded  as  an  external  natural  end,  only  on  condition 
that  the  existence  of  that  for  which  something  else  is 
immediately  or  remotely  advantageous,  is  in  itself  an  end 
of  nature.  But  this  can  never  appear  from  a mere  con- 
templation of  nature,  and  therefore  relative  purpose, 
although  it  points  hypothetically  to  natural  ends,  does 
not  of  itself  justify  an  absolute  teleological  judgment. 

382  64.  The  Properties  of  Things  which  are  Natural  Ends. 

To  see  that  a thing  is  really  a natural  end,  or  cannot 
be  explained  in  a mechanical  way,  its  form  must  be 
incapable  of  explanation  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature 
that  are  known  and  applied  by  the  understanding  to 
objects  of  sense;  in  other  words,  it  must  be  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  cannot  be  known  in  experience  even  as  an 
effect,  except  on  presupposition  of  conceptions  of  reason. 
Simply  to  know  what  are  the  conditions  required  for  the 
production  of  such  a natural  object,  reason  must  per- 
ceive its  form  to  be  necessary.  Now,  the  very  fact 
that  in  the  present  case  the  form  of  the  object  is  not 
necessary  but  accidental,  so  far  as  the  ordinary  laws  of 
nature  are  concerned,  is  itself  a ground  for  regarding  that 
form  as  possible  only  through  reason.  And  as  reason  or 
will  is  the  faculty  of  acting  from  ends,  an  object  which 
is  regarded  as  possible  only  through  reason  must  be 
conceived  as  an  end. 

383  To  know  a thing,  however,  not  only  as  an  end,  but  as 
a natural  end , more  than  this  is  required.  A thing  exists 
as  a natural  end  only  if  it  is,  in  a double  sense,  its 
own  cause  and  its  own  effect.  This  may  be  illustrated  by 
an  example.  In  the  first  place,  a tree  produces  another 


32 b THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

tree  according  to  a well-known  natural  law.  The  tree  so 
produced  is  of  the  same  species  ; hence  a tree,  being 
continually  self-produced,  is,  on  the  one  hand,  its  own 
effect,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  its  own  cause,  and  by  such 
continual  self-production  it  perpetuates  itself  as  a species. 
In  the  second  place,  a tree  is  self-productive,  even  as 
an  individual.  This  no  doubt  is  what  we  call  growth, 
but  it  must  be  observed  that  growth  is  quite  different 
from  any  mere  increase  in  size  according  to  mechanical 
laws.  The  matter  which  the  tree  incorporates,  it  pre- 
viously works  up  into  a specifically  peculiar  quality, 
which  is  not  due  to  any  natural  mechanism  outside  of  it ; 
and  thus  it  develops  itself  by  means  of  a material,  which, 

' as  assimilated,  is  its  own  product.  No  doubt  the  tree,  so 
far  as  the  constituents  obtained  from  external  nature  are 
concerned,  must  be  regarded  as  an  educt ; but,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  displays  a power  of  separating,  recombining 
and  shaping  this  raw  material,  which  is  far  beyond  the 
384  reach  of  human  art.  In  the  third  place,  each  part  of  the 
tree  is  self-productive,  so  that  the  preservation  of  one  part 
is  dependent  on  the  preservation  of  all  the  rest.  A bud 
inoculated  on  the  twig  of  another  tree  produces  a plant 
of  its  own  kind,  and  so  also  a scion  engrafted  on  a foreign 
stem.  We  may,  therefore,  regard  each  twig  or  leaf  of  the 
same  tree  as  engrafted  or  inoculated  on  it,  or  as  an  inde- 
pendent tree,  externally  attached  to  another  and  parasiti- 
cally  nourished  by  it.  And  while  the  leaves  are  a 
product  of  the  tree,  the  tree  is  in  turn  dependent  for 
its  growth  upon  their  effect  on  the  stem,  for  if  it  is 
repeatedly  denuded  of  its  leaves  it  dies. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  327 


65.  Things  which  are  Natural  Ends  are  Organized 
Beings. 

Causal  connection  as  thought  by  the  understanding 
always  constitutes  a regressive  series  of  causes  and 

385  effects This  sort  of  causal  connection  we  call 

that  of  efficient  causes  ( nexus  effectivus).  But  another 
kind  of  causal  connection  is  conceivable,  which  rests 
upon  the  conception  of  ends.  Here  the  series,  if  it  can 
be  called  a series,  may  be  taken  either  backwards  or 
forwards,  and  hence  that  which  has  been  named  effect  is 
with  equal  propriety  termed  the  cause  of  that  of  which 

it  is  the  effect Such  a causal  connection  we  name 

that  of  final  cause  ( nexus  finalis). 

For  a thing  to  be  a natural  end,  in  the  first  place,  its 
parts  must  be  possible  only  in  relation  to  the  whole.  As 
an  end  the  thing  itself  is  comprehended  under  a 
conception  or  idea,  which  must  determine  a priori  all 
that  is  to  be  contained  in  it.  This,  however,  does  not 
distinguish  a natural  product  from  an  artificial  product, 
in  which  the  cause  is  an  intelligent  being,  distinct  from 
the  material  parts  that  are  brought  together  and  combined 
in  accordance  with  the  idea  of  a whole  that  is  possible 
• only  by  means  of  them. 

Hence,  in  the  second  place,  a natural  product  must 
in  itself  or  in  its  inner  possibility  imply  relation  to  an 
end ; in  other  words,  it  must  be  possible  as  a natural  end 
irrespective  of  any  intelligent  cause  external  to  it. 
Accordingly,  the  parts  of  such  a natural  product,  which 
combine  in  the  unity  of  a whole,  must  be  reciprocally 
cause  and  effect  of  each  other’s  form.  Only  in  this  way 
can  the  idea  of  the  whole  determine  conversely  the  form 


32§ 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


and  combination  of  all  the  parts,  not  indeed  as  cause — 
for  then  we  should  have  an  artificial  product — but  as  the 
ground  on  which  the  thing  is  known,  by  the  subject 
judging  of  it,  in  the  systematic  unity  of  the  form  and  the 
combination  of  all  its  parts. 

386  A body  is  therefore  a natural  end,  only  if  all  its 
parts  mutually  depend  upon  each  other  both  as  to  their 
form  and  their  combination,  and  are  thus  themselves  the 
cause  of  the  whole ; while,  conversely,  the  idea  of  the 
whole  may  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the  body  in 
accordance  with  a principle.  In  such  a body,  accordingly, 
the  conjunction  of  efficient  causes  is  at  the  same  time 
regarded  as  an  effect  through  final  causes. 

In  a natural  product,  each  part  not  only  exists  by  means 
of  the  other  parts,  but  is  conceived  as  existing  for  the 
sake  of  the  others  and  of  the  whole,  that  is,  as  an  instrument 
or  organ  ; and  not  only  so,  but  its  parts  are  all  organs 
reciprocally  producing  one  another,  which  is  never  the 
case  with  artificial  instruments.  Only  a product  of  this 
kind  is  called  a natural  end,  and  it  receives  this  name 
just  because  it  is  an  organized  and  self-organizing  being. 

388  Organized  beings  are  the  only  things  in  nature  which, 
in  themselves  and  apart  altogether  from  their  relation  to 
other  things,  can  be  conceived  to  exist  only  as  ends. 
The  conception  of  an  end  of  nature,  as  distinguished  from 
a practical  end,  first  obtains  objective  reality  from  a 
consideration  of  such  beings  ; and  apart  from  them,  the 
teleological  consideration  of  nature  as  a special  principle 
of  judgment  would  have  no  justification  whatever. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  329 


66.  The  Principle  by  which  Organized  Beings  are  judged 
to  be  internally  purposive. 

The  principle  that  is  applied  when  a thing  is  judged 
to  be  internally  purposive,  a principle  which  is  at  the 
same  time  a definition,  is  this  : An  organized  product  of 
nature  is  one  in  which  all  the  parts  are  reciprocally  end 
and  means.  Nothing  in  an  organized  being  is  useless,  or 
without  purpose,  and  nothing  in  it  can  be  ascribed  to 
blind  natural  mechanism. 

This  principle  finds  its  occasion  in  the  methodical 
observation  of  experience,  but,  as  it  affirms  the  idea  of 
purpose  to  be  of  universal  necessity,  it  cannot  be  derived 
from  experience,  but  must  be  a priori.  At  the  same  time, 
as  ends  exist  only  as  an  idea  in  the  judging  subject,  not 

389  in  any  efficient  cause,  it  is  merely  a regulative  principle, 
or  a maxim , for  judging  of  the  internal  purpose  exhibited 
in  organized  beings. 

390  67.  The  Teleological  Judgment  m regard  to  Nature  as  a 

System  of  Ends. 

As  has  been  shown  above,  external  purpose  does  not 
justify  us  in  saying  that  things  can  be  known  to  exist  only 
as  ends  of  nature,  or  in  employing  the  principle  of  final 
cause  to  account  for  the  purpose  which  may  seem  to  be 

implied  in  their  effects Now,  if  there  is  no  reason 

for  regarding  a thing  as  in  itself  end,  the  external  relation 
can  be  only  hypothetically  judged  to  imply  purpose. 

To  regard  a thing  as  a natural  end  on  account  of  its 
internal  form,  is  a very  different  thing  from  holding  the 
existence  of  that  thing  to  be  an  end  of  nature.  The 
latter  assertion  is  justifiable  only  if  it  can  be  shown,  not 


33° 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


merely  that  we  have  the  conception  of  a possible  end, 
but  that  we  have  a knowledge  of  the  ultimate  end  ( scopus } 
of  nature.  But  this  requires  the  relation  of  such  know- 
r ledge  to  something  which  is  supersensible  and  far 
transcends  all  our  teleological  knowledge  of  nature,  for 
the  end  of  nature  must  be  sought  beyond  nature.  The 
internal  form  of  a simple  blade  of  grass  is  sufficient  to 
show  that  for  our  human  faculty  of  judgment  its  origin  is 
possible  only  according  to  the  rule  of  ends.  But  if  we 
change  our  point  of  view,  and  look  merely  at  its  external 
adaptation  for  the  use  of  other  natural  beings,  we  get  no 
categorical  end,  but,  finding  always  a new  condition  of 
such  adaptation,  we  are  led  to  the  idea  of  the  un- 
conditioned existence  of  a thing  as  ultimate  end,  and  so 
entirely  beyond  the  physico-teleological  consideration  of 
the  world.  So  conceived  the  thing  is  not  even  a natural 
end,  for  it  is  no  longer  regarded  as  a natural  product. 

Only  organized  matter,  as  in  its  specific  form  a product 
of  nature,  necessarily  demands  the  application  of  the 
conception  of  natural  end.  But  this  conception,  when 
once  obtained,  necessarily  leads  to  the  idea  of  the  whole 
of  nature  as  a system  of  ends,  and  to  this  idea  all  natural 
mechanism  must  be  subordinated  in  accordance  with 
principles  of  reason. 

It  is  manifest  that  this  is  not  a principle  of  the 
determinant,  but  only  of  the  reflective  judgment;  that  it 
is  regulative  and  not  constitutive  : and  that  it  supplies  us 
with  a guiding  conception,  by  means  of  which  natural 
objects  already  determined  may  be  considered  according 
to  a new  law  and  order,  and  our  knowledge  of  them 
extended  by  means  of  the  principle  of  final  cause.  But 
this  principle  in  no  way  interferes  with  the  principle  of 


THE  CRITIQUE  OE  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  33 1 

mechanical  causality  already  applied  to  them,  nor  does 

392  it  entitle  us  to  regard  anything  whatever  as  a purposive 
end  of  nature. 

After  the  teleological  judgment  by  natural  ends  as 
applied  to  organized  beings  has  brought  us  to  the  idea  ot 
a great  system  of  ends  of  nature,  even  the  beauty  of 
nature,  that  is,  the  harmony  of  nature  with  the  free  play 
of  our  faculties  of  knowledge  in  apprehending  and 
judging  of  its  appearance,  may  be  regarded  as  a sort  ot 

393  objective  purpose  exhibited  by  nature  in  a systematic 
whole  of  which  man  is  a member. 


397  Section  II — Dialectic  of  Teleological  Judgment. 

70.  Antinomy  of  Judgment. 

398  In  dealing  with  nature  as  a totality  of  sensible  objects, 
reason  may  either  take  its  stand  upon  the  a priori  laws 
prescribed  to  nature  by  understanding,  or  upon  laws 
which  are  capable  of  indefinite  addition  as  experience  is 
gradually  extended.  In  applying  the  former  sort  of 
laws,  that  is,  the  universal  laws  of  material  nature,  judg- 
ment needs  no  special  principle  of  reflection ; for  an 
objective  principle  is  given  to  it  by  understanding,  and 
it  is,  therefore,  merely  determinant.  But  so  multifarious 
and  diverse  are  the  particular  laws  which  have  to  be 
learned  from  experience,  that  judgment  must  here  supply 
its  own  principle,  if  it  is  to  conduct  its  investigations  into 
the  phenomena  of  nature  in  an  orderly  way.  Without 
such  a guiding-thread  there  is  not  the  least  hope  that 
our  empirical  knowledge  may  form  a thoroughly  con- 
nected and  orderly  system,  and  may  reduce  the  empirical 
laws  of  nature  to  unity.  Now,  in  a contingent  unity  of 


332 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


this  kind  it  may  very  well  happen,  that  judgment  in  its 
reflection  proceeds  from  either  of  those  principles.  It 
may  simply  apply  the  a priori  laws  of  understanding,  or 
it  may  start  from  the  special  principle,  by  means  of  which 
reason,  on  occasion  of  particular  experiences,  seeks  to 
399  form  a judgment  upon  corporeal  nature  and  its  laws. 
Hence  it  comes,  that  these  two  maxims  seem  to  be 
mutually  exclusive,  and  that  a dialectic  arises  which 
leads  judgment  into  error  in  its  application  of  the 
principle  of  reflection. 

The  first  maxim  of  judgment  is  the  position : All 

production  of  material  things  and  the  forms  of  material 
things  must  be  judged  to  be  possible  according  to  purely 
mechanical  laws. 

The  second  maxim  is  the  counterposition  : Some  products 
of  material  nature  cannot  be  judged  to  be  possible 
according  to  purely  mechanical  laws,  but  require  quite  a 
different  law  of  causality,  namely,  that  of  final  cause. 

Now,  if  these  regulative  principles  in  the  investigation 
of  nature  are  converted  into  constitutive  principles,  which 
are  supposed  to  determine  the  possibility  of  objects  them- 
selves, they  will  run  thus  : 

Position  : All  production  of  material  things  is  possible 
according  to  purely  mechanical  laws. 

Counterposition  : Some  production  of  material  things  is 
not  possible  according  to  purely  mechanical  laws. 

If  we  take  the  last  pair  of  propositions  as  objective 
principles  of  the  determinant  judgment,  each  is  contra- 
dictory of  the  other,  and  hence  one  of  them  must  be 
false.  We  shall  then  no  doubt  have  an  antinomy, 
but  it  will  be  an  antinomy  not  of  judgment  but  of 
reason.  Reason,  however,  can  prove  neither  the  one 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  333 

proposition  nor  the  other,  for  there  can  be  no  a priori 
principle  which  determines  the  possibility  of  things  so 
far  as  the  purely  empirical  laws  of  nature  are  concerned. 

The  first  two  propositions,  on  the  other  hand,  if  they 
are  regarded  simply  as  maxims  of  reflective  judgment, 
are  not  really  contradictory.  For,  to  say  that  all  events 
in  the  material  world,  and,  therefore,  all  the  forms  which 
are  products  of  nature,  must  be  judged  to  be  possible  on 
purely  mechanical  laws,  is  not  to  say  that  they  are  possible 
in  this  way  alo7ie,  or  apart  from  any  other  sort  of  causality. 
All  that  is  implied  is,  that  we  ought  in  all  cases  rejlectively 
to  judge  them  by  the  principle  of  natural  mechanism,  and 
to  make  this  principle  the  foundation  of  all  our  investiga- 
tions, and  apply  it  as  far  as  we  can,  since  without  it  there 
can,  properly  speaking,  be  no  knowledge  of  nature  at  all. 
But  this  in  no  way  prevents  us,  if  occasion  is  given 
400  for  it,  from  following  the  guiding-thread  of  the  second 
principle  in  our  reflection  upon  certain  natural  forms,  and 
even  by  instigation  of  these  upon  the  whole  of  nature, 
the  principle,  namely,  of  final  cause,  which  is  quite 
distinct  from  that  employed  in  the  explanation  of  natural 
mechanism.  The  value  of  reflection  of  the  kind  indicated 
in  the  first  maxim  is  not  in  any  way  denied,  but  on  the 
contrary  we  are  told  to  follow  it  as  far  as  we  can.  Nor  is 
it  said,  that  those  forms  are  not  possible  at  all  on  the 
principle  of  natural  mechanism  : all  that  is  said  is,  that 
by  following  this  path  human  reason  will  never  be  able  to 
discover  any  ground  of  the  specific  character  of  natural 
ends,  although  it  will  certainly  gain  increased  knowledge 
of  natural  laws.  Thus  it  is  left  undetermined,  whether 
in  the  inner  ground  of  nature,  which  to  us  is  unknown, 
conjunction  by  physical  mechanism  and  conjunction  by 


334 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


ends  may  not  themselves  be  connected  together  in  the 
same  thing  by  one  principle.  We  must  conclude,  how- 
ever, that  our  reason  is  not  in  a position  to  unite  the  two 
principles,  and  that  it  is  not  the  determinant  but  the 
reflective  judgment  which  compels  us  to  explain  the 
possibility  of  certain  forms  of  nature  by  means  of  a 
different  principle  from  that  of  natural  mechanism. 

4.13  76.  Remark. 

Without  conceptions  of  understanding,  for  which  an 
objective  reality  must  be  presented,  theoretical  reason 
can  make  no  objective  or  synthetical  judgments.  In 

414  itself  it  contains  no  constitutive  principle  whatever,  but 

merely  regulative  principles Now  the  very  nature 

of  our  intelligence  compels  us  to  distinguish  between  the 
possible  and  the  actual.  Such  a distinction  would  not 
be  made,  did  not  our  knowledge  involve  the  exercise  of 
two  heterogeneous  faculties, — understanding  for  concep- 
tions and  sensible  perception  for  objects  corresponding 
to  conceptions.  Were  our  intelligence  perceptive,  its 

objects  would  always  be  actual The  distinction 

of  things  into  possible  and  actual  is  therefore  a subjective 
distinction,  which  is  valid  for  human  reason  merely 
because  we  can  always  think  something  that  has  no 

415  reality,  or  suppose  something  of  which  we  have  no  con- 
ception to  be  given  as  an  object.  That  possible  things 
may  not  be  actual,  and,  as  a consequence,  that  actuality 
cannot  be  deduced  from  possibility,  is  certainly  true 
when  we  are  speaking  of  human  reason,  though  it  does 
not  follow  that  such  a distinction  applies  to  things  them- 
selves. That  it  has  no  such  application  is  indeed  plain 
from  the  irrepressible  tendency  of  reason  to  suppose  some 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  335 

unconditionally  necessary  existence,  or  original  ground, 
in  which  the  distinction  of  possible  and  actual  no  longer 
holds  good. 

The  conception  of  an  absolutely  necessary  being  is 
thus  an  indispensable  idea  of  reason,  but  it  is  an  idea 
which  remains  for  human  intelligence  a problem  that  it 
cannot  solve.  It  arises  from  the  peculiar  nature  of  our 
faculties  of  knowledge,  and  therefore  it  does  not  hold 
true  objectively  but  merely  subjectively.  We  cannot  say 
that  such  an  idea  is  essential  to  every  intelligence,  for  we 
have  no  right  to  assume  that  in  all  thinking  beings  there 
are  two  conditions  of  knowledge,  so  different  in  their 
nature  as  thought  and  perception,  and  therefore  we  have 
no  right  to  suppose  that  in  all  thinking  beings  the 
conditions  of  possibility  and  actuality  are  different.  An 
intelligence  for  whom  this  distinction  did  not  exist,  might 
say  : All  objects  that  I know are^  that  is,  exist;  and  such 
a being  could  never  suppose  some  objects  to  be  possible 
that  have  no  existence,  and  therefore  to  be  contingent 
when  they  do  exist,  nor  could  it,  in  contrast  to  those 
objects,  think  of  others  as  necessary. 

16  Just  as  theoretical  reason  must  assume  as  an  idea  the 
unconditioned  necessity  of  the  original  ground  of  nature, 
so  practical  reason  presupposes  its  own  unconditioned 
causality,  or  freedom,  which  is  implied  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  its  own  moral  commands.  Here  the  objective 
necessity  of  an  act,  as  being  a duty,  is  opposed  to  the 
necessity  which  it  would  have  as  an  event,  if  its  ground 
lay  in  nature  and  not  in  freedom,  that  is,  in  the  causality 
of  reason.  The  morally  necessary  act  is  regarded  as 
physically  quite  contingent,  since  that  which  ought 
necessarily  to  take  place,  often  does  not  take  place.  It 


336  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 

is  evidently  owing  to  the  subjective  constitution  of  our 
practical  faculty,  that  moral  laws  must  be  represented  as 
commands,  and  the  acts  conforming  to  them  as  duties  ; 
and  that  reason  expresses  this  necessity  not  in  the  form 
that  something  is  or  happens,  but  in  the  form  that  it 
ought  to  be.  This  would  not  be  the  case  were  reason 
considered  as  a cause  which  acts  quite  independently 
of  sensibility,  that  is,  independently  of  the  subjective 
condition  of  its  application  to  objects  of  nature,  and 
therefore  as  a cause  in  an  intelligible  world  that  is 
completely  in  accordance  with  moral  laws.  For  in  such 
a world  there  would  be  no  distinction  between  being  and 
doing,  between  a practical  law  of  that  which  is  possible 
through  us,  and  the  theoretical  law  of  that  which  is 
actual  through  us.  A purely  intelligible  world,  then, 
would  be  one  in  which  whatever  is  possible  is  at 
the  same  time  actual,  just  because  it  is  good.  But  even 
freedom,  which  is  the  formal  condition  of  an  intelligible 
world,  is  for  us  a transcendent  conception,  and  is  therefore 
incapable  of  serving  as  a constitutive  principle  for  deter- 
mining an  object  and  its  objective  reality.  Yet,  although 
our  nature  is  partly  sensuous,  freedom,  in  so  far  as  it 
involves  the  idea  of  conformity  to  reason,  is  for  us,  and 
417  all  other  rational  beings  that  have  a connection  with  the 
world  of  sense,  a universal  regulative  principle.  This  prin- 
ciple does  not  objectively  determine  the  nature  of  free- 
dom, but  it  commands  everyone  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  idea  of  freedom,  and  that  as  absolutely  as  if  it 
were  a constitutive  principle. 

Let  us  see  the  bearing  of  these  considerations  on  the 
topic  immediately  in  hand.  Between  natural  mechanism 
and  the  technic  of  nature,  that  is,  its  teleological  connec- 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  337 

tion,  there  would  be  for  us  no  distinction,  were  it  not  that 
our  intelligence  is  compelled  by  its  very  nature  to  advance 
from  the  universal  to  the  particular.  There  can,  there- 
fore, be  no  knowledge  of  the  adaptation  of  the  particular 
to  an  end,  and  consequently  no  determinant  judgments, 
unless  judgment  has  a universal  law  under  which  it  may 
subsume  the  particular.  Now,  the  particular,  as  such,  has 
a certain  contingency  with  respect  to  the  universal ; and 
yet  reason  demands  conformity  with  law  in  the  reduction 
of  particular  laws  of  nature  to  unity.  Conformity  with 
law  in  the  case  of  the  contingent  is  called  purpose, 
and  from  such  a universal,  particular  laws,  so  far  as 
they  imply  a contingent  element,  cannot  be  derived  a 
priori.  Hence  the  conception  that  natural  products  are 
purposive,  necessary  as  it  is  for  our  judgment,  does  not 
enable  us  to  determine  the  objects  themselves.  It  is  a 
subjective  or  regulative  principle  of  reason,  although  for 
human  judgment  it  has  the  same  validity  as  if  it  were  an 
objective  or  constitutive  principle. 


77.  The  conception  of  Natural  End  as  due  to  the  peculiar 
character  of  our  Intelligence. 

There  are  certain  peculiarities  of  even  our  higher 
faculty  of  knowledge  which  it  is  very  natural  to  transfer 
as  objective  predicates  to  things.  But  they  really  belong 
only  to  ideas,  for  no  possible  object  of  experience  can  be 
presented  which  corresponds  to  them.  This  holds  good 
x8  even  of  the  conception  of  a natural  end,  which  as  a 
predicate  can  exist  nowhere  but  in  the  idea.  But, 
as  the  effect  corresponding  to  this  idea,  that  is,  the 
product  itself,  is  a real  object  in  nature,  the  conception 


33§ 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


of  nature  as  a being  acting  from  an  end  seems  to 
make  the  idea  of  a natural  end  a constitutive  principle. 
In  this  respect  the  idea  of  a natural  end  is  different  from 
all  other  ideas. 

The  difference,  however,  lies  in  the  fact  that  this  idea 
is  not  a principle  of  reason  for  the  understanding,  but 
only  for  the  judgment,  and  is  therefore  merely  the  appli- 
cation of  an  intelligence  in  general  to  possible  objects  of 
experience.  For  here  judgment  is  not  determinant  but 
merely  reflective,  and  hence  although  the  object  is  given 
in  experience,  judgment  cannot  determine  it  by  the  idea, 
but  can  only  reflect  on  it. 

It  is  therefore  a peculiarity  of  human  intelligence  that 
in  its  judgment  upon  natural  things  it  assumes  the  form 
of  reflection.  Now  this  suggests  the  idea  of  an  intelli- 
gence different  from  ours  and  presupposed  in  it,  just  as 
in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  it  was  by  supposing  the 
possibility  of  a perception  different  from  ours,  that  we 
were  able  to  see  that  our  perception  is  by  its  very  nature 
limited  to  phenomena.  It  is,  then,  by  reference  to  this 
supposed  intelligence  that  we  are  able  to  say  : Certain 
natural  products,  from  the  very  nature  of  our  intelligence, 
must  be  considered  by  us  as  if  they  could  not  exist  at  all 
unless  they  had  been  produced  purposely,  or  from 
conceived  ends.  But  we  cannot  venture  to  say  that 
there  actually  is  a particular  cause  which  acts  from 
such  ends,  or  that  an  intelligence  higher  than  ours 
may  not  find  in  the  mere  mechanism  of  nature,  as 
a sort  of  causality  conceivable  apart  from  intelligence, 
a sufficient  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  such  natural 
products. 

We  must  therefore  expect  to  find  that  there  is  a certain 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  339 

contingency  in  the  nature  of  our  intelligence  as  related  to 
its  faculty  of  judgment,  and  if  we  can  show  wherein  this 
contingency  consists,  we  shall  learn  how  our  intelligence 
differs  from  other  possible  intelligences. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  contingency  lies  in  the 
particular , which  it  is  the  function  of  judgment  to  bring 
under  the  universal  that  is  supplied  in  the  conceptions  of 

419  understanding.  For  the  universal  of  our  understanding 
does  not  determine  the  particular,  and  it  is  contingent  in 
how  many  ways  different  things  which  agree  in  a common 
mark  may  present  themselves  to  our  observation. 
Knowledge  involves  perception  as  well  as  conception. 
Now,  a perfectly  spontaneous  faculty  of  perception  would 
be  a faculty  of  knowledge  different  from  sensibility,  and 
quite  independent  of  it ; in  other  words,  an  intelligence 
in  the  most  general  sense  of  the  term.  Thus  we  are  able  to 
conceive  of  a perceptive  intelligence,  but  only  negatively 
or  simply  as  not  discursive  ; in  other  words,  we  can  think 
of  an  intelligence  which  does  not  advance  from  the 
universal  to  the  individual  through  the  particular.  For 
such  an  intelligence  there  would  not  be  that  contingency 
in  the  adaptation  of  particular  laws  of  nature  to  under- 
standing, which  makes  it  so  difficult  for  us  to  reduce  the 
multifarious  forms  of  nature  to  the  unity  of  knowledge. 

In  order,  then,  to  think  at  least  the  possibility  of  such 
an  adaptation  of  natural  things  to  our  faculty  of  judgment, 
we  must  at  the  same  time  conceive  of  another  intelligence, 

420  by  reference  to  which,  and  apart  from  any  end  attributed 
to  it,  we  may  represent  as  necessary  that  harmony  of 
natural  laws  with  our  faculty  of  judgment,  which  for  our 
intelligence  can  be  thought  only  through  the  medium  of 
ends. 


340 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


It  is  the  nature  of  our  intelligence  to  proceed  in 
knowledge  from  an  analytical  universal , or  a conception, 
to  the  particular  as  given  in  empirical  perception.  The 
multiplicity  of  the  latter  thus  remains  undetermined, 
until  judgment  has  determined  it  by  bringing  the  percep- 
tion under  the  conception.  We  may,  however,  conceive 
of  an  intelligence  different  in  kind  from  ours,  an  intelli- 
gence which  is  perceptive  and  not  discursive,  and  which 
therefore  proceeds  from  a synthetic  universal  to  the 
particular,  that  is,  from  a perceived  whole  to  the  parts. 
For  such  an  intelligence,  the  connection  of  the  parts 
which  form  a determinate  whole  would  not  be,  or  appear, 

contingent  as  it  is  for  us But,  from  the  peculiar 

character  of  our  intelligence,  a real  whole  in  nature  is 
regarded  only  as  the  effect  of  the  combined  motive  forces 
of  the  parts.  We  may,  however,  instead  of  viewing  the 
whole  as  dependent  on  the  parts,  after  the  manner  of  our 
discursive  intelligence,  take  a perceptive  or  archetypal 
intelligence  as  our  standard,  and  seek  to  comprehend  the 
dependence  of  the  parts  on  the  whole,  both  in  their 
specific  nature  and  in  their  interconnection.  And  as  it  is 
a contradiction  in  terms  to  say  that  for  a discursive  intelli- 
gence the  connection  of  the  parts  necessarily  presupposes 
the  whole,  it  must  be  the  idea  of  the  whole  that  for  such 
an  intelligence  explains  the  form  of  the  whole  and  the 
connection  of  its  parts.  Now,  such  a whole  is  an  effect 
or  product,  the  idea  of  which  is  treated  as  the  cause  that 
makes  it  possible,  and  such  a product  is  called  an  end. 
It  therefore  arises  solely  from  the  peculiar  character  of 
our  intelligence,  that  we  regard  certain  natural  products 
as  due  to  a different  sort  of  causality  from  that  of  the 
material  laws  of  nature,  namely,  that  of  ends  and  final 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  34 1 

42  r causes.  This  principle,  therefore,  does  not  determine  the 
manner  in  which  things  themselves,  even  when  they  are 
regarded  as  phenomena,  are  capable  of  being  produced, 
but  merely  the  manner  in  which  our  intelligence  can 
alone  judge  them  to  be  produced.  And  this  is  the 
reason  why  in  our  scientific  investigations  we  are 
dissatisfied  with  any  explanation  of  natural  products  by 
final  causes.  In  such  investigations  our  sole  object 
is  to  judge  of  natural  products,  so  far  as  we  are 
capable  of  doing  so  in  consistency  with  the  nature  of 
our  judgment,  that  is,  our  reflective  judgment,  not  to 
determine  them  by  judgment  as  things  in  themselves. 
The  correctness  of  the  view  here  taken  does  not 
require  us  to  show  that  an  intellectus  archetypus  may 
possibly  exist ; it  is  enough  that  the  idea  is  not  self- 
contradictory, and  that  a perceptive  or  archetypal 
intelligence  is  the  natural  counterpart  of  a discursive 
intelligence  like  ours  ( intellectus  ectypus ),  which  by 
its  very  nature  is  contingent  and  dependent  upon  the 
presentation  of  particulars. 

If  we  think  of  a material  whole  as  in  its  form  a product 
of  the  parts,  with  their  forces  and  power  of  combining 
themselves  with  one  another,  we  get  the  conception  of  a 
mechanical  mode  of  production.  But  we  do  not  in  this 
wav  obtain  any  conception  of  a whole  as  end,  such  as  we 
are  compelled  to  suppose  an  organized  being  to  be, — a 
whole,  the  inner  possibility  of  which  is  utterly  inconceiv- 
able apart  from  the  idea  of  it,  and  on  which  depends  the 
very  nature  and  mode  of  operation  of  the  parts.  It  does 
not  follow,  as  we  have  just  seen,  that  the  mechanical 
production  of  such  a body  is  impossible ; for  to  say  so 
would  be  to  say,  that  no  intelligence  could  possibly  think 


342 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


the  different  parts  as  combined  in  a unity,  unless  the 
idea  of  the  unity  was  at  the  same  time  the  cause  of  the 
whole  ; unless,  in  other  words,  the  production  was  pur- 
posive. For  the  unity  which  is  the  necessary  ground  of 
the  form  of  natural  products  would  then  be  merely  that 
of  space ; and  space  is  not  a real  ground  of  products,  but 
simply  their  formal  condition,  although  no  doubt  it  has 
this  in  common  with  the  real  ground,  that  no  part  of  it 
can  be  determined  except  in  relation  to  the  whole.  Now, 
422  it  is  at  least  possible  to  regard  the  material  world  as  a 
mere  phenomenon,  and  to  conceive  of  its  substrate  as  a 
thing  in  itself,  to  which  an  intellectual  perception  corre- 
sponds. Thus  we  get  the  idea  of  a supersensible  and 
real  ground  of  the  world  of  nature  to  which  we  our- 
selves belong,  although  that  ground  is  not  for  us  an 
object  of  knowledge.  Accordingly,  we  may  apply 
mechanical  laws  in  explanation  of  that  which  in  the 
sensible  world  is  necessary,  but  the  harmony  and  unity 
of  the  particular  laws  and  forms  of  nature — which 
relatively  to  the  mechanism  of  nature  must  be  regarded 
as  contingent — we  must  view  as  an  object  of  reason  to 
which  teleological  laws  are  applicable.  Nature  thus 
comes  to  be  judged  on  two  distinct  principles,  the 
mechanical  and  the  teleological,  but  these  in  no  way 
conflict  with  each  other. 

From  this  point  of  view  we  can  see,  what  even  in  other 
ways  might  readily  be  guessed,  but  in  no  other  way  could 
be  proved  and  maintained  with  certainty,  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  a mechanical  derivation  of  those  natural  products 
which  exhibit  purpose  is  quite  consistent  with  the 
teleological  principle,  but  by  no  means  enables  us  to 
dispense  with  it.  In  the  investigation  of  a thing  that  we 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  343 

are  forced  to  regard  as  a natural  end,  that  is,  an  organized 
being,  we  may  try  all  the  known  and  yet  to  be  discovered 
laws  of  mechanical  production,  and  may  even  hope  to 
make  good  progress  in  that  direction,  but  we  need  never 
hope  to  get  rid,  in  our  explanation  of  natural  products,  of 
the  quite  different  principle  of  causation  by  ends.  No 
human  intelligence,  and  indeed  no  finite  intelligence, 
however  it  may  surpass  ours  in  degree,  need  expect  to 
comprehend  the  production  of  even  a blade  of  grass  by 
purely  mechanical  causes.  The  teleological  connection 
of  causes  and  effects  is  absolutely  indispensable  in  judg- 
ing of  the  possibility  of  such  an  object.  There  is  indeed 
no  adequate  reason  for  regarding  external  phenomena 
as  such  from  a teleological  point  of  view  ; the  reason  for 
it  must  be  sought  in  the  supersensible  substrate  of 
phenomena.  But,  as  we  are  shut  out  from  any  possible 
view  of  that  substrate,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  find  in 
nature  grounds  for  an  explanation  of  nature,  and  we  are 
4 23  compelled  by  the  constitution  of  our  intellectual  faculty 
to  seek  for  the  supreme  ground  of  teleological  connec- 
tions in  an  original  Intelligence  which  is  the  cause  of  the 
world. 

APPENDIX  ON  METHOD. 

46 1 87.  The  Moral  Pi'oof  of  the  Existence  of  God. 

Theoretical  reflective  judgment  is  quite  justified  in  sup- 
posing, on  the  ground  of  a physical  teleology , that  there  is 
an  intelligent  cause  of  the  world.  Now,  in  our  own 
moral  consciousness,  and  still  more  in  the  general  con- 
ception of  a rational  being  who  is  endowed  with  free 
causality,  there  is  implied  a moral  teleology.  But  as  the 


344 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


relation  to  ends,  together  with  the  laws  connected  with 
them,  is  determined  a priori  in  ourselves,  and  therefore 
is  known  to  be  necessary,  this  internal  conformity  to  law 
does  not  require  for  its  explanation  the  supposition  of  an 
intelligent  cause  outside  of  ourselves.  At  the  same  time 
moral  teleology  has  to  do  with  man  as  a being  in  the 
world,  and  therefore  with  man  as  connected  with  other 
things  in  the  world.  For,  in  the  conception  of  ourselves 
as  beings  under  moral  law,  we  find  the  standard  by  refer- 
ence to  which  those  other  things  are  judged  either  to  be 
ends,  or  to  be  objects  subordinate  to  ourselves  as  the 
ultimate  end.  Moral  teleology,  then,  has  to  do  with  the 
relation  of  our  own  causality  to  ends,  and  even  to  an 
ultimate  end  necessarily  set  up  by  us  as  our  goal  in  the 
world,  as  well  as  with  the  possibility  of  realizing  that  end, 
the  external  world  being  what  it  is.  Hence  the  question 
462  necessarily  arises,  whether  reason  compels  us  to  seek,  in 
a supreme  intelligence  outside  of  the  world,  for  a principle 
which  shall  explain  to  us  even  the  purpose  in  nature 
relatively  to  the  law  of  morality  within  us.  There  is 
therefore  a moral  teleology,  which  is  concerned,  on  the 
one  hand  with  the  nomothetic  of  freedom,  and  on  the 
other  hand  with  that  of  nature. 

If  we  suppose  certain  things,  or  even  certain  forms  of 
things,  to  be  contingent,  and  therefore  to  depend  upon 
something  else  which  is  their  cause,  we  may  seek  for  this 
supreme  cause,  or  unconditioned  ground  of  the  condi- 
tioned, either  in  the  physical  or  in  the  teleological  order. 
That  is  to  say,  we  may  either  ask,  what  is  the  supreme 
productive  cause  of  those  things,  or  what  is  their  supreme 
and  absolutely  unconditioned  end,  that  is,  the  ultimate 
end  of  that  cause  in  its  production  of  those  things,  or 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  345 

even  of  all  things.  In  the  latter  case  it  is  plainly  implied 
that  the  cause  in  question  is  capable  of  setting  an  end 
before  itself,  that  is,  is  an  intelligence,  or  at  least  must  be 
thought  of  as  acting  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  an 
intelligence. 

From  the  teleological  point  of  view,  it  is  a fundamental 
pj'oposition  admitted  by  every  one,  that  there  can  be  no 
ultimate  end  at  all  presupposed  by  reason  a priori , unless 

463  that  end  is  man  as  under  moral  laws.  A world  con- 
sisting of  mere  lifeless  things,  or  even  containing  living 
but  unintelligent  beings,  would  have  no  meaning  or 
value,  because  there  would  be  in  it  no  intelligent  being 
to  appreciate  its  value.  Again,  suppose  that  in  the  world 
there  are  intelligent  beings,  whose  reason  enables  them 
to  value  existing  things  for  the  pleasure  they  bring,  but 
who  have  not  themselves  any  power  of  imparting  a value 
to  things  by  means  of  freedom  ; then,  there  will  indeed  be 
relativ „•  ends,  but  there  will  be  no  absolute  or  ultimate 
end,  for  the  existence  in  the  world  of  such  intelligent 
beings  can  never  have  an  end.  Moral  laws,  however, 
are  of  this  peculiar  character,  that  they  prescribe  for 
reason  something  as  an  end  apart  from  all  conditions, 
and  therefore  exactly  as  the  conception  of  an  ultimate 
end  requires.  The  existence  of  a reason  which  can  be 
for  itself  the  supreme  law  in  the  relation  of  ends,  in  other 
words  the  existence  of  rational  beings  under  moral  laws, 
can  alone  be  conceived  as  the  ultimate  end  of  the 
existence  of  a world.  On  any  other  supposition  its 
existence  does  not  imply  a cause  acting  from  any  end,  or 
it  implies  ends  but  no  ultimate  end. 

464  The  moral  law,  as  the  formal  condition  in  reason  of 
the  use  of  our  freedom,  lays  its  commands  on  us 


346 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


entirely  on  its  own  authority,  without  appealing  to  any 
material  condition  as  an  end  ; but  it  nevertheless 
determines  for  us,  and  indeed  a priori,  an  ultimate 
end  as  the  goal  to  which  our  efforts  ought  to  be 
directed  ; and  that  end  is  the  highest  good  possible  in 
the  world  through  freedom. 

The  subjective  condition  which  entitles  man  to  set 
before  himself  an  ultimate  end  subordinate  to  the  moral 
law  is  happiness.  Hence  the  highest  physical  good 
possible  in  the  world  is  happiness , and  this  end  we  must 
seek  to  advance,  as  far  as  in  us  lies,  but  always  under  the 
objective  condition  of  the  harmony  of  man  with  the  law 
of  morality  as  worthiness  to  be  happy. 

But  it  is  impossible,  in  consistency  with  all  the  faculties 
of  our  intelligence,  to  regard  the  two  requisites  of  the 
ultimate  end  presented  to  us  through  the  moral  law  as 
connected  by  merely  natural  causes,  and  yet  as  conforming 
to  the  idea  of  that  ultimate  end.  If,  therefore,  nature  is 
the  only  cause  which  is  connected  with  freedom  as  a 
means,  the  conception  of  the  practical  necessity  of  the 
ultimate  end  through  the  application  of  our  powers,  does 
not  harmonize  with  the  theoretical  conception  of  the 
physical  possibility  of  the  realization  of  that  end. 

Accordingly,  we  must  suppose  a moral  cause  or  authoi 
of  the  world,  in  order  to  set  before  ourselves  an  ultimate 
end  that  is  conformable  with  the  moral  law  ; and  in  so 
far  as  the  latter  is  necessary,  in  the  same  degree,  and  on 
the  same  ground,  the  former  also  must  necessarily  be 
admitted  ; it  must,  in  other  words,  be  admitted  that  there 
is  a God. 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  347 


469  88.  Limitation  of  the  Moral  Proof. 

The  ultimate  end,  as  merely  a conception  of  our  prac- 
tical reason,  is  not  an  inference  from  data  of  experience 
for  the  theoretical  explanation  of  nature,  nor  can  it  be 
applied  in  the  knowledge  of  nature.  Its  only  possible 
use  is  for  practical  reason  in  relation  to  moral  laws ; and 
the  ultimate  end  of  creation  is  that  constitution  of  the 
world  which  harmonizes  with  the  only  end  which  we  can 
definitely  present  to  ourselves  as  conforming  to  law, 
namely,  the  ultimate  end  of  our  pure  practical  reason,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  the  nature  of  reason  to  be  practical.  Now, 
we  have  in  the  moral  law,  which  enjoins  on  us  practically 
the  application  of  our  powers  to  the  realization  of  the 
ultimate  end,  a ground  for  supposing  the  possibility  and 
practicability  of  that  end,  and  therefore  also  a ground  for 
supposing  a nature  of  things  harmonious  with  it.  Hence 
we  have  a moral  ground  for  representing  in  the  world  an 
ultimate  end  of  creation. 

So  far  we  have  not  advanced  from  moral  teleology  to 
theology,  that  is,  to  the  existence  of  a moral  author  of  the 
world,  but  have  merely  concluded  to  an  ultimate  end  of 
creation  determined  in  that  way.  But,  in  order  to 
account  for  this  creation,  that  is,  for  the  existence  of 
things  that  are  adapted  to  an  ultimate  end,  in  the  first 
place  an  intelligent  being,  and  in  the  second  place  not 
only  an  intelligent  but  a moral  being  or  author  of  the 
world,  that  is,  a God,  must  be  admitted  to  exist.  But 
this  conclusion  is  of  the  peculiar  character,  that  it  holds 
good  merely  for  the  judgment  according  to  conceptions 
of  practical  reason,  and  as  such  for  the  reflective  not  the 
determinant  judgment.  It  is  true  that  in  us  morally 


348 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KANT. 


practical  reason  is  essentially  different  in  its  principles 
from  technically  practical  reason.  But  we  cannot  assume 
that  in  the  Supreme  Cause  of  the  world,  conceived  of  as 
an  intelligence,  the  same  contrast  exists,  and  that  a 
peculiar  kind  of  causality  is  required  for  the  ultimate 
end,  different  in  its  character  from  that  which  is  required 
merely  for  ends  of  nature.  We  cannot  assume,  there- 
fore, that  in  an  ultimate  end  we  have  a reason  for 
admitting  not  merely  a moral  ground  or  ultimate  end  of 
creation  as  an  effect,  but  also  a moral  being  as  the  original 
o ground  of  creation.  But  we  may  certainly  say,  that, 
according  to  the  constitution  of  our  reason , we  cannot 
make  intelligible  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  an  adapta- 
tion relative  to  the  moral  law,  and  to  its  object  as  it  is  in 
this  ultimate  end,  apart  from  an  author  and  ruler  of  the 
world,  who  is  also  a moral  lawgiver. 

Physical  teleology  sufficiently  proves  for  theoretical 
reflective  judgment  an  intelligent  cause  of  the  world; 
moral  teleology  proves  it  for  the  practical  judgment, 
through  the  conception  of  an  ultimate  end,  which  must 
be  attributed  to  creation  when  we  view  it  in  relation  to 
action.  It  is  true  that  the  objective  reality  of  the  idea  of 
God,  as  the  moral  author  of  the  world,  cannot  be  shown 
from  a consideration  of  physical  ends  alone.  But,  it  is  a 
maxim  of  pure  reason  to  secure  unity  of  principles,  so  far 
as  that  is  possible  ; and  hence  the  knowledge  of  physical 
ends,  when  it  is  brought  into  relation  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  moral  end,  greatly  aids  us  in  connecting  the 
practical  reality  of  the  idea  of  God  with  its  theoretical 
reality  as  already  existing  for  judgment. 

To  prevent  a very  natural  misunderstanding  two  re- 
marks must  be  made,  which  should  be  carefully  borne  in 


THE  CRITIQUE  OF  TELEOLOGICAL  JUDGMENT.  349 

mind.  In  the  first  place,  we  can  think  the  attributes  of 
the  Supreme  Being  only  by  analogy.  How,  indeed, 
could  we  investigate  directly  the  nature  of  a Being  to 
whom  nothing  similar  is  given  in  experience  ? Secondly, 
the  attributes  by  which  we  think  the  Supreme  Being  do 
not  enable  us  to  know  Him  as  He  is,  nor  can  we  theor- 
etically predicate  them  of  Him.  To  contemplate  that 
Being  as  he  is  in  Himself  speculative  reason  must  assume 
the  form  of  the  determinant  judgment,  and  this  is  con- 
trary to  its  very  nature. 


INDEX. 


Esthetic,  transcendental,  22  ; distin- 
guished from  transcendental  logic, 
23  ; deals  only  with  space  and  time, 
36  ; implies  contrast  of  phenomenal 
reality  and  reality  of  thing  in  itself, 
36 ; summary,  39. 

Affirmation  and  negation,  196. 

Analogies  of  Experience,  ior ; first 
analogy,  106  ; second,  no  ; third, 
118;  general  remark,  121. 

Analysis  perhaps  main  work  of  reason, 
12  ; presupposes  synthesis,  49,  64. 

Analytic  judgments  contrasted  with 
synthetic,  13  ; also  called  explica- 
tive, 13. 

Analytic,  transcendental,  its  object, 
43  ; analytic  of  practical  reason,  261. 

Animal,  the,  not  free,  186. 

Antinomy  of  pure  reason,  155 ; first 
antinomy,  158 ; second,  160  ; third, 
162;  fourth,  165  ; necessity  of  their 
solution,  166  ; critical  solution,  168  ; 
solution  of  first  antinomy,  173  ; so- 
lution of  second  antinomy,  177 ; 
transition  from  the  mathematical  to 
the  dynamical,  179 ; solution  of 
third  antinomy,  182  ; solution  of 
fourth  antinomy,  191  ; contrast  of 
antinomy  and  ideal,  193  ; antinomy 
of  practical  reason,  292;  antinomy 
of  judgment,  331. 

Apperception,  transcendental  unity  of, 
61,  65 ; in  itself  analytic  but  the 
condition  of  synthesis,  67  ; the  su- 
preme principle  of  understanding, 
67,  68  ; not  the  principle  of  a per- 
ceptive understanding,  67,  69  ; con- 
dition of  objective  unity,  70. 

A priori  and  a posteriori , 8,  22. 

Archetypal  and  ectypal  intelligence, 
341- 

Association  of  ideas  not  an  explana- 
tion of  causality,  10  ; presupposes 
synthesis  of  reproduction,  58. 

Autonomy  of  will,  248,  270. 

Axioms  of  perception,  92. 


Beautiful  and  sublime  the  object  o! 
aesthetic  judgment,  318. 

Categories,  guiding-thread  to,  46 ; 
imply  synthesis,  49  ; correspond  to 
logical  functions,  51  ; table,  51  ; 
distinguished  as  mathematical  and 
dynamical,  52  ; third  of  each  class 
the  union  of  the  other  two,  52  ; their 
deduction.  53  f. ; principle  of  the 
deduction,  53  ; an  empirical  deduc- 
tion irrelevant,  35  ; subjective  de- 
duction, 56  f. ; objective  deduction, 
63  f.;  possibility  of  combination, 
63;  original  synthetic  unity  of  ap- 
perception, 64  ; objective  unity,  70; 
perceptions  stand  under  them,  72; 
apply  only  to  experience,  73  ; their 
application  to  objects  of  sense,  76, 
78 ; result  of  their  deduction,  82 ; 
short  statement  of  deduction,  82 ; 
peculiarity  of  modality,  r22 ; re- 
stricted to  external  perception,  126  ; 
their  real  definition  implies  sensibi- 
lity, 130  ; cannot  be  used  transcen- 
dentally,  130. 

Causality  a pure  a priori  judgment, 
10 ; Hume’s  view,  10 ; a synthetic 
judgment,  14  ; its  category,  52  ; its 
schema,  89;  proof  of  the  principle, 
no;  not  a generalisation  from  ex- 
perience, 115  ; implies  perception  of 
motion,  127 ; antinomy  of  natural 
and  free  causation,  162  ; solution  of 
the  antinomy,  182 ; first  cause  and 
supreme  cause,  203  ; final  cause  in 
physico-theological  argument,  219 ; 
will  the  causality  of  a rational  being, 
244  ; final  cause  as  the  principle  of 
judgment,  313  ; formal  purpose, 
313  ; aesthetic  idea  of  purpose,  317  ; 
logical  idea,  318  ; formal  objective 
purpose,  323;  relative  and  internal 
purpose,  324  ; real  things  as  natural 
ends,  325 ; nature  as  a system  of 
ends,  329. 


352 


INDEX. 


Change  conceivable  only  through  time, 
31,  35  5 wrongly  supposed  to  dis- 
prove ideality  of  time,  34 ; an  em- 
pirical conception,  36;  its  contin- 
uity, 98;  implies  permanence,  108; 
also  implies  causality,  no. 

Community,  category  of,  52 ; its 
schema,  89  ; proof  of  the  principle, 
1 18  ; either  dynamical  or  local,  119; 
phenomena  stand  in  community  of 
apperception,  120;  implies  percep- 
tion of  things  in  space,  128. 

Conception  an  element  in  all  know- 
ledge, 40  ; either  pure  or  empirical, 
40  ; the  form  in  which  an  object  is 
thought,  40  ; a function  of  under- 
standing, 47 ; when  problematic, 
132  ; see  Categories  and  Ideas. 

Constitutive  principles,  103 ; impos- 
sible for  reason,  174. 

Continuity  of  magnitudes,  97. 

Copernicus  the  type  of  the  critical 
philosopher,  3. 

Cosmology,  rational,  defined,  142 ; 
system  of  ideas,  156  ; see  Antinomy 
and  Ideas. 

Critical  philosophy  demands  scrutiny 
of  all  beliefs,  1 ; denies  knowledge 
of  supersensible,  affirms  faith,  5 ; 
not  opposed  to  science,  7 ; its  object 
pure  reason,  not  philosophical  sys- 
tems, 7 ; determines  the  possibility, 
principles  and  limits  of  knowledge, 
11  ; leads  to  science,  19;  its  idea 
and  division,  19;  draws  a plan  of 
transcendental  philosophy,  20 ; its 
method  of  proof,  103. 

Deduction  of  categories,  53  f.;  of  prin- 
ciples of  practical  reason,  272 ; see 
Categories  and  Principles. 

Degree  the  schema  of  quality,  88. 

Demonstration  possible  oqly  in  mathe- 
matics, 103. 

Design,  argument  from,  218. 

Desires,  natural,  not  an  object  of  reve- 
rence, 229  ; contrary  to  duty,  231  ; 
supply  no  moral  motive,  284. 

Dialectic,  transcendental,  exposes  the 
illusions  of  reason,  44,  137 ; dia- 
lectic of  practical  reason,  289  ; dia- 
lectic of  teleological  judgment,  331, 

Dogmata  and  mathemata,  104. 

Dogmatism  a phase  of  philosophy, 

1 ; an  enemy  of  morality,  6 ; its 
definition,  7 ; leads  to  scepticism, 
19- 


Duty  a pure  idea,  186  ; analysis  of  the 
idea,  227b  ; not  derived  from  ex- 
perience, 233 ; implies  a will  not 
perfectly  good,  235,  269  ; expressed 
in  a categorical  imperative,  238 ; 
opposed  to  self-interest,  284. 

Dynamical  categories,  32  ; principles 
of  judgment,  103;  principle  of 
causality,  183  ; contrast  of  dyna- 
mical and  mathematical  regress,  192. 

Empirical  reality  of  space,  29 ; of  time, 
34 ; deduction  of  categories,  54  ; 
apperception,  66,  70 ; character  of 
man,  188. 

Existence,  category  of,  52  ; its  schema, 
89. 

Experience  contains  two  elements,  7 ; 
does  not  yield  universal  judgments, 
9,  14;  supplies  synthetic  judgments, 
14 ; limits  the  application  of  the 
categories,  73. 

Exposition,  metaphysical,  of  space,  23; 
of  time,  29 ; transcendental,  of 
space,  26 ; of  time,  30 ; of  prin- 
ciples of  practical  reason,  261. 

Faith,  objects  of,  6 ; a need  of  pure 
reason,  302. 

Final  cause,  see  Teleology. 

Form  of  perception  an  element  in 
knowledge,  22 ; space  a form  of 
outer  sense,  27 ; time  a form  of 
inner  sense,  31  ; time  the  form  of 
all  phenomena,  32  ; time  and  space 
the  only  pure  forms  of  sense,  35; 
time  not  a form  of  God’s  perception, 
37  ; form  of  thought  the  object  of 
general  logic,  41  ; form  of  judgment 
indicates  objective  unity,  71. 

Freedom  an  object  of  faith,  6 ; a pro- 
blem of  pure  reason,  11;  its  rela- 
tion to  natural  causality,  182;  the 
key  to  autonomy  of  will,  250 ; its 
negative  definition,  250;  its  positive 
definition,  251 ; peculiar  to  rational 
beings,  252  ; its  relation  to  morality, 
253  ; not  incompatible  with  natural 
mechanism,  254,  273,  286;  com- 
patible with  the  causality  of  God, 
287 ; its  relation  to  idea  of  final 
cause,  310. 

Galileo  a discoverer  of  scientific 
method,  2. 

Geometry,  its  judgments  synthetic,  16, 
26 ; involves  productive  imagina- 


INDEX. 


353 


tion,  93  ; its  figures  display  forma 
objective  adaptation,  323. 

God  an  object  of  faith,  6 ; His  exist- 
ence a problem  of  reason,  11  ; not 
conditioned  by  space  and  time,  37; 
conceived  as  ens  realissimum , 197  ; 
the  object  of  transcendental  theo- 
logy, 199 ; speculative  proofs  of  His 
existence,  202 ; ontological  proof, 
204 ; cosmological,  210  ; physico- 
theological,  218  ; not  under  impera- 
tives of  duty,  236,  269  ; His  caus- 
ality compatible  with  human  free- 
dom, 287 ; moral  proof  of  His 
existence,  296. 

Good  and  pleasure,  236,  280 ; the 
sumtnutn  donum , 291  ; supreme  and 
complete  good,  291  ; see  Morality 
and  Will. 

Happiness  the  complete  satisfaction  of 
natural  desire,  231  ; an  assertoric 
hypothetical  imperative,  237  ; inde- 
finable, 239  ; comprehends  all  mate- 
rial principles,  263 ; implied  in  the 
summum  bonum,  291. 

Heteronomy  of  will,  271. 

Hume,  his  view  of  causality,  10. 

Ideas,  transcendental,  140  ; rest  upon 
the  unconditioned,  141  ; their  sys- 
tem, 142 ; idea  of  the  soul,  142  ; 
idea  of  the  world,  155  ; idea  of  God, 
196. 

Ideal,  the,  i95f. 

Ideality,  transcendental,  of  space,  29; 
ot  time,  33. 

Illusion,  material  and  transcendental, 
1:35 ; logical  and  transcendental, 
136 ; dialectical,  in  rational  psy- 
chology, 143 ; in  rational  cosmo- 
logy, 168 ; in  rational  theology, 
215- 

Image  and  schema,  86;  space  the 
image  of  external  magnitudes,  time 
the  image  of  all  magnitudes,  88. 

Imagination  synthetic,  49,  51,  77; 
productive  or  reproductive,  78  ; its 
product  the  schema,  86,  87. 

Immortality  an  object  of  faith,  6 ; a 
problem  of  reason,  11  ; its  proof, 
294- 

Imperatives  as  rules  of  conduct,  186  ; 
either  categorical  or  hypothetical, 
236  : only  the  categorical  imperative 
expresses  law,  240 ; three  ways  of 
stating  it,  241 ; its  proof,  254. 


Induction  does  not  prove  a judgment 
universal,  9 ; not  the  foundation  of 
causality,  115. 

Indifferentism  a phase  of  philosophy, 

1. 

Intellectual  perception  peculiar  to 
original  being,  38  ; apperception 
not  its  principle,  67,  69;  indefinable, 
75,  *33  1 implies  archetypal  intelli- 
gence, 340. 

Judgment,  empirical,  not  universal,  9 ; 
pure  a priori,  found  in  common 
sense  and  science,  10;  analytic  or 
synthetic,  13 ; its  definition,  47 ; 
transcendental,  83  ; its  schematism, 
84  ; its  principles,  92  ; its  type,  282  ; 
connects  theoretical  and  practical 
philosophy,  311  ; determinant  or  re- 
flective, 311 ; its  antinomy,  331; 
teleological,  336. 

Knowledge  begins  with  experience,  7 ; 
a priori  or  a posteriori , 8 ; pure  or 
mixed,  9 ; criteria  of  a priori , uni- 
versality and  necessity,  9;  tran- 
scendental, 19. 

Logic  and  aesthetic,  23,  41  ; its  divi- 
sions, 43. 

Magnitude,  external,  space  its  image, 
88  ; time  the  image  of  all  magnitude, 
88 ; perceptions  extensive  magni- 
tudes, 92  ; intensive  magnitude,  96; 
continuity,  97  ; relation  of  extensive 
to  intensive  magnitude,  100. 

Man,  his  intelligible  and  empirical 
character,  186. 

Materialism  unprovable,  153. 

Mathemata  and  dogmata,  104. 

Mathematical  categories,  52  ; prin- 
ciples of  judgment,  102;  antinomies, 
192. 

Mathematics,  its  method,  2,  104 ; its 
judgments  synthetic,  15  ; how  pos- 
sible, 18 ; applicable  to  all  pheno- 
mena, 94  ; its  figures  display  formal 
objective  purpose,  323. 

Matter,  its  definition,  17 ; permanence 
of  its  quantity  a synthetic  judgment, 
17  ; matter  of  sense  an  element  in 
knowledge,  22;  matter  of  desire, 
262. 

Mechanism  of  nature  compatible  with 
freedom,  6,  254,  273,  286  ; and  with 
teleology,  340. 


354 


INDEX. 


Metaphysic,  its  past  failure  due  to 
false  method,  i ; true  method,  3 ; 
gives  no  knowledge  of  supersensible, 
4 ; seeks  for  a priori  synthetic  know- 
ledge, 17  ; exists  as  a natural  dis- 
position, 18 ; how  possible  as  a 
science,  19;  metaphysic  of  morality, 
225ft 

Misology,  226. 

Modality  of  judgments,  48  ; its  cate- 
gories, 52  ; its  peculiarity,  122. 

Momentum  implies  degree,  97. 

Morality  compatible  with  the  mechan- 
ism of  nature,  5 ; its  principles  not 
included  in  transcendental  philo- 
sophy, 20;  metaphysic  of  morality, 
225f;  popular  and  philosophical  con- 
ception of  morality,  226  ; rests  upon 
idea  of  duty,  227  ; possible  only  for 
a rational  being,  229  ; distinguished 
from  prudence,  238 ; a law  for  all 
rational  beings,  243 ; necessity  of 
metaphysic  of  morality,  243  ; moral 
conceptions  a priori,  246 ; implies 
a kingdom  of  ends,  248 ; its  laws 
determine  action  by  their  mere  form, 
249- 

Motion  made  conceivable  by  time,  31 ; 
an  empirical  conception,  36. 

Motives,  284f.;  only  moral  motive  con- 
formity to  law,  284. 

Natura  materialiter  spectata  and  for- 
maliter  spectata,  80. 

Natural  theology  assumes  subjectivity 
of  space  and  time,  37. 

Necessary  being  as  condition  of  phe- 
nomena, 191. 

Necessity  a criterion  of  a priori  know- 
ledge, 9 ; its  category,  52  ; its 
schema,  89 ; a postulate  of  empirical 
thought,  125. 

Negation,  category  of,  51  ; involves 
limitation,  197. 

Non-existence,  category  of,  52;  its 
schema,  89. 

Noumena  and  phenomena,  129;  the 
idea  of  a limit,  132  ; not  a division 
of  things,  133. 

Object,  meaning  of,  60. 

Ontology  not  a science,  131 ; onto- 
logical argument,  204. 

Organism  implies  internal  purpose, 
327- 

Paralogism  of  rational  psychology,  145. 


Perception  pure  or  empirical,  22 ; an 
element  in  all  knowledge,  40 ; an 
extensive  magnitude,  92  ; see  Intel- 
lectual Perception. 

Perceptive  understanding,  see  Intel- 
lectual Perception. 

Phenomenon  defined,  22;  implies  time, 
33;  its  reality,  36;  determinable  by 
mathematics,  94  ; has  degree,  96 ; 
a continuous  magnitude,  98 ; rela- 
tion to  noumenon,  129 ; man  as 
phenomenon,  186 ; distinction  of 
phenomena  and  noumena  reconciles 
human  freedom  with  God’s  caus- 
ality, 287. 

Philosophy,  its  division  into  theoretical 
and  practical,  307 ; see  Critical 
Philosophy. 

Physico-theological  argument,  218. 

Physics,  its  method,  2 ; contains  a 
priori  synthetic  judgments,  17  • 
how  is  pure  physics  possible,  18. 

Plato,  his  theory  of  ideas,  12. 

Pleasure  relative  to  desire,  262  ; does 
not  admit  of  qualitative  differences, 
264  ; distinct  from  good,  281. 

Plurality,  category  of,  51. 

Possibility,  category  of,  52 ; its  schema, 
89 ; a postulate  of  empirical  thought, 
123  ; has  no  meaning  for  a percep- 
tive intelligence,  334. 

Postulates  of  empirical  thought,  92, 
122  ; possibility,  123  ; actuality,  124 ; 
necessity,  125  ; postulates  of  pure 
practical  reason,  298. 

Principles  of  judgment,  92  ; mathe- 
matical constitutive,  dynamical  re- 
gulative, 102  ; immanent  or  trans- 
cendent, transcendent  or  transcen- 
dental, 135,  139  ; principles  of  rea- 
son, 137  ; regulative  principles  of 
reason,  173  ; empirical  use  of  regu- 
lative principles,  174;  practical  prin- 
ciples are  maxims  or  laws,  261  ; 
material  principles  reducible  to  self- 
love,  263 ; they  rest  on  the  lower 
desires,  263. 

Prudence,  its  precepts  hypothetical, 
238. 

Psychology  distinct  from  logic,  41 ; 
rational  psychology,  142;  its  paia- 
logisms,  145  ; not  a doctrine  but  a 
discipline,  153. 

Purpose  in  nature,  see  Teleology. 

Quality  of  judgments,  48 ; its  cate- 
gories, 52  ; its  schemata,  88. 


INDEX. 


355 


Quantity  of  judgments,  48 ; its  cate- 
gories, 51 ; its  schema,  88 ; no 
axioms  of  quantity  ( quantitas ),  93  ; 
quantum  of  substance  unchange- 
able, no;  quanta  imply  external 
perception,  128. 

Reality,  empirical,  of  space,  29;  of 
time,  34 ; category  of  reality,  52  ; its 
schema,  88;  totality  of  reality,  197. 

Reason  organic,  7 ; its  problem,  18  ; 
the  faculty  of  principles,  137 ; its 
principles  derived  from  the  form  of 
inference,  138 ; its  dialectical  con- 
clusions, 143  ; its  paralogisms,  145  ; 
its  antinomies,  155 ; critical  solu- 
tion of  its  antinomies,  168 ; specu- 
lative and  practical,  256 ; limits  of 
practical,  257  ; critique  of  practical 
reason,  261?.  ; the  source  of  moral 
law,  269  ; object  of  practical  reason 
the  summum  bonum , 280  ; its  mo- 
tives, 284  ; extension  of  pure  reason, 
278,  300. 

Reciprocity,  category  of,  52 ; its 
schema,  89  ; proof  of  the  principle, 
118. 

Recognition,  synthesis  of,  56. 

Regulative  principles  of  judgment, 
103  ; of  reason,  173  ; in  regard  10 
necessary  being,  193 ; in  regard  to 
idea  of  God,  216. 

Relation  of  judgments,  48  ; its  cate- 
gories, 52  ; its  schemata,  89. 

Reproduction,  synthesis  of,  56,  58. 

Reverence  for  moral  law,  229. 

Scepticism  a phase  of  philosophy,  1 ; 
the  result  of  dogmatism,  19. 

Schematism  of  categories,  84  ; tran- 
scendental schema,  85  ; schema  and 
image,  86  ; schemata  underlie  ma- 
thematics, 86 ; the  various  schemata, 
88;  schemata  restrict  the  categories, 
91  ; schema  and  type,  283. 

Self-consciousness,  see  Apperception 
and  Paralogism. 

Self-love,  263. 

Sensibility  and  understanding,  20;  de- 
finition of  sensation,  22  ; external 
and  internal  sense,  23  ; sensibility 
receptive,  40  ; all  sensations  have 
degree,  97  ; inner  sense  a flux,  127  ; 
quantum  of  inner  sense  implies  ex- 
ternal perception,  128. 

Soul  the  object  of  rational  psychology, 
*45- 


Space  an  object  of  transcendental 
aesthetic,  23  ; metaphysical  exposi- 
tion, 23 ; transcendental  exposition, 
26  ; not  a thing  or  property,  27  ; a 
form  ot  outer  sense,  27,  32 ; its 
empirical  reality  and  transcendental 
ideality,  29  ; the  source  of  a priori 
synthetic  judgments,  35  ; not  a form 
of  divine  perception,  37  ; the  image 
of  external  magnitudes,  88 ; a quan- 
tum continuum , 97 ; empty  space 
unknowable,  99  ; its  transcendental 
ideality  confirmed  by  critical  solu- 
tion of  antinomies,  172. 

Subject,  thinking,  not  substance,  149. 

Sublime  and  beautiful  the  object  of 
aesthetic  judgment,  318. 

Substance,  category  of,  52 ; its  schema, 
89  ; proof  of  the  principle,  106  ; all 
substances  in  dynamical  community, 
118;  implies  perception  of  matter, 
127 ; not  applicable  to  soul,  147  ; 
contrasted  with  thinking  subject, 
149. 

Summum  bonum  includes  morality  and 
happiness,  291. 

Synopsis  implies  synthesis,  56. 

Synthesis,  definition  of,  49 ; an  opera- 
tion of  imagination,  50;  pure  syn- 
thesis the  category,  50 ; synthesis 
of  apprehension,  57,  79  ; of  repro- 
duction, 58  ; of  recognition,  60  ; the 
condition  of  knowledge,  63  ; figural 
and  intellectual,  77. 

Synthetic  judgments  distinguished 
from  analytic,  13 ; also  called  am- 
pliative,  13  ; some  rest  on  experi- 
ence, others  do  not,  14 ; mathema- 
tics contains  them,  15 ; examples 
from  arithmetic  and  geometry,  16; 
physics  contains  them,  17;  meta- 
physic seeks  for  them,  17  ; how  pos- 
sible, 18 ; time  and  space  their 
source,  35  ; principles  of  reason 
synthetic,  139. 

Taste,  aesthetic,  318. 

Teleology  ir.physico-teleologica  argu- 
ment, 219  ; in  nature,  313  ; a maxim 
of  judgment,  316 ; implied  in  or- 
ganized beings,  327  ; as  a system, 
329  ; its  relation  to  the  mechanism 
of  nature,  331. 

Thales  perhaps  the  discoverer  of  ma- 
thematical method,  2. 

Theology,  natural,  its  conception  ot 
God,  37  ; rational,  142 ; criticism  of 


356 


INDEX. 


speculative  theology,  222 ; moral 
theology,  345. 

Thing  in  itself,  27,  31,  see  Noumena . 

Time  an  object  of  transcendental  aes- 
thetic, 23 ; metaphysical  exposition, 
46 ; transcendental  exposition,  29  ; 
not  a thing  or  determination  of  a 
thing,  31  ; the  form  of  inner  sense, 
32  ; represented  as  a line,  32  ; a form 
of  all  phenomena,  32  ; its  empirical 
reality  and  transcendental  ideality, 
33 ; objection  to  its  transcendental 
ideality  answered,  34 ; a source  of 
a priori  synthetic  judgments,  33  ; 
not  a form  of  divine  perception,  37  ; 
homogeneous  both  with  category 
and  with  object  of  sense,  85 ; the 
image  of  all  magnitudes,  88  ; im- 
plied in  all  schemata,  90  ; a quan- 
tum  continuum , 97  ; empty  time 
unknowable,  99  ; its  modi  are  per- 
manence, succession  and  co-exist- 
ence, 101 ; its  transcendental  ideal- 
ity confirmed  by  critical  solution  of 
antinomies,  172. 

Torricelli  a discoverer  of  scientific 
method,  2. 

Totality,  category  of,  sr. 

Transcendental  knowledge,  19  ; criti- 


cism, 20 ; philosophy,  20 ; aesthetic, 
23  f. ; logic,  23,  41,  42  ; analytic,  43 
f.;  deduction  of  categories,  53  f.; 
doctrine  of  judgment,  83  ; determi- 
nation of  time,  85  ; illusion,  135  ; 
dialectic,  137  f, ; principle  of  pure 
reason,  139 ; ideas,  140. 

Type  of  pure  practical  judgment,  282. 

Unconditioned,  not  a self-contradic- 
tory idea,  5 ; the  object  of  reason, 
139- 

Understanding  one  of  the  two  stems 
of  knowledge,  20;  a spontaneous 
faculty,  40 ; its  logical  use,  46 ; 
its  faculty  is  judgment,  47  ; its  logi- 
cal functions,  48 ; makes  objects 
possible,  115;  contrasted  with  rea- 
son, 138. 

Unity,  category  of,  5r  ; implied  in  all 
categories,  64. 

Will,  a good,  the  only  absolute  good, 
223  ; a good  will  the  highest  good, 
229 ; possible  only  for  a rational 
being.  229  ; divine  will  not  subject 
to  imperatives,  236 ; autonomy  the 
basis  of  morality,  270  ; heteronomy, 
271 ; will  as  desire,  308. 


END. 


PRINTED  BY  ROBERT  MACLEHOSE,  UNIVERSITY  PRESS,  GLASGOW. 


3V 

i • 


TRANS.  FROM  PL 
1993 


